National Identity in a "State" of Limbo: Scale, Surrogation and Identity in Taiwan

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NATIONAL IDENTITY IN A "STATE" OF LIMBO:
SCALE, SURROGATION AND IDENTITY IN TAIWAN

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To Brooke
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ABSTRACT

Taiwanese identity has been defined, redefined and challenged at various spatial scales. At the local level, the renaming of streets in Taiwan after 1949 reflected the nationalist identity that was manifested in the Kuomintang (KMT). However, recent renaming trends, including the renaming of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in Taipei, have challenged this identity in an attempt to redefine the Taiwanese people. At the national level, identity politics is tied-in with the four open presidential elections that have taken place since 1996. Through these four elections, Taiwan witnessed the emergence of the opposition part that attempted to shed all former identities associated with the mainland and craft a more "independent" identity. And yet a third scalar battleground for Taiwanese identity – the international – plays out in the sporting world, where Taiwanese athletes must compete under the name "Chinese Taipei." These three scalar battlegrounds for Taiwanese identity also serve as attempts to find a surrogate identity for Taiwan in the international community. Since the 1970s, Taiwan has lost its international standing, stripped of its "China" seat with the United Nations and the International Olympic Committee, and watched the number of countries that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan dwindle to 23 states. Given its current position, Taiwan is searching for a surrogate identity to replace its "lost" identity. Yet, this project is no small feat as attempts to construct a new (surrogate) identity clash with conceptions of what constitutes "Taiwaneseness." The overarching aim of this research is to bring to light the issues and debates concerning what it means to be “Taiwanese.” That the research focuses on Taiwan, a state that lacks significant international recognition, speaks to the contentious nature of nationalism and identity. The spatial rooting of the identity debate is important because the construction of identity is not fixed at one scale, but instead is multiscalar and multifaceted. Facing a global community that essentially turned its back on Taiwan’s sovereignty claims, the Taiwanese construct various representations of Taiwan that attempt to replace the lost identity that came with the lack of international recognition. In other words, the three case studies are evidence of Taiwan’s attempts to remain viable and to avoid marginalization. This dissertation explores this surrogation, and how each play out their respective scales.
CHAPTER ONE

THE BEGINNING

"Suffering gives us experience and fresh power for life."

Chiang Kai-shek (1974, 3)

On the morning of 1 January 2011, I found myself sitting on my couch watching the 122nd Rose Parade, which was taking place in Pasadena, California. Admittedly, I was not interested in watching the parade itself and only tuned on the ABC broadcast of the event so that my two sons could watch it. However, during the brief moments that I did watch the Rose Parade, the entry from China Airlines was shown. A beautiful entry designed to resemble dragon boat races, the China Airlines float won the International Award for the most beautiful entry outside of the United States.\(^1\) The float also included a small sign that stated "Taiwan: Touch Your Heart."

The slogan is one that is used by the Tourism Bureau of Taiwan (2011). However, the slogan used for this island country might invite confusion, especially given that it is associated with a float entry from a company called China Airlines. Yet, the reason why an airline based in Taiwan carries the word "China" in its name is based on the official name of the island state Republic of China.

That "China" is used with reference to Taiwan creates the potential for misunderstanding with regards to identity, even if the official name of the country includes "China." Although the ABC announcers did reference dragon boats as being common in China and Taiwan – an indication of two separate places – the connection made is one that links China and Taiwan together through "cultural" practice. In fact, based on the official names of the two places, there are two governments with the name "China": the aforementioned Republic of China (Taiwan)

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\(^1\) While the ABC announcers claimed that China Airlines has won 59 consecutive International Award, the Tournament of Roses website (2011) notes that the company's entry has won ten of the last eleven; the website's past winners list does not go beyond 2001.
and the People's Republic of China (China). And while there is no benefit or political motive for the announcers to note that there is a difference between the two places, that the status of Taiwan is left unstated only continues to add to the confusion over Taiwanese identity.

While Taiwan and China are different countries, the governments of both claim to be "China." This is due in part to a "One China" policy to which both governments adhere. "The One-China policy states that there is one China, of which Taiwan and the mainland are a part" (Otopalik 2006, 84). The People's Republic of China continues to maintain this policy since the victory of the Chinese Communist Party during the Chinese civil war in 1949. The Republic of China (Taiwan) also maintained this policy, claiming that its government on the island of Taiwan still represented of the mainland. In fact, domestically referring to the Republic of China as "Taiwan" or even mentioning Taiwanese independence was banned and considered taboo until the 1990s (Chang and Holt 2007). This ban was lifted under the regime of Lee Teng-hui as he moved towards a policy of recognizing two states. The Taiwanese rejection of the "One-China" policy continued under the Chen Shui-bian administration, or what then-Vice President Annette Lu (2001, 17) referred to as "break[ing] out of the 'One China' cocoon."

As a government separate from China, Taiwan has remained an active member of the international community. Taiwan is home to over 23 million people and concentrated in an area roughly one-third the size of Alabama. With a technologically sophisticated economy, Taiwan maintains strong economic ties with the United States, which is the island state's third largest trading partner both in terms of imports and exports. Taiwan currently ranks 19th in the world in terms of gross domestic product. With a per capita GDP of $35,700 (purchasing power parity), Taiwan is tied with Germany for 32nd in the world and ranks ahead of countries such as the United Kingdom, Japan, France, and South Korea. As Cumings (1984) notes, Taiwan's economic "miracle" is due to a number of factors, including the core-periphery relationship between colonial Japan and Taiwan (pre-1945), intervention from the United States (post-1945), export-led industrialization, land reform, and government intervention. With a current GDP growth rate over ten percent, Taiwan is an important part of the global economy separate from China.

Additionally, Taiwanese and Chinese people have ethnic and linguistic differences. To be sure, Taiwanese – those that arrived on the island of Taiwan between the 1600s and 1949 – share some similarities with the mainlanders – ethnic Chinese that arrived to Taiwan after 1949.
Most Taiwanese trace their origins back to southeastern China and include the Hoklo and Hakka ethnic groups. However, over the course of many years, many of these Taiwanese have come to view themselves as ethnically different from Chinese, both those on the mainland and those in Taiwan. This difference is especially reflected in the linguistic differences between Taiwanese and Chinese. While Mandarin and Taiwanese are both Sinitic, or Chinese, languages and use a similar script, both are spoken differently. Certainly Mandarin is widely spoken in Taiwan, however the differences between Mandarin and Taiwanese are similar to the differences between German and English, with the latter two both being Germanic languages, but spoken and written differently. The linguistic difference reflects the origins of the peoples that speak the two languages, with Taiwanese originating in southeastern China and Mandarin focusing on Beijing in northern China. This ethnic/linguistic difference also does not take into account the Originals, those people of Austronesian background who first arrived to the island of Taiwan approximately 8000 years ago.

Yet, despite Taiwan and China being recognized as economically and ethnically different, diplomatically-speaking the global community does not recognize a clear different as the "One-China" policy dictates international recognition of the two countries. No county recognizes both China and Taiwan, and only one country – Bhutan – chooses to recognize neither government. Although Taiwan initially held the Chinese seat at the United Nations, since 1971 mainland China represented "China" in the international organization. Since that time, much of the world has chosen to establish diplomatic relations with China while severing formal ties with Taiwan. At present, only 23 countries recognize the government in Taipei; the United States is not one of those countries. Taiwan’s peculiar position in the global community is exemplified in the CIA World Factbook. While most countries are listed alphabetically on the website, the Taiwanese entry, as of 21 March 2011, appears last among all political territories – after Zimbabwe but before the European Union, which is the final entry. While it is unclear what this positioning means, it is worth noting that the Factbook includes territories of internationally-recognized states, such as Puerto Rico, which is listed in its correct alphabetical place (after Portugal and before Qatar). Additionally, the disputed territory of Western Sahara is also included in its correct alphabetical place (after the West Bank and before Yemen), even though no other major

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2 Many countries continue to maintain informal ties with Taiwan while also recognizing the government of China.
3 The CIA World Factbook has since moved the Taiwan entry to its rightful alphabetical location, which is after Syria and before Tajikistan.
disputed territory is not included in the list and even though that the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, which claims sovereignty over Western Sahara, is not recognized by the United States. Thus, Taiwan's inclusion and placement on the list becomes even more confusing.

The question that the Taiwanese entry in the CIA World Factbook brings forth pertains to Taiwan's status; what is Taiwan? Regardless of if this question focuses on sovereignty or not, the questions dips into another level – what is Taiwanese identity? Or, more specifically, what constitutes Taiwanese identity? The issue goes back to that seemingly innocent float representing China Airlines, and that seemingly innocent sign – "Taiwan: Touch Your Heart." In terms of national identity, is Taiwanese national identity also, in part, "Chinese" identity, or is it something different, something that can simply be referred to as "Taiwanese" identity? What constitutes a Taiwanese identity, how is it constructed, and how does it reflect the current international conditions surrounding the island state? Investigating these questions is the goal of this dissertation.

How one refers to the people of Taiwan, and therefore what type of identity is constructed for these people, is not to be taken lightly. Chang and Holt (2007, 130) write of how the terms Chinese (zhonguoren) and Taiwanese (taiwanren) create confusion because of the inconsistent use of both terms in reference to Taiwan. "While some believe zhongguoren is a broader category of which taiwanren is merely a subset, others view the two terms as conceptually equivalent and hence interchangeable. Still others treat these two labels as occupying different, mutually exclusive spaces." The authors note that the rise in Taiwanese consciousness has come to challenge the previously assumed Chinese identity of Taiwan. During the administration of Chen Shui-bian, the government of Taiwan moved more towards using "Taiwan" and removing references to "China." Additionally, the name "Taiwan" was being used to define all Taiwanese and not just those who migrated to the island prior to 1949. The long-used term "Chinese mainland" also lost favor during the Chen administration, although current Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou has opted to return the use of "Chinese mainland" (Taipei Times 2011).

What is in a name? Or, what is in an identity? The importance of an identity is not lost on those in Taiwan who attempt to control what it means to be "Taiwanese." While the term "Taiwanese" does have ethnic undertones, the purpose here is not to necessarily examine that form of identity, although it will be broached. The purpose here is to examine "Taiwanese" in
terms of national identity. How does a country that is only recognized by 23 governments construct a viable national identity? This research will detail three manifestations of the debate over Taiwanese national identity.

Monuments and the cultural landscape serve as representations of public memory and identity. During the tenure of Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan experienced great changes that attempted to erase visible connections to the mainland while promoting "Taiwan." These steps included renaming the international airport serving Taipei " Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport," adding the previously absent "Taiwan" to the front of the Republic of China passports, and removing island-wide statues of late leader Chiang Kai-shek. The removal of memories of Chiang was perhaps the greatest erasure of Chinese connections undertaken by Chen, culminating in the renaming of the grandiose monument to Chiang from the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall to the National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall. This attempt to promote "Taiwan" at the expense of "China" is one example of the debate over Taiwanese identity.

Taiwan/Republic of China experienced its first direct presidential elections in 1996, with subsequent elections occurring every four years since that time. Beginning in 2000 with the victory by the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a pattern emerged that also reflects differences in consciousness and the rise of "Taiwanese" identity via the electoral map. The southern part of the island became a stronghold for the opposition and a pillar of pro-Taiwan/pro-independence support. Thus, the patterns that surfaced in the presidential elections is a second example of the debate over Taiwanese identity.

Sports are often held as apolitical and a form of escape from the mundane grind of everyday life. However, sports, especially international sports, are often tinged with political undertones. In 2010, an unnamed Chinese corporation attempted to woo Taiwanese female golfer Yani Tseng with an endorsement deal worth $25 million over five years. The deal included a stipulation that Tseng must renounce her Taiwanese citizenship and become a Chinese citizen; Tseng rejected the deal outright (Strege 2010). The courtship of Tseng not only reflects how sports are infused with politics, but it also is representative of the rivalry between China and Taiwan. However, while the LPGA (the governing body for women's golf) heralds Tseng as hailing from Taiwan, many sporting organizations do not recognize Taiwan, instead choosing to use the term "Chinese Taipei." This label, one that creates ambiguity over Taiwan's status and identity, and the role of sports is a third case of the dispute over Taiwanese identity.
Each of these three manifestations of the Taiwanese identity debate take place at different spatial scales, or what could be called spaces of engagement (Cox 1998). According to Cox (2), spaces of engagement consist of "space[s] in which the politics of securing a space of dependence unfolds." The space of dependence "define place-specific conditions for our material well being and our sense of significance," which in this case is Taiwan. These three scalar battlegrounds for Taiwanese identity present an intriguing research opportunity for geographers to approach. While geography is replete identity-based research (see Chapter 2), Taiwan has for the most part been ignored in political geography. Taiwan presents not only a unique opportunity to explore issues of identity, but also issues of sovereignty and what it means to be a nation-state. And while issues focusing on topics such as memorialization and elections have been researched by geographers, sports remains largely untouched, especially by political geographers. Thus, these dissertation not only aims to dissect the identity debate in Taiwan, but also legitimate sports as a viable, critical tool through which geographers can examine issues such as identity.

In addition to scale, I will also utilize the theory of surrogation first presented by Roach (1996). Surrogation attempts to fill voids created by loss or death, usually unsuccessfully. Each of these three cases serves as surrogates for Taiwan in the international community. They do this by attempting to find the place for Taiwan since the “death” of its legitimacy and international recognition. The use of “Chinese Taipei” maintained Taiwan’s involvement in the Olympic Games and other international sporting competitions. The election of Chen Shui-bian signaled a movement towards independence, as reflected by Chen’s party’s platform. And the erasure of Chiang Kai-shek from the Taiwanese landscape is an attempt to sever public memory connections with China.

In order to develop these debates on Taiwanese national identity, the following research questions are posed:

1. How is Taiwanese identity constructed, and how is it constructed at different scales?
   a. How does scale play a role in the construction of Taiwanese identity? Do these various scalar discourses inform one another?

2. With regards to the international community, what is Taiwan? Or, can there be “Taiwanese” identity if a state does not exist diplomatically?
3. What are the different conceptions of “Taiwanese”? How do monuments; political parties and voting patterns; and international sports reflect the debate over what it means to be “Taiwanese”? Are there internal, ethnic ramifications of the construction of “Taiwanese” identity?

4. Do these case studies reflect an attempt to find a surrogate to replace Taiwan’s former standing in the international community? If so, how successful are these surrogates in promoting Taiwanese identity and position? In other words, have these surrogates satisfactorily replaced the former identity of Taiwan/Republic of China?

Outline of Chapters

This dissertation is divided into eight chapters, including this introductory chapter. The second chapter lays out previous research conducted on the issue of identity. The overriding theme of this dissertation is focused on identity and it is therefore necessary to pay respect to those individuals and colleagues whom have taken on issues of identity. Thus, the literature review examines various methods used and topics researched in an attempt to better understand identity construction. The third chapter describes the methodology employed in this dissertation.

Chapter four is the first of the three case studies and focuses on the National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. The memorial is examined in terms of the renaming process of the structure and the attempts to erase vestiges of the late Nationalist (KMT) leader from the Taiwanese landscape. The renaming of the memorial reflects the delicate nature of public memory and attempts to use the cultural landscape as a means for constructing identity. The Memorial Hall is examined using geographic works that focus on the politics of renaming, as well as research that centers on public memorialization.

Chapter five is the second case study and examines the role of presidential elections in crafting national identity in Taiwan. While certainly the election of a particular presidential candidate will yield itself towards a particular asserted identity, the focus of this chapter is on the electoral patterns that have emerged in Taiwan since the first direct presidential election in 1996. The pattern that emerged, particularly following the 2000 presidential election, reflect the establishment of a space of opposition in southeast Taiwan. This electoral pattern also reflects long-standing opposition that has traditionally centered on the Taiwanese south, an area with a high degree of Taiwanese consciousness and a low density of so-called mainlanders.
The sixth chapter centers on international sports and the use of the name "Chinese Taipei." The term, which was agreed upon by China, the KMT-controlled Taiwanese leadership, and the International Olympic Committee, is now a common name for Taiwan not just among sporting organizations but also among both political and non-political organizations. The use of this term draws into question the status of Taiwan and questions the basis for what it means to be "Taiwanese."

Chapter seven attempts to bring the three case studies together through the use of scale and surrogation. The chapter details the debate over scale and whether or not scale is a viable geographic tool. For this research, Cox's work on spaces of engagement (1998) is an applicable method for examine the connectivity between the three case studies. As mentioned above, Roach's work on surrogation (1996) also serves as a way to tie together the three case studies presented here. Because of Taiwan's "loss" of international recognition, surrogation serves the purpose of the Taiwanese attempting to create a new identity to fill the cavity created by the loss of their previous, internationally-recognized identity. These two theories also help in understanding how the debates over Taiwanese identity are interconnection and multi-faceted.

The final chapter, chapter eight, summarizes the findings of this research and serves as the conclusion.
CHAPTER TWO
IDENTIFYING IDENTITY

"Without philosophy, a man cannot be a complete human being."
Chiang Kai-shek (1974, 90)

The overriding theme of this research concerns identity and the state of Taiwan. Identity is an important part of defining exactly who we are as human beings. Our identity not only defines us as individuals but also defines who we are as collective groups. It can also serve as a means of defining who we are not and to which groups that we do not belong. Because of its defining role and its determination of in-group/out-group status, identity carries with it a tremendous amount of power, particular in the hands of those who do the defining. However, identity is not universal nor is it a given; identities are often constructed, debated and negotiated. This research uses case studies as examples of how identity can be debated. Also, in an effort to tie the individual case studies together in the much larger discourse over Taiwanese national identity, I will use theories involving surrogation and scale.

In addition to identity, each of the three cases studies presented below is examined as a "stand alone" research topic using theories and previous research that offer insights into the particular cases. For example, chapter four covers the National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, which is analyzed using the work of geographers such as Till (1998; 2008), Cresswell (1996), Alderman (1996; 2000). Electoral geography research from individuals such as Webster (1992), Agnew (1987; 1994; 1996) and Lee and Brunn (1996) are helpful in examining presidential elections in Taiwan, which is covered in chapter five. Finally, while sports identity is underrepresented with regards to geographic research, many scholars outside of the field have delved into the construction of national identity and sports. Individuals such as Jarvie (2003), Lutan (2005), Borucki (2003), Bairner (2003) and Bale (1996; 2003) examine the ways through which sports produces and, in some cases, reinforces identity. Literature supporting the theories and analysis appropriate for each case study will be detailed below.
In addition to these various theories utilized with the three case studies, both surrogation and scale are used to tie the three cases together. Scale is not a given geographic "tool," with geographers increasingly challenging notions of scale, going as far as questioning the very existence and necessity of the once unquestioned geographic "feature" (Marston, Jones and Woodward 2005). As Howitt (2008, 139) notes, "part of the problem facing any contemporary discussion of scale issues in political geography, however, commences with an effort to explain just what this powerful concept actually means." The politics of scale are examined later in this chapter, with Kevin Cox's research on spaces of dependence and spaces of engagement emerging as a legitimate basis through which to examine Taiwanese identity.

Surrogation is a "process" through which "the cavities created by loss through death or other forms of departure" are filled by "alternatives" by the survivors (Roach 1996, 2). These alternatives, or surrogates, attempt to replace what was lost and create a place of memory. Lambert (2007) uses surrogation to explain attempts to create public memory of the slave rebellions in Barbados, where an enslaved man named Bussa is commemorated to represent public memory. As Lambert notes, Bussa's promotion to surrogate is not without controversy as these "alternatives" rarely succeed in filling the void created by loss. Hence, it is this aspect – failing to fill a void – that surrogation is useful to Taiwan as the island state has struggled to find an "alternate" identity in the face of decreasing international relations.

All of the theories help in creating an understanding about the processes that are ongoing in the construction of Taiwanese identity. Still, the heart of this research is on identity. Therefore, it is necessary first to detail identity construction with regards to geography.

**Identity Construction and Geography**

Identity research has been advanced by numerous academic disciplines, especially sociology. Two examples of sociological research include identity theory and social identity theory. Hogg, Terry and White (1995, 256) use identity theory is used to explain "social behavior through reciprocal relations between self and society.” They explain that society plays a significant role in shaping one’s identity. Social identity theory differs from identity theory in that the former postulates the formulation of identity based on an in-group. Hogg, Terry and White (259) note that the “social category (e.g., nationality, political affiliation, sports team) into which one falls, and to which one feels one belongs, provides a definition of who one is in terms
of the defining characteristics of the category.” Because the members of the social group desire to maintain a positive perception of their group, there is often a need for a comparative out-group; although to be certain without an out-group there is no in-group. This necessity for a contrasting group is essential in defining one’s own group and can serve to state the characteristics that the in-group do not possess (Stets and Burke 2000). However, these two theories are similar in that both hypothesize that individuals carry a bundle of identities. With social identity theory, the bundle is based on the in-group while identity theory uses social situations to define the bundle.

Identity research invites various methods through which to study the topic. In his book *Popular Culture, Geopolitics, and Identity*, Dittmer (2010) provides a brief sketch of the ways in which identity is being researched, at least with regards to geopolitics and pop culture. Rather than focusing on formal or practical geopolitics, Dittmer uses popular geopolitics, which arises from "ordinary" citizens, in order to explore the construction and manifestations of identity. He also writes of three basic concepts that exist in popular geopolitics – imagined communities, geopolitical imagination, and banal nationalism. All three of these will be explored below.

Dittmer uses popular culture as a way to explain the various means through which identity is constructed and represented. His case studies provide solid examples of how popular culture can be used as a "serious" tool for academics. Each of the case studies is built on concepts that can applied to any study of identity. For example, in his examination of James Bond films, Dittmer (2010, 50) takes the opportunity to introduce representation, touching on the various debates involving representation including realism (i.e., there is a knowable reality) and social construction (i.e., reality is a "product of a web of representations spun by sources deemed authoritative"). He not only demonstrates how Bond films represent an attempt to maintain (or restore) lost British power, but he also notes the use of geographical imagination in Bond films, citing the exoticizing of Turkey in *The World is Not Enough*. Another example of Dittmer's exploration of the concepts of geopolitics is his study of the narrative depicted in the Captain America comics (Dittmer 2005). For Dittmer, Captain America represented a non-aggressive position (exemplified by his shield), as well as a representation of the American ideal vis-a-vis the impostor Captain America, who represented "positions such as racism, Communism and fascism" (Dittmer 2010, 89).

That Dittmer uses case studies to show the various representations of identity through popular culture also speaks to the infinite ways through which identity can be manifested,
including such indicators as gender, ethnicity, language, nationality, religion, sexuality, political affiliation, musical preferences, and even sport teams. While group-based identities may focus on just one of these conditions, an individual's identity tends to be a collection of various identities that includes "categories" such as race, gender, sexuality, language, religion, and nationality to name just a few. To be sure, group-based identities such as national identity incorporate multiple perspectives and therefore are also a collection of identities. However, which identities are included, and which are excluded, is determined by the power to define. This power reflects the role of identity politics, which serves as a challenge of the public narrative that only one, universal identity exists. Thus, Dittmer (2010, 74) argues that it is "perhaps best to imagine people's identity as being produced through a variety of public narratives, all interesting in one ontological narrative." Through these public narratives, what it means to be Taiwanese is debated and produced based on a given perspective.

Geographers have taken concepts of identity and applied it in numerous bodies of work ranging from race and ethnicity to gender and sexuality. With regards to racial and ethnic identities, geographers attempt to demonstrate how the construction of such identity takes place in space. Examples of this type of research include street (re)naming with respect to memorialization (Alderman 1996, 2000, 2006) and colonial identity (Yeoh 1992); public memory and race (Leib 2002); environmental racism (Pulido 2000); music and resistance (Woods 2007); the role of neighborhood movements and civil rights (Wilson 2000); the "invention" of ethnic neighborhoods and assigned identity (Anderson 1987); and unification and competing identities (Li et al. 1995). Geographers and others also examine the role of "whiteness" and white privilege with regards to place (Rothenberg 2005; hooks 1995; Pulido 2000; Kobayashi and Peake 2000). Geographic research on identity is not limited to ethnicity as geographers examined gender issues (e.g. McDowell 1992; Rose 1993; McDowell and Court 1994; Winchester 1990; Kwan 2002; Valentine 2007), as well as issues of gay rights and identity (e.g. Bell 1991; Binnie and Valentine 1999; Podmore 2006; Chapman et al. 2007; Tucker 2009).

More germane to this dissertation is the work produced by geographers on national identity. Two concepts in particular are germane to this research – imagined communities and banal nationalism. The notion of an imagined community derives from the work of Anderson (1983, 6 and 7). Anderson notes that the community is a place or "nation . . . conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship." This comradeship is important because according to Anderson
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them." Thus, the community becomes "imagined" because "in the minds of each [member of the community] lives the image of their communion." This view is similar to that Tuan's (1977) notion that the nation-state is too large to be experienced and iconography must be used to create a sense of place. The rise of imagined communities is rooted in the rise of nationalism, itself a product of emerging capitalist social relations and technologies such as the printing press. Mass printing helped elevate vernacular dialects to national languages, which in turn fostered national consciousness. Anderson (1983, 44-5, emphasis in original) lists three distinct ways through which national consciousness is established through print-languages.

First and foremost . . . speakers . . . became capable of comprehending one another via print and paper. In the process, they gradually became aware of the hundreds of thousands, even millions, of people in their particular language-field, and at the same time that only those hundreds of thousands, or millions, so belonged. . . . Second, print-capitalism gave a new fixity to language, which in the long run helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation. . . . Third, print-capitalism created languages-of-power of a kind different from the older administrative vernaculars.

Through what Anderson calls "print-capitalism," awareness of national consciousness was raised creating a "community" of individuals who would otherwise have little in common. Of course, certain vernaculars are privileged over others, allowing for manipulation over the imagined community by those in power.

Banal nationalism (Billig 1995) is the second basic concept involving national identity. Billig suggests that "our patriotism" is the unwaved flag, something that is omnipresent and yet unnoticed. Meanwhile, nationalism is the product of others and remains on the periphery of everyday life. However, the ideological habits that produce banal nationalism “are not removed from everyday life, as some observers have supposed. Daily, the nation is indicated, or ‘flagged’, in the lives of its citizenry. Nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic condition” (Billig 1995, 6). As Dittmer (2010, 19-20) notes, the concept of flagging goes beyond just flags and includes "any instance when citizens are encouraged to think of themselves using national categories." Billig (1995) himself offers media coverage of sports as an example of non-flag "flagging," while Webster (2011) touches on banal nationalism in the media coverage of the Iraq War. Leib (2011) uses license plates as another example of "unwaved flags" producing banal nationalism. Each of these cases exemplifies the ubiquitous
nature of nationalism in everyday life and how these often overlooked symbols subconsciously shape our identity.

National identity serves as a method to unite relatively disparate peoples together under a single concept. Geographers Jean Gottmann (1951, 1952) and Richard Hartshorne (1950) examined the ways that peoples are brought together through centripetal forces that help stabilize a national group. Gottmann (1952) noted that these forces help foster a national spirit that can unite a group of people, thereby creating a national identity. But national identity, and those symbols that promote nationalism, are not fixed but exist in a state of constant negotiation. For example, Rössler’s research on unified Germany discusses the debate over choosing the capital city (1994). Each of the two possible choices represented a particular segment of German history – Bonn representing maintenance of the democratic West and Berlin linked to Prussian and Nazi history. In the end, Berlin, a city that was also divided, was chosen as the new capital. As Rössler (99) states, “The reunification of Berlin corresponded to the unification of Germany, and once again Berlin became the symbolic location of the German identity.” What the German unification example entails is the difficulty in fostering a national identity when different histories are involved.

Ethnicity also plays a role in national identity. For example, Vincent (1999) discusses the role ethnic/national identities play in the divisions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Soviet Union had to deal with multiple ethnic/national identities while also trying to create a new Soviet identity (Hooson 1994), whereas China had to deal with ethnic minorities within its “natural boundaries” while attempting to maintain a Chinese identity (Husmann 1994). Other examples of geographic research involving national identity focus on topics such as: ethnic privilege and globalization of the Malaysian economy (Brunnell 2002); language and signscape (Gade 2003); ancient sites as "heritage" markers of national identity (Harvey 2003); the impact of immigration on identity both in the sending country (Kong 1999) and the receiving country (Kaya 2005); physical landscape and national identity (Nogue and Vicente 2004); and the use of postage stamps (Brunn and Raento 2007), banknotes (Unwin and Hewitt 2001) and license plates (Leib 2011) as a means of fostering national identity.

Perhaps one of the best examples of the representation of national identity can be seen on the cultural landscape. The landscape itself is a form of representation, i.e., the landscape is a representation of a state’s identity. Cosgrove (1985) refers to the landscape as a way of seeing,
underpinning the importance of the visual in landscape and geography. Like a work of art, the landscape is "read" as a representation of the world, which can in turn construct identity. But the landscape is not automatically infused with identity or "emotion." This is because identity, and by extension the nation, is a construction that comes about through social negotiations. Behavioralists see the landscape through the lens of individual interaction, including the preference for a place that reflects past experiences from another place. Humanistic approaches to the landscape involve "reading" the landscape, where the landscape reflects the world according to a particular group. Therefore, the cultural landscape becomes a representation of a society's values and ideologies. This views delves into the symbolism of the landscape as a means to interpret specific cultural indicators, be it religion, language, sexuality or nationality.

Identity is developed through place consciousness that arises as the nation becomes "experienced" by its citizens. However, this consciousness or "emotion" must be constructed, typically at a local level. Writing on neighborhoods and the creation of place, Tuan (1977, 171) notes that the neighborhood is "a conceptual place and does not involve emotion. Emotion begins to tinge the whole neighborhood – drawing on, and extrapolating from, the direct experience of its particular parts – when the neighborhood is perceived to have rivals and to be threatened in some way, real or imagined." A sense of place, and thus identity, is always created in relation to others, as postulated in social identity theory. Identity is therefore a conflation of what takes place within a state and its connections with others. As Tuan states (166), "to the local people sense of place is promoted not only by their settlement’s physical circumscription in space; an awareness of other settlements and rivalry with them significantly enhance the feeling of uniqueness and of identity." Tuan's connection of a sense of place with identity is similar to what Mitchell (2000, 272), in citing Massey (1994), describes as a progressive "sense of place that understands identity . . . in relation to other places, other identities. A progressive sense of place and identity is predicated as seeing that identity and that place as part of a web of interconnections with other places and identities, a web defined not by exclusion or sameness, but by interdependence and difference" (emphasis in original). This notion can be seen in Duncan's (1973) examination of Bedford Village and how identity and place were reflected through various social networks.

Mitchell (2000) also notes that identity, as well as the landscape, is never static; both are in constant negotiation. People work to craft their landscape to reflect their identity. Mitchell
(102) writes that the landscape itself is capable of doing work: “it works on the people that make it. Landscape, in this sense, provides a context, a stage, within and upon which humans continue to work, and it provides the boundaries, quite complexly, within which people remake themselves.” With this idea in mind, identity of any type is always spatial. Using sexuality as an example, Mitchell (175, emphasis in original) points out that the construction of sexuality is a “process” and “that like any other social relationship, sexuality is spatial – it both depends on particular spaces for its construction and in turn produces and reproduces the spaces in which sexuality can be, and was, forged.” Similarly, national identity depends on a particular space for its construction and in turn (re)produces the spaces in which this identity can be forged. But national identity is often challenged and in some cases faces destruction. Identity is constantly being produce, and reproduced, and constantly changing. As Schein (1997, 664) writes, the cultural landscape "is continually implicated in the ongoing reconstitution of a discourse, or set of discourses, about social life, and it is in this sense that it serves as both a disciplinary mechanism and a potentially liberating medium for social change."

But who is able to define identity of a particular state? Cresswell (2004, 72, citing Massey 1997) writes that “particular places have singular unitary ideas – New York is this, Wales is that. Often these identities are based on ideas about race. Place at the national scale for instance often acts in a way that ties a particular ‘race’ or ethnic group to a particular area of land.” However, such constructions oftentimes create identities and conceptions that are “not everyone’s view” of that state. If this is the case, then it is apparent that the construction of identity and the shaping of the landscape is an exercise in the power to define. An example of this notion is the erection of the Vittoriano in Rome, Italy, which by including both a statue of Dea Roma (the goddess of Rome) and a statue of Vittorio Emanuele II created a symbolic connection and "represented the ancient unity of Italy the reborn nation-state" (Atkinson and Cosgrove 1998, 33). Placing the Vittoriano on the Roman landscape symbolized an attempt to foster a new, united Italian nationalism that not only represented the modern nation-state but also linked to the ancient past.

As another example, Mitchell (2000, 97), writing on Johnstown, Pennsylvania, states that a “sanitized version of the history of ordinary people in the town” is reproduced for consumption. For Johnstown officials “it was essential to present an image of Johnstown as a united community – a community in which class and race interest had always been less important than
the common interest of the ‘community’.” For a state, this concept of constructing a unified community means propping up the unitary identity while hiding dissent and “those who do not fit such an identity” (Cresswell 2004, 73). In order to control this representation, identity and the landscape on which such an identity is forged lie in the hands of those in power. As Mitchell (2000, 109 emphasis in original) notes,

Landscape, and landscape representations, are thus incorporations of power. But sometimes, landscapes are made precisely to intervene in relations of power themselves. They are made to actively represent who has power, certainly, but also to reinforce that power by creating a constant and unrelenting symbol of it.

The purpose of this control over the power to define is to naturalize the landscape, thereby naturalizing identity and one’s place in society. Writing on culture and "maps of meaning," Jackson (1989, 2-3) notes that cultures "involve relations of power, reflected in patterns of dominance and subordination" whereby "dominant views are most effective if they become 'naturalized' as part of everyday common sense." The power to define and shape identity can be aided by naturalizing dominant views while at the same time suppressing or even hiding subordinate views. Mitchell (2000, 117-9) argues that this expression of power is part of the capitalist order of the world; one where the landed elite project a particular image of the world, or how the world should be viewed. In order to achieve this image negative aspects of the construction of the capitalist order must be removed or hidden. “Landscape representation thus sought to legitimate and naturalize the emerging capitalist order by erasing many of the facts upon which it was built.” Mitchell continues on, noting that the power to define and construct the landscape is “about class consciousness, about ideologically structuring the world so as to make one’s place in it appear just and perhaps even divinely ordained.” In the case of national identity, the construction of the landscape often reflected the interest of the landed elite, who sought to maintain and legitimate their position at the expense of the working class. Thus, “the interests of the elite, and to a lesser extent the middle class, are shown to be the interest of everyone through landscape representation” (emphasis in original).

It is worth noting that the naturalization and legitimating of a particular identity is important for the state, particularly at a local scale. This naturalization is important because, as Tuan (1977, 176-7) points out the sentiment and attachment that is more readily available at the local level is not easily transferred to the national level. Unlike a neighborhood or a village, the
“modern nation-state is far too large to be thus experienced.” Therefore in order to foster a strong sense of place at the national level, “the sentiment that once tied people to their village, city, or region had to be transferred to the larger political unit. . . . Symbolic means had to be used to make the large nation-state seem a concrete place – not just a political idea – toward which a people could feel deep attachment.” This is where Gottmann’s (1951) notions of iconography become important in the construction of national identity. Once again, the question of which forms of iconography represent the people lies in the hands of those in power. So, while there is a need to legitimate an identity with regards to the international community, it often comes at the expense of dissenting voices within the state in question.

What is clear about landscape representation and identity is that while there are attempts to create a unitary identity, that identity is always contested. The debate over what it means to be a certain identity becomes the point of contention and it is often reflected in the landscape. As Keith and Pile (1993a, 28-9) remark, identity is an "incomplete process" that is the product of "a set of articulated elements in different discursive settings." The landscape represents identity, but does so as a freeze-frame – to use the words of Keith and Pile – of that ongoing and incomplete process. Crafting the landscape, and thereby crafting identity, is an exercise in power, as Keith and Pile write that "any single set of articulated elements which defines the subjects . . . is thus simultaneously an expression of power. Writing on the issue of German identity after reunification, Mitchell (264) notes that "‘Germanness’ is a point of struggle, a continuing battle over just how the German nation is to be socially constructed.” Here it is noted that what is contentious is what constitutes being German, or in other words how Germanness is made. It is important to not just focus on identity itself but also examine how identity is constructed. Mitchell (273, emphasis in original) later states that “nationalism, like national identity or ‘the nation’ itself, is not inherently anything; it is what is made.” So, when approaching research on identity, “the question is really one of how nationalism is made, and how it situates itself in the world at large.” Thus, the process of producing identity is what is important, even more so than identity itself.

Casing the Case Studies

In chapters four, five and six I use case studies as examples of the various ways through which debates over Taiwanese national identity are manifested. However, each of the three case
studies relies on different theoretical underpinnings – public memory, electoral geography, and sports identity. Because of these differences, it is necessary to summarize the pertinent literature below.

Public Memory and Cultural Landscape

The cover piece of the November 2007 edition of *National Geographic* focuses on memory and why we remember and why we forget. It is noted that humans have “gradually replaced our internal memory with what psychologists refer to as external memory, a vast superstructure of technological crutches that we’ve invented so that we don’t have to store information in our brains” (Foer 2007, 50). While external memory includes items such as photographs and diaries, it also includes the creation of monuments and memorials on the cultural landscape. Placing these instruments of memory solidifies, and in many ways freezes, time in the landscape. In this way, memorials and monuments represent a marriage of temporal and spatial attributes.

Cresswell (1996) suggests that monuments and memorials are rarely neutral and oftentimes infused with narratives controlled by those in power. Furthermore, public or social memory should be understood as “the ongoing process whereby social groups ‘map’ their myths of self onto and through a place and time” (Till 1999; 2008, 290). Till also notes that sites of public memory are not only fixated on the past, as these sites are “always constructed and located in the social environment of the present.” She states that “social narratives and cultural practices . . . are infused with moral meaning and continuously change according to the needs of the present” (Till 2008, 290, citing Halbwachs 1992, 1925). Furthermore, Johnson (1996, 551) notes that “the cultural history associated with a nation’s identity often derives from more recent interpretations tailored to particular political needs.” Through the various interpretations and negotiations of a society’s past, those in power are able to form “dominant cultural understandings of [the] ‘nation’ or ‘people’” (Forest, Johnson and Till 2004, 358). But, as Johnson asks (2003, 9), “What idea or set of ideas are stimulated by memories made material by the landscape?” Geographers have applied this question to numerous places of memory (e.g., Atkinson and Cosgrove 1998; Webster and Leib 2001; Leib 2002).

One way that geographers have approached places of memory is through the study of iconography, the understanding of the meaning of symbols. At its root, iconography seeks a
clear understanding of the interpretation of art and architecture (Cosgrove and Daniels 1988). Gottmann (1951, 1952) and Hartshorne (1950) both introduced the impact of iconography on a people’s sense of place and the formation of nationalism. Contemporary geographers have used iconography as a means to understand how symbolism on the cultural landscape shapes and manipulates identities. For example, Schwartz (1982) writes on the usage of iconography during the early history of the United States as a way to promote both nationhood and statehood. In particular, he notes the emergence of Pilgrim symbolism during the Revolutionary era as well as the “Indian” during the late nineteenth century. Atkinson and Cosgrove (1998) offer the Vittoriono in Rome as a case of symbolism being utilized as a means of unifying the new Italian state. However, Agnew (2002) downplays the importance of the Vittoriano, viewing it more as a memorial to an individual rather than to a nation.

Iconography, public memory, and the cultural landscape go beyond the promotion of nationalism and can also include regional and ethnic identity struggles. For example, contestations over Southern identity in the United States play out in debates over the Confederate battle flag (Leib 1995; Leib, Webster and Webster 2000; Musgrave 2005; Webster and Leib 2001; Webster and Webster 1994), Celtic symbolism with regards to the League of the South (Hague, Giordano and Sebesta 2005), Christian symbolism (Sebesta and Hague 2002), and Civil Rights memorialization (Dwyer 2000; 2002). Dixon and Drakakis-Smith (1995) explore the feasibility of a “Pacific Asia” region by examining economic indicators and the regional division of labor. De Beus (2001) discusses the development and potential of a democratic European identity fostered by the European Union. Harner (2001) uses copper mines in the Mexican state of Sonora to explain the creation of a “mining” identity that expanded beyond the miners themselves and included the towns as a whole.

Streets and street renaming have also been utilized as a means to promote nationalism. Place naming on the cultural landscape is an important, yet controversial, process that promotes legitimacy, pride, cohesiveness, among other sentiments (Alderman 1996, 2000; Azaryahu 1992). Renaming can also serve as a means to remove parts of a culture’s history that are deemed by those involved in the renaming process as “disagreeable.” As Azaryahu (1992, 361) notes, renaming represents “a new national order” where “those parts of the text which represented an undesirable version of the national past” are erased. Leitner and Kang (1999) note that when the Nationalists fled the mainland for the island of Taiwan in 1949, the KMT leaders renamed many
of the streets in Taipei. The names were often similar to many of the streets in China, representing a transplanting of (mainland) China onto Taiwan. Street renaming can prove controversial as it is related to public memory and whose memory is being celebrated. As Alderman (1996, 59) demonstrates with the commemoration of Martin Luther King, Jr., the “social struggles that surround the construction and control of space affect struggles over the construction and control of the past.”

The National Chiang Kai-shek National Memorial Hall serves as a site where the struggle over the construction and control of the past takes place. The successful renaming of this memorial, along with the reversion to the original name, provides an example of the battle over Taiwanese identity and how that identity is represented on the cultural landscape. The renaming under the Chen Shui-bian administration serves as an example of surrogation because it represents the desires of the opposition DPP to replace places of memory that connect Taiwan to the mainland and the KMT’s legacy.

While streets have been renamed and statues removed from military installations, the National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall was chosen primarily due to the sheer physical size of the site itself, which makes it immediately recognizable in the Taipei and Taiwanese landscape. It is well-known not only to Taiwanese but also to foreigners and travelers to the island state. Because of its visibility, the monument is much more controversial than street renamings or statue removals.

Electoral Geography and Identity

Agnew (1996) notes that electoral geography helped political geography emerge from the “moribund backwater” described by Berry (1969). However, despite this trend, Agnew points out that such research tended to divorce “serious theorizing about such geographical concepts as space and place and the study of elections” (130). As part of his explanation of the need to bring in social, political and cultural aspects that impact elections, Agnew lists six processes that control “human agents in particular places” (132). These six processes include the social division of labor; nature of communication technology; the embeddedness of all places in territorial states; divisions such as social class, ethnicity and gender; claims made by political movements; and the micro-geography of everyday life. By taking these processes into account and utilizing this approach, geographers can assume “that political behavior is inevitably
structured by a changing configuration of social-geographical influences as global-local connections shift over time” (133).

Pattie and Johnston (2000) explore the influence neighbors and social networks have on people’s voting choices. Citing Kevin Cox (1969), they note that electorally relevant information (political cues) flows through social networks and stimulates responses in the form of partisan decisions: if the information reaching an individual through her/his conversations predominantly favors one party, then he/she is more likely to vote for that party, irrespective of prior predispositions, than if the information was less biased in that particular direction (42).

Brooks and Prysby (1991) put forth “a theory of contextual effects that identified four separate potential processes.” These four processes have the potential to influence voters’ decision with regards to elections. The processes are as follows:

(1) personal observation, whereby individuals are influenced in how they vote by their appreciation of events and situations in their milieux . . . ; (2) informal interaction, with interpersonal communications influencing voting behavior, as in Cox’s formulation; (3) organizationally based interaction, in workplaces, churches, labor unions, and a range of other organizations . . . ; and (4) mass media, many of which are locally focused and provide politically relevant cues about events in voters’ own neighborhoods (Pattie and Johnston 2000: 42-3).

These processes, which often overlap, root the decision-making processes among voters in their local place. This process means that the geography of the individual voter is rooted at the local scale and is therefore influenced by social and cultural networks created at that scale. Pattie and Johnston demonstrate this notion with British elections, noting that respondents who regular conversed with supporters of a particular party were much more likely to continue voting for that party (or defect to that party if they originally supported the opposition) than if they had no political conversations. In other words, the networks and political conversations that take place at the personal level play a direct role in a voter’s decision and thus create certain geographies of elections.

Geographers have also examined sociodemographic patterns in order to better understand voting patterns. Geographers recognize that there is a strong correlation between certain demographic variables and voting patterns. For example, O’Reilly and Webster (1996) undertook a study on the sociodemographic influences on the anti-gay rights referenda in Oregon. They were able to draw a parallel between not only the rural-urban dichotomy and the referenda,
but also the traditionalist-progressive dichotomy and the referenda. This idea is reinforced by the fact that the counties that voted for a Republican presidential candidate in 1992 also voted for the anti-gay referenda. Furthermore, geographers have noted the impact of race on electoral patterns. In their work on the passage of an anti-gay amendment in Georgia, Chapman et al. (2007) demonstrate a strong correlation between the African-American community and a “yes” vote for passing an amendment banning gay marriage. Webster and Leib (2001) note that in South Carolina, most regions with a majority African-American population tended to have a Democrat as their elected representative. This fact is important because during debates over the flying of the confederate flag in that state, South Carolina Democrats need to appease their constituency.

The construction of spatially-rooted voting patterns is important in the study of political regions in a country. Lee and Brunn (1996) examined regional politics in South Korea and note that the electoral cleavages are rooted in the histories of the Korean regions. They note that regional cleavages in Korea emerged with the results of the 1972 elections, which saw Park Jung Hee of Seoul (northwest Korea) defeat Kim Dae Jung of Cholla province (southeast Korea). The defeat of Kim led to growing resentment in southeast Korea against the ruling party and in subsequent years the region experienced uprisings, as well as government crackdowns. Part of the cause for the oppositional movement in the southeast is due to the historic rivalry between the southeast and rest of the country (Lee and Brunn 1996; Park 2003a, 2003b). Additionally, West (2005), using the theory of political cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), identifies three main clusters in Turkish general elections. He notes not only certain sociodemographic differences between more affluent western Turkey and relatively poorer eastern Turkey, but also identifies the ethnic differences as eastern Turkey is dominated by ethnic Kurds who generally oppose the Turkish regime.

Finally, Webster (1992) notes that the shift from one political party dominating a region to another political party is usually a slow, gradual process that begins in urban nodes. His point is that “electoral transitions are most frequently accomplished in sequences of realigning contests, not in a single election” (44). Webster emphasizes three factors that create the catalyst for such a transition – the role of third parties; the role of metropolitan areas as focal; and political party realignment to certain issues or ideologies.
While the 1996 elections in Taiwan were a landslide victory for the KMT in terms of counties and municipalities that it won, the 2000 elections experienced a dramatic change in the electoral geographic landscape. Due to a split in the KMT, the opposition DPP was able to garner a plurality of votes and its nominee Chen Shui-bian won the presidency. With this election, a political cleavage emerged in the southwest. Chen succeeded in winning reelection in 2004, where the distinct voting pattern from 2000 holds true. With the 2008 victory by KMT nominee Ma Ying-jeou, there was a shift back to the old guard. However, the pattern that emerged in 2000 was once again reinforced in the 2008 presidential elections. This emerging pattern and how it reflects the Taiwanese identity debate can be analyzed using the processes incorporated by other political geographers.

**Sports Identity**

Issues of sports in terms of constructing regional identity are but one aspect that has been approached by academics working in this field. For example, Borucki (2003) notes how college football was utilized in the recasting of Southern identity in the United States. The rise of football programs at the University of Alabama and Georgia Institute of Technology in the 1920s were often placed in the context of the U.S. Civil War. Teams from the South exuded a “spirit” that was not found in other parts of the country. That these Southern teams were able to defeat the mighty teams of the west served as a catalyst for the resurgence of Southern identity.

Research on sports and identity often center on how sports foster a sense of nationalism. In his discussion on the England Cricket Tour in Australia, Frost (2002) notes that cricket helped Australians maintain a connection to their English heritage. In fact, the good behavior and order that is allegedly present in the game of cricket ensured that Australians would not follow the path of those in the United States, a place that lacked cricket and subsequently became home to unruly and drunken individuals. Lutan (2005) explains how landing the 1962 Asian Games propelled Indonesia into the international spotlight. Indonesian leader Sukarno used the opportunity to upgrade the city of Jakarta, which Lutan (420) claims “made Jakarta a model and dynamic city equal to any other Asian capital city.” For Sukarno, participation in sports would bring pride to Indonesia and thus create a new Indonesia; one that challenges the Western-dominant international order. While he has been criticized for many of his policies, Lutan (417)
claims it is highly plausible that Sukarno’s “greatest legacy was the building of national identity through sport.”

Even youth sports are not immune to politicization. The Taoyuan team that competed in the 2009 Little League World Series is just another in a long line of successful Taiwanese teams that have reached the baseball championships. Over a 27-year period from 1969 until 1996, Taiwanese youth baseball teams won 18 Little League World Series titles. This dominance and visibility gave the Taiwanese citizens reasons to be proud of what their young citizens accomplished. That pride derived from the fact that Taiwan not only gained equal footing in a Western sport, but had actually surpassed the West and particularly the United States (Sundeen 2001). However, it is worth noting that while the Taiwanese teams were initially warmly received, their dominance led to some bitterness, with one U.S. coach referring to the Taiwanese players as “robots” (Hersch 1990).

Sports provide a medium through which a relatively united national identity can be expressed. As Bairner (2001, 17) explains, “Except in times of war, seldom is the communion between members of the nation, who might otherwise be classed as total strangers, as strongly felt as during major international events. . . . [S]porting events unite members of the nation in highly emotional circumstances.” An example of this unity is the 2004 Iraqi men’s Olympic soccer team, which scored upset victories over Australia, Costa Rica and soccer powerhouse Portugal on their way to a fourth-place finish (Johnson and Crain 2004). Thus, a connection is made between the athletes and the fans that constructs an identity, or in this case a sense of nationalism. “As the athletes compete and their compatriots support their efforts, there exists a bond that can often only be understood with reference to the concept of nationality” (Bairner 2001, 21).

While sports can be used to promote a country's image in the international community, it can also be difficult for a country to adapt to global standards and practices when it comes to sports. Collins (2007) notes that the Japanese Empire experienced difficulties in positioning Japanese national culture within the global Olympic context. Translating Japanese practices and traditions to conform with Olympic Games, and vice versa, led to much debate during the organization of the proposed 1940 Tokyo Summer Games. The proposed Olympic Stadium debate pitted Meiji Shrine Outer Gardens stadium versus a new stadium built on reclaimed land. The former was chosen because of the correlation between the historic nature of the Emperor
Meiji and Japan and the hosting of the global event, while the latter, which won, was favored because it would be up to the standards set by previous Olympic hosts, namely Berlin. Additionally, debates arose about the Torch Relay, which was unofficial at the time, and whether it should take an international, Silk Route inspired journey or a more nationalistic route, visiting several important Shinto shrines on its way to Tokyo. Also, there was great concern of Hirohito announcing the opening of the Games due to prohibitions on the emperor’s voice being heard in public places or being recorded and broadcast.

Jarvie (2003) suggests that sports can play a role in forming internationalism as well. He notes that sports are being internationalized rather than globalized and offers three examples of such an occurrence. Sports have been utilized as a means to combat social injustices, such as the 1964 expulsion of apartheid South Africa from the Olympic Games. Second, the movement of players from many different countries to play in another country reflects socially embedded patterns of labor migration that are subject to “a range of social, economic, and political factors that were national and international in origin” (547). Third, sports could be utilized as a means to break down cold relationships between rival countries. Here, Jarvie provides the example of Japan and South Korea co-hosting the 2002 World Cup Finals, in which Korea’s success made the country appear “cool” to young Japanese.

Nevertheless, the marriage of sports and is one that the Olympics and other sporting events cannot avoid. Similar to Bouruki’s analysis of Southern football representing the South rising again, sports at a local and regional level are rooted in geographic boundaries that promote a sense a pride. For example, members of the “Red Sox Nation” are linked to the city of Boston, even if they do not reside there. Fans of universities from the Southeastern Conference will be quick to point out that the best college football is played in the South. On the international scale, participants in events such as soccer’s World Cup, the Olympics, or the recently established World Baseball Classic represent their respective nation-state, again a concept that is rooted in geography. As Bale (2003, 25) writes, “Sports teams most often represent either the nation state or the so-called ‘local state’ (i.e. aspects of government at the sub-national scale such as local authorities). It is therefore difficult to understand the view, often expressed, that sports is in some way independent of politics.”
Tying One On: Scale, Surrogation and Taiwanese Identity

In this section I will outline the two theoretical concepts that I use to tie together the three cases studies and examine the geographies of the Taiwanese national identity debate. The first concept is that of scale. Because of the contentious nature of the term "scale" among geographers, it is necessary to examine the ongoing debate over the use of the term, as well as how it will be used in this dissertation. The second concept, surrogation, involves the attempts to fill a void created by loss. In the case presented here, surrogation offers a way to understand Taiwan's search for an identity following the "loss" of their previous (Chinese) identity.

Politics of Scale, or Scaling of Politics

The debates over the concept of scale are reviewed by Marston and her colleagues (2005), where they point out the various ways in which scale has been defined. From Agnew’s (1993) definition of scale as the “spatial level, local, national, or global, at which [a] presumed effect of location is operative” (as cited by Marston et al. 2005, 416, emphasis in original) to the claim by Thrift (1995) that there is “no such thing as a scale” (as cited by Marston et al. 2005, 416), there appears to be no clear consensus as to what scale really is.

Marston and colleagues track the evolution of the challenge of understanding the concept of scale by geographers. One of the first geographers to approach the problem of scale in social terms is Taylor (1982), “who draped an urban-to-global scalar hierarchy onto Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems model” (Marston et al. 2005, 417). Taylor develops two important concepts – “(a) he theorizes these levels (urban, nation, global) as separated domains, and (b) he traces their emergence to the expanding capitalist mode of production” (ibid.). To Taylor, scales were hierarchically structured and were nested within one another.

Smith (1984) expanded Taylor’s original thesis and sought to go beyond the fixed, hierarchical model. Smith introduced two ideas that altered the given perception of scale. The first is scale jumping, which notes that “political claims and power established at one geographical scale are expanded to another” (Smith 2000, 726). An example of scale jumping is farmworkers enlisting the help of regional and national business groups to back its attempts to improve farm conditions at the local level. The other concept, scale bending, holds that “entrenched assumptions about what kinds of social activities fit properly at which scales are being systematically challenged and upset” (Smith 2004, 193). These two concepts are notable
due in large part to the challenges it presents to preconceived notions of scale. The politics of scale in Smith’s theories allows for a concept or finding at one particular scale to be extracted to another scale. With scale bending, what might have been previously seen as only occurring at, say, the urban scale can now be present in the nation or regional scale. An example here is issues of air pollution moving from a regional scale in the northeast United States to an international scale with the impact of acid rain in southeastern Canada.

Taylor and Smith are held as the earliest pioneers in the analysis of the politics of scale. Both believed that scale played a very important role in political geography in particular. However, despite the concepts of scale jumping and scale bending, conducting research across scales is seen as problematic. For Taylor and Smith, scale, despite their efforts to avoid fixity, is still a fixed notion that at best can lead to inductive research but not cross-scale study. Thus, it is difficult to undertake significant research across scales or at multiple scales. As Howitt (2008, 139) notes, it is this issue “that has been so troubling in operationalizing scale as a fundamental concept with practical rather than merely rhetorical value.” Thus, since the beginning of the 1990s, some geographers have sought to challenge the given nature of scale.

Perhaps the greatest contribution to the debate over scale is the challenge of the fixity of scale. The move from scale as ontology to scale as epistemology is an important step in debunking the myth that scale is a given structure. One of the torchbearers for scale as epistemology is Kevin Cox (1998) in his article on spaces of dependence, spaces of engagement and the politics of scale.

Cox (1998) lays out the social construction of scale by introducing the concepts of spaces of dependence and spaces of engagement. The former are “defined by those more-or-less localized social relations upon which we depend for the realization of essential interests and for which there are no substitutes elsewhere.” The latter refers to “the space in which the politics of securing a space of dependence unfolds. This may be at a more global scale than the space of dependence, as per the idea of ‘jumping scale’ but it may not be” (Cox 1998, 2). Spaces of dependence are place-specific and are connected to other spaces of dependence. This organization of these spaces ensures the “continued existence of their spaces of dependence but in so doing they have to engage with other centers of social power: local government, the national press, perhaps the international press, for example” (ibid., emphasis in original). It is through this interaction that spaces of engagement are produced.
It is important to note here that Cox essentially advocates an understanding of scale as a network rather than simply a bounded area. In this sense, “[n]etworks signify unevenness in the penetration of areal forms. They are also rarely entirely contained by areal forms; boundaries tend to be porous” (Cox 1998, 2-3). Thus, scale is not confined and tends to be permeable. This notion allows for a study of scale across scales and at multiple scales.

Cox’s concepts combine an understanding of scale as both fixed (spaces of dependence) and fluid (spaces of engagement). As Jones (1998, 25) notes in her response to Cox, “[s]paces of dependence are the somewhat fixed, localized arenas within which individuals are embedded by their social, employment, or business interests.” She also notes that spaces of engagement are fluid and “may be broader or narrower than spaces of dependence in any particular instance.” Thus, scale jumping “may not mean simply moving from the ‘local’ to the ‘global’.”

The importance of what Cox demonstrates is how scale can be socially produced. Jones (1998, 27, emphasis in original) states that since participants in political disputes deploy arguments about scale discursively, alternately representing their position as global or local to enhance their standing, we must also accept that scale itself is a representational trope, a way of framing political-spatiality that in turn has material effects. And, if scale is a trope, then we can longer see it as neutral or transparent in how it represents.

It is this notion of scale as a representational trope that Jones finds discouraging. Her concern is not with the epistemological application of scale, but that as a “representational trope, scale may be implicated in enabling particular relationships of power and space that advantage some social groups and disadvantage others.” Using J.B. Harley’s 1992 research on maps as an example of the construction of a particular form of knowing, Jones references Söderström’s (1996) work to note how urban planning uses scale to imbed a particular “truth” about the city; one that is not questioned. “The more that urban information was presented through maps and zones, the more the city was understood only by way of these sorts of spatialized and geometrical systems, until what was considered ‘true’ about the city was altered in practice” (Jones 1998, 27). Thus, scale can still create “givens” in the way it is represented.

Because of this, the construction of scale is a powerful tool of those with the means to construct the once-conceived geographic “truth.” Marston (2000, 220) writes that scale, along with “environment, space or place, is one of the elements from which geographical totalities are built.” She cites Howitt’s (1998) recognition that geographers tend to hold scale “as possessing
three facets: size, level and relation. [Howitt] finds the first two treatments problematic because, alone, they oversimplify scale.” In those two treatments, scale is viewed as a naturalized category. Thus, “Howitt insists that we see scale not as size (census tract, province, continent) and level (local, regional, national) but as a relational element in a complex mix that also includes space, place and environment – all of which interactively make the geographies we live in and study” (Marston 2000, 220-1).

Marston approaches the social construction of scale and the dangers of such productions. She cites Henri Lefebvre, among others, in an attempt to link the social construction of scale to the rise of capitalism. She notes that “scale construction is a political process endemic to capitalism, the outcome of which is always potentially open to further transformation” (2000, 221). Marston also points out that “scale-making is not only a rhetorical practice; its consequences are inscribed in, and are the outcome of, both everyday life and macro-level social structures.”

Returning to Taylor’s work on scale, Marston notes how he incorporated Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-system theory into the debate about scale. For Taylor, the starting point is “the world-economy scale – or the scale of ‘reality’, the scale that ‘really matters’ . . . because it is at the global level that capital accumulation is ultimately organized” (Marston 2000, 228). The scale of the nation-state, also known as the scale of ideology is the result of a fragmented capitalist world market predicated on the ideological constructions of statism and nationalism. The urban scale (the scale of experience) is orientated around the daily urban system and the particular ways in which accumulation (and investment and disinvestment) are manifested in places and affect how the inhabitants live out their daily lives.

Thus, the macro-level structure of the world-economy and the everyday life of the urban scale help forge a primary scale of ideology – the nation-state.

But what of scale as epistemology? Moore (2008) moves away from scale as an analytical tool and towards scale as a category of practice. He notes studies on “nation” and “nationhood” and how, as Brubaker (1996) suggests that researchers tend to either conflate the two or focus solely on “nation.” Both point to the “nationhood” as being the focal point of nation studies as it is the concept of nationhood that produces the nation. Thus, the need is to concentrate on the category of practice.
The significance of making a distinction between nation and nationhood is that it forces us to shift our focus from nation as a substantial category of analysis, to nationhood – the crystallization of feelings and practices of nation-ness – as a contingent event, thereby placing emphasis on the process of nationalization (Moore 2008, 213).

In Moore’s opinion, avoiding scale to discuss scale politics allows researchers to examine it “while avoiding the trap of reification.”

Scale as an epistemological tool is just as important as if it is taken as an ontological concept. “[I]t alerts us to the real and important ways scalar categorization structures not only personal perceptions but social relations” (Moore 2008, 214). In other words, it helps geographers understand how scale shapes what we know about the world. Moore, referencing Jones (1998) pushes geographers to ask “how people, places, events, actions and social relationships get classified in these [scalar] terms” (Moore 2008, 214-5). Using frame analysis, Moore (218) notes how scalar politics are used “not just to interpret spatial politics, but to frame and define, and thereby constitute and organize, social life.” Thus, “the degree to which ‘scale’ shapes social life is an open question to be addressed empirically, rather than treated as a starting point of any research.”

If geographers are to study scalar politics without scale, then is scale necessary at all? Marston and colleagues believe that geographers need to move beyond scale and towards “flat ontology,” a term borrowed from Latour. In fact, Marston, Jones and Woodward (2005) argue for the complete abandonment of “scale.” They offer several reasons. First, is the confusion over what scale actually means and how scale as size and scale as level tend to be conflated. To Marston and colleagues (421), “after some 30 years of critical geography we certainly should have the theoretical and political tools at our disposal to deconstruct or otherwise analyse its [scale’s] deployments.” Second, they believe that utilizing scalar hierarchies, even with the introduction of networks, will inevitably create binaries that become difficult or near-impossible to disentangle. Third, they argue that despite a move towards scale-as-epistemology, scale is still held as a given, “whereby objects, events and processes come pre-sorted, ready to be inserted into the scalar apparatus at hand.” Lastly, “hierarchical scale is bound to methodological perspectivalism, a God’s Eye view leveraged on the Archimedean point of the global from which the world is surveyed” (422).
In place of scale, Marston and colleagues support a flat ontology, “where the dynamic properties of matter produce a multiplicity of complex relations and singularities that sometimes lead to the creation of new, unique events and entities, but more often to relatively redundant orders and practices” (422). They highlight three key conceptual zones in their version of a flat ontology:

Analytics of composition and decomposition that resist the increasingly popular practice of representing the world as strictly a jumble of unfettered flows; attention to differential relations that constitute the driving forces of material composition that problematize axiomatic tendencies to stratify and classify geographic objects; and a focus on localized and non-localized emergent events of differential relations actualized as temporary – often mobile – ‘sites’ in which the ‘social’ unfolds (423).

It is important to note that a flat ontology allows for stability in its repetitive nature while also allowing for the creation of new forms by way of actualities and potentialities. Therefore, a flat ontology is site-specific and provides “a strategy [that] avoids misrepresenting the world as utterly chaotic and retains the capacity to explain those orders that produce effects upon localized practices” (425).

But the call for abandoning scale is not without controversy. Jonas (2006) sees the replacement of scale with a flat ontology as dangerous. He notes that Marston and colleagues fail to escape the binaries that scales create by themselves creating a binary. “[A]ny emphasis put on the site, place, practice, agency, social reproduction, the home, the local and so forth, requires implicitly or explicitly situating such concepts in relation to what (spatially) they are not to be” (402, emphasis in original). Jonas argues in favor of a scaled approach that is more interested in the “inbetweenness” of spatial scale, or regionalization. More importantly, Jonas (399) believes a rejection of “‘scale’ altogether would be to miss out on an important dimension of thinking about and acting upon contemporary economic, political, social and environmental change.”

Furthermore, Jonas (2006, 404) attacks Marston and colleagues’ assumption that “scalist” geographers have approached their work with a pre-conceived notion of scale as a given.

Upon close inspection, many so called ‘scalists’ are not writing about ‘scales-as-fixed-structures’; nor are they treating scalar territories as ‘vertical structures’ or ‘rational abstractions’ in the realist sense. Instead, they are responding to the challenge of narrative and deploying scalar categories in ways that attempt to show how particular material structures and processes have become fixed at or around certain sites and scales,
are in the process of becoming unfixed at a specific scale, or combine to differentiate the world in complex scalar and site-specific dimensions.

Jonas further notes that there are occasions where human geographers have approached issues of scale unproblematically. However, most geographers avoid a blanket assumption of scale as a given.

In the discourse of scale, I agree with Jonas in his opposition to Marston and colleagues’ attempt to rid geography of the study of scalar hierarchies. Research involving scale is an important contribution to the discipline of geography. Jonas (401) notes that research on “scalar politics has been [able] to reveal the complex ways that scalar-defined geographic processes, operating simultaneously and in combination with each other, variously empower or disenfranchise economic and social actors.” He continues by pointing out that scalar politics “has also aided in demonstrating how struggles for social recognition, political identity and social justice are framed by, or represented at, different spatial scales.” Jonas is right to point out that the debate over scale is beneficial to geography and produces more intellectually-enriched research projects.

The contentious nature of “scale” and the multitude of definitions for the concept foster such lively debate. Marston and colleagues should also remember that “geography” is also defined in a number of different ways. To state that, among other reasons, we should do away with scale because attempts to define it create confusion is akin to claiming geography itself should be abandoned. Additionally, while Marston and colleagues attempt to offer a flat ontology as a way to escape scale privileging, they actually privilege the local, or where one is standing (Herod 2010). Moreover, essentially stating that all positions are unique – and therefore none is privileged – harkens back to Keith and Pile (1993b, 6) and their questioning that "every reading of a specific landscape is either of equal value or of equal validity." By beginning research as some location or some scale or some place is, by definition, privileging, but allows us to root our work in a starting point, even if we are to take Marston and her colleagues' advice and eliminate scale altogether. For example, if we regard "race" as a biological myth, it still serves as a starting point to race-related research because "race" is a "social fact" (James 2001, 236). However, much to the chagrin of Marston and colleagues, "it appears that scale remains a vitally important concept through which to make sense of the unevenly developed absolute spaces of capitalism, even if we must remain vigilant to how out conception of it shapes how we engage
with the material world” (Herod 2010, 251). Furthermore, as Jonas (2006, 405) suggests, human geography without scale “creates a world without spatial difference or connection, devoid of identities and hierarchies of a territorial nature: in short, a world without human geography. Do we really want that?”

In the research at hand, I utilize Cox’s approach to scale in that the struggle over what it means to be “Taiwanese” is constructed by the spaces of dependence. The notion of “Taiwaneseness” is created through local, everyday interactions among the people of the Republic of China and is connected to other spaces of dependences, most notably in the PRC and the United States. The spaces of engagement occur not only at broader (the case of international sports) and narrower (the case of Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall) scales, but also at what might be considered the same (national) space (the case of presidential elections). Additionally, that debates occur at various scales also lends itself to the notion that no one debate at a given scale is truly privileged over the other. In fact, the interconnectivity of the debates suggests a process of globalization, where “the local and the global are mutually constituted” and where “other spatial scales are also deeply implicated in these events as well” (Swyngedouw 1997, 137-8).

But it is equally important to keep in mind Moore’s call to focus on the practice of scale rather than scale as an analytical tool. Much like how “nationhood” is the practice of making a “nation,” these three cases are practices in making “Taiwaneseness.” It is not the “Taiwanese” identity per se that is being researched but how that identity is constructed. In this way, it is not a plug-and-play scenario where the cases are simply plugged into “scales” and thereby predicated on a given scale, but that scale serves as the arena at which these debates occur. Thus, scale is not a given in this research, but simply one of many ways in which the construction of and debate over Taiwanese identity take place.

Finding a Surrogate: Surrogation and Identity

Another theory utilized in this dissertation is surrogation, which is part of the construction of memory after the death of a person. “The process of surrogation is a key mechanism through which collective social memory and cultural identity are reproduced” (Lambert 2007, 358). While collective social memory has been studied by many geographers, surrogation provides a novel perspective on the topic. Surrogation attempts to explain how a community or state attempts to fill in voids caused by death. However, this is a continuous
process. “The process of surrogation does not begin or end but continues as actual or perceived vacancies occur in the networks of relations that constitutes the social fabric. Into the cavities created by loss through death or other forms of departure . . . survivors attempt to fit satisfactory alternates” (Roach 1996, 2).

Roach’s use of surrogation is primarily concerned with performance with what he refers to as the circum-Atlantic. However, this theory also draws on the work of Pierre Nora (1989) and places of memory. To Roach, these places of memory, or what he refers to as “vortices of behavior,” work to “canalize specified needs, desires, and habits in order to reproduce them.” In the process, these places help construct a landscape that provides potential surrogates to be designated for the construction of public memory. In Roach’s application, the vortices of behavior create the “circum-Atlantic cityscape – the grand boulevard, the marketplace, the theater district, the square, the burial ground – where the gravitational pull of social necessity brings audiences together and produces performers (candidates for surrogation) from their midst” (28).

Lambert (2007) applies Roach’s theory of surrogation to Barbados and the commemoration of the 1816 slave rebellion, led by a slave named Bussa. A statue commemorating Bussa was erected in 1986 and he was listed as a National Hero of Barbados in 1998. Lambert (363) notes that Bussa serves as a surrogate in three ways:

he is a substitute for all the people who have suffered and died under slavery, whose histories have been marginalized and whose stories are irrecoverable . . . he stands in for Africa in a historically creolized culture searching for its diasporic roots; and . . . he represents a resistant tradition in a supposedly politically quiescent society.

Essentially, Lambert argues that the legacy of Bussa and his commemoration is used to fill voids in the narratives of marginalized peoples (Black Caribbeans and Africans).

It is argued here that since the loss of international standing, Taiwan has attempted to use surrogates to fill the voids created by this loss of status. An initial step in this process has been the creation of the “Chinese Taipei” moniker, which has not only allowed Taiwan to participate in the Olympic Games but other international competitions as well. The pattern of voting in Taiwan’s presidential elections, including the 2000 and 2004 victories by opposition leader Chen Shui-bian, suggests a different type of surrogation. In this case, because of the opposition DPP’s association with the notion of formal independence and disassociation with the mainland, the
surrogate becomes the party platform itself and its manifestation in the voting pattern. Thus, the south becomes a geographic surrogate that, to use Lambert’s (2007, 363) words, “represents a resistant tradition in a supposedly politically quiescent society.” The renaming of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall also serves as a surrogate in that it attempts to represent those that have been marginalized (i.e., the native Taiwanese) and replace the old regime.

However, surrogation does not always correspond neatly with the needs of those seeking a surrogate. Roach notes that surrogation is rarely successful and it takes many trials and errors to find the proper substitution. “The intended substitute either cannot fulfill expectations, creating a deficit, or actually exceeds them, creating a surplus” (1996, 2). Lambert (2007) notes that Bussa was both a deficient and an excessive surrogate. In terms of the former, there was not enough historical evidence to suggest that Bussa was the leader of the Barbadian rebellion and thus it is questionable to elevate him to National Hero status. Bussa is also an excessive surrogate because he was elevated above other slaves who also played an important role in Barbadian history. Excessive surrogates can also be problematic as it may create “new ruptures in the collective social and cultural identity by expanding existing cavities through their excessive presence or destabilizing performances” (Lambert 2007, 367). With regards to the three Taiwanese case studies, each one tends to represent a deficit as none have fully met the expectations of its attempted substitution. But also, especially with regards to the renaming of the Chiang Kai-shek memorial, these surrogates can be held as being “excessive” because of the expansion of pre-existing “cavities.”

Roach writes of other problems that arise with surrogation. He notes that “the surrogate-elect may prove to be a divisive choice, one around whom factions polarize, or the prospective nominee may tap deep motives of prejudice and fear, so that even before the fact the unspoken possibility of his or her candidacy incites phobic anxiety” (1996, 2). Not only can the surrogate-elect and therefore the process of surrogation be divisive, but the process occurs in “a climate of heightened anxiety that outsiders will somehow succeed in replacing the original peoples” (6). It is during this time of a community’s “most consequential single loss” that the potential for marginality exists. Hence, the need for finding a suitable surrogate becomes important. But, while surrogation should be a rallying point, the “sense of affiliation pervades the community.” This pervasion is because of disagreements over the proper surrogate, with various “anxieties
and uncertainties about what the community should be – contradictory emotions that focus a range of potentially phobic responses on the body of the deceased” (39).

While surrogation is not a theory that is found widely in the geographic literature, it is beginning to be incorporated. Alderman (2010) uses the theory in his research on the politics of remembering slavery in Savannah, Georgia. He notes how “marginalized social actors and groups can use memorials and monuments to challenge dominant narrations of the past” (90). Alderman’s examination of the politics of remembering slavery focuses predominantly on the inscription on the African-American Monument in Savannah, which was proposed by Abigail Jordan and originally written by author Maya Angelou. Some in Savannah, including those among the black community, held the inscription as an “excessive surrogate.” While the monument attempts to “embody those who suffered and died under slavery and their previously marginalized histories” (94), the monument fails at completely filling the void created by loss because of its contentious nature.

While Lambert and Alderman, more so than Roach, use surrogation as a means to understand the remembrance on slavery, it is posited here that surrogation is a valid theory in understanding how marginalized groups attempt to maintain their voice and construct identities when a previous identity is “lost” or “dies.” Marginality can arise when previous standing, such as international recognition, is lost thereby creating a void. The more marginalized a country or group becomes, the more it searches for surrogates to replace its former position. However, by doing so, the chosen surrogate might not complete fill the void – or even exceed expectations – and become a point of contention.

In terms of Taiwan, the fear of marginality exists. Since former U.S. President Richard Nixon helped start the normalization of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan has seen the number of states recognizing it as the entity representing “China” steadily dwindle. According to the Republic of China’s Government Information Office (2010), Taiwan has diplomatic relations with only 23 foreign states, including Panama, Paraguay and the Vatican City. While Taiwan maintains missions in a number of other states, including the United States, this lack of international recognition makes it difficult for Taiwanese officials and citizens to gain legitimacy in the global community.

Due to the low number of states that recognize Taiwan, the ROC’s territorial claims of the mainland and its international legitimacy is at best on life support and at worst dead. But the
government on the island has not stopped searching for ways to maintain itself on the international stage. What it has done is simply to replace the old (and dead) claims of territorial legitimacy to the mainland with claims of legitimacy of the island of Taiwan as an entity separate from the PRC. This is where the theory of surrogation can be applied.

The move to remain a part of the Olympic Games was a reaction to the marginalization of Taiwan in the international community. The presidential elections in Taiwan and the renaming of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall were both reactions by native Taiwanese and independence supporters to avoid marginalization, despite being the ethnic majority. However, all three of these surrogates are divisive as disagreement continues of the proper representation of Taiwan in the Olympic Games and other international competitions. The election issues and monument renaming display divisiveness in the fact that the opposition party was voted out in 2008 and the name change was later reversed.

**Conclusion**

This chapter serves as a backdrop to much of the theories and background that I rely on to help craft this research, as well as tie together the various debates over Taiwanese national identity. Identity is an important part of defining exactly who we are as human beings. And yet, identity is not a given; identities are always constructed, debated and negotiated. Identity is not a single, static snapshot but part of a larger, incomplete and ongoing process. That identity is a process rather than a state leaves it open to debate that plays out on the cultural landscape. These freeze-frames of identity processes – be it a memorial, electoral patterns, or sports representations – allow us to analyze these debates in an effort to better understand how identity is crafted.

This chapter also provides background on the theories and literature used with regards to the three cases studies presented within this dissertation. Theories concern monuments and public memory, electoral geography, and sports identity are used to enrich the case studies and provide an understanding of the battle over control of Taiwanese national identity. Furthermore, the above lays out the two theoretical frameworks – scale and surrogation – that helps tie together the case studies and bring the larger identity debate into clearer view.

The following chapters cover the three case studies, starting with the National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall and the proceeding to presidential elections in Taiwan and then
international sports and Taiwan. After the case studies, Chapter Seven will connect the cases together through the concepts of surrogation and scale.
CHAPTER THREE

METHODS TO THE MADNESS

"The purpose of learning is to help the world."

Chiang Kai-shek (1974, 59)

This dissertation derives predominantly from a qualitative methodological approach. This method was chosen over quantitative methodologies or even a liberally mixed approach because quantitative methods did not appear feasible.

The overarching theme of this dissertation is that of identity, in particular the national identity of Taiwan and the process of constructing that identity. Cornell and Hartman (2007, 169) note that identity is "neither 'natural' nor static . . . but are variable, diverse, and contingent." They take a constructivist approach, noting that primordial concepts of identity take an identity-as-given perspective while circumstantialism arose from contexts. This is to not state that each of the latter two concepts lacks importance. For example, Cornell and Hartman (58), citing anthropologist Clifford Geertz, write that primordialism does not necessarily root identity in blood (i.e., as given).

[T]he primordiality of ethnicity and the emotional charge it often carries lie not in the 'givens' of social life, but in the significance group members attach to them. . . . [I]nstead of beginning with blood ties that, in turn, produce an ethnic identity that therefore has power, we begin with an identity that we claim is rooted in ties of blood, and we thereby give it power.

While primordiality is often related to blood ties, identity itself is not primordial but constructed out of the primordiality of ethnicity. For Cornell and Hartman (75-6), the constructionist approach is able to reconcile both the primordial and the circumstantialist approaches. This approach "accepts the fundamental validity of circumstantialism, while attempting to retain the key insights of primordialism, but it adds to them a large dose of activism: the contribution groups make to creating and shaping their own – and others' – identities."
For the purposes of this research, I take a constructivist approach to identity. By choosing this approach, the focal point of this dissertation is how identity is constructed and contested. Or, to frame it within the context of Taiwan, I am not researching Taiwanese identity per se inasmuch as I am researching how Taiwanese identity is constructed. The case studies used in this dissertation serve as examples for how "Taiwaneseness" is constructed and debated.

Case Studies

When deciding how to approach Taiwaneseness, I use case studies as a method for examining the "critical sites" of identity construction (Cornell and Hartman 2007). With multiple case studies – in this research there are three – there is the potential to not only offer various examples of the manifestations of Taiwaneseness, but also ensure rigor in that a given case study is not an isolated instance of a critical site for Taiwanese identity construction. Although each case of identity construction in Taiwan may not have a direct role in the construction that takes place in another case, the case studies each play a role in the larger debate over Taiwanese identity. Each case study reflects an instance where this identity is debated and influences the concepts that constitute "Taiwanese." Identity is not a given in each of these case studies but is produced through each case study and is thereby imbued with power. The case studies become sites of contestation through which identity is constructed and debated.

Taiwan/Republic of China is the case study in how these debates are manifested at various scales. Taiwan was chosen for this dissertation for three reasons – two academic and one personal. First, Taiwan offers an example of the contentious nature of national identities and, in this case, what it means to be "Taiwanese." Certainly many countries face questions over national identity and what it means to be a citizen of that country. Most of those countries, however, are "established" states that enjoy widespread international recognition. While countries like the United States, United Kingdom and Japan face national identity questions ranging from political policies (Montopoli 2010; Fitzgerald 2011) to religious laws (Porter 2008; Fernandes 2009; Namazie 2010) to naturalized citizens (The Japan Times 2005), what makes Taiwan unique and worthy of inquiry is that it approaches these debates over national identity during a time where the international status of Taiwan is also debated. As noted above, Taiwan is officially recognized by only 23 countries. This lack of international recognition adds a level of complexity to the debate unseen in national identity constructions in other countries.
Second, related to the justification above, the loss of international standing related to the United Nations stripping Taiwan of the "China" seat in 1971 left the island in search of a "replacement" identity. Prior to the recognition change from the United Nations and the shift in policies from the West, Taiwan carried a "Chinese" identity that associated it not only with the mainland but also as the legal claimant to all Chinese territory. The shift in international attitude during the 1970s and 1980s stripped Taiwan of that identity. Since that time, Taiwan has searched, debated and constructed an identity to replace its lost identity, one that is become more rooted in Taiwan rather than mainland China. This search for a "new" identity is a search for a surrogate that attempts to fill the void created by the decline in international recognition of Taiwan. However, surrogation rarely succeeds in filling that void, either falling short of expectations or even exceeding its potential (Roach 1996). As explained in Chapter 7, Taiwan has faced many obstacles in finding a suitable surrogate. Nevertheless, Taiwan provides an example for the use of surrogation in conjunction with national identity and offers new surrogation examples that move beyond memorialization (Lambert 2007; Alderman 2010).

The third and final reason for the choice of Taiwan is due to my own personal interest in the country. In full disclosure, my wife is Taiwanese and my interaction with her piqued my interest in her home country. Her politics – she is pro-independence – do have some influence over my own positionality. I am aware of this position and the potential for my biases to influence my work. It is my charge to maintain rigor to ensure balance and legitimacy in my work and avoid influencing my results. However, I also understand that any form of research is balancing act between the so-called “God trick” of objectivity and one’s personal philosophies. That stated, I do lean towards subjectivity in that any research is conducted with an underlying agenda. In this case, I use this research to bring to light the debate over national identity for a "country" that is largely ignored as an internationally-recognized member of the community of states.

While my positionality perhaps influences my usage of the terms "state" and "country" in reference to Taiwan, the terms are also framed within their ambiguous definitions. The classical political geographic definition of a "state" offered by Glassner and Fahrer (2004, 31-2) include five criteria – land territory, permanent resident population, government, organized economy, circulation system – that Taiwan meets. The extension of this definition to include sovereignty, which Taiwan meets, and diplomatic recognition, which Taiwan may not meet, is where the
The definition of Taiwan's political status – is it or is it not legally a "state" – is another reason for focusing on Taiwan. Related to the reasons above, i.e., that Taiwan's status is ambiguous and yet it functions as any widely-recognized country, draws into question the very meaning of what exactly defines a "state." Thus, the debate over and construction of Taiwanese national identity is also a debate over the very status of "states" as Taiwan participates in virtually every facet of the global community despite its widespread lack of formal diplomatic recognition.

The issue of Taiwanese national identity will be examined through three very different yet interconnected case studies. Each of these three case studies was chosen because each reflect the complexities of debating and constructing a national identity, especially in a situation where the status of that country is in question. To be sure, there are other potential case studies from Taiwan that could help build a similar argument – Taiwan's role in the "Cold War," the change of the "China" seat at the United Nations, the marginalization of its indigenous population, Japanese colonization, and territorial disputes over the Spratly Islands, to name a few. Thus, while the three case studies are not the only cases that illustrate the debate over identity, the cases are a part of a larger discourse over what constitutes "Taiwaneseness." The case studies chosen also occur at three different geographic "scales," giving the research a scalar approach. This scalar approach aids in showing how these debates are not necessarily scale-specific but occur at multiple levels, with various interests involved.
Case Study 1: National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall

Originally named the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, this monument to the late KMT and ROC leader became a center for controversy when opposition leaders renamed the site National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall. While the hall recently reverted to memorializing Chiang, while also maintaining the “National” in the official name, this renaming process represents a challenge to the status quo in Taiwan. The push by opposition leaders of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to remove elements of Chiang’s legacy from the Taiwanese landscape represents a spatial challenge to the policies and rule of the KMT. The broader effort to dictate the public memory on the Taipei landscape relates to attempts to define "Taiwaneseness." The case study of the memorial hall is an example of this debate that places the legacy and memory of Chiang Kai-shek squarely within the questions of what it means to be Taiwanese.

Case Study 2: Presidential Elections in Taiwan

The second case study is presidential elections in Taiwan. Taiwan's history of direct presidential elections is quite short as the first took place in 1996. Previous to this historic election, the presidency was determined by the National Assembly of Taiwan. The move to allow direct elections also ushered in an era that allowed the Taiwanese people to challenge the long-standing rule of the KMT. It was not until the mid-1980s that opposition parties were allowed to compete for the presidency. This addition of multiple parties coupled with the direct elections led to a direct challenge to the KMT and its associated policies, including the identity of the island. With this in mind, this second case study uses the results of the four presidential elections since 1996 as a means to understand contestations over the national identity question at the national level. Because the primary political parties involved are generally characterized as representing opposite sides of the status question – KMT with the status quo and cooperation with China, DPP with independence – the election results reflect a spatialization of the identity debate. This case study not only allows for the examination of the national identity question, it also helps place the opposition movement in Taiwan as much of the DPP support is found in the southern part of Taiwan.

This dissertation primarily uses a qualitative methodology for understanding the identity dimensions of Taiwan's electoral geography. Certainly the tradition of electoral geography has
been dominated by quantitative approaches (Agnew 2002b; Leib and Quinton 2011), and thus the case study on presidential elections in Taiwan could follow a purely quantitative approach. However, electoral studies over the past 30 years have experimented with more mixed methods or completely qualitative methods (Leib and Quinton 2011). Therefore, a more qualitatively-focused approach for this research is viable. This is, of course, not to state that quantitative methods are not useful nor that qualitative approaches are superior to those that utilize statistical analyses. In fact, rudimentary use of geographic information systems (GIS) is employed in the case study on presidential elections. However, this employment is done only to organize electoral data spatial and while it does assist in painting a picture of southern Taiwan as an area of opposition, GIS is not used as a tool for in-depth analysis. The reliance on qualitative methods is due to the belief that quantitative analysis falls short in expressing the various manifestations through which Taiwanese identity is constructed and debated.

**Case Study 3: International Sports and Taiwan**

The final case study – international sports and Taiwan – provides a window into the debate over Taiwanese identity at the international scale. Taiwanese participation in the Olympic Games dates back to 1932 when the Republic of China served as the "Chinese" representative. However, since the so-called Nagoya Resolution of 1979, the ROC/Taiwan has been represented as "Chinese Taipei," a moniker that draws into question the identity of Taiwan. "Chinese Taipei" is used not only for the Olympics but also other sporting events such as the World Cup of soccer and the World Baseball Classic, as well as non-sporting organizations such as the World Bank and the Miss International Pageant. The use of "Chinese Taipei" reflects how Taiwanese identity is manifested through sports representations. The label is central to the debate over Taiwanese national identity because the name itself undermines attempts to create an identity unassociated with the Chinese mainland. However, while the use of the moniker “Chinese Taipei” reflects a certain image of Taiwan as being a part of the People’s Republic of China, it is worth noting that the decision to use this label allows Taiwan to continue its participation in international sports. Therefore, the very participation of Taiwan as "Chinese Taipei" helps position Taiwan among countries that enjoy widespread diplomatic recognition and, in essence, questions the definition of states. Additionally, the participation allows for the identity question to be placed in the international spotlight of sports.
One final note on the choice of the three case studies concerns the sports case study. As noted, sports as an academic subject has been largely ignored by geographers. It is a sad paradox given how valuable sports can be in explaining geographic phenomenon. Additionally, sports contain many inherently geographic features from the regionalization of sports to the political economic decisions of the building of sports stadia and arena to the impact of physical geography on sports. With this in mind, it is my hope that the incorporation of sports as a case study will serve as just one example of how sports can be explored critically in the discipline of geography (see, for example in other contexts, Gaffney and Mascarenhas 2005 and Gaffney 2008).

**Methods and Measures**

Much of the research is rooted in content analysis, through which I examined news articles, previous research, websites, and video. This method helped construct the background in each of the three case studies and, especially in the case of news articles, provided up-to-date resources on the fluid situations surrounding the cases. Content analysis also aids in offering a clearer understanding and resolution to the findings of the research. Interviews and questionnaires were considered but ultimately rejected as a part of this dissertation because it was not economically feasible to travel to Taiwan. Additionally, on the recommendations of a colleague, conducting interviews amongst Taiwanese citizens in the United States, in general, and in Tallahassee, Florida, in particular, was considered too restrictive. Such a method of conducting interviews would be one of convenience that may not provide a full representation of opinions. Additionally, given my own associations with the Taiwanese community in Tallahassee, the pool of interviewees would likely be biased. Thus, that option was eliminated for the current research.

Data were collected for the second case study – presidential elections. Election data was retrieved from the database maintained by the National Chengchi University in Taipei. Additional data such as ethnic composition of parties and support were taken from secondary sources such as Huang (1996) and Rigger (2001). The election data assisted in mapping out the results of the four presidential elections and visualizing social and spatial patterns of voting. The demographic data are useful in determining patterns of party performances with reference to the national identity question.
Each of the three cases studies is also examined using a theoretical body of work appropriate to the case study. These theories are discussed in depth in the previous chapter; however I will briefly revisit each here. In examining the National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, the work of Till (1999; 2003) and Johnson (1996; 2003) on memorialization and public memory is useful in framing the identity debate. Because the case study of the memorial hall deals with (re)naming, Alderman's (1996; 2000; 2006) research on street (re)naming and commemoration of Martin Luther King, Jr. is pertinent to the memorial to Chiang.

Similarly, the case study on presidential elections is also aided by the theoretical contributions of various geographers. Webster's (1992) work on the "Demise of the Solid South" is beneficial in grasping how the area of opposition in southern Taiwan formed and solidified in that region. This paper is useful in explaining the demise of Taiwan's own "solid" voting bloc, although admittedly the solid Taiwanese bloc was a result of single-party rule. In addition, Agnew (1987) offers a means of tying the power of place to the construction of oppositional identity in Taiwan. Other than geographers, research on Taiwanese politics by Bedford and Hwang (2006), Dickson (1996), Lu (2002) and Rigger (2001) helps to frame the argument regarding the ethnic and political climate of Taiwan.

The case of sports as an instrument in the national identity debate is a bit more difficult to place within the geographic literature. To be sure geographers have covered sports in the past, most notably by Bale (2003). However, the topic is still under-researched in the discipline. Hence, it is necessary to draw on scholarly sports research conducted in other disciplines, namely sociology. For example, Borucki (2003), Lutan (2005) and Jarvie (2003) are but a few scholars who use sports as a means for exploring issues of identity. Such research is useful for demonstrating how sports serve as a manifestation of the debate over Taiwanese identity. Butler's work on performativity (1990; 1993a; 1993b) also provides a way to understanding how Taiwan's "performance" as Chinese Taipei both reinforces international norms – linking Taiwan to China by way of the moniker "Chinese Taipei – and undermines conceptions of nation-states – allowing Taiwan to compete with widely-recognized countries.

To tie these three cases studies together, I rely on two theoretical bases – scale and surrogation. Scale is constructed and used to produce spaces through which Taiwanese identity is debated. Each "scale" that is constructed does not create difference, but rather it produces the interconnectivity of these debates over Taiwanese identity. In this dissertation I utilize Cox’s
(1998) approach to scale in that the struggle over what it means to be “Taiwanese” is constructed by the space of dependence. As noted above, a space of dependence is “defined by those more-or-less localized social relations upon which we depend for the realization of essential interests ... and our sense of significance” (2). While Cox focuses more on the local scale, I argue that Taiwan is a space of dependence where "Taiwaneseness" is created and realized through local, everyday interaction among the people of the Republic of China. The spaces of engagement that are used to secure the spaces of dependence occur not only at broader (the case of international sports) and narrower (the case of Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall) scales, but also at what might be considered the national scale (i.e., the case of presidential elections). Using Cox's interpretation of scale is beneficial in tying together these three examples of identity construction and viewing these case studies not as three separate, isolated cases but as parts of a larger process – the making of "Taiwaneseness."

Surrogation, a concept initially developed by Roach (1996), is part of the construction of memory after death or destruction of a person. Surrogation attempts to explain how a community or state attempts to fill in voids caused by death. This is a theory that is just recently finding its way into the geographic literature (see Alderman 2010). However, it has yet to be applied to the identity construction process of countries. Taiwan provides an excellent example of how surrogation could be used to understand the construction of identity with a country that lacks widespread international diplomatic recognition. In particular, surrogation is valuable to comprehending how the Taiwanese people have attempted to fill the void created by the loss of their international standing. Through the stripping of the "China" representation at organizations like the United Nations and the International Olympic Committee, Taiwan must fill the void of that lost recognition. What has been done is simply replacing the old (and dead) claims of territorial legitimacy to the Chinese mainland with claims of legitimacy regarding the island of Taiwan as an entity politically separate from the PRC. This is where the theory of surrogation can be applied. Thus, surrogation helps explain how these three case studies represent attempts to forge a new identity for Taiwan.

Conclusion

The goal of this dissertation is to explore the manifestations of the Taiwanese (national) identity debate. I use a qualitative approach to understand national identity in Taiwan, although some rudimentary quantitative methods are used in the mapping of election results in Taiwan.
The case studies presented in this research are but three examples of how Taiwanese identity is constructed, debated, deconstructed, disputed and scrutinized. However, while the case study approach allows for multiple examples of identity construction, it also lends itself to ignorance of counter-examples of situations where such identity debates fail to materialize. The theories of scale and surrogation tie the case studies to one another and help to better understand the processes involved as Taiwan attempts to find its identity in a world that barely recognizes it.
CHAPTER FOUR

ADDITION BY SUBTRACTION: THE RENAMING OF THE CHIANG KAI-SHEK MEMORIAL HALL

"No one is perfect. No one is useless. Everyone has his good points and his shortcomings."

Chiang Kai-shek (1974, 57)

On 7 December 2007, Taiwan officials completed the removal of four Chinese characters that adorned a gate to one of the most popular sites in Taipei. The gate, which marks the main entrance to the National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall, was given a new set of Chinese characters and with it a new name for the park that surrounds the hall. Gone was the name “Da Zhong Zhi Zheng” (“Great Mean/Perfect Uprightness”) – a phrase that is associated with the late leader – and in its place went “Ziyou Guangchang,” or “Liberty Square.” This renaming represented a culmination in the transformation of the Taipei landscape that began after Chen Shui-bian was elected president in March 2000. One of the changes that Chen advocated was the removal of the name of Chiang Kai-shek – the longtime leader of the island state – from throughout the capital city’s landscape (Hsu 2007b).

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the changing landscape of Taipei and its impact on the questions of Taiwanese identity. It is argued that this removal of Chiang Kai-shek from the Taipei landscape is closely tied to the struggle over national identity, as well as a longer standing ethnic conflict. Furthermore, this chapter will explore the battle between the local Taipei government – controlled by the dominant Kuomintang party (KMT) – and the national government under Chen’s opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The conclusion draws on the difficulties of the identity of the island state that must also incorporate its tumultuous relationship under Chiang’s leadership.
The Legacy of Chiang Kai-shek

In the midst of droughts and flooding in late 1887, Chiang Kai-shek was born in Zhejiang province in (mainland) China. Son of Chiang Shu-an and Wang Tsai-yu, the future leader of the KMT was born on 31 October 1887 and initially given the name Jui-yuan. He was later given the name Chung-cheng before he finally gained the honorific Jieshi in the early 1910s. Upon moving to Hong Kong in the 1920s, he Cantonized his name to Chiang Kai-shek, which is the name by which he is commonly known in the West (Fenby 2003; Taylor 2009).

Chiang’s father was part of family that was one of the more economically important families in the village of Xikou. Shu-an took over his father’s salt shop and he was able to turn a profit on the once failing shop. Chiang Kai-shek and his family were able to live well in a two-story merchant house even after Shu-an passed away. Only eight-years old, Chiang was left to be raised by his mother, who initially overlooked Kai-shek in favor of a more handsome younger brother. After the younger brother passed away at age four, Wang focused more of her attention on Kai-shek and a Confucian-influenced bond developed between the two (Fenby 2003; Taylor 2009).

Wang arranged a marriage for fourteen-year old Kai-shek with Mao Fumei, who gave birth to future ROC president and Chiang Kai-shek’s successor Ching-kuo (Taylor 2009). Chiang was soon be by Confucianism and began adopting anti-Manchu sentiments. Manchus, a distinct Altaic ethnicity originating from northeast China formerly known as Manchuria, controlled China from 1644 to 1911 and catered to outsiders, especially Westerners. Neo-Confucianism, which was a reaction to the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century, shaped Chiang’s philosophies because of its “emphasis on character development, self-discipline, and the conscious cultivation of the self, along with a sense of duty, courage, honor, and activism rather than passive contemplation” (Taylor 2009, 14). This philosophical influence coupled with the growing anti-foreign sentiment due to humiliating defeats to Western powers as well as Japan left a revolutionary imprint on the young Chiang (Fenby 2003; Taylor 2009).

Driven by the Qing’s reconciliatory response to the West, many revolutionary-minded Chinese joined secret societies known in the West as “Triads.” Sun Yat-sen, often referred to as the founding father of the Republic of China, joined a branch of the Three Harmonies Society before starting the Revitalize China Society. Revolutionaries used secret societies in order to
ensure survival and organize resistance. These gangs also recruited new members, which is how Chiang Kai-shek became associated with secret societies (Booth 2008). Chiang developed a close relationship with Green Gang member Du Yuesheng, who was right-wing and anti-communist. The activities of the Green Gang, including the opium trade, financed much of the Republic of China’s budget (Martin 1995; Booth 2008). The secret society also carried out arrests of people suspected of being communist, extortion and the creation of the “Blue Shirts,” which were based on Mussolini’s Black Shirts (Booth 2008).

In 1908, Chiang joined Sun Yat-sen’s Alliance Society (Tongmenghui), the precursor to the Kuomintang. Once the Qing were overthrown, Chiang joined Sun in founding the KMT and the Republic of China. After the death of Sun in 1925, Wang Jingwei took over as chair of the KMT with Chiang taking a position in the top triumvirate. However, after the Northern Expedition to unite all of China, Chiang turned against Wang, who called for cooperation with the Communist. On 12 April 1927, Du Yuesheng aided Chiang in a massive purge that left many communist supporters either jailed or dead. Chiang set up a government in Nanjing, one that rivaled the weaker government established by Wang. However, after Wang surrendered and joined Chiang’s government, the KMT faced resistance from the countryside, coordinated primarily by the communists. This resistance resulted in the Chinese Civil War, interrupted by the second Sino-Japanese War, and eventually the 1949 retreat of the KMT and the Nanjing government to Taiwan (Taylor 2009). However, prior to the move, Chiang orchestrated the writing of a new constitution in 1947 and become the first president of the Republic of China (Fenby 2003; Taylor 2009).

In 1929, the Republic of China entered into a civil war, with the government led by Chiang fighting against the Communist Party and its leader Mao Zedong. After a brief cease-fire to deal with the Japanese threat, the civil war resumed in 1945 and by 1949 the communist regime had taken control of the mainland. In response, Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT party fled to the island of Taiwan. Mao soon established the People’s Republic of China as the legitimate government of China, leaving Chiang, the KMT and the Republic of China confined to Taiwan. And while Chiang and the KMT had initially hopes of reclaiming the mainland, over time the balance of political, economic, and diplomatic power shifted to the People’s Republic of China and a military takeover of the mainland by the Republic of China became increasingly less feasible (Eastman 1981; Dickson 1993; Bedford and Hwang 2006).
On the island, Chiang Kai-shek implemented martial law, postponed legislative elections, and banned all political parties with the exception of the KMT. Prior to the KMT’s move to Taiwan, Chiang’s government suppressed opposition in Taiwan, including playing a role in the 228 Incident. On 27 February 1947, violence and protest erupted in the southern Taiwanese city of Kaohsiung after KMT officials confiscated cigarettes and money from a tobacco vendor, who was beaten and arrested. With anti-KMT sentiment already building, the arrest sparked outrage and riots. The following day, after attempting to link the protests to pro-Japanese and Communist factions, Chiang sent military personnel to quell the riots. The result was upwards of 30,000 Taiwanese killed and an increase in anti-KMT sentiment, especially in southern Taiwan (Wu 1995; Rigger 2001; Taylor 2009). As I demonstrate later in this chapter and in the following one, the 228 Incident continues to influence Taiwanese identity.

While there were land reforms and economic growth, namely switching to an export-oriented economy, under Chiang (Cumings 1985), much of his rule could be best characterized as authoritarian. He implemented an emergency decree that allowed him to circumvent term limits, criticism of the government was all but forbidden, and civil spies were used to monitor the people of Taiwan. Additionally, statues of Chiang Kai-shek were placed in public spaces throughout the island. Although supplementary elections did expand under Chiang’s rule, credit generally goes to his son Chiang Ching-kuo rather than the elder Chiang (Wu 1995).

By the time Chiang Kai-shek passed away on 5 April 1975, he had become a polarizing figure, either beloved as a champion for mainlanders and those who advocated reclaiming all of China or despised as a ruthless dictator who attempted to undermine Taiwanese consciousness. His goal of retaking the mainland connected his legacy and his party to an identity that promoted a Chinese (i.e., mainland) identity over a Taiwanese one. The controversy surrounding Chiang Kai-shek’s public memory plays out on the landscape of Taipei through the National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall.

**The Founding of the (National) Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall**

Motions to build a memorial to Chiang Kai-shek began almost immediately after his death. The Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall Preparatory Committee was established to determine the location for such a monument. In July 1975, the Preparatory Committee chose a site in present-day Zhongzheng District, which is named after Chiang Kai-shek and is home to
most national government buildings, national museums and the national theater. After inviting architects from throughout the world to design the memorial, the Committee narrowed the choices to Taiwanese architect Yang Cho-cheng, who also designed several other famous landmarks in Taiwan. Groundbreaking for the memorial took place on 31 October 1976, which would have been Chiang’s 90th birthday, and on 5 April 1980, the fifth anniversary of Chiang’s death, the memorial officially opened (National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall website 2010).

Figure 4-1: National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall

The memorial hall is located in a park previously known as Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Square, which predates the hall itself and covers just over 59 acres. The main gate to the hall is on the western side and was originally adorned with the characters 大中至正 (Da Zhong Zhi Zheng, or “Great Mean/Perfect Uprightness”). The hall, which is approximately 230 feet tall, is situated at the opposite end of the park. The hall itself is white with an eight-sided, blue-tiled roof, resembling traditional Chinese architecture (Wakeman 1985). Within the hall is a large, bronze statue of Chiang (Wakeman 1985; TravelTaipei 2010; National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall website 2010). The hall is replete with symbolism, including the characters 大中至正 embossed on the ceiling tiles of the hall museum’s lobby and the painting of the Blue Sky with a White Sun – the national emblem of the Republic of China – on the ceiling of the main hall.
However, under the presidency of Chen Shui-bian, changes came to the massive memorial to the late KMT leader. These alterations reflect not only changes to the political landscape of Taiwan, but also the emergence of the vicarious debate over Taiwanese identity via the memorial.

**Renaming of CKS Memorial Hall**

Attempts to rename the memorial are rooted in the battle between the two main political factions in Taiwan – the Pan-Blue Coalition and the Pan-Green Coalition. The former coalition is led by the KMT, whose party color is blue, while the latter is led by the DPP, whose party color is green (Chu 2004). These coalitions represent two different sets of opposing ideologies. The Pan-Blue Coalition tends to seek more economic, social and cultural cooperation with China while the Pan-Green Coalition tends to push for less cooperation and even *de jure* political independence from the mainland. Furthermore, the Pan-Blue Coalition, namely the KMT, is generally held as the association of the *waisheng*, or mainland Chinese, while the Pan-Green Coalition is viewed as representing native Taiwanese. Because of this division, disputes between the DPP and the KMT are often held as being “ethnic,” although the KMT often claims any ethnic conflict is politically-driven by the opposition (Bedford and Hwang 2006).

Because of Chiang’s ties to the KMT, the Pan-Blue Coalition supports the memorial hall maintaining the name of the former leader, although they do not necessarily support the political views or parties of Chiang. However, the Pan-Green Coalition opposes the use of Chiang’s name in association with Taiwan. They view Chiang not only as a representative of mainland China, but also as a dictator who ruthlessly ruled Taiwan (Chuang 2007). Under the presidency of Chen Shui-bian, DPP leaders successfully removed Chiang Kai-shek’s name from the main Taipei international airport (it is now referred to as Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport). After the renaming of the airport in September 2006, Chen passed legislation that called for the removal of statues of Chiang Kai-shek from all military bases by 28 February 2007. The move to rename the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall is just another step in the process of removing the KMT icon from the Taipei landscape (Wang, Chang and Shih 2007).

This dispute also involves different political scales due to the fact that Taipei’s local government is ruled by the KMT while the executive branch is held by the DPP. Chen called for the renaming of the memorial and attempted to use executive powers to carry out this change.
Meanwhile, Taipei mayor Hau Lung-pin, a KMT member, attempted to withstand this pressure, claiming that the memorial falls under municipal jurisdiction and any name change mandated from above would be illegal. Nevertheless, Chen and the DPP pushed ahead with the steps to rename the memorial (Chuang 2007).

It should be noted that DPP officials initially wanted to rename the memorial while at the same time establishing a new memorial for Chiang in Dashi Township, Taoyuan County – the location of his mausoleum. The DPP cited the 1975 Organic Act, noting that the act only established a memorial to Chiang Kai-shek while stating nothing of where to locate it (Wang, Chang and Shih 2007). While indecision on this (re)establishment of the memorial persisted, Chen and his cabinet took action to rename the existing memorial. On 17 April 2007, Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall was demoted to a “fourth tier” government organization. This designation is important because under the 2004 Basic Law of the Organization of Central Government Agencies, first and second tier organizations require “organic acts” from the legislature in order to alter or change a site. Third and fourth tier organizations require “organic regulations,” which are under the jurisdiction of the central government (Taiwan News 2007). Because the KMT still controlled the legislature and was therefore opposed to a name change for the memorial, this designation allowed the DPP-controlled central government to move forward with the name change. On 19 May 2007, by decree of an organic regulation, Chen Shui-bian announced that the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall had been renamed the National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall. The resolution also placed the site under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education (Taiwan News 2007; Loa and Wang 2007).

Strong opposition arose despite Chen’s careful maneuvering to bypass the KMT and push the name change. Taipei Mayor Hau claimed that the move was strictly politically-driven, stating that the renaming put “political ideology ahead of people's rights” (Chuang 2007). On 22 May 2007, Hau declared that the memorial was a municipal cultural heritage site and threatened to fine and jail anyone who attempted to alter the site. Hau also claimed that the site was protected under the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act. In response, Education Minister Tu Cheng-sheng countered this designation by declaring the site a national cultural heritage site and therefore overriding the municipal designation (Young 2007). While Mayor Hau and the KMT were unable to stop the official name change, they were successful in removing a large banner declaring the name change from the side of the memorial hall (Mo 2007a). Hau also refused to
change the names of signs and subway maps, claiming that it would cost over NT$8 million (US$230,000) (Chuang 2007).

In November 2007, when it was announced that the park surrounding the memorial would be renamed “Liberty Park” – and subsequently “Ziyou Guangchang” would replace “Da Zhong Zhi Zheng” on the main gate – KMT opposition resurfaced (Mo 2007b; Shih 2007). Hau continued to resist name changes, while Lee Yung-ping, director of Taipei’s Department of Cultural Affairs pushed through legislation stipulating that the designation or abolition of heritage sites by the city could not be influenced by the central government’s designation or revoking a historical site’s status. She threatened to fine anyone who attempted to rename the main gate. Once again, the DPP stepped in when Premier Chang Chun-hsiung passed a resolution overriding municipality powers. When the main gate was renamed on 8 December 2007, Lee slapped an NT$1 billion (US$31,000) fine on the Ministry of Education (Hsu 2007a).

The debate over the name change was also conducted among Taiwanese citizens as well. Supporters of the name change labeled protesters as “idiotic leftover garbage of an authoritarian regime.” One supporter who claimed that he had already drank “a few beers” threatened to
“punch those damn China-lovers in the face” (quoted in Hsu 2007a). Protesters to the name change tended to voice their displeasure at those workers who were removing “Da Zhong Zhi Zheng” from the main gate. One protester called the act “despicable” and yelled to a worker that if he did not stop then the worker “would fall to [his] death and [his] house will be burnt to rubble” (ibid.). Some citizens attempted to take a middle ground; “It's a dictator's name and we shouldn't have that kind of government, but this is also a landmark and you shouldn't dismantle it” (quoted in Jennings 2007).

Regardless, Chen and the DPP were successful in renaming the memorial hall. However, Chen did not have much time to celebrate his erasure of Chiang Kai-shek from the Taipei landscape. With term limits in effect Chen’s presidency was soon coming to an end and with it the potential for the name changes to be reversed.

**Back to the Future: Renaming the National Taiwan Democracy Hall**

In March 2008, KMT-nominee and former Taipei mayor Ma Ying-jeou defeated DPP nominee Frank Hsieh to capture Taiwan’s presidency. With this victory, the KMT controlled both the legislative and executive branches, as well as the Taipei municipal government. Even before becoming president, Ma suggested that the memorial should return to its original name, as well as returning “Da Zhong Zhi Zheng” to the main gate. Once elected, Ma continued to crusade for the return of the original name, but stated that he would first seek public opinion before moving forward with yet another renaming (Lu 2008; The China Post 2009a).

Despite claims that public opinion would be taken into consideration, no such survey took place. Education Vice Minister Lu Mu-lin claimed that such a debate would likely increase tensions between the two factions (Wang 2009). On 22 August 2008, Ma’s cabinet passed a measure to change the hall’s name from National Taiwan Democracy Hall to National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. By January 2009 Ma and the KMT decided that the original Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall plaques would be return; a move that was completed in July 2009 (Wang 2009; The China Post 2009a).

While Chiang’s name was returned to the hall, the park that houses the memorial maintains the name “Liberty Park,” a move DPP politicians have claimed is ridiculous. DPP legislator Lin Shu-fen said “How can he even suggest putting the word ‘liberty’ in the same space where people go to worship a dictator that murdered so many people? There was no such
thing as freedom under Chiang’s rule. It would be a total insult to Taiwan’s hard-won democracy” (Hsu 2008). DPP chairperson and 2012 presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen (2009) questioned this use of “public resources” to commemorate a “dictator” as a "national hero, while those who were killed . . . have been forgotten and disappeared quietly from history." The reference to Chiang as a dictator is not surprising given that Chen used the same label to describe the late KMT leader (Ko and Shih 2007). For DPP members, juxtaposing “liberty” with Chiang’s legacy contradicts the sentiment that drove the purging of Chiang’s name from Taipei’s landscape, as well as the move to distance the island from the mainland. This latter notion and how the renaming of the memorial hall reflects the deeper debate over identity is the concern for the remainder of this chapter.

**Memorializing Chiang, Memorializing Democracy: Renaming, Reputational Politics and Identity**

A Chinese tourist visiting Taiwan was puzzled over the fervor surrounding the name change of the memorial hall: “It's just a name or two; why there should be much ado about nothing” (as quoted in *The China Post* 2007)? However, as Azaryahu (1992; 1993), Alderman (2000; 2003) and Yeoh (1992) have demonstrated, names and the naming process have much ado about something.

In writing about the street-naming process in Singapore, Yeoh (1992) notes that the power of street naming rests on the control over meaning. While street naming in Singapore served in part as a way to create order and, in some ways community pride, the process also served to imprint the dominant colonial forms of thought onto Singaporeans. Because the process of street naming was controlled by municipal and government officials, those who lived on the street had little say with regards to the naming. Streets were utilized to create not only an unofficial segregationist policy, but the geography of colonial Singaporean streets hinted at colonial linkages to other parts of Southeast Asia. Streets such as Malacca Street, Rangoon Road and Manila Street reflect European colonization in general and the British Empire in particular.

As Leitner and Kang (1999) demonstrate, a similar street-naming process occurred on the island of Taiwan. Once the KMT fled the mainland for the island, streets in Taipei were renamed to reflect similar street names in China. To call the KMT’s renaming process a reflection of dominant *colonial* thought might be inaccurate, but such a move did reflect a
transplanting of Chinese consciousness at the expense of Taiwanese consciousness. Those in power, in this case Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT, were able to control the naming process and thereby control meaning on the Taipei landscape.

After the death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, plans crafted by the KMT-dominated government were put into place to build a memorial to Chiang. By placing a memorial to Chiang Kai-shek on the Taipei landscape, those in a position of power, namely KMT officials, were able to construct a particular meaning on that landscape. Because of Chiang’s role as the leader of the KMT and the close correlation of the KMT with the central government (e.g. “Nationalist China” in reference to the ROC), the memorial to Chiang also serves as a memorial to the KMT. This connection to the Nationalist party is seen literally in the memorial itself, as the colors of blue and white were chosen to reflect the primary colors of the Kuomintang (Wijesinghe 2010). Additionally, while the Blue Sky with a White Sun is the national emblem of the ROC, it is also the emblem of the KMT. Thus, its usage on the main hall’s ceiling as well as the engraving of the White Sun on the northwest ramp embeds the KMT symbolism on the memorial. By extension, the memorial serves as a celebration of Chiang’s legacy, including the KMT goal of returning to China rather than establishing a full-fledged government of the island. Thus, the memorial serves to promote Chinese consciousness rather than Taiwanese consciousness. To put the issue another way, Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall reflects onto the Taipei landscape an identity that Taiwan is a part of the mainland rather than a separate entity.

Because of this physical construction of a KMT-based identity in Taipei, the attempts to change the name of the memorial hall by the Chen administration attempted to erase elements that he and the DPP believed undermine Taiwanese identity. The public discourse over the memorialization of Chiang Kai-shek is rooted in reputational politics (Fine 1996; 2001). As Fine (2001, 3) notes, “reputations are collective representations enacted in relationships. A reputation is not the opinion that one individual forms of another; rather, it is a shared, established image. Reputations are embedded within social relations.”

Fine highlights four domains through which these reputations operate: personal, organizational, mass-media and historical. Of importance here are the latter two domains. He notes how mass-media determines which individuals to cover thereby dictating about whom the general population should care. “Subsequent media coverage results in these individuals becoming the focus of interactions among strangers: strangers to them and strangers to each
other” (4). Through this engagement, the public makes judgments of the character and motivations of particular individuals. But because the images and reputations of others are controlled through “institutionally sanctioned knowledge,” history becomes an important part of the reputation process and contributes to the construction of public memory. “The building blocks of this collective memory are ‘facts’ – ostensibly unquestioned claims about the past” (5). While Fine notes that these institutions help the public learn of the reputations of others includes schools and the media, I add that political parties also attempt to control how certain individuals are remembered and judged. Thus, both the DPP and KMT work to offer “facts” about and representations of Chiang Kai-shek that further their own political agendas.

The reputation of Chiang Kai-shek falls under what Fine (2001, 10-11) labels as a “difficult reputation” – one that is not “positive or stable.” Fine writes of three types of difficult reputations – negative reputations, which “attributes negative traits or characteristics to an individual”; contested reputations that “are in the process of being formed . . . or re-formed”; and individuals with more than one reputation (“subcultural reputations”). While Chiang’s reputation could be categorized as subcultural – the DPP and KMT both view his reputation as though he is two different people – his reputation is best described as contested. Additionally, because of what he represents to the respective parties, his contested reputation also reflects the contested nature of Taiwanese national identity.

Both supporters and opponents of Chiang Kai-shek attempted to “cobble together the ‘facts’ of history to create renditions of reality” (Fine 1996, 1160). While members of the Pan-Blue coalition attempt to portray Chiang as a hero, Pan-Green members challenge the public memory of Chiang and paint him as, in Fine’s words, a “failure.” In an effort to control history and interpret Chiang Kai-shek through a different lens, Chen Shui-bian and the DPP became “reputational entrepreneurs” in order to transform “persons into moral” (1186). In other words, it is not necessarily Chiang himself that is the target but his legacy and what he represents to the Pan-Green members – a dictator who suppressed democratic movements and consolidated power. This is similar to how a debate over a mural in Richmond that included Robert E. Lee was “more than just a debate over Lee;” the renaming of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall was a debate “over the changing nature of power and public memory” in Taiwan (Leib 2004, 255). Therefore, the removal of Chiang’s name from his own memorial reflected more on the erasure of Chiang’s legacy and connections to the mainland than it did the removal of Chiang the person.
Additionally, reputational politics comes into play with the reversion to include Chiang’s name in the memorial. Fine (1996, 1162) writes that the process of fading the person into the background and promote the “failings” of what that person represents requires general consensus. “To be recognized as a failure suggests the absence of supporters who propose a historical justification for one’s positive reputation.” While even current Taiwanese president Ma recognized Chiang’s role in the 228 Incident, a move that reflects negatively on Chiang, Pan-Blue members including Ma continue to support a generally positive narrative of the late leader. The restoration of Chiang’s name to the hall despite the irony of his association with Liberty Square reflects this positive narrative. The KMT as a party stand as reputational entrepreneurs that came to the defense of Chiang and his legacy.

As noted above, this purge of Chiang Kai-shek from the Taiwanese landscape extended to the naming of Taipei’s international airport and also included the removal of the numerous statues of the late leader. To change the name of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall is to change the meaning it has on the landscape. Just as African and Asian states following independence often changed the names of cities, the changing of the memorial’s name by the DPP serves as a reaction towards the KMT’s version of social memory and converts the hall to a celebration of democracy in Taiwan. In other words, it supplants a “colonial” history with more localized interpretation. In writing on the changing of personal names in Angola, Brinkman (2004) notes that it is common in parts of Angola to change one’s name with every major event in one’s life. With regards to Taiwan, Chen saw an opportunity to demonstrate a major event in the “life” of the island – a transition from the brutal, China-focused, authoritarian regime of Chiang Kai-shek to a more democratic, Taiwan-focused political climate on the island. To Chen and members of the DPP, the name change was therefore a part of the "maturation" process for Taiwan.
The choice of names used for both the memorial and the surrounding park also function as a method to challenge the legacy and memory of Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang’s rule, while instrumental in the modernization of Taiwan, was marked by an authoritarian grip that restricted free speech, disenfranchised voters, curtailed free elections at the national level, and led to the deaths of tens of thousands of Taiwanese. Thus, by removing the memories of Chiang from the landscape, Chen Shui-bian, who labeled the KMT leader a “murderer” (Ko and Shih 2007), attempted to also erase the memories of Chiang’s brutal regime. Choosing to call the memorial hall the National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall and the park “Liberty Square” serves as a way to display Taiwan’s transition from the Chiang era to one that is more politically open and more democratic. As Chen noted on 1 January 2008, “We have turned a hall that was originally
a temple at which to worship an authoritarian dictator into a place for Taiwan people to reflect, study and explore the freedoms of democracy and human rights” (as quoted in BBC News 2008).

Additionally, the site for newly-named Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall is also a significant place in the historical development of democracy in Taiwan. In a press conference following the name change, Chen stated that “The Ministry of Education considers the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall as the originating point of Taiwan's social and student movements, so Taiwanese people can come here to commemorate Taiwan's difficult road in becoming a democratic nation” (as quoted in Taiwan News 2007). Although the initial purpose of the memorial was to honor a leader who, to some, represented an oppressive regime, the site itself was still a starting point for democratic movements in Taipei. Similar to how Asians in Singapore often ignored colonial street names and used their own, Taiwanese used the site for the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall as a space to push for democracy, something that runs counter to the regime represented by Chiang and the KMT. Thus, the new name reflected how the space for the memorial was utilized and serves as a spatial reminder of the progress of Taiwan. Through reputational politics, Chen was able to cast Chiang as a negative memory on the Taiwanese landscape and argue for the removal of the late leader’s memorialization.

But if the name change to National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall represents the progress of the island, does the reversion to have Chiang’s name adorn the memorial hall represent a step backwards? Certainly DPP leaders paint the renaming of the hall in this light, but suggesting that current president Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT are attempting to celebrate the oppressive regime of Chiang would be erroneous. In justifying the KMT’s decision to revert to the memorial’s original name, hall manager Tseng Kun-ti stated that the restoration was in line with “the due process of the law” and that the Chen administration “had never completed the legal procedures before removing the [Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall] nameplate” (quoted in Chung 2009; Wang 2009b). Education Vice Minister Lu Mu-lin added that the restoration was “in line with the provisions of a number of laws” and the “the Ministry of Education needed to reinstate the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall plaque . . . to protect the dignity of our laws” (as quoted in The China Post 2009a).

Additionally, KMT leaders attempted to diversify the memory of Chiang Kai-shek by noting the cultural, economic and education contributions by Chiang (Chang 2009). For example, while Ma placed partial blame for the 228 Incident on Chiang Kai-shek, KMT
legislator Hung Hsiou-chu, whose family was a victim of the incident and who applauded Ma’s statement, also noted that “Chiang's achievements should not be forgotten and that it is only fair to judge a politician both by his credits and faults” (Taiwan News 2009). Ma made a similar statement when justifying events that celebrated Chiang Ching-kuo, noting that such events celebrated the younger Chiang’s contributions rather than the era of martial law.

[T]he series of political reforms initiated by Chiang – including lifting martial law, removing a ban on the organization of political parties, reforming the legislature, liberalizing newspapers and opening up travel to China by Taiwan citizens to visit their relatives – were all important elements forming the foundation of Taiwan's freedom and democracy nowadays (Low 2009).

Rather than focusing solely on the repressive policies and atrocities committed by the government of Chiang Kai-shek, the memorial should focus on his contributions to the modernization of Taiwan, which includes both positive and negative aspects of his legacy.

The decision to maintain the name “Liberty Square” for the park reflects a compromise offered by the KMT. In this case, the KMT leadership recognized the historical and symbolic importance of the park as a site for social protest and the struggle for democratic reform. Allowing the name “Liberty Square” to remain helps divest the entire site – park and memorial – from being solely a remembrance of Chiang Kai-shek and embraces the long, arduous process of becoming democratic. Additionally, that the KMT opted to keep “National” a part of the memorial’s name also serves as a way to overcome Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT-centric representation. By now calling the site “National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall,” the KMT attempt to construct meaning of the site as a symbol of national rather than party pride. Adding the term “National” gives an impression that the site represents all of Taiwan rather than just mainlanders and members of the KMT. In other words, by keeping “National” a part of the memorial’s name and allowing the “Liberty Square” name to remain, Ma and the KMT transformed the site from one that solely celebrates the KMT leader’s legacy to one that celebrates Taiwan’s modernization. For Ma and the KMT, reputational politics helped recast and justify the reversion of the memorial’s name to include Chiang Kai-shek.

That stated the renaming of the memorial hall still serves as a point of contention in the debate over what it means to be Taiwanese. After Chiang’s death in 1975, the KMT was able to construct a place of memory for Chiang Kai-shek that reflected not only desires of the ruling elite, but also that Chiang’s legacy and support for a one-China – represented by the ROC – was
a necessary memory to be spatialized on the Taipei landscape. After Chen Shui-bian’s 2000 victory, the opposition DPP was able to wrest away power and with it control of the country’s landscape. Through legal and political loopholes, the DPP was able to construct their own version of memory and history onto the landscape. By changing the memorial’s name to National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall, the Chen administration not only removed the memory of Chiang from the landscape, but also casts its own version of public memory onto the landscape; one that celebrates independence rather than potential subordination to the mainland. Once the KMT were able to regain control of the executive branch, the site reverted back to being a memorial to Chiang Kai-shek. However, KMT leaders compromised in hopes of avoiding the issue again in the future. Therefore, the result of the action of reputational entrepreneurs, both supporters and opponents of the renaming of the memorial hall, serves not only as a fight over the interpretation of the past, but also illustrates how the present and future are shaped (Leib 2004).

**Conclusion**

After the Chen administration renamed the memorial, KMT legislator Lin Yu-fang called on the DPP to focus on adopting “proper policies to realize democracy, rather than constantly change the names of specific buildings.” He went on to claim that “if changing the name of the CKS Memorial Hall could make Taiwan a more democratic country in substance, then I would support it. However, everyone knows that it (renaming) is symbolic and unrealistic” (Taiwan News 2007, emphasis added).

The last sentence of Lin’s statement is striking in that if renaming was simply symbolic then neither party should have become upset when the memorial hall was renamed. However, the fact of the matter is that renaming is not just a symbolic move but is a spatialization of a particular memory, in this case one involving Chiang Kai-shek. The name itself may not be more important than what the name and the memorial represents. In this case, what Chiang Kai-shek represents varies depending on the individual or group. This variation strikes at the core of the debate over Taiwanese identity.

The irony of the renaming process is that the new name of the memorial hall did not necessarily reflect the actual process in which the renaming was achieved. Because the Chen administration used methods to bypass the KMT-dominated legislature, the process used to
rename the memorial “National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall” was anything but democratic. Equally ironic is that the renaming by the KMT was also undemocratic as Ma’s administration did not seek public opinion with regards to the memorial’s name, something that Ma had promised to do once he was elected. To Ma’s credit, he did seek public opinion regarding the name of Liberty Square (*The China Post* 2009b).

The debate over the memory to be spatialized, in particular the DPP’s push to remove Chiang Kai-shek’s name from the memorial, also reflects the power struggle between the city of Taipei and the national government, a reflection of another form of scalar politics that is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Taipei’s KMT mayor Hau Lu-ping attempted to preserve the memorial as a heritage site and one that fell under the protection of the municipality. Hau’s efforts reflect an attempt to keep the legacy of Chiang Kai-shek on the landscape. Meanwhile, the moves by Chen’s administration, in particular his Education Minister Tu Cheng-sheng, circumvented Hau’s attempts to stop the name change. While Hau was unable to stop the Chen name change, he was able to protest the move by not authorizing the changing of train stops and road signs to reflect the memorial’s new name.

Names and the process of name changing play a powerful role in the growth of the political state and the formation of identity. This process should be viewed as a natural step in the formation and maturation of cultures and state. Foote, Toth and Arvay (2000, 307) state that “political iconoclasm should be treated as part of the general process through which nations build commemorative traditions.” But are such iconoclastic moves as erasing undesirable parts of Taiwan’s past from the landscape “putting political ideology ahead of people’s rights,” as Hau claims (as quoted in Chuang 2007), or is it attempting to “follow the example of post-war Germany by removing all remnants of a past dictator” as Education secretary-general Chuang Kuo-rong suggests (as quoted in Wang and Hsu 2007)?

In the case of Taiwan, the debate over the visibility of Chiang Kai-shek on the cultural landscape is one over an interpretation of history and memory. To those in the Pan-Blue Coalition and many mainland Chinese in Taiwan, Chiang is a national hero and should be revered. For these individuals, Chiang serves as a reminder of the nation that they lost and the memorial represents his legacy and a link to the mainland via the KMT’s platform. However, those in the Pan-Green Coalition and many native Taiwanese see Chiang as representative of an oppressive and brutal regime. They question how Chiang supporters can, in the words of
secretary-general Chuang, be “so obsessed and infatuated with a past dictatorship” (as quoted in Hsu 2007). Erasing Chiang from the landscape divorces the connection between the mainland and the island that is created by the memorial and Chiang’s legacy.

This debate is heavily weighted in the search for identity for the Taiwanese people – should it be associated with the mainland or associated with a sense of “Taiwaneseness.” To confuse matters more, some suggest that Chiang Kai-shek was an “accidental ally” of Beijing due to his promotion of one China and because he oppressed moves towards Taiwanese independence (Ching 2008). Like attempts in Taiwan to reappraise Chiang’s legacy, some on the mainland have begun rehabilitating the KMT’s leader’s role in the second Sino-Japanese War (Taylor 2010). Nevertheless, whether he is viewed as a hero or a villain – or something in between – it is difficult to divorce the impacts of Chiang Kai-shek from the economic and political development of Taiwan. As one KMT legislator noted, “Like him or not, Chiang is part of Taiwan’s history” (BBC News 2007).
CHAPTER FIVE

IT HAS TO START SOMEWHERE: PLACE, IDENTITY AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

"Only through unity can we save our country and our people."
Chiang Kai-shek (1974, 14)

On 23 March 1996, the Taiwanese people celebrated a monumental day in the history of the Republic of China (ROC). On that day, Kuomintang (KMT) nominee Lee Teng-hui defeated two opponents to remain the president of the ROC. This election was significant not simply because Lee was re-elected, but because it marked the first time that the Taiwanese people were able to directly elect the leader of the country.

Previous to the 1996 presidential election, the now defunct National Assembly held the responsibility of selecting the president of the ROC. The National Assembly, established in 1948 in accordance to the constitution of the ROC, only elected two presidents during its existence – Lee Teng-hui in 1988 and Chiang Ching-kuo in 1978.4 When a new National Assembly was established in 1991, the decision to abandon indirect presidential elections was made and the process towards the country’s first direct presidential elections commenced. This culminated in the historic re-election of Lee in 1996.

Since this election, Taiwan has held direct presidential elections every four years, with the most recent occurring in 2008. During the past twelve years, Taiwan experienced a shift in political parties, with the opposition Democratic People’s Party (DPP) winning both the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections. By the time a KMT candidate returned to the presidency in 2008, a clear geographic pattern had emerged among the Taiwanese electorate. While the 1996 elections in Taiwan were a landslide victory for the KMT in terms of counties and municipalities won, the 2000 elections experienced a dramatic change in the electoral geographic landscape. Due to a split in the KMT, the opposition DPP was able to garner a plurality of votes and its nominee Chen Shui-bian won the presidency. With this election, a political cleavage emerged in

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4 Yen Chia-ken, who succeeded Chiang Kai-shek, was vice president at the time of Chiang’s death and therefore ascended to president without the National Assembly electing him to the position.
the southwestern part of the island. Chen succeeded in winning reelection in 2004, where the
distinctive voting pattern from 2000 held true. With the 2008 victory by KMT nominee Ma
Ying-jeou, there was a shift back to the old guard. However, the pattern that emerged in 2000
was once again reinforced in the 2008 presidential elections.

Because political parties in Taiwan tend to carry a distinct position on Taiwan’s
international status, the emergence of such patterns are likely linked to locally-held opinions on
independence, as well as questions of identity and regional rivalries. The purpose of this chapter
is to explore the voting patterns of the four presidential elections in Taiwan and how these
patterns represent the ongoing debate over Taiwan’s international status. It seeks to further the
work done by electoral geographers linking votes and elections with debates over identity, and
add to the limited number of studies of Asian elections with the English-language electoral
geography literature (see Lee and Brunn [1996] for one example from South Korea).

The chapter begins with a history of political parties in Taiwan, followed by discussion of
the intersections of identity politics and political parties. The chapter concludes with an analysis
of the 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008 presidential elections, and suggests how place and identity are
crucial concepts in understanding the geographic patterns of these votes.

Political Parties in Taiwan.

The Origins of the Kuomintang

Since its founding, the Republic of China has been dominated by the Kuomintang (KMT),
in the capacity of the presidency, the legislature, and local offices. This dominance was so
prevalent that the KMT was synonymous with “Nationalist China,” a term used to differentiate
the ROC from the People’s Republic of China (Wright 1955).

The roots of the KMT date to the Qing Dynasty (Booth 1999). The original purpose of
the KMT was revolutionary in nature; “a revolution to establish the Republic” (KMT website
2009). Once the Republic of China was established and the KMT gained power over the
mainland in 1912, the ideology of the party shifted from one of revolution to one of state-
building. However, the wars with the Communist and with Japan made it difficult for the KMT
to establish itself internationally. Despite Western support, the Nationalists suffered numerous
losses to the Communist and eventually fled to the island of Taiwan in 1949. It was here that a new KMT ideology developed, one that continues to influence the party even today.

However, it is important to note the transformation of the KMT’s ideology did begin while the party and the ROC controlled the mainland. The switch from a revolutionary ideology of establishing a Chinese state to a restoration ideology of reclaiming the mainland was based on the need to legitimate its claim as the rightful leader of China. In this sense, the KMT felt it best to project itself as a continuation of Chinese history rather than a completely new beginning. Party officials, including Chiang Kai-shek, also sought to promote the Confucian traditions that were prevalent, albeit intermittently, throughout China’s long history (Wright 1955). Yet, the KMT’s shift was also influenced by interaction with the Soviet Union; for example, in 1924 Sun Yat-sen adopted Leninist elements from the Soviets, even going as far as to using the Soviet Communist Party as a model for reorganization (Dickson 1996). This Leninist influence played a significant role in the reorganization of the KMT once it fled to Taiwan.

The Reorganization of the KMT and Its Current Philosophies. The goal of the KMT/ROC was never to remain on the island of Taiwan, but to reorganize and retake the mainland from the Communist. But coexisting on the island with the native Taiwanese would prove to be a difficult task.

The term “native Taiwanese” refers to those people who arrived on the island previous to the ROC gaining possession of the island in 1945. Bedford and Hwang (2006, 5) note that eighty-five percent of Taiwan’s current residents have ancestors who emigrated from China three- to four-hundred years ago. . . . The remaining 13 percent of nonindigenous residents arrived in Taiwan or are descended from those who arrived in Taiwan between 1945, when Japan ended its colonization, and 1949 when Chiang Kai-shek and his armies and followers arrived.

This latter group is referred to as waisheng, which references their “foreign” nature to Taiwan. This distinction, while not necessarily visible, is an important ethnic difference that plays out in present-day Taiwanese politics. Because the KMT members were viewed as outsiders and were the minority on the island, they needed a way to consolidate power.

The KMT did little to enamor themselves with the Taiwanese in the immediate years following the end of the Pacific War. For all the negative actions that the Japanese took during the Pacific War, it is also clear that they modernized and invested in Taiwan (Cumings 1984). In fact, by the time the Japanese were forced out, Taiwan had actually advanced economically past
China. This notion was reinforced by the actions of the KMT army that arrived on the island. Due in part to low pay, the soldiers plundered the local community. Furthermore, the KMT “dismantled Taiwanese infrastructure including telephone wires, pipes, metal roofing, fire hydrants, and railroad switches and shipped everything back to the mainland to support the effort there, asserting that Taiwan’s citizens owed a debt to the KMT for liberating them from the Japanese” (Bedford and Hwang 2006, 6). As crime rates rose and the KMT took control of major industries, a feeling of resentment began to fester. The local feeling at the time is summed up best by a local saying quoted by Bedford and Hwang (ibid.) “that the dogs (who could at least protect your property) had been chased away, but the pigs (who only make a mess) had come.”

Taiwanese resentment culminated in what is known as the 228 Incident. Beginning on 27 February 1947, protests began in Taipei and spread throughout the country. The response was brutal as the Republic of China’s army, backed by the KMT, violently suppressed the uprising (Wu 1995; Cooper 1998; Huat 2001). This anti-government revolt not only galvanized Taiwanese resentment towards the KMT, but it also solidified a connection between the KMT and the mainland prior to Chiang's 1949 relocation to Taiwan. The 228 Incident “resulted in considerable bloodshed after soldiers were called from the mainland to put it down, and in its aftermath there was deep antipathy on the part of the Taiwanese toward Mainland China, the KMT, and the government” (Cooper 1998, 15). The subsequent suppression of the majority Taiwanese by the KMT left an impact that continues to define the political landscape in Taiwan. As Huat (2001, 135) notes,

> local Taiwanese suffered a regime of “white terror” under the KMT’s security apparatus, identified with the colonizing mainlanders, who constituted no more than 15 percent of the population. The terms “mainlanders” and “locals” thus became an ideological/identity/political divide providing one of the central discursive resources for the organization of opposition to the KMT and preventing the formation of a Taiwan “nation” so long as the “mainlanders” are in power.

Thus, the KMT was ascribed a mainlander identity regardless of the ethnicity of its members. Additionally, any party that came to oppose the KMT could potentially be ascribed with a Taiwanese identity.

After the ROC leadership fled the mainland for Taiwan, the KMT struggled to find its place on the island. While the KMT initially attempted to undercut identity politics by sinicizing the Taiwanese (Huat 2001), the party soon realized that it needed to adapt to its new political
environment. As Dickson (1995, 49) notes, “the main goals and tasks of the KMT changed: Rather than concentrating on plans to retake the mainland, the party devoted more of its energy to issues of immediate concern to Taiwan and its own reputation.” One way to accomplish this task was to Taiwaneseize the government, as well as the party itself, by allowing Taiwanese to join its ranks. In order to do so, the KMT utilized local elections to integrate Taiwanese into the political process. However, the central government remained in the hands of the KMT. This integration process created the façade of an all-inclusive government while maintaining the legitimacy of the ROC state (Rigger 2001). A similar tactic was repeated in the 1970s as the KMT government attempted “to maintain the legitimacy of its power” (Bedford and Hwang 2006, 7). In this case, Taiwanese elites were allowed to join the party.

Not surprisingly, this shift in attitude coincided with an international shift in recognition. KMT leadership recognized that reclaiming their political claim to the mainland would have to be put off and a new focus would need to be shift to simply maintaining some form of legitimacy. There was some relaxing of the KMT’s political control, but martial law, for example, remained in effect until the mid-1980s. Taiwaneseization of the party placed Taiwanese members into local offices and helped integrate Taiwanese, including future president Lee Teng-hui, into the central government (Dickson 1995). While change was slow, by 1985 the influx of Taiwanese members of the KMT had made a profound impact. Using data gathered by Yang (1985), Dickson (54-5) notes that “the proportion of Taiwanese among district cadres rose to 56.6 percent in 1975 and to 73.3 percent in 1985. At the county level, the proportion of Taiwanese increased from 34.5 percent to 53.9 percent between 1975 and 1985.” While some of this could be explained by the lack of immigration from the mainland – and therefore fewer mainlanders from which to choose – this pattern marks a new trend within the KMT; one implemented by Chiang Ching-kuo that differed from his father Chiang Kai-shek, who preferred mainlanders to Taiwanese. And even though the numbers of Taiwanese in the provincial cadres were not as high, the impact of locally visible Taiwanese KMT members was important. “In local offices where society came into direct contact with the party, the increased visibility of Taiwanese in party posts created at least the appearance of greater responsiveness to local wants and needs, a basic goal of the Taiwaneseization strategy” (Dickson 1996, 55).

The reign of Chiang Ching-kuo also marked a departure from the tight-fisted control demonstrated by his late father. The younger Chiang began to loosen up restrictions on
opposition parties, something that was forbidden during the era of martial law. In 1986, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was established and Chiang took “a tolerant position” (KMT website 2010). One year later, martial law was officially lifted on the island. These steps not only helped establish an opposition to the KMT, but it also provided a much louder voice for the Taiwanese people; a voice that signaled the beginning of ethnic politics.

**From Dangwai to Opposition: the Rise of the DPP**

One way the KMT kept Taiwanese from directly electing the president, or even establishing political parties, was the notion that the Republic of China was not confined solely to the island of Taiwan. Indeed the KMT-controlled ROC stressed the fact that they represented the mainland. Therefore, to allow the people of Taiwan to be the only ones selecting the leader for all of China would disenfranchise their fellow countrymen and women on the mainland. While this line of reasoning worked in the 1950s and 1960s, the changing political climate of the 1970s eroded this façade and led the KMT to reconsider its position.

Although the KMT dominated politics on the island, there were a few independent candidates who were able to break through and reach the upper echelons of the Taiwanese political hierarchy. One of the first was Kao Yu-shu (Henry Kao), who was able to defeat KMT opponents to become mayor of Taipei in 1954 and then again in 1964. Kang Ning-hsiang was able to work his way into the Legislative Yuan by 1972. Since he was not a member of the Kuomintang, he took up the moniker of a Dangwai candidate, or an “outside the party” candidate. This denotation, once held in a negative light and seen as a threat to the KMT, is an important step towards creating an organized opposition to the KMT. Although the Dangwai had its share of factionalism (Rigger 2001), the rise of Dangwai candidates in the 1970s helped stoke the fire of opposition in Taiwan. It is from this movement that the DPP gained its initial momentum.

The wave of democratization and the loosening of the authoritarian system on the island began in the early 1970s. Triggered by the supplementary elections to replace members of the Legislative Yuan who either retired or passed away, non-KMT politicians began to break into the political system. However, it would be a mistake to assume that the opposition held any power or that it was a solid cohesive unit. There were some attempts to organize the opposition movement, most notably the Dangwai and its accompanying political publication *Formosa*. The magazine set up offices throughout the island and helped create a network in which to build
opposition. The threat posed by the Dangwai via Formosa was very real in the eyes of the KMT leadership. The rising opposition and the KMT’s fear culminated in a clash in 1979 in the southern city of Kaohsiung. This incident, known as the Kaohsiung Incident or the Meilidao Incident, occurred on 10 December 1979 as opposition leaders held protests against the KMT-led government. Police, both civilian and military, responded with violence and several opposition leaders, including those that did not participate in the protest were jailed (Rigger 2001; Bedford and Hwang 2006; Wu 1995). While some of the leaders were removed from the political process, the fallout of the Kaohsiung Incident led to a rise of new opposition leaders, including Chen Shui-bian, who was an attorney for the jailed dissidents (Rigger 2001).

The Kaohsiung Incident marked a transition into a comparatively more relaxed political climate. Ching-kuo allowed for some publications to continue printing dissenting voices. One such publication was The Eighties, headed by moderate opposition leader Kang Ning-hsiang. Kang represented a more tolerable opposition in comparison to the Formosa group. However, despite the arrests and depletion of activist opposition leaders, there were still factions in the Dangwai movement that challenged the moderate position, namely the defense lawyers and a new group of radicals (Rigger 2001; Wu 1995). While some of the defense attorneys and even family members of jailed dissidents won seats in the 1980 elections, the Dangwai movement factionalized even more. Radical magazines such as Deep Plow accused the moderate Kang of having close ties with the KMT. When the two sides attempted to work together in 1983, disagreement arose about how the selection process should be conducted; moderates preferred a top-down approach while the activists favored a bottom-up method. By 1984, there were at least four factions: “the Writers and Editors Alliance, the Dangwai Public Policy Research Association (DPPRA), the Progress Faction . . . and the imprisoned Formosa Faction” (Rigger 2001, 23). The radical Writers and Editors Alliance would soon establish the New Tide Magazine, which continued to be the voice of the radical faction until 2006 when DPP factions were abolished (DPP website 2010; Rigger 2001).

Despite factionalism, the Dangwai collectively pursued the establishment of a political party. Under martial law, political parties other than the KMT were illegal. Nevertheless, the opposition recognized the importance of having a political party. In 1986, Kang established a DPPRA branch in Taipei. After that time, the opposition spent the summer carefully planning their move. On 28 September, the opposition arrived at a consensus and established the
Democratic Progressive Party. “The party represented a coalition of all camps within the Dangwai: the Mainstream Faction (or Kang Group), New Tide (formerly the Writers and Editors Alliance), and Lin Cheng-chieh’s Progress Faction. The Formosa Faction was absent at the founding only because the leading Formosa activists were still behind bars” (Rigger 2001, 25).

It is important to note that the party was founded despite the fact that such parties were illegal. However, Chiang Ching-kuo, who had advocated for reform, turned a blind eye to the DPP and held back conservative calls for prosecution (Wu 1995).

The DPP wasted little time breaking into the upper tier of the Taiwanese political system, making headway in 1986, 1989 and 1992. By March 2000, just shy of fourteen years after its founding, the DPP claimed the presidency in Taiwan’s second direct presidential election.

What does the 2000 victory by Chen Shui-bian represent for Taiwan? Or, more importantly, how does this victory reflect the identity debate in Taiwan? To answer this question, it is imperative to understand the identities of the political parties of Taiwan, namely the KMT and DPP.

**Identity Politics and Political Parties in Taiwan**

As noted above, the KMT carries with it the mainlander identity. This connotation is due in large part because of the migration of the party from the mainland to Taiwan. However, the connection runs deeper than a simple transfer of location from Nanjing to Taipei. Under Chiang Ching-kuo, the KMT went to great lengths to Taiwaneseize the party. However, events such as the 228 Incident and the Meilidao Incident injured the party’s reputation. With the KMT resembling more of a colonizer rather than fellow citizens during the early years of its rule in Taiwan, the KMT was stained with the outsider stigma. Regardless of the steps taken by Ching-kuo, Lee Teng-hui and other party leaders, the KMT continues to be linked with its association with the mainland.

The DPP, by way of comparison, is often identified as the party of the Taiwanese. The 228 Incident, which created great a rift between the Taiwanese and the mainlanders, remains an important symbol of the opposition movement. That incident came to represent the resistance against the mainlanders and, by extension, the KMT (Hsieh 2008). Through this connection to the 228 Incident, as well as the Meilidao Incident, the birth of the DPP was in direct opposition
to mainlanders as a whole, and the KMT in particular. Through these means, the DPP is identified as “Taiwanese.”

However, to differentiate the KMT and DPP solely on the basis of ethnic identity is erroneous. While the parties, especially the KMT, may have carried a strict ethnic identity in their early years, that is no longer the case. As noted above, through the efforts of Chiang Ching-kuo, the KMT has become more diversified in its ethnic make-up. According to Huang (1996, 115), the ethnic composition of the KMT shifted from 60.6 percent mainlanders in 1969 to only 30.81 percent in 1992. Additionally, the composition of the KMT Central Committee grew from 3.1 percent Taiwanese in 1952 to 53.3 percent Taiwanese in 1993 (118). This is also reflected in the electorate, as Taiwanese and Mainlanders were equally likely to support the KMT (Rigger 2001, 164). This trend indicates that the KMT’s composition has lost its mainlander identity, even if it continues to be painted as a mainlander party. The reason for this has more to do with support for the DPP. As Rigger notes, “Taiwanese were far more likely to support the DPP than were Mainlanders.” Thus, Rigger concludes, the characterization of the DPP as the party of the Taiwanese remains an accurate one. If the KMT is to continue to carry with it the identity of the mainland, it is only because of its historical antecedents and by way of contrast to the DPP rather than anything based on reality.

However, the primary difference between the DPP and KMT rests on the issue of national identity rather than ethnic identity. Hsieh (2008, 12-3) notes that “as Taiwan became more and more democratic, Taiwanese, as the majority population, gradually got the upper hand, and the salience of ethnicity in Taiwanese politics declined. In its stead, the issue of national identity became more and more prominent in Taiwan’s politics.” It is important to note what is meant here by “national identity.” In this case, the sides fall either for independence (from China), the status quo, or reunification (with China). Political parties that are considered to be party of the pan-Blue coalition, namely the KMT, People First Party (PFP) and the New Party (NP) tend to support the status quo with a slight lean towards reunification. The pan-Green coalition tends to support independence and is led by the DPP, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) and the appropriately named Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP). It is worth noting here that support for independence or for status quo/unification does not necessarily fall along ethnic lines. The issue of national identity has existed since the KMT arrived on the island. While this issue coexisted along with the ethnic divide, the Taiwanization of the KMT and the rise to power
of Taiwanese has lessened the role of ethnicity and given way to the effect of national identity. Nevertheless, there are some mainlanders who favor independence and some native Taiwanese who support the status quo. The issue of national identity could not easily fall along ethnic lines because, as Bedford and Hwang (2008, 11) note, “with native Taiwanese constituting the vast majority of the population, if the independence-unification issue were decided along purely ethnic lines, the pan-blues would have no hope of getting elected.”

That the national identity issue is the main division between the two major parties, and more generally the two coalitions, is portrayed in a table provided by Rigger (2001, 165). In a post-election survey after the 1995 legislative election, 41 percent of Taiwanese and 44.7 percent of mainlanders were likely to support the KMT (21.9 percent and 5.4 percent respectively for DPP support). In terms of self-identification, 34.5 percent of those who consider themselves Taiwanese supported the KMT while 51 percent of self-identified Chinese sided with the KMT. In general, Taiwanese and mainlanders were equally likely to support the Kuomintang. However, when it came to the question of national identity, 49.5 percent of unification supporters and 45.7 percent of those that wanted to maintain the status quo preferred the KMT. In contrast, only 20.2 percent of supporters for independence were likely to back the KMT. Conversely, 52.8 percent of voters who backed independence preferred the DPP, with supporters of unification (10.7 percent) and status quo (15.7 percent) not likely to favor the DPP.

What these numbers suggests is that the division between the two main Taiwanese political parties is along national identity issues rather than ethnic issues. However, it would be erroneous to suggest that this is clear cut, that the national division is the only difference between the parties, or that ethnic identity plays no role. The characteristics of the KMT are more muddied than that of the DPP. In fact, those that support independence who still backed the pro-unification party was double the percentage of those unification supporters who still preferred the pro-independence DPP. As Rigger (2001, 165) concludes, “party identification is not a simple matter of ethnic identity or policy preference.” However, it is clear that the DPP elicits a different type of voter – ethnic Taiwanese, pro-independence – than does the KMT. Thus, the supporters of the DPP are more defined by its ethnic composition and policy preference than the KMT. Ethnic identity is still important with regards to the DPP given the parties pro-independence lean – a policy that resonates well with many Taiwanese. With the number of self-
identified Taiwanese tripling since the 1990s (Bedford and Hwang 2006), ethnic identity continues to be important for the DPP.

What can be stated here is that because of how the supporters of the DPP are defined, supporters of the KMT are “othered” as being mainlanders and pro-unification, even if it is not entirely accurate. Yet, the ethnic divide has become less of an indicator of support while the national identity issue continues to provide a clearer understanding for one’s support for a given party. Certainly ethnic identity is an indicator of support for independence (Rigger 2001; Hwang and Bedford 2006; Hsieh 2008), but the national identity issue still remains the better determinant for party support in Taiwan. Given the platforms of the two parties, national identity is still a central source of division to the parties itself even if the electorate may not be as clearly defined, at least with regards to the Kuomintang.

Thus, how does geography aid in better understanding this division? Does place prove to be a clearer determinate for party support than ethnic identity or policy preference? In turn, how does place reflect the debate over national identity; in other words how does geography explain the discourse over what it means to be “Taiwanese”? As a way to illustrate this notion, the remainder of this chapter will examine direct presidential elections since 1996. However, before doing so it is necessary to briefly explain the process of selecting Taiwan’s president prior to 1996.

The Democratic Transition in Taiwan

As noted above, the National Assembly, the constitution-amending body of the Taiwanese government, elected the president for the Republic of China prior to 1996. But, elections at all levels were limited to some degree by the KMT-controlled government. The freeze on elections for legislative members as well as the ban on political parties created a one-party system that ensured the KMT remained in power while it attempted to reorganize and plan its return to the mainland. With the shift in attitudes in the international community, the KMT began to soften its stance and slowly allowed for a more open and democratic system to take effect.

Tien (1996, 4-11) notes that the transition from an authoritarian system of government to modern democracy took place in three phases. The first stage, from the 1950s until 1971, witnessed elections at a local level. The first local elections took place in 1952, allowing
Taiwanese to vote for town chiefs, county and city councilpersons, and city mayors. Direct elections were not allowed above the provincial level. During this time non-KMT candidates were able to receive as much as 35 percent of the vote. However, because of the implications of martial law, these non-KMT candidates could not organize as a party. In fact, the KMT banned candidates from engaging in political activities outside of their voting districts.

The second period (1972-1985) was marked by the decline in international diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China. As noted above, as a means of maintaining some semblance of political legitimacy the KMT began to Taiwanize its party and by extension Taiwanize the political hierarchy. This process of Taiwanization of the KMT served the purpose of recasting the party as one that was representative of the mainland to one that represented Taiwan. The KMT also began to allow an expansion of the election process in Taiwan. There were supplementary elections for the National and Legislative assemblies in 1969 and 1972, then more regularly beginning in 1980. The dangwai were allowed to participate as a quasi-party and began making their way into the various assemblies. Tien attributes this expansion, in part, to the rising economic condition in Taiwan. Economic growth in Taiwan led to more opportunities for higher education attainment, greater personal wealth, a larger middle-class, and a more diverse media industry. “These developments provided not merely the requisite conditions for democratic change but also the additional driving forces for liberalizing the political system” (Tien 1996, 10). Additionally, more Taiwan-born political activists meant fewer connections to the mainland and a swing in momentum in favor of opposition. This trend set the stage for the third phase.

With the birth of the DPP in 1986, the third phase opened the door for elections under a competitive party system. However, it was not until after the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988 that political parties were legalized. Under the leadership of Lee Teng-hui, more steps were taken to liberalize the political system of Taiwan. The most important here is the move to direct elections for president. Lee worked with both KMT and DPP leaders to hatch a plan to allow the voters of Taiwan to decide on their president. In 1992, the Legislative Assembly passed an amendment that would abolish the previous method for electing the president. However, the amendment did not immediately decide on a new method, choosing instead to wait until one year before the next election, which was in 1996 (Lu 2002). The amendment to the 1947 constitution,
which was enacted in 1994, also set the length of terms to four years each with a maximum of two consecutive terms (Lu 2002; Myers et al. 2002).

The effects of the democratization process of Taiwan can be seen in the early open elections of the Legislative Assembly. The Dangwai/DPP saw its representation in the Legislative Yuan jump from 13 percent in 1980 to 33.2 percent in 1995 before sliding down slightly to 29.6 percent in 1998 (Tien 1996, 16; Diamond 2001, 53). Additionally, Diamond notes that by 1995, the KMT’s representation in the Legislative Yuan dipped below 50 percent. Similarly, the KMT’s representation among county magistrates and city mayors fell below 50 percent in 1993 (Tien 1996, 17). This pattern culminated in the 2000 election of Chen Shui-bian as president, giving the DPP a plurality of the votes. Four years later, Chen secured just over 50 percent of the votes for the DPP.

Since this election, Taiwan has held direct presidential elections every four years, with the most recent occurring in 2008. During the past twelve years, Taiwan experienced a shift in power, with the opposition Democratic People’s Party (DPP) winning both the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections. By the time a KMT candidate returned to the presidency in 2008, a clear geographic pattern had emerged among the Taiwanese electorate. And because political parties in Taiwan tend to carry a particular position on Taiwan’s international status, the emergence of such patterns are likely linked to locally-held opinions on independence, as well as questions of identity and regional rivalries.

Four Presidential Elections in Taiwan: 1996-2008

The presidential election in 1996 witnessed an overwhelming victory for the KMT, with their candidate Lee Teng-hui winning 24 of the 25 districts. Independent candidate Lin Yang-gang, who finished third in the voting, captured his home county of Nantou in central Taiwan. Lee garnered a majority of the votes in 18 of Taiwan’s 25 districts and at least 40 percent of the votes in five other districts. The only two districts where he received less than 40 percent of the votes were in the aforementioned Nantou County (31.5 percent) and Taipei City in the north (38.9 percent). Thus, the 1996 election pattern represents a fairly solid voting bloc in Taiwan as the KMT was able to secure victory throughout the country.

While the 2000 presidential election involved five candidates, the competition was primarily among three individuals – Lien Chan of the KMT, Chen Shui-bian of the DPP, and
James Soong of the newly formed People First Party (PFP). With 39.3 percent of the vote, Chen won the election and for the first time in ROC history the country was led by someone not of the KMT party. Not only did the KMT lose, Lien did not win a single electoral district. While Chen won the popular vote, Soong actually won more districts – 15 to Chen’s ten. Here, a geographic pattern begins to emerge as the DPP won districts in the south and west as well as Yilan County in the north, and Soong won a contiguous string of districts from the west to the north, including the three western island districts – Kinmen County, Lienchiang County and Penghu County. It should be noted that Chen only gained a majority of votes in one district, his home county of Tainan, while Soong managed to receive a majority of votes in five districts.

Both the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections pitted only two candidates in each election – one from the KMT and one from the DPP. In 2004, Chen sought re-election under the DPP endorsement as Lien Chan attempted to restore power to the KMT. In a very narrow and somewhat controversial election, Chen was able to capture a second term for the DPP, gaining 50.1 percent of the popular vote. He carried the same ten districts as he did in 2000 while also picking up Taichung County in central Taiwan. While obvious that Chen would win the majority of votes in those 11 districts, the margin of victory is noteworthy as he was either close to or exceeds a three-fifths majority in seven of those 11 districts. His largest margins of victory were in the south.

In 2008, Chen was unable to run again due to term limits. Therefore, the DPP nominated (Frank) Hsieh Chang-ting while the KMT nominated former Taipei mayor Ma Ying-jeou. The KMT was able to return to power with a landslide victory (58.45 percent versus 41.55 percent). Ma wrested away six districts and secured all seven municipalities. Hsieh’s five victories were concentrated in the south.
Figure 5-1: Map of 1996 Presidential Election Results

Figure 5-2: Map of 2000 Presidential Election Results
Figure 5-3: Map of 2004 Presidential Election Results

Figure 5-4: Map of 2008 Presidential Election Results
Place, Identity, and Taiwan’s Presidential Elections

The 12-year evolution from a seemingly “solid Taiwan” to the cleavage in the south is rooted in both the historical experience of the island and the political dynamics of Taiwan.

It should first be noted that the appearance of a “solid Taiwan” had more to do with Lee Teng-hui’s popularity rather than an affinity towards the KMT or its traditional stance. Lee’s approval rating remained above 60 percent. An ethnic breakdown of his approval ratings shows that he “enjoyed rather high popularity among Taiwanese of Fujian origin, moderately high popularity among Hakka speakers, and rather low popularity among mainlanders” (Lu 2002, 62). It is important to note that his low approval rating among mainlanders, a stalwart of the KMT, demonstrates fractures in the base of the party. As an ethnic Taiwanese, he easily appealed to the “native Taiwanese” who tend be pro-independence (Bedford and Hwang 2006). Furthermore, Lee was instrumental in deconstructing the old system and democratizing the island, something that was seen as a challenge to mainland China, although it should be noted president Lee stated that he was not in favor of independence (Lu 2002).

The results of the 2000 election can be informed by the work of Webster (1992), who notes that the demise of the “solid South” in the United States was due in part to the emergence of the State's Rights Party as a viable third party. The emergence of a third party in Taiwan is crucial in allowing the opposition DPP to gain control of the Taiwanese presidency. James Soong’s candidacy as an independent greatly divided both the mainlander vote, as well as the native Taiwanese vote. Cheng and Hsu (2002) note that the KMT nominee Lien was not as popular as Soong. Lee, as chair of the KMT, did not support the more popular Soong due to previous disagreements and chose the less popular Lien. As a result, Soong opted to run as an independent and immediately became the front-runner to win the election (Rigger 2001).

Because many KMT supporters did not feel that Lien would win the presidency, voters shifted their allegiance to the candidate best suited to defeat Chen – Soong. “[T]he KMT’s Lien was the second preferred candidate for most voters, mainlanders and [native Taiwanese] alike. ... [C]onsistently lagging behind the other two contenders in polls rendered Lien a nonviable alternative, and eventually he became the victim of strategic voting” (Cheng and Hsu 2002, 166-7). The division of the KMT vote is important in that if we were to combine the votes for Lien and Soong, then the numbers would reflect previous elections in Taiwan (a 60/40 victory for the
KMT). Thus, this division allowed for the DPP and Chen to narrowly wrest power away from the KMT.

Webster (1992) suggests that the impetus for electoral change in the U.S. South is situated in urban areas. While DPP candidate Peng Ming-min was unable to win a single district in the 1996 election, his highest shares were in metropolitan areas and provincial cities. Peng also did well in what would become staples of the DPP electorate – counties in the south as well as Yilan County in the northeast. Similarly in 2000 and 2004, in districts won by the KMT, Chen Shui-bian fared better in city districts than in county districts. Furthermore, DPP support tends to be the lowest in the rural counties of Hualien and Taitung. This pattern is reflected in numbers cited by Rigger (2001, 166), where she notes that DPP support is weakest among those involved in agriculture.

Another key point in the 2000 election is that Chen and the DPP distanced themselves from the pro-independence platform. Chen quickly noted that the DPP only wanted a referendum on independence, rather than outright independence. Chen moved his position towards the political middle, aligning himself more to Lee’s policies. While Lee Teng-hui never publicly endorsed Chen, many of those close to Lee backed the DPP candidate in the weeks leading up to the election. These endorsements included Lee Yuan-tseh, Noble laureate, and Hsu Wen-lung, president of plastic producer Chi Mei Corporation who claimed that Chen was best suited to “continue Lee Teng-hui’s course” (Rigger 2001, 193). These late endorsements gave Chen a final push to the presidency.

Chen’s emphasis on self-determination was not simply political rhetoric during his campaign for presidency; Chen publicly espoused such views as early as 1991. While hardline leaders of the DPP wanted a platform seeking independence, Chen sought to soften the stance by stating that a move should be decided by the people and not by one political party. After a disastrous showing in the 1991 National Assembly elections, the DPP began moving further away from independence “plank” and by 1996, once the hardliners left the DPP to form the Taiwan Independence Party, the DPP’s position was closer to Lee Teng-hui’s middle position. This stance placed the DPP in a more comfortable position to claim the presidency. Chen
reiterated this stance in his 2000 inauguration speech in which he advocated the “five noes” and the maintenance of the status quo (Chen 2000).\(^5\)

While the DPP carries the mantle of the independence movement, in fact it has more in common with the KMT than public perception indicates. As Rigger (2001, 130) writes, “the DPP still is no fan of unification or ‘One China’, but it has accepted the two Chinas arrangement that exists, in effect, today.” This stance, which supports the status quo backed by the KMT, is promoted primarily because Taiwan is, for all intents and purposes, independent, but also because of security concerns. “The DPP’s current position is that because Taiwan already enjoys de facto independence, a declaration of de jure independence is unnecessary and would only antagonize Beijing.” Thus, DPP leaders “accepted the logic that since Taiwan already enjoyed independence, there was no need to change the status quo” (128 and 130). Therefore, even though the DPP advocates for a referendum on Taiwanese independence (DPP website 2010), in general there is acceptance by the party of the status quo. It is through this “new middle way” (Bedford and Hwang 2006) that Chen was able to calm fears of an independence movement and work his way towards the middle.

The resulting victory by Chen and the DPP gave the opposition footing that carried over to the 2004 election in which Chen narrowly defeated a joint ticket of Lien and Soong. By 2008, however, the KMT was able to emphatically return to power when Ma Ying-jeou defeated DPP candidate Frank Hsieh. At this point, a clear geographical pattern emerged.

By taking the election results in terms of regional blocs,\(^6\) it is clear to see that the opposition DPP holds a firm grip on the south, while the KMT is strongest in the east and north (See Figures 5-1 through 5-4). The central districts in Taiwan do not clearly fall into one camp as it has voted for both KMT and DPP candidates. Also, there is one outlier as the DPP has claimed Yilan County in the north in two of the four elections – 2000 and 2004.\(^7\)

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\(^5\) While Chen did push for a referendum to rewrite the constitution, a move some argued was akin to declaring independence, he stated that a new constitution would not address independence. Chen, therefore, stood by his five noes and maintained the status quo.

\(^6\) While arbitrary, the author breaks down the regions of Taiwan as follows: Central (Changhua, Miaoli, Nantou, Taichung and Yunlin counties, and Taichung city), East (Hualien and Taitung counties), North (Hsinchu, Taipei, Taoyuan and Yilan counties, and Keelung, Hsinchu and Taipei cities), and South (Chiayi, Kaohsiung, Penghu, Pingtung and Tainan counties, and Chiayi, Kaohsiung, and Tainan cities). For this analysis, the island counties of Lienchiang and Kinmen were not included. These regions are consistent with other regionalizations of Taiwan.

\(^7\) Yilan County has demonstrated a long history of opposition to the KMT. It was one of the first to locally elect a non-KMT leader and, despite the 2008 election, remains a stronghold for the DPP (Wang 2009).
Conclusion

So, what explains this pattern of electoral geography and political opposition in southern Taiwan? There are several factors that come into play. First, there is an ethnic difference. Rigger (2001, 164) notes that “Taiwanese and Mainlanders were equally likely to support the KMT. However, Taiwanese were far more likely to support the DPP than were Mainlanders.” Historically, Mainlanders are concentrated in the north and east, both KMT strongholds, and are sparser in the south, the DPP’s territory. Additionally, the eastern counties of Hualian and Taitung have the largest percentage of indigenous peoples, a traditional supporter of the KMT.

Another factor that Rigger (167) notes is “political differences between the north and the south.” In their analysis of voting in South Korea, Lee and Brunn (1996) argue that historical rivalries and resentment between the southwest and other parts of the country, especially the north, explain political cleavages in South Korea. A similar north-south rivalry is present in Taiwan. Because of this rivalry, “the DPP has benefited from resentment in southern Taiwan at the wide discrepancy in government spending between north and south” (Rigger 2001, 167). Considering that the KMT long controlled government spending, the south’s affinity towards the opposition, in this case the DPP, makes sense.

But this resentment reflects the center of opposition that the south came to represent during the democratizing process and the emergence of (new) political parties. Rigger (167, emphasis added) notes that “the DPP’s emphasis on Taiwanese identity, including language and culture as well as Taiwan independence, has been well received in the south, where Taiwanese consciousness is strong.” Given that the KMT’s platform with regards to mainland China is one of cooperation and reconciliation, the DPP is often held as the party of independence and therefore Taiwanese nationalism. This perception coupled with Taiwanese consciousness centers the south as a site of opposition.

The connection between the DPP and the south was galvanized by the Meilidao Incident, also known as the Kaohsiung Incident, which is held as one of the catalysts for the formation of the DPP. On December 10, 1979 in the southern city of Kaohsiung, a human rights protest was violently halted by the KMT government and three days later several political opposition leaders were arrested. The resulting outcry over this incident led to an increase in opposition movements, including a group of defense attorneys that included Chen Shui-bian. Seven years later, the
Democratic Progressive Party was established in Taipei (Rigger 2001; Bedford and Hwang 2006). Although it was created in a hotel in the north, it was the incident in the south that fueled the opposition movement. The Meilidao Incident and its connection to the DPP place the opposition movement in the south.

What these factors all represent is that more than any single other indicator, place is a main factor in understanding the voting patterns in Taiwan. Agnew (1987, 34) writes that places can “become collective actors.” This is important to note with regards to the role of political parties. “The ideologies and policy proposals of different parties appeal more successfully in some places than in others as they strike responsive and nonresponsive chords among dominant sectors of the electorates.” Agnew notes that certain actions, such as opposition movements, are rooted in places, which act as a seat of sentiment. In other words, a sense of place “can present itself through different manifestations,” such as the DPP. “Place, therefore, is not the outcome on a map of an abstract social process beyond place. Place refers to the process of social structuration” (36, emphasis in original). The pattern that takes shape in Taiwan is a result of place-based factors – concentration of mainlanders in the north; Kaohsiung as a symbol of opposition, KMT support among agricultural workers in the east – more so than simply a matter of ethnic difference or policy preference. Certainly the latter two variables are important, but each is rooted in place and helps create the place-based identity that gives rise to the electoral pattern in Taiwan.
CHAPTER SIX

MORE THAN JUST A GAME: SPORTS, IDENTITY AND “CHINESE TAIPEI”

"National spirit is more important than material resources; patriotism is more important than weapons."
Chiang Kai-shek (1974, 80)

On 30 August 2009, a Little League team from Chula Vista, California defeated their counterparts from Taoyuan, Taiwan 6-3 to win the 2009 Little League World Series title. It was the fifth consecutive title for a team from the United States. For Taiwan, the most successful international competitor in the tournament’s history, it was their first finals appearance since 1996.

However, the appearance of the youths from Taoyuan was more than just a sign that Taiwan had returned to big stage for Little League baseball. The team’s appearance also shone light on the trouble with naming sports teams representing the island. Reports of the competition reflect this quandary. The website for NBC Sports (2009) ran an Associated Press article on Chula Vista’s victory, choosing to use “Taiwan” in reference to the Taoyuan team. ESPN (2009) ran the same Associated Press article on its website. However, instead of using “Taiwan,” ESPN chose to use “Chinese Taipei” – the official name recognized by the Little League organization – even stating that the team is from “Taoyuan, Chinese Taipei.” In the accompanying video highlights on ESPN’s website, sports anchor John Anderson unproblematically alternated between “Taiwan” and “Chinese Taipei.”

The above media accounts of the 2009 Little League World Series reflect the difficulty in referencing sports teams from Taiwan. At the heart of this dilemma is how Taiwan is represented in international sports competitions, or, to put it another way, how Taiwanese identity is manifested through sports representations.
While the use of the moniker “Chinese Taipei” reflects a certain image of Taiwan as
being a part of the People’s Republic of China, it is worth noting that the decision to use this
label allowed Taiwan to continue its participation in international sports. With this in mind, this
chapter focuses on sports identity and how the use of “Chinese Taipei” not only allowed Taiwan
to remain an actor in international sports, but also how it portrays the identity of Taiwan. Thus,
the sports identity that is constructed through international competition is a manifestation of
Taiwan as a place.

**More than Just a Game: Politics and Sports**

Countries have long used sports as a political tool in order to project a particular identity
or image. Lapchick (1978) details early instances of sports being used as a means to project
power. He notes that part of the initiative to rebuild the Olympic Games laid in the fallout of the
Franco-Prussian War. Baron Pierre de Coubertin saw the Olympics as a way to resuscitate
French pride, while at the same time working to keep Germany out of the first modern Olympics.
The 1936 Summer Olympics in Berlin are perhaps the most well-document instance of sports
politicization, with Jewish athletes initially barred from the German teams, threats of boycotts,
and even the German national anthem playing for the Austrian athletes, insinuating that Austria
was German territory. Additionally, mass boycotts of the Summer Games took place in 1976,
1980 and 1984. In all three of these cases, African states boycotted the allowance of New
Zealand, which had sent its “All Blacks” rugby team to apartheid South Africa (Senn 1999). The
United States and many of its Western allies boycotted the 1980 Moscow Games due to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Shinnick 1982; Senn 1999). The Soviet Union and its allies
retaliated by boycotting the 1984 Los Angeles Games. There have been threats of boycotts since
1984, including the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing (Blackistone 2007; Boychuck and Mathis
2008), but none have been taken seriously.

The influence of politics on sports extends beyond the Olympics. Indonesian president
Sukarno used the Asian Games not only as a way to build his emerging country’s identity, but
also to counter the West. Fearing that Indonesia might bar Israel and Taiwan from participating
in the 1962 Asian Games, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) suspended the Indonesian
National Olympic Committee (NOC). Indonesia argued that the IOC inconsistently applied the
principles of the Olympic Games, choosing not to punish Belgium (1920 Summer Olympics), the
United States (1960 Winter Olympics) and France (1961 World Cycling Championships) for banning athletes from (East) Germany. Indonesia stood by its decision, but the IOC’s move to suspend the Indonesian NOC angered the country and in 1964 Indonesia withdrew from the Olympic family (Lutan 2005; Lutan and Hong 2005). Additionally, Sukarno helped organize the Games of the Newly Emerging Forces (GANEFO), which were held as a way to “build the world anew.” Sukarno encouraged countries that had recently received independence to remember the spirit of Bandung – an Asia-Africa conference that took place in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 – and he believed that GANEFO was a way to show unity and help countries “gain their freedom from imperialism and colonialism.” While Sukarno had his own motives, namely to use GANEFO as a means to promote him as “a hero in the Third World, someone who had the courage to challenge Western hegemony and imperialism” (Lutan and Hong 2005, 431), the Games, which were held in 1963 – the only time the Games took place – constructed a symbol of unity against the old Western order. To Sukarno and others, they were using a political tool of the West – sports – against the West. While shortlived, GANEFO did pose a threat to the IOC as the organization's then-president Avery Brundage believed countries, particularly those in Africa and Southwest Asia, would choose to participate in GANEFO rather than the Olympics. The political power of sports was not lost on China as it attempted to use GANEFO as a way to promote its place as the only representative of “China” (Lutan and Hong 2005).

But the politicization of sports involves more than just nationalism and international politics, especially with regards to identity. Kusz (2007) goes to great lengths to demonstrate how the National Association of Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) and the death of football player-turned-U.S. soldier Pat Tillman represent what he calls White cultural nationalism. Leonard (2004) explains how the public reaction to NBA star Kobe Bryant's sexual assault case reflects White fear over Black male sexuality. Stempel (2006) draws a parallel between masculinist sports and militaristic nationalism. Davis (1993) and King and Springwood (2001) focus on the discourse concerning the use of Native American “mascots” for high school, collegiate and professional sports teams. In each of these cases, issues of identity are reflected in sports-related situations.

The politics of identity is a reflection of the ways in which the identity (or identities) of a group are debated, assigned, assumed, constructed, reified, asserted, and deconstructed. Sports, while seemingly apolitical, often play a pivotal role in the politics of identity. Whether it is a
country’s attempt to challenge the Western-dominated order of the world or NASCAR’s image as pure, family-oriented and traditional, sports serve as a means through which identity is constructed. It is with this in mind that this chapter turns towards Taiwan and how sports and sporting organizations reflect the identity debate in Taiwan.

The Two China Situation

The Republic of China began competing in the Summer Olympics in 1932, when Los Angeles was the host. With the exception of the 1952 Summer Olympics in Helsinki, Finland, the ROC competed in every Summer Olympics held from 1932 until 1972. In each of those events, the country was recognized under the title “Republic of China.”

However, after the normalization of relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, there occurred a drastic shift that consisted not only of western states recognizing the PRC as “China,” but also within international organization such as the United Nations and the International Olympic Committee. With regards to the latter, a 1979 resolution reinstated the Chinese (PRC) Olympic Committee and renamed the ROC’s committee the “Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee.” This change placed the PRC as the representative of “China” while Chinese Taipei represented athletes from the island of Taiwan (China Daily 2008). The first athletes to compete under the name “Chinese Taipei” did so at the 1984 Sarajevo Winter Olympics. Since that time, the ROC/Taiwan has competed not only in the Olympics under that name, but also other major sporting events such as soccer’s World Cup and baseball’s World Baseball Classic.

The issue that was resolved in 1979 is known as the Two-China question, a question that has troubled the International Olympic Committee since the Nationalists fled the mainland for Taiwan. The issue is multifaceted and, as Xu (2008) notes, involves China, Taiwan and the IOC. Thus, it is necessary to briefly detail each side’s position on the matter.

Prior to the 1952 Helsinki Summer Olympics, China was initially unaware of the potential political significance of Olympic competition. In fact, China was ignorant to the fact that one of the three Chinese IOC officials still lived on the mainland. While the People’s Republic of China did not have a national Olympic committee, “China” was represented in the Olympics due to the participation of athletes from the Republic of China. After the Nationalists fled the mainland in 1949, two of China’s IOC representatives followed while Dong Shouyi
remained behind. This fact would have allowed the PRC a voice in the Olympic movement had they known he was even on the mainland (Xu 2008).

It was not until the Soviet Union intervened and alerted the Chinese of the Olympic movement that the PRC began to pursue recognition. But the Chinese faced an uphill battle. Because they were unaware of Dong’s presence, China sent diplomat Sheng Zhibai to protest Taiwan’s Olympic participation and argue for the PRC to represent all of China. Sheng’s politicization of the Olympic movement angered then-IOC president Sigfrid Edström, who dismissed Sheng thereby placing China in a difficult position (Senn 1999; Xu 2008).

After this misstep, China began to work its way into the Olympic movement through other means. Because the IOC would not allow athletes to participate unless they belonged to an international federation, China sought to gain recognition through the Fédération Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA). China claimed to be the successor to the Republic of China’s membership and began paying dues to these international federations. This tactic paid off as the IOC, which at first opted to exclude both China and Taiwan, extended an invitation to the PRC to participate in the Helsinki Games; Taiwan was also invited. Taiwan declined to participate leaving the PRC as the lone representative of “China” at the 1952 Summer Olympics (Xu 2008).

The dilemma of a “Two-China” situation did not officially arise until the IOC’s recognition of China’s NOC. Initially known as the Olympic Committee of the Chinese Republic, the 1954 admission of the mainland’s Olympic committee created a second NOC representing “China,” with Taiwan’s NOC recognized under the name Chinese Olympic Committee (Chan 1985). When both Chinese NOCs were invited to the 1956 Melbourne Summer Games, China attempted to arrive in Melbourne early in an attempt to cause Taiwan to withdraw in protest. However, Taiwan checked into the Olympic village prior to China’s arrival and it was China that withdrew in protest (Chan 1985; Xu 2008). This conflict led to China calling for Taiwan’s expulsion from the Olympic movement and stern criticism for IOC president Brundage, whom the Chinese claimed was pro-Taiwan. Brundage argued that Taiwan had a more legitimate claim to Olympic representation because, at that time, the KMT government held China’s seat in the United Nations. In 1958, recognizing that Brundage was not going to expel Taiwan from the Olympic movement, China began withdrawing from any international federation that recognized Taiwanese membership, including the IOC (Xu 2008).
The difficulty in removing the ROC from the Olympics relates to its initial representation in the Olympics. The KMT government made the connection between their exiled government on Taiwan and the admission of “China” in 1922. Xu (2008, 88) notes that “after the Nationalistic government fled the mainland, Taipei immediately notified the IOC that the Chinese national Olympic committee had changed its address to Taiwan.” This tactic solidified Taiwan’s place in the Olympic movement, at least early on, because the establishment of the Chinese/Taiwan NOC predates the war between the nationalists and the communists and its continuation on the mainland allowed it to remain a viable entity. As former IOC chancellor Otto Mayer (as quoted in Xu 2008, 87) remarked, the “IOC does not recognize Governments, but only sport organizations.” Thus, to the IOC, the squabble between China and Taiwan was moot because the organization was not concern with who truly represented “China” only that their respective NOCs were recognized.

Taiwan’s main issue related to the KMT’s position as the sole government of “China.” Taiwan stood by a position of no two Chinas and protested the acceptance of the mainland into the Olympic movement. The rhetoric used by Taiwan is similar to present language utilized by the PRC. In a statement written by the NOC for Taiwan, the committee called the allowance of China into the 1952 Helsinki Olympics “unlawful” and noted that its own NOC was the “only legal national Olympic committee of China and has been recognized as such for many years” (Xu 2008, 88-9). Taiwan also noted its recognition as the legitimate government of “China” by the United Nations, a point supported by Brundage and one that would come back to hurt Taiwan.

Sentiment towards Taiwan began to change in the late 1950s when the Soviet Union, recognizing the impact of China’s withdrawal from the IOC, suggested that the NOC for Taiwan change its name. This call related to something the international community – save the United States – began to realize: the Taiwanese NOC could not adequately represent athletes on the mainland. The United States stood strongly behind Taipei and called any attempt to remove Taiwan from the Olympic movement as an attempt to bring politics into what was perceived as an apolitical realm (i.e. sports). Nevertheless, the first attempt to rename the representation from the ROC occurred at the 1960 Summer Olympics in Rome when the delegation was known as “Taiwan.” This designation was held by the KMT as “discriminatory and unfair” (Xu 2008, 93) because it stripped the KMT’s claim as the legitimate government of China. The Taiwan NOC responded by marching at the opening ceremony with an “Under Protest” sign. The ROC
competed under the title of “Taiwan” – sans the protest sign – in the Olympics of 1964 and 1968 before returning to the “Republic of China” designation. However, by that time the political climate of the international community turned against Taiwan.

For its part, the IOC sent mixed signals to both China and Taiwan with regards to participation. The move to allow both China and Taiwan to participate in the 1952 Summer Olympics was just one of several missteps by the IOC. Neither country had viable representation to participate at the Helsinki Games. As Xu (2008, 97) notes, “the new sports authority in Beijing was not an official Olympic committee and Taipei was claiming to represent all of China.” The initial decision to deny both countries entry into the 1952 Summer Games, followed by the admission of both, only complicated matters further. So too did issues with names and language, as the mainland was sometimes erroneously labeled the Democratic People’s Republic of China and individuals for both China and Taiwan were referred to by their given name rather than their family name (Xu 2008). Add to this the issue of two Germanys and two Koreas and Brundage’s misapplication of those cases to the case of China and Taiwan and the IOC comes to shoulder just as much of the blame as the two countries for the confusion.

Brundage himself may be the biggest culprit in the confusion of the issue of Chinese and Taiwanese participation in the Olympics. His stance that the mainland should be left out of the Olympic family was based on the United Nation’s recognition of the ROC as the seat-holder for “China.” This stance, based on the international landscape of the 1950s, changed in the 1970s after much of the West began to switch its diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing. By the time Lord Killanin (Michael Morris) of Ireland took over the IOC presidency from Brundage in 1972, the United States already begun normalization of relations with the mainland. Additionally, the United Nations, long Brundage’s measuring stick for which “Chinese” NOC to recognize, switched its position and admitted the PRC in 1971 and to the permanent seat on the Security Council previously held by the ROC. Lord Killanin took the opportunity to resolve the “two China” situation by flipping Brundage’s logic to argue for China’s admission into the Olympic family.

However, both the IOC and even China recognized that Taiwan should be allowed to participate in the Olympics. China would allow for such entry only if it was understood that Taiwan was a part of China and that the Chinese Olympic committee represented all of China. This new situation would give birth to the name “Chinese Taipei.”
The Compromise: The Montreal Games, Chinese Taipei and China’s Admission

The buildup to the IOC showdown between China and Taiwan over rightful representation in the Olympics culminated in the 1976 Summer Olympics in Montreal, Canada. Canada was one of the first Western states to switch its diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China (1970). In doing so, Canada agreed to follow the one-China policy and recognize that Taiwan was a part of China rather than a separate entity. This agreement created a dilemma for Canada as time drew closer to the opening of the Montreal Games because the Canadian government had promised the IOC that all NOCs would be allowed to enter Canada and compete in the Games. Because China had withdrawn from the Olympic family and Taiwan still maintained representation, Canada was left with deciding between honoring its promise to the IOC and respecting its agreement and newfound friendship with China (Xu 2008).

Canada realized the situation in which it had placed itself and attempted to resolve the matter even before the prodding by China began. Canada attempted to force the IOC to accept China as a member of the Olympic family. When it became apparent that Lord Killanin would not make a move on this issue, Canada decided to allow Taiwan to participate. However, Taiwan could not use its flag, anthem, or its official designation as the “Republic of China.” Canada notified the IOC of its stance less than two months before the opening of the Montreal Games, a fact noted by Lord Killanin. Additionally, the Canadian government instructed its Ministry of Manpower and Immigration to “make sure the Taiwanese team would not be allowed to enter the country until Canada and the IOC had reached an agreement. The Canadian government invalidated for purposes of entry the Olympic identity cards held by Taiwanese nationals” (Xu 2008, 172). Due to the timing of the decision, Canada all but assured that Taiwan would be effectively barred from participating in Montreal.

Canada and the IOC attempted to work through the situation of Taiwan, even offering the option for Taiwan to march in simply under the name “IOC” and with a flag bearing the Olympic rings rather than Taiwan’s own flag. Taiwan refused and instead chose not to participate in Montreal (Xu 2008; Deford 1976). Although the United States and others threatened to boycott the 1976 Summer Olympics, there was no widespread protest over the issue of Taiwan and the
Montreal Games went on without a delegation from Taiwan. Ironically, four years later at the 1980 Winter Olympics in Lake Placid, the U.S. government barred the Taiwanese delegation from competing using the name “Republic of China” (Xu 2008).

The decision by Canada to bar Taiwanese athletes from competing under the moniker “Republic of China” forced the IOC to take action on its two-China policy. While mainland China was still not a member of the Olympic family, changes to the international landscape and the growth of diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China coerced the IOC to settle the omission of the world’s largest country. Three years after the Montreal Games, the IOC took action on Taiwan and the absence of China.

China first extended an invitation to Taiwanese athletes to join the mainland in establishing a unified Chinese team (Kanin 1980). Taiwan refused this invitation and the two countries were headed for (sports) diplomatic showdown. Lord Killanin invited the two countries to meet with the IOC in Switzerland. While both initially agreed, Taiwan only wanted to meet with the IOC and balked at direct meetings with China (Kanin 1980; Chan 1985; Xu 2008). Presented with an impasse, the IOC worked more with China and, through three separate meetings in 1979, reached an agreement known as the “Olympic formula” (Chan 1985).

At the first meeting, held in Montevideo, Uruguay, the IOC agreed to allow both China and Taiwan to be members of the Olympic family. But China insisted that there was no room for two Chinas and that their NOC should be the only one recognized as representative of all of China. China did accept that the athletes from Taiwan could remain a part of the Olympic family, but they could not use “China” at all. While Taiwan pushed for recognition as the “Republic of China,” the delegation for Taiwan agreed to a new moniker – “Chinese Olympic Committee, Taipei.” Although China was still unhappy with this new label, preferring instead the name “Chinese Taiwan Olympic committee,” the IOC now had a better understanding of the positions of the two sides (Chan 1985; Xu 2008).

The second meeting was held in San Juan, Puerto Rico, where the IOC executive committee “confirmed China’s Olympic committee’s title as the ‘Chinese Olympic Committee,’ as agreed at the IOC session in Montevideo. It also recommended to the full IOC board that Taiwan should stay in the IOC as the ‘Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee,’ with a different national anthem and flag” (Chan 1985, 481). Ironically, the name “Chinese Taipei” was first suggested 19 years earlier by Filipino IOC member Jorge Vargas (Xu 2008, 92). Nevertheless,
when the executive committee convened in Nagoya, Japan in October 1979, the stage was set to welcome China back into the Olympic family. China’s NOC would be recognized as the “Chinese Olympic Committee” and, despite some debate, would be able to use its own flag and own anthem. Taiwan, meanwhile, would remain a part of the Olympic movement, but would now be known as the “Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee.” Taiwan was required to amend its NOC constitution and it was not be allowed to use its national flag, anthem, or emblem (Chan 1985; Xu 2008). The Nagoya resolution, as it is known, passed with 62 voting in favor, 17 against, and eight abstaining with two ballots deemed “spoiled” (Chan 1985).

China’s first post-Nagoya Olympics was the 1980 Winter Games in Lake Placid. Taiwan, now under the name “Chinese Taipei,” attempted to follow legal channels to challenge the forced name change. Taiwan was essentially barred from competing in the 1980 Winter Olympics when the United States refused their athletes entry into the country (Kanin 1980). Taiwan eventually decided to boycott both the 1980 Winter Olympics and the 1980 Summer Games in Moscow. By 1981, Taiwan capitulated and accepted the new moniker of “Chinese Taipei.” They submitted a new flag design, as well as a new emblem, and agreed to use the Olympic hymn if its athletes won a gold medal (Xu 2008).

Since Taiwan agreed to accept the name “Chinese Taipei,” other international federations also took steps to adopt the new sobriquet. Soccer’s governing body FIFA (Federation

Figure 6-1: Flag of Chinese Taipei alongside the flag of China, at 2008 Beijing Olympics
Internationale de Football Association) adopted the name in 1981, three years after Taiwan was suspended by the Oceania Football Confederation due to naming issues. The Chinese Taipei name is so common place that FIFA president Joseph Blatter referred to it as a geographic unit. In a press conference prior to the opening of the 2004 Futsal World Championship, Blatter stated that it was an honor for him “to be in Chinese Taipei” (quoted in FIFA.com 2004). Other international federations such as FIBA (Federation Internationale de Basketball Association) and IBAF (International Baseball Federation) soon followed suit. The term even found its way into the non-sports arena, such as the Miss Earth and Miss International beauty pageants, and economic and political organizations, such as the World Bank and the World Health Organization.

**“Chinese Taipei” and the Elusiveness of Taiwanese Sportive Nationalism**

Bale (2003, 166) notes that “sports are mediated by the ways in which they are represented.” He explains that through media accounts or photography, sports and sporting accounts are (re)produced; “media may construct imaginative geographies of sports.” Bale continues by stating that “imaginative sports geographies are worlds constructed by texts of various kinds, including writing, photography, movies and art.” While Bale wrote on the construction of sports, this same notion can be applied to the ways in which sport teams, in particular national teams, are constructed. With regards to Taiwan, the international use of the label “Chinese Taipei” projects a particular representation of the national teams of Taiwan, one that links the island to the mainland. It is through this representation that Taiwan struggles with the formation of its identity, even though it is still allowed to participate in international competition.

But there is perhaps another layer at work – one where the “performance” of the teams of “Chinese Taipei” creates an unquestioned and natural identity that links it to China. The work of Michael Billig on “banal nationalism” informs not necessarily the creation of an unquestioned national identity, but raises a “flag” that undermines that identity and naturalizes Taiwan as a part of China.

Billig (1995, 6) notes that “banal nationalism” derives from the notion that “nationalism” occurs “‘there’ on the periphery, not ‘here’ at the centre.” In other words, nationalism is a
concept that is constructed by others and a notion that belongs to others and is not a construct of “us.” But, as Billig argues, there is a method through which “our” nationalism is constructed.

The ideological habits, by which “our” nations are reproduced as nations, are unnamed and, thereby, unnoticed. The national flag hanging outside a public building in the United States attracts no special attention. It belongs to no special, sociological genus. Having no name, it cannot be identified as a problem. Nor, by implication, is the daily reproduction of the United States a problem.

Thus, while the nationalism of radicals is seen as problematic, the nationalism of “us” remains unquestioned. But the nationalism of “us” is unquestioned is because it is produced subtly. The ideological habits that produce banal nationalism “are not removed from everyday life, as some observers have supposed. Daily, the nation is indicated, or ‘flagged’, in the lives of its citizenry. Nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic condition.”

Billig also writes of how sports can also raise “flags” that are waved. Pointing out the perceived apolitical nature of sport, Billig notes that newspapers, “whatever their politics, have a section in which the flag is waved with regular enthusiasm. This is the sports section. ... Modern sport has a social and political significance, extending through the media beyond the player and the spectator” (119-20). To Billig, sports coverage in newspapers largely goes “unchecked” and constructs natural images of “our” victories and “our” hopes. Throughout the British papers, sports articles pieced together stories “inviting readers to celebrate ‘our’ victories and salute ‘our’ heroes” while making the opponent “invisible” (121). Sports become a means to promote nationalism, doing so in a way that not only makes it appear natural – the unnoticed waving flag – but also diminishes the other.

However, in the case of Taiwan, sports do not necessarily promote nationalism in the same way they do for other countries. The perceived naturalness of sports and sporting account work against the creation of a national identity for Taiwan because many sporting accounts involving Taiwan refer to those teams by the name “Chinese Taipei” – a name that obscures the country’s national identity. Citing O’Donnell (1993), Billig writes that “sporting pages repeat the commonplace stereotypes of nation, place and race, not to mention those of masculinity” (120). These stereotypes can be extended to the performance of sports and how repetition reinforces the norm. In this case, repeated reporting of “Chinese Taipei” reinforces the “norm”
that Taiwan is a part of mainland China and therefore lacks a true national identity that is expressed through other “national” teams. In other words, a “flag” is flown for “Chinese Taipei” but it is one that creates an unconscious connection between Taiwan and China rather than expressing unnoticed nationalism.

China’s role in suppressing the sportive expression of Taiwanese identity is crucial in understanding how “Chinese Taipei” undermines expressions of national identity. The Soviet Union helped enlighten China on the power of sports as a means to promote the mainland’s legitimacy (Xu 2008), but China also attempted to use GANEFO as a means to support its agenda once relations with the Soviets deteriorated (Lutan and Hong 2005). Sack and Suster (2000) explain how prior to the dissolution of Yugoslavia Croatia used sports as a means to gain international legitimacy. A 1990 soccer match between the United States and Croatia represent a Balkanized version of ping-pong diplomacy in which the “U.S. team, representing the most powerful nation in the world, was helping Croatia to celebrate its independence from Yugoslavia and to enhance its stature in the world community” (314). The match’s program included Croatian national iconography, including its flag and a monument to revolutionary Ban Josip Jelacic, along with the U.S. flag and the Statue of Liberty. Other territories seeking independence, such as Timor-Leste\(^8\) and Palestine, have participated in the Olympics (Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games 1997; Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games 2001; Sack and Suster 2000) as an avenue for legitimacy. Thus, limiting and controlling how Taiwan is represented in sports is important in maintaining the status quo.

Representation in the international sporting community is another manifestation of the “imagined community” (Anderson 1983). As Tuan (1977, 176-7) notes, the “nation-state is far too large to be thus experienced.” Sports serve as a symbolic vehicle for the state to unite its people through the experiences of its national teams. Tuan continues to explain that “symbolic means had to be used to make the large nation-state seem a concrete place – not just a political idea – toward which a people could feel deep attachment.” Thus, sports and sport teams provide states with another method to construct its identity and forge its “imagined community.”

However, because of the censoring of Taiwan’s use of either its official name (Republic of China) or the stand-alone name “Taiwan,” the state is stripped of its ability to use sports as a

\(^8\) Timor-Leste was able to compete in the 2000 Summer Olympics under the title “Individual Olympic Competitor” prior to its independence from Indonesia.
means to project its identity. To be more exact, Taiwan is not able to construct an identity through sports that clearly separates it from the mainland. The use of the label “Chinese Taipei” constructs an assigned identity that explicitly links Taiwan to China. Certainly the IOC has allowed territories of states establish an NOC and compete at the Games. But, while U.S. territories such as Guam and Puerto Rico participate in the Olympics under their own name and flag, China is a bit more restrictive with regards to its territories and claimed territories. Hong Kong competes with “China” attached to its name (e.g. Hong Kong, China) and is allowed to use its own flag. As with the label “Chinese Taipei,” the addition of “China” to the Hong Kong delegation attaches an identity to the Special Administrative Region that ensures there is no mistake that Hong Kong is a part of China. Similarly, while part of Taiwan’s official name appears in its Olympic name, under the one-China policy the use of “Chinese Taipei” attempts to create the appearance that Taiwan is without a doubt a province of China. Therefore, through the use of “Chinese Taipei,” Taiwan is assigned an identity that makes it subordinate to the mainland.

This is not to claim that Taiwan has not attempted to assert its own, separate identity that distances itself from China. While it was required to redesign its flag and national anthem and lacked leeway with the English version of its sports name, Taiwan was able to play with the Chinese equivalent of its name. The official name uses the word Zhonghua Taipei rather than Zhongguo Taipei (中華奧林匹克委員會). The difference is crucial as Zhonghua refers to the Chinese language or people while Zhongguo is a reference to the state of China (Chan 1985; Xu 2008). As a point of reference, the Chinese text for Hong Kong’s NOC uses Zhongguo. This subtle difference insinuates that the Taipei-based NOC, and by extension Taiwan, is not subordinate to the mainland and its NOC.

Additionally, while “Chinese Taipei” does disrupt Taiwan’s attempts to construct its own identity, it also allows the state to continue its participation in international sporting events. Bairner (1996, 320) notes that because Scotland participates in rugby and soccer matches separate from the United Kingdom, the Scottish national teams for both sports aid in the creation of an emotional attachment that brings the Scottish people together, creating “crucial links between sport and nationalism in Scotland. These are the team sports that permit Scots to compete at the highest international level and allow their compatriots to wrap themselves in the national flag as they support the efforts of their sporting representatives.” While Taiwanese fans at the Olympics are not able to literally wrap themselves in their national flag (Associated Press
1996), they can still take pride in watching their compatriots compete against countries that receive unanimous or widespread international recognition regardless of the moniker used to denote Taiwanese athletes. This concept of competing at the top level of international sporting competition brings attention, as well as confusion, to the debate over Taiwanese identity.

Despite the moniker, Taiwanese understand that the team “Chinese Taipei” represents them in competitions ranging from the Olympics to beauty pageants. However, sporting events and the usage of “Chinese Taipei” act as a “performance” that reinforces the norms of the international community. Butler’s work (1990; 1993a; 1993b) is concerned with the creation of identity and the reflection of the norm. Focusing on gender and sexuality, Butler (1993a, 21-2, emphasis in original) notes that people do not choose which gender to be on a given day, but that social norms dictate how a particular gender must “perform.”

Gender is performative insofar as it is the effect of a regulatory regime of gender differences in which genders are divided and hierarchized under constraint. Social constraints, taboos, prohibitions, threats of punishment operate in the ritualized repetition of norms, and this repetition constitutes the temporalized scene of gender construction and destabilization. . . . Gender performativity is not a matter of choosing which gender one will be today. Performativity is a matter of reiterating or repeating the norms by which one is constituted: it is not a radical fabrication of a gendered self. It is a compulsory repetition of prior and subjectivating norms, one which cannot be thrown off at will, but which work, animate, and constrain the gendered subject, and which are also the resources from which resistance, subversion, displacement are to be forged.

To Butler, while performativity is a process of repetition that reflects the norm, it also allows for opportunities to challenge the norm.

Performativity in geography is not solely concerned with sexuality and gender. Gregson and Rose (2000, 441) note how the "stages," or spaces "do not preexist their performances, waiting in some sense to be mapped out by performances; rather, specific performances bring these spaces into being." They argue that the performances and therefore these spaces are "articulations of power" and thus play a role in the construction of identity related to the spaces. Houston and Pulido (2002) depict worker protests as a performance that transforms the landscape of the University of Southern California campus into a site of social justice. In her work on pregnant women and public space in New Zealand, Longhurst (2000) writes how their “performance” as part of a local radio station’s contest challenge the norms and stereotypes that surround the pregnant body. Longhurst notes how the pregnant bodies bring private spaces into
the public sphere via performance. While she does note that this performance helps reinforce the normative, Longhurst also insinuates that the public performances of the “bikini babes” creates opportunities to challenge that norm. Dewsbury (2000, 476), relying on Deleuze and Guattari (1988), notes that the “ruptures, folds, fissures, and ephemeral alliances” are a result of performance and help to expose identity. Thus, while performance may create a space that reinforces the norm, it also creates ruptures that allow for challenges, although not necessarily subversion (Butler 1993), of the norms.

With regards to research on performance, Weber’s (1998, 81) description of an advertisement featuring drag queen RuPaul is germane to the type of performance that Taiwanese athletes portray on the international sporting stage.

Read as an instance of performance, the image of RuPaul as a healthy, patriotic, cross-dressed African-American male is consumed on its own. What one sees is a man in drag, a man intentionally acting out a part in the clothes of a woman for the specific purpose of selling magazines. When the photo-shoot is finished, so is RuPaul’s drag performance. He simply goes back to his closet and dresses ‘normally’, as a man.

Taking this image into account, Taiwanese athletes wear the “clothes” of Chinese Taipei when they perform at the Olympics or qualify for soccer’s World Cup. When those events end, these athletes go back to dressing “normally,” as Taiwanese.

However, the performance of being “Chinese Taipei” may not necessarily be confined to only those instances when Taiwanese national teams compete in international competitions. Weber (81-2) notes that if one takes a “performative reading of [the RuPaul] ad,” then a different image may be constructed. She argues that the difference between a performance reading and a performative reading rests on how the relationship between the performance and normativity is constructed. A performative reading suggests that normativity is also constructed in the performance. In other words, the performance is not a deviation from the norm but it that norms “are the effects of performative acts. Normativity . . . is always bound with performativity – in this case, wearing a particular outfit.” Thus, “a performative reading suggests that RuPaul is in drag before, during, and after the photoshoot, whether he ‘means’ to be or not. RuPaul’s ‘performance’ cannot be contained within the ad. It spills over into his everyday life.”

If a performative reading of the participation of “Chinese Taipei” is made, then the “performance” is not contained solely at the Olympics or on the soccer pitch or on the baseball field. This identity spills into other aspects of Taiwanese life and constructs a norm that links the
island to the mainland. Or, to put it another way, the performative view suggests that Taiwan is “Chinese Taipei” before, during and after sporting events. And it is through these “performances” that the “Chinese Taipei” identity is normalized in relation to the global community that, according to most states, diplomatically holds the island as part of China.

Nash (2000), however, holds that performance and performativity are not necessarily two different methods of interpreting representation. Notions of performance suggest that the actors are conscious of the embodiment that they perform, whereas performativity proposes an unconscious act. But even if performativity suggests unconsciousness, the performance is still an act that is still mediated by rules. Using dance as an example, Nash (658) notes that “not only is dance always mediated by words as it is taught, scripted, performed and watched but dance is often highly formalized and stylized; even untrained dance is culturally learnt and culturally located.” Relying more on the term “choreography” as opposed to “performance” (Wolff 1995), Nash continues on to state that “choreography re-emphasizes codes and traditions, the constraints and rules of performed identities – the regulatory system – as well as the possibility of subversion within Judith Butler’s [1987] theory of performativity.” Thus, the conscious performance aids in reinforcing the norm, in this case that Taiwan is a part of China.

Sports play a role in this performance because of the repetitive nature of sporting events. The more Taiwan competes in the Olympics, World Baseball Classic, and Little League World Series as “Chinese Taipei,” the more that the island begins to assume that representation. “For performativity is not just a singular act but a reiteration of a norm or set of norms that have assumed this status through their repetition, and that become known in myriad ways, including their representation” (Nash 2000, 662; Weber 1998). Sporting bodies and their associated events are rigidly designed and when countries participate in sporting events they re-emphasize the codes and traditions constructed via the international federations.

To be sure, Taiwan consciously chooses to participate in sporting events as “Chinese Taipei.” It is a conscious effort on its part to remain a viable member in international federations such as the IOC, FIFA and IFBA. As mentioned above, competing as “Chinese Taipei” allows the teams of Taiwan to compete at the highest level of international sporting competition. This participation not only brings Taiwan to the international stage, but in many ways it also allows for Taiwan a way to challenge the established norms. That FIFA provisionally recognized the national team from Bosnia and Herzegovina prior to U.N. recognition (Sack and Suster 2000;
Sugden and Tomlinson 1998), and that both FIFA and the IOC allow for Palestinian participation, sports can provide avenues for international recognition. While it is not recognized by its official name of the Republic of China, or even by the name “Taiwan,” the fact that it can compete with France and Russia and the United States allows for some recognition and challenges concepts of representation. In a sense, to paraphrase Weber, the participation of Taiwan as “Chinese Taipei” becomes a performative parody of being the nation-state. Weber’s (1998, 95) conclusion returns to the RuPaul advertisement, where she notes that “RuPaul’s image turns the question of drag and performativity back onto the businessman [‘normal man’], disrupting any security he may derive from an understanding of himself as naturally masculine. He too – and every ‘regular guy’ – is in drag.” Applying this concept to sports, the appearance of any sports team representing Taiwan regardless of the label brings into question the political constructs of nation-states and its implications in the sports world.

The point here is that by allowing for the participation of Taiwan, the country is able to construct an identity through the shared experiences of its sports teams. While this form of sportive nationalism can be effective in creating a cohesive identity, the truth is that even this type of nationalism is contested and not without debate. Because the Nagoya Resolution and decision to accept the name “Chinese Taipei” was entered into by the ruling KMT government, the identity reflected in the sports teams of Taiwan also reflects the political policies of the KMT party, one that despite its current platform of cooperation with the mainland nevertheless supports a one-China policy. Thus, while “Chinese Taipei” allows for Taiwanese participation, it still creates a subordination to mainland China, even if such an appearance challenges the nation-state. This subordination runs counter to opposition parties, namely the DPP, as it strives for an identity separate from the mainland. Although a national sports team may draw citizens together, “it also highlights their differences and makes it difficult to construct coherent and unified national identities on the basis of sportive nationalism” (Bairner 1996, 331). This is because, as Bairner continues, “sport’s capacity to help forge national identities is weakened by the fact that sport is also intimately bound up with those divisions that are a feature of even the most homogenous nation-state.” In the case of Taiwan, that division is tied up in ethnic differences that are manifested in the two major political parties of the island. Therefore any identity that can be constructed from the international participation of teams from Taiwan is bound to be contested due to internal divisions.
Conclusion

Bale (1986) writes of mental sports maps, which are connections of place-based identities constructed through the image of sports. While these may not represent reality, these mental sports maps project particular images and identities that, if repeated often, may become naturalized. Bale (24) notes that “events like the Olympic Games or the World Cup may mould people’s impressions of participating nations and nationalities.” Images of a country’s athletes may create identities that are transferred onto the country itself. Commenting on how soccer fans perceived Brazilians as “more creative, more skilful, and more intelligent” compared to non-soccer fans’ perceptions, Bale concludes that “the perceived characteristics of the nation [seem] to be derived from the sporting individuals who [represent] it.”

Although Bale focuses on how sports can create images of particular regions or states, the same can apply to how the participation of a team known as “Chinese Taipei” reflects certain images of Taiwan. The identity that is created through the use of “Chinese Taipei” creates a mental sports map that links athletes from the island to the mainland. This is not to claim that individuals cannot differentiate the two or lack the understanding that “Chinese Taipei” is in reference to Taiwan. The fact that ESPN allows its anchors to use “Taiwan” or “Chinese Taipei” verbally while graphically using only “Chinese Taipei” (Nagle 2010) – reflected in the aforementioned use by SportsCenter anchor John Anderson of both names interchangeably – speaks to this notion. Nevertheless, the connection made to the mainland by the name “Chinese Taipei” undermines any attempt to create a separate identity for Taiwan, even if the desire is to build a strong cooperative relationship with China.

“Chinese Taipei” and the sports teams of Taiwan reflect the difficult and delicate nature of the construction of a Taiwanese identity. The spaces of engagement that are created at the international level through sports provide a forum to debate the identity of Taiwan. International sports allows not only for the participation of teams from Taiwan, providing the island with the opportunity to compete on the same level as recognized states. It also allows for a conduit through which Taiwanese identity can be debated. The label “Chinese Taipei,” agreed upon by the KMT government, reflects the one-China notion that the party of Chiang Kai-shek has long held. The name represents an identity that promotes a connection to the mainland and, vicariously, an identity that is reflective of the KMT and mainlanders on Taiwan.
Although "Chinese Taipei" denotes a connection between Taiwan and China, the name and the island’s participation still reflect some degree of autonomy and an identity separate from the mainland. Taiwan still operates as an independent state and maintains both diplomatic and, more impressively, economic relations of its own. Additionally, the Mandarin manipulation of the word “Chinese” – Zhonghua as opposed to Zhongguo – creates a modicum of individuality and an identity that, while Chinese, is different from that of China. Taiwan’s battle to maintain this linguistic distinction at the 2008 Summer Olympics represents a desire to keep separate the identities of China and Taiwan (China Post 2008).

The distinction that is made between “Chinese Taipei” and “Taipei, China” is important in the debate over how Taiwanese identity is constructed at the international level via sports. Equally important is how the use of “Chinese Taipei” allows Taiwanese sports teams adequate representation in international sporting events, especially given the loss of widespread international recognition. But it also takes the local debates over what constitutes Taiwanese identity and elevates it to the international scale. Regardless of their performances, the teams of “Chinese Taipei” still represent Taiwan. The athletes may wear the clothes of “Chinese Taipei,” but they represent the people on the island of Taiwan. And through these representations, conceptions of “Taiwaneseness” play out on the playing fields of international sports and construct a place-based identity for the island.
"We cannot rely indefinitely on outside assistance. Our future depends on our strength."
Chiang Kai-shek (1974, 82)

The three case studies presented in the preceding chapters illustrate how Taiwanese national identity is constructed and debated. However, these debates do not exist in a vacuum and are not mutually exclusive. Each case study reflects a different “landscape” or scale where these debates unfold. Yet, there is a politics of scale that must be addressed as each “scale” is not a natural phenomenon but one that is constructed relative to the debate.

The purpose of this chapter is to bring the three case studies together and explain how the national identity debate transcends all three “debates.” I will use two theoretical concepts – Cox’s spaces of engagement and spaces of dependence; and Roach’s theory of surrogation. In order to properly utilize these theories, it is necessary not only to define each theory, but in the case of scale it is important to lay out the politics of scale and the ongoing debate in geography concerning scale.

The Scaling of Taiwanese National Identity

The three case studies detailed in the preceding three chapters focus on the debate over Taiwanese national identity. It would be easy to pin these three case studies to the "national" scale due to its dealings with issues of nationality. The National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall is a national monument even though it is located in the city of Taipei. Presidential elections affect the governance of the entire nation, while the "Chinese Taipei" teams are the national representatives of the island of Taiwan.
However, simply to position these three case studies solely in relation to national scale would overlook the engagement that is taking place with each of the three issues. The monument, elections and international sport teams are certainly all manifestations of similar debates over Taiwanese national identity. These debates over national identity are what actually occur at the national scale. Using Cox’s vernacular, Taiwan becomes a space of dependence where the debate over identity takes place. Understanding Taiwan as a space of dependence becomes intertwined with its network with other spaces of dependence, namely China but also other internationally-recognized states. How Taiwan defines itself, regardless of which side of the identity debate one chooses, is tempered by its relationship to these other place-specific entities.

That Taiwan is a somewhat fixed entity is reflected in how those who participate in the debate over identity are also fixed, or at most limited in how they can construct identity(ies). The challenge here is that it is not how "Taiwan" is constructed that is being debated. The space of dependence is not the space (or "scale") at which the debate over identity is taking place. However, it is the representation of Taiwan that is the central focus here. In other words, it concerns how "Taiwaneseness" is constructed and debated rather than what is "Taiwanese" identity. Focusing on "Taiwaneseness" allows for the examination of how "Taiwanese" or "Taiwan" is constructed. The debate that emerges here concerns what characteristics create Taiwanese identity. And, in turn, what characteristics represent Taiwan? The space of dependence – Taiwan – is the starting point for the debate over identity, but it is ultimately the end result as well. Without Taiwan there would be no Taiwaneseness, yet without Taiwaneseness there would be no Taiwan.

Conceptions of Taiwaneseness occur at what Cox refers to as spaces of engagement. Cox (1998, 2) writes that a space of engagement is "the space in which the politics of securing a space of dependence unfolds." These spaces arise out of the spaces of dependence and are contingent to the changing identity of Taiwan since the decline of its international diplomatic recognition. With Taiwan serving as the space of dependence, the politics of "securing" the identity of Taiwan transcends the boundaries of the space of dependence as it expands to and deduces down to different spaces of engagement. In this case, the National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, presidential elections and Taiwan's southern region, and international sports competition become the spaces of engagement through which these "politics" unfold.
Jones and MacLeod (2004, 447) note how constructions and debates over regions in the United Kingdom are used to challenge conceptions of those given regions. They note that "various insurgent regionalisms in the South West have gone some way to destabilize those organizations programmed to sponsor 'official' visions of the state's regionalization project." These challenges are the outcomes of processes that are often implemented by various groups, thereby creating tension over how to identify a given space. "The territorialization of political life is never fully accomplished once and for all, but remains a precarious and deeply contentious outcome of historically specific state and non-state projects" (emphasis in original). Drawing on the work of Paasi (see 1996, 2001, 2003), Jones and MacLeod (437-8) note that these processes and projects undertaken by various groups are "mobilized in different places, in different ways and at different times through the articulation of a deeply embedded territorially oriented consciousness." While these projects may attempt to create a particular identity for a region – or in the case of this research a particular identity for Taiwan – it is not necessarily reflective of the region – or Taiwan – as a whole.

To apply this concept to the research at hand, the spaces of engagement are the spaces in which the politics of securing Taiwan unfold. The spaces not only serve as a way to create a particular identity for Taiwan, but in the case of opposition groups it also challenged official visions of what Taiwan should be in the international community. However, regardless of the group working to create an identity for Taiwan, the agenda does not necessarily represent the desires of all of the people of Taiwan. Yet, these projects and debates reflect the goals of these groups and have been conflated and distorted to reflect the desires of all of Taiwan. How these spaces of engagement appear relates to the relationship between Taiwan and other states (i.e., other spaces of dependence). But the spaces of engagement – spaces at which Taiwanese identity is debated, constructed, critiqued, and projected – work with one another to aid in crafting a representation of Taiwan and "secure" a place-specific identity. Spaces of engagement do work somewhat independently, but there is overlap and fluid movement between these spaces. The three case studies are spaces of engagement through which Taiwaneseness is made.

The National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall creates a space through which Taiwanese identity is debated because of the struggle over remembrance and public memory. This space is created at what can be deemed a "narrow" space when compared to the "national" space through
which Taiwanese identity is initially created. But this narrower space impacts the greater debate over what it means to be Taiwanese.

The memorial initially existed to commemorate the long-standing leader of Taiwan. It was Chiang who brought the KMT-led government to the island of Taiwan. However, Chiang's purpose of moving to the island was not to establish a government solely in Taiwan but to one day return to the mainland and regain full control over the whole of China. As the leader of the KMT, this concept of returning to the mainland was also held by the party and continues to influence the party's platform. While reclaiming the mainland is no longer a central tenet of the KMT, greater cooperation with the mainland continues to be the primary characteristic of the party (Ma 2010). Thus, as described above, the National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall becomes a monument to not only Chiang but also his party and its policies.

After the establishment of the Hall, it stood as a representation of Chiang and the Taiwanese people. Due to the political climate of Taiwan in the 1980s it was not easy to openly challenge the Hall's representation on the Taiwanese cultural landscape. It became a symbol of Taiwanese identity only to the extent that it reflected the late leader of the ROC and the KMT. But prior to the rise of the DPP and other opposition parties, the Hall did not become a space of engagement at which Taiwanese identity was debated. The meaning of the Hall was unquestioned and the identity that it portrayed was one of banal nationalism. It was on the everyday landscape of Taipei and it served as "the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building" (Billig 1995, 8).

With the rise of the DPP and former president Chen Shui-bian, the debate over what constitutes "Taiwan" converged on the Hall converting it into a space of engagement. The removal of Chiang from the Taiwanese landscape – including the Hall but also his statues on military bases and the renaming of streets and the Taipei airport – challenged the public memory of the late leader. But it also called into question how he represents "Taiwaneselessness" and how his memorialization reflects the identity of Taiwan. The renaming of the Hall challenged the "unnoticed" representation of Taiwan and created a space through which conceptions of Taiwan could be debated. This memorial to Chiang represented a Chinese consciousness as opposed to a Taiwanese consciousness and created a connection between the (political) identity of the island and the mainland. Thus, the challenge and renaming by Chen and the DPP represented an
attempt to wrest away control over the public memory of Chiang from the KMT and disassociate
with any lingering connection to a memory that suggests Taiwan is a part of China.

The change to National Taiwan Democracy Hall narrowed the debate over national
identity from the "nation" to the "local" (i.e. Taipei) and created a theater where this debate could
take place. The intentional use of "Taiwan" in the new name challenged the promotion of
Chinese consciousness that was placed on the landscape by the KMT upon its arrival (Leitner
and Kang 1999). This move promoted Taiwanese consciousness and challenged the norm that
existed on the Taipei landscape. It also challenged the legacy of Chiang Kai-shek and he should
be remembered. While the DPP held the removal of Chiang from the landscape as a means for
removing the memory of an authoritarian, the KMT used the opportunity to recast the legacy of
Chiang as one who brought great cultural, political and economic change to the island. Thus,
when the Hall was again renamed – this time to the National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall – it
did not necessarily reaffirm the previously unchallenged legacy of Chiang or his policies, but
served as a way to add to the Taiwanese identity debate by focusing on the positive changes to
the island attributed to Chiang, and vicariously to the KMT.

The Hall's role in the debate over Taiwaneseness reached its pinnacle during the Chen
administration (2000-2008). The fervor produced over the name change under Chen reflects
how delicate the debate is in Taiwan. That the Hall maintained much of its symbolism – the
Hall's White Sun on Blue Sky ceiling, a symbol of both the Republic of China and the KMT –
after the first name change inadvertently reproduces the tightrope that is walked by those
constructing and debating Taiwanese identity. Chen and the DPP derive their power from the
institutions that were created thanks in part to Chiang Kai-shek and that "Taiwan" can even be
debated would not exist without the KMT. The narrowing of the debate onto the Hall thusly
reproduces the larger debate over Taiwaneseness.

But without the election of the DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian, would there even exist a
name change to discuss? This is where the second space of engagement occurs – the regional
voting patterns that result from presidential elections in Taiwan.

For 88 years (1912-2000), the Republic of China was controlled by the KMT. But it was
not until the 1996 presidential election that the opposition parties even had a chance to break the
iron grip afforded to the party of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek. Although the legalization of
political parties occurred a decade earlier, the 1996 was the first open election in Taiwanese
history and allowed the opposition to stake its claim on the political landscape. While the KMT maintained its leadership following the 1996 elections, it set the stage for change by the next election cycle.

In March 2000, DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian used a split KMT electorate to position his party to take the presidency. His victory allowed the opposition to assume power and change the agenda of the ROC/Taiwan. During the eight-year tenure of Chen, Taiwan aligned more closely with the agenda of the DPP, including moving away from cooperation with the mainland and more towards independence. Although Chen never declared independence nor did he push for referenda to decide that fate\(^9\), the country moved away from the policies of the KMT and away from mainland connections. By the time the KMT regained the presidency in 2008, the DPP established itself as a political mainstay in Taiwan and a worthy opposition to the dominant KMT.

Although other opposition parties existed prior to the ascension of Chen, the DPP became the lead opposition group in Taiwan and took on many of the opposition traits that stood counter to the KMT identity. The KMT carries a mainlander identity due to its historical perception as an "outside" force. Despite efforts of Chiang Ching-kuo and others to "Taiwanize" the KMT, public perception of the party continues to be one fueled by mainland connections and Chinese appeasement. Conversely, the DPP projects a Taiwanese identity due to its opposition to the KMT. As noted above, Taiwanese are more likely to vote for the DPP than are mainlanders. The assignment of Taiwanese identity to the DPP comes largely from the absence of mainlander support rather than an abundance of Taiwanese support.

However, to suggest that the party line is simply drawn along ethnic differences (i.e. mainlander/Taiwanese) would be erroneous. Rigger (2001) notes that a KMT candidate is more likely to draw support from both mainlanders and Taiwanese than a DPP candidate, who is more likely to draw a majority of her/his support from Taiwanese. Additionally, given that Taiwanese are by far the ethnic majority, if party lines were even loosely based on ethnicity then the DPP would win most elections and the independence movement would have a stronger position on the island than it enjoys now (Hsieh 2008; Bedford and Hwang 2006). While ethnicity cannot be

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\(^9\) To be sure, the DPP desired to maintain the status quo. However, unlike the KMT the status quo for the DPP was one where Taiwan/ROC was already independent and separate from the PRC. Thus, declaring independence would be redundant. The primary goal of the DPP is to draft a constitution and push for international recognition of Taiwan's sovereignty (DPP website 2010).
completely ignored – it does tend to play a role in DPP and Pan-Green support – it seems that national identity is more of the dividing line between the two parties. Thus, the presidential elections serve as a space of engagement where the national identity debate ensues.

This space can be viewed as both a regional and a national space. That mainlanders are concentrated in the north and east and sparser in the south plays a role on the political cleavage that has appeared over between 1996 and 2008. But this distribution lends itself to developing the opposition rooting itself in the southern part of Taiwan. Certainly the relatively smaller number of mainlanders allows for the Taiwanese to rise up to oppose KMT rule, but other factors played a role as well, namely north-side discrepancies. Rigger (2001) points out the national spending discrepancy that existed and how it helped the Pan-Green Coalition rally opposition in the south. While focusing national spending on the north benefits mainlanders living there, it also benefits Taiwanese living in the region as well. Therefore this situation could explain why support for the KMT remains strong in the north despite that ethnic Taiwanese outnumber mainlanders while opposition is strong in the south where mainlanders are less concentrated.

However, the opposition in the south also plays off Taiwanese sentiment in the region and uses events such as the Meilidao Incident to garner support. That a major platform position of the DPP is de jure independence also explains the south’s affinity towards the party. This "solid south" in Taiwan creates a space for the opposition to control and guarantee support for its agenda. The DPP won the south in 2000 (47.81 percent), 2004 (58.91 percent), and 2008 (51.06 percent) and in 1996 the DPP received their greatest support in the south (25.43 percent). The largest DPP victory in each of those three elections also occurred in the south – Tainan County – including the only majority victory in 2000\(^{10}\). Due to the regionalization of the DPP electorate, the south becomes a reflection of the national identity debate, leaning towards independence. This does not mean that the north and the east are necessarily reflective of the status quo/reconciliation identity. Much as the KMT represents the "other" to the DPP Taiwanese identity, the north and east only carry with it the Chinese identity insofar as it is juxtaposed with the south.

Because of this regionalization driven by the political agenda of the DPP and KMT, the national electorate becomes the space of engagement where the two factions debate Taiwanese national identity. The electoral maps that result from the presidential elections spatialize the

\(^{10}\) Tainan County is Chen Shui-bian’s home county.
national identity debate. Because the primary agenda of the DPP and the KMT are divided along questions of national identity, how one votes in the presidential election tends to be a reflection of where one stands on the identity debate. The regional space of the south is a space where the opposition can express itself while the national space becomes the space of engagement where the national identity debate continues. Both main parties and their respective supporters carry on the national identity debate by campaigning and casting their votes. While the south is a DPP stalwart and the east is solidly in favor of the KMT, the north and the center remain open for either side to take. The north is open due to that region covering Taipei, the country's capital and largest city. The central region has been the linchpin of the presidential elections as in three of the four elections the winner of that region has won the presidency. The margin of victory in the central region also tends to reflect the national margin of victory, with the lone exception being the 2000 election where James Soong of the People's First Party won the central region but lost the election.

The country's electorate as a whole, and the central and south regions in particular, bring forth the debate over "Taiwaneseness." The rooting of the opposition movement and the political agenda of the two main parties in space create the space of engagement where what constitutes "Taiwaneseness" plays out. Each presidential election serves as a referenda on "Taiwaneseness," as well as which party will lead the country.

The third space of engagement occurs at the international scale. International sports, namely the Olympic Games, serve as a space at which Taiwanese national identity can be debated. Much like the National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall and the presidency of Taiwan, Olympic participation by Taiwan/ROC was relatively unquestioned, or at most Taiwan's participation was rationalized as "natural" (e.g., Taiwan/ROC held the "China" seat at the United Nations and thus deserved to be represented in the Olympic family). The sports case does differ from the previous two in that Taiwan's "China" representation in the IOC actually supports the opposition's stance that they are a sovereign state.

With the emergence of the mainland as a power, Taiwan/ROC lost its standing, culminating in the loss of the seat at the United Nations and ultimately its IOC standing as "China." This slip in status did not remove Taiwan from the IOC, but altered its position. With the Nagoya Resolution in 1979, Taiwan was allowed to remain in the IOC but could not use its
official name ("Republic of China") nor could it use "Taiwan" as a standalone name.\textsuperscript{11} Using "Chinese Taipei" does allow for Taiwan to remain part of the international sporting community, but it also undermines its sovereignty by disallowing the use of its name, flag, and national anthem in such events. Thus, international sports become a space of engagement where the debate over "Taiwaneseness" shifts from the national to the international scale.

While the KMT has expressed dissatisfaction with the use of the name "Chinese Taipei" in non-sporting situations (deLisle 2009; Wang 2010a), it was in fact the KMT-led government that agreed upon the name and conditions at the Nagoya meetings. To be sure the decision was made in order to keep Taiwan/ROC viable in the international (sport) community. But the name draws into question the national standing of Taiwan, with the maintenance of "Chinese Taipei" associating the island with the mainland. And although the KMT has question its usage, the DPP tends to be more vocal in railing against "Chinese Taipei" (Hsu and Chuang 2008; Chao 2010; Wang 2010b). This firmer positioning by the DPP brings their ongoing debate over national identity to the broader scale international scale of sports.

But the broader scope of the national identity debate extends beyond the political coalitions of Taiwan. The very appearance of teams representing Taiwan regardless of national designation raises the question of what it means to be a nation-state. Certainly the same can be said of Scotland's participation in rugby tournaments or Palestine's participation in FIFA World Cup qualifying matches. For political entities like Palestine, Scotland and Taiwan to participate in sporting events with the likes of the United States, Israel and China challenges widely held notions of the nation-state simply by being allowed to perform on the same stage.

The allowance of Taiwan to participate in the Olympics and World Baseball Classic and FIFA World Cup qualifying allows for its standing to be debated. The state of Alabama or Hiroshima prefecture are not allowed to participate in international sporting events. That Taiwan is allowed into these competition and not Alabama or Hiroshima draws a line as to who is allowed to participate and who is not. But if Taiwan is considered a province of China, at least from the mainland's perspective, then why can Hiroshima or South Ossetia not be allowed to field teams? What are the criteria for international participation in sports?

\textsuperscript{11} China was willing to allow the use of "Chinese Taiwan." Additionally, as noted in chapter six the ROC previously balked at using Taiwan, protesting its usage at the 1960 Summer Olympics in Rome.
That Taiwan is able to participate and challenge the norms of the international sporting community despite not being internationally recognized diplomatically by most international organizations creates the forum for debate over Taiwanese identity. But what purpose does the serve in the greater debate of Taiwanese national identity in Taiwan itself?

**Surrogate Identity: Surrogation and Taiwanese Identity**

With the politics of scale, in particular the Coxian spaces of engagement, may suggests how each of the three cases studies are linked together, these spaces do not necessarily explain why such spaces exist. For example, why is it that Taiwan/ROC chose to use "Chinese Taipei" instead of its official name? As detailed above, Taiwan was forced to make the change and by accepting it remained viable in the international sporting community. But there is more going on here than simply choosing a name. The process leading up to the creation of "Chinese Taipei" was fueled by the need to find a surrogate. This is where Roach's work on surrogation can be useful in explaining the national identity debate in Taiwan.

Surrogation focuses on attempts to fill a void. In Roach's work *Cities of the Dead* (1996), he notes how individuals or groups attempt to fill voids created by death or departure through the use of a replacement or surrogate. While Taiwan has not experienced "death," it has experienced loss, the loss of international standing and recognition. This situation leaves Taiwan searching for ways to fill the void that has fractured open.

In the case of sports, Taiwan's loss was its representation of "China" in the Olympic family. However, Taiwan did not completely lose its position in the Olympic family as both the IOC and mainland China were willing to allow Taiwanese participation with conditions. In an attempt to survive the changing international political climate, the KMT and Taiwan were left with little choice but to accept their demoted status. Thus, in order to fill the cavity created by the loss of representing "China," the KMT and Taiwan accept an alternative – "Chinese Taipei."

The use of the term "Chinese Taipei" allows Taiwan to avoid marginalization in the international sporting community. Taiwan is still able to participate in international sports on equal footing with internationally recognized countries by creating/accepting this surrogate. However, because the agreement to use "Chinese Taipei" keeps Taiwan from using its official name, anthem and flag, the surrogate falls short in completely filling the cavity of that lost "Chinese" identity. Certainly the use of "Chinese Taipei" creates an image that can suggest that
sports teams represent a political entity separate or at least different from the mainland. However, it falls short because of the lack of Taiwanese national iconography. Additionally, the use of "Chinese Taipei" in English still creates a link to the mainland not seen even in cases such as Puerto Rico or Guam (e.g., American San Juan or American Hagatna). For the mainland, to allow Taiwan to use "Taiwan," "Republic of China," or even "China-Taipei" would recognize its standing as separate from China. While the mainland holds that the Taiwan is a province of China, allowing the use of "Chinese Taipei" also works as a surrogate for China as the mainland "lost" control of the island. "Chinese Taipei" fills that void by creating a symbolic connection between Taiwan and China.

As Lambert (2007) and Roach (1996) both note, surrogates are never neutral and without controversy. "Chinese Taipei" creates controversy on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. For Taiwan, the use of the label does not meet full expectations as sovereignty is undermined. Taiwanese cannot wrap themselves in their national flags and utilize sports as rallying points for patriotism in the same way that the United States, Germany and Japan can. Certainly Taiwanese feverishly support their compatriots in competition (e.g. Chao and Ko 2010; Taipei Times 2010). However, Taiwan is not allowed to use the same types of iconography that other countries are allowed to use. Additionally, while both main political parties are dissatisfied with the "Chinese Taipei" moniker, it is the DPP that is more vocal about its opposition to the name. The surrogate becomes controversial within Taiwan because it serves as a flashpoint for Taiwanese national identity. Its usage lends itself towards the marginalization of Taiwan and serves as a reminder of how the "loss" of international recognition was replaced by outsiders, i.e., mainland China and the IOC.

For China, "Chinese Taipei" may serve as an excessive surrogate. Although the name creates ambiguity about Taiwan's status, the name also allows for debate over the standing of Taiwan. Furthermore, Taiwan is able to participate separately from the mainland and has a separate identity from China. While China does allow both Hong Kong and Macau to participate in international competitions separate from China, the Chinese language manipulation of "Chinese Taipei" creates a different image than does the name "Hong Kong, China" and "Macau, China." To be sure, China goes to great lengths to ensure that Taiwan is grouped in with Hong

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12 Similar to the use of Guinea-Bissau to differentiate it from the Republic of Guinea, or the informal use of Congo-Kinshasa and Congo-Brazzaville.
Kong and Macau as pieces of China rather than separate entities. One only needs to see the original proposal for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Torch Relay to see how China attempted to ensure that the domestic path included Taipei (Beijing 2008 Torch Relay 2007; Wade 2007). Furthermore, the attempts to apply the label in the non-sports sphere have been challenged by Taiwan. That the application of the name is not uniform also creates a situation for China where the surrogate fails to meet expectations.

But the use of a surrogate is not limited to the "Chinese Taipei" case. The identity issues addressed in the other two case studies also serve as surrogates for marginalized groups. Lambert (2007, 363) notes that surrogates can represent "a resistant tradition in a supposedly politically quiescent society." The DPP and the presidency of Chen Shui-bian serve this role as a surrogate representing a previously marginalized group – the ethnic Taiwanese. The party platform of the DPP, one that is more aligned with independence and separation from the mainland, also serves as a surrogate as that position was previously marginalized. The victory by Chen in 2000 and his subsequent reelection in 2004 allowed for him to fill the void created by the death of Taiwan's status with a DPP-influenced surrogate.

The Taiwanese south also plays a role in creating this surrogate as the region becomes a "vortex of behavior" or a place of memory. As stated above, southern Taiwan is the focal point of the opposition movement, encapsulated by the Meilidao Incident. Roach (1996) notes that these vortices of behavior create a landscape where potential surrogates are provided for the construction of public memory. While he is referring to performances, and Lambert is referring to monuments, this construction also extends to oppositional candidates for political office. The opposition movement from the south creates a space where the DPP and the Pan-Green Coalition can form a viable surrogate to fill the void created by both internal and external marginalization. The south therefore becomes a surrogate in and of itself giving voice to the marginalized and providing resistance to the "politically quiescent society." That the DPP has experienced its greatest success in the south should come as no surprise as that region provides the landscape for the surrogate – in 2000 and 2004 President Chen; in 2008 Frank Hsieh – to be constructed.

However, as is the case with "Chinese Taipei," the surrogate created by the presidential elections is not without controversy. The DPP's stance and Chen's agenda could be deemed examples of excessive surrogation. While his presidency provides Chen and the DPP with the means to push for de jure independence, it was not uniformly accepted across Taiwan.
Corruption charges against Chen and his family did not aid his agenda as in 2008 the KMT used the pending investigation to its advantage. KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou also used his campaign as a means to paint Chen and his independence agenda as dangerous. To Ma and KMT supporters, pushing the independence agenda may actually injure Taiwan's future by inviting Chinese retaliation. As The Economist (2008) notes, Chen and the DPP "had done too well in his fight for a Taiwanese identity" by creating an excessive surrogate. In other words, Chen exceeded the expectations of filling the cavity and representing the marginalized by putting all other issues second to the national identity debate.

Yet, even so, the presidential election as a surrogate can also be viewed as a failure as Chen was not able to maintain the process started under his administration. The 2008 defeat of the then-ruling DPP represented the shortcomings of Chen as the surrogate. Roach notes that finding a suitable surrogate may take many attempts, with Chen's surrogation appearing as a failed attempt at filling the void. Even the southern region as a surrogate was fractured as a result of the failure (or excess?) as 2008 DPP-candidate Hsieh only held on to the south by a 51-49 margin, losing the cities of Kaohsiung and Tainan.

The northern part of Taiwan also has a surrogate – the National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. The Hall was just one part of the DPP’s and Chen Shui-bien’s erasure of memories of Chiang Kai-shek from the Taiwanese landscape. This maneuvering by Chen served as a means to alter public memory, or as Roach terms it, the vortices of behavior. Much as the south acted as a surrogate, the Hall was not constructed as a surrogate – at least not for the opposition DPP – but was converted into a one following the name change in 2007.

The Hall could be held as a surrogate for the KMT. Chiang Kai-shek was the long-serving president of the Republic of China/Taiwan and responsible for leading the Nationalists from Nanjing to Taipei ensuring the party's survival. His death in 1975 left a leadership void that was filled by his son Chiang Ching-kuo. However, the loss of the elder Chiang removed the symbolic power of the ROC's mainland claim and the KMT party. The Hall with its grandiose design and massive areal expanse leaves an indelible mark on the Taipei landscape. It projects symbolic power and control over public memory and celebrates Chiang's legacy and by extension KMT history.

For opposition groups in Taiwan, the original Chiang Kai-shek Hall became an excessive surrogate overplaying Chiang's legacy and ignoring atrocities such as the 228 Incident. That
Chiang is granted such a large space hints that he was more responsible than others in the development of Taiwan/ROC, relegating others as secondary figures. It also works as a means to "silence" opposition voices by displaying one version of history – one glorifying Chiang and the KMT – at the expense of those versions of history suppressed under martial law.

After the 2000 presidential election of Chen, the opposition positioned itself to change public memory by removing Chiang Kai-shek from the landscape. These steps were part of a larger process of the native Taiwanese expressing their voice and erasing "negative" memories. Lambert (2007, 363) notes that in the case of Bussa and Barbados a surrogate can act as "a substitute for people ... whose histories have been marginalized and whose stories are irrecoverable" and "stands in for Africa in a historically creolized culture searching for its diasporic roots." While the Taiwanese stories are not "irrecoverable," nor is it necessarily a "creolized culture," the Taiwanese were previously marginalized and have been searching for their roots, which do have diasporic elements. This latter notion is intriguing as the construction of the Hall could be held as a way for the KMT to maintain its "diasporic roots" on the mainland, while the DPP-led renaming could be held as a means of establishing Taiwanese identity after its diaspora from the mainland prior to 1949.

The renaming of the Hall to National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall became a surrogate for all of those who suffered and died under Chiang's rule and gave "voice" to those long marginalized under KMT rule. It also allowed them to create an identity – a Taiwanese identity – that separated it from connections to the mainland and inserted "Taiwan" into one of the most popular tourist destinations in Taipei. The renaming of the space surrounding the Hall to "Liberty Square" also reflected the struggle of the marginalized Taiwanese and how they were able to transform into a relatively free society.

What allowed the DPP to rename the Hall is not just contingent on the election of its candidate Chen Shui-bian. That the ROC/Taiwan lost its standing in the international community as "China" also gave the opposition an opportunity to create a Taiwanese national identity. The "death" of Taiwan's status opened up a cavity in which the opposition could find a worthy surrogate to fill that void. Once presented with such an opportunity, Chen and the DPP were able to use the Hall as a surrogate to create an identity that was separate from the mainland and establish its own version of Taiwanese national identity. The renaming became a way for
the DPP to place on the Taipei landscape its position in the national identity debate and create a surrogate to fill the void created by Taiwan's loss in status.

However, this surrogate turned out to be an excessive one. The widespread renaming campaign to remove vestiges of Chiang Kai-shek from the Taiwanese landscape proved to be extremely controversial. Plans to rename the Hall led to pro-Chiang rallies and a defensive campaign by the KMT to remind Taiwan of the positive role Chiang played in the development and protection of the island and its sovereignty. The official renaming also created a divisive situation between pro-independence and pro-reconciliation factions where the two sides clashed in front of the Hall, each accusing the other of wrongdoing – either celebrating a tyrant or rewriting history. The excessive nature of the renaming is summarized in the fact that after Ma Ying-jeou's victory in March 2008 the Hall was renamed so that Chiang's name once again adorned the memorial. In the end, the renaming went too far in its surrogation of Taiwanese identity.

Conclusion

The three case studies come together as methods for debating and discussing Taiwanese identity. In each case the players involved have shifted to a different space of engagement in order to present their side of the argument and attempt to craft what constitutes "Taiwaneseness." By narrowing the space to the National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, both the Pan-Blue and the Pan-Green Coalitions were able to create an everyday space that reflects what it means to their group to be "Taiwanese." Those involved in the space of dependence (Taiwan) were able to narrow down their focus and use the Hall to their advantage. For the Pan-Blue Coalition, the Hall serves as a symbol of KMT power and a connection to its mainland roots. For the opposition Pan-Green, the renaming of the Hall allows for a severing of ties to the mainland and a way to promote its take on Taiwanese national identity.

The debate also takes place in a space similar to the space of dependence – the national space of presidential elections. The pattern of voting allows for both sides of the national identity debate to express their position spatially through the electorate. The pro-independence parties have grown from the opposition movements from the south to use that region as a method of expressing what constitutes "Taiwaneseness." The remaining regions of Taiwan become a method to express the status quo position in the identity debate.
Finally, the debate jumps to the broader scale in the context of international sports. In this case, however, the debate does not necessarily involve the two coalitions in Taiwan but other spaces of dependence, namely China, the United States and other internationally recognized states. Certainly the coalitions in Taiwan are involved in the international debate as the KMT's acceptance of "Chinese Taipei" abides by their stance of one-China and avoids the controversy regarding independence. However, even the KMT and current president Ma Ying-jeou hold the title as unsatisfactory. Thus, the debate at this space of engagement is predominantly between those who hold Taiwan is part of China and those who view it as a separate political entity.

But each of the spaces of engagement works as a surrogate in an attempt to fill in the void created by Taiwan's loss of its standing in the international community. Both the Hall renaming and the southern region in the presidential elections serve as a surrogate in giving the previously marginalized Taiwanese a voice in the national identity debate. The loss in standing provided the opposition with a means to push for their surrogate to replace the previous "Chinese" identity. The use of "Chinese Taipei" is perhaps the most direct form of surrogation as it replaced Taiwan's Olympic representation of "China" with an Olympic committee that represents the island.

However, in all three cases the surrogates failed to fill the cavity created by the loss in Taiwanese standing. Even with the party's initial support, the KMT also holds "Chinese Taipei" as falling short in replacing its previous standing and does not satisfactorily fill the cavity for Taiwan. The renaming of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall fails to serve as a satisfactory surrogate because lacked longevity and created controversy. That it was converted back to a memorial to Chiang Kai-shek also suggests that the renaming was a failed surrogate. The presidency of Chen Shui-bian as a surrogate also failed because the DPP's loss in 2008 reflects the shortcomings of Chen as a surrogate and how it may take many attempts to find a proper surrogate.

These surrogates and their spaces of engagement represent how the national identity of Taiwan is debated and constructed. In each case, all parties involved attempt to manipulate monuments, elections and sports as a way to promote their understanding of "Taiwaneseness" and what it means to be "Taiwanese." These debates also leak into other identities, not just domestically (e.g. ethnicity) but also international ones such as Chinese and identities of other nation-states. With the former, if the Taiwanese and the island of Taiwan are deemed to
represent a separate national identity from that of China, then the Chinese identity would not include Taiwanese. With the latter, that Taiwan is not a widely recognized nation-state their participation in international sports and their ambiguous standing fuels debates about what it means to be a nation-state.

Using national space as well as a means for jumping to broader and narrower spaces allows for Taiwanese national identity to be debated in various forums. Given Taiwan's questionable international status, these debates become an important part of crafting the characteristics that define "Taiwaneseness." and the search for a surrogate becomes vital. However, that these surrogates have often failed (or exceeded) expectations in filling voids highlights the delicate and controversial nature of forming a national identity that can at least satisfy most Taiwanese. Thus, the battle for Taiwanese identity forges on until the next competition, the next presidential election, and the next attempt to spatialize history.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION: NATIONAL IDENTITY IN TAIWAN

"To revive China is not only to save China, but also Asia and the world."
Chiang Kai-shek (1974, 50)

The preceding chapters bring to light the issues and debates concerning what it means to be “Taiwanese.” That the research focuses on Taiwan, a state that lacks significant international diplomatic recognition, speaks to the contentious nature of nationalism and identity. However, it is through this quandary that the issues of the different conceptions of what is “Taiwanese” are truly realized. Questions of identity are linked to questions of “place” and this issue gets at the heart of how identity is constructed, and by whom.

I opened with an overview of identity research. Both individual and group identities are multilayered and incorporate many different dimensions. The multiplicity of characteristics found in a particular identity lends itself to debates over what it means to possess that given identity, which in this case means Taiwaneseness. Debates over identity – or identity politics – are also multi-scalar and take place at various spaces of engagement. These debates are not mutually exclusive. Each space of engagement serves a similar purpose – determining "Taiwaneseness" – and each space work in conjunction with the other spaces in order to form a broader understanding of what it means to be "Taiwanese."

Three chapters in this dissertation laid out three spaces at which debates over "Taiwaneseness" take place. Each of these case studies was analyzed uniquely and allows for each space of engagement to be examined as a stand-alone space of identity debate. The National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall was examined using geographic research devoted to public memory and memorialization (Alderman [1996, 2000, 200] Azaryahu [1992]). The renaming of the Hall, as well as the monument itself, served as a way for opposition groups in Taiwan to reshape public memory and craft their own version of Taiwanese identity, one that severs connections to the mainland.
Presidential elections in Taiwan provide insight into the formation of oppositional cleavages in the Taiwanese electorate. Relying partially on the work of Webster (1992), I demonstrate how splits in the dominant KMT allowed for DPP-candidate Chen Shui-bian to win the 2000 presidential election. The subsequent patterns reflect a spatialization of party politics and opposition, with the south falling mostly with the Pan-Green Coalition (which advocates 

*de jure* independence), the north and the east typically voting with the Pan-Green Coalition (which advocates the status quo of one China), and the central region acting as the "swing" counties. Due to national identity characteristics, both real and imagined, being assigned to the two dominant parties – KMT and status quo; DPP and independence – the pattern of the electorate comes to reflect opinions on national identity.

Last, sports identity and the use of "Chinese Taipei" reflect issues of nationality and international recognition. While "Chinese Taipei" undermines attempts to form an identity separate from mainland China, it does provide Taiwan with an avenue through which to contest what it means to be a sovereign nation-state. Performativity research serves as a way to better understand how sports "perform" expected roles in the international sporting community and how performing as "Chinese Taipei" does not necessarily take away from the fact that they still represent the island of Taiwan. It becomes an issue of national identity because of its contentious nature, elevating questions of "Taiwaneseness" to an international debate.

However, while each of these three case studies offer examples of how "Taiwaneseness" is debated, they do not exist in a vacuum. Overlap exists among each space of engagement and allows for those attempting to construct their vision of what constitutes "Taiwaneseness" and how each case reproduces (or negates) their vision. This shift between one space and another affords, for example, pro-independence groups multiple opportunities and spaces to reproduce their "Taiwaneseness." The broadening and narrowing of the spaces at which identity is constructed and debated allows for various participants to take part in forming national identity. The renaming of the National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall may have been primarily driven by politicians and the elite, but it also provided "common people" with a space through which to express their support or opposition to the name change. Through this space, individuals and groups could also express their views on national identity, at least as it is framed by politicians in Taiwan.
Additionally, due to the change in international diplomatic recognition since 1970, Taiwan has search for ways to express its national identity. Surrogation provides a method for expressing identity in order to replace the "lost" identity. The renaming of the Hall, the pattern of voting, and the use of "Chinese Taipei" in sports all perform as surrogates in an effort to fill the void created by the "death" of Taiwan's former identity (as "China"). These surrogates often fall short in filling the cavity left behind by "death" by not providing a suitable "replacement" identity. Surrogates can also exceed expectations, causing controversies to arise over the surrogate-elect.

The tie that binds each of the three case studies is not scale or surrogation, however, but national identity. While members of the DPP or KMT, as well as individuals from the northern or southern regions of Taiwan, may have different conceptions of "Taiwaneseness," they are joined together in the ever-present debate over national identity. The spaces through which these debates develop and are pushed forward take place in what could be deemed "everyday" space: the grandiose monument on the Taipei landscape; the pattern of voting that arises from the act of participating in elections; the baseball team that plays a game against South Korea. That each of these case studies originates in everyday space is telling in that public memory, electoral patterns, and sports can create naturalized spaces where the particular identities that arise from such spaces appear to be natural and unchallenged. Each space becomes, in the words of Billig (1995), an "unwaved flag" that generally goes unnoticed and unchallenged. Thus, the spaces begin as widely "accepted" forms of identity.

Yet, as has been demonstrated in the above chapters, the identities and memories created through those spaces are indeed challenged. This challenge helps bring new voices and angles into the identity construction. Identities are more well-defined when they are multifaceted (and multiscalar) rather than one-dimensional. Yet still, these identities and spaces, and the challenges to each, also demonstrate that identity is fluid rather than static. The renaming of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall challenged the uncontested legacy of Chiang, the linkages between Taiwan and the mainland, and gave voice to the previously marginalized Taiwanese majority. The development of a southern cleavage of opposition among the Taiwanese electorate broke up the "solid" KMT electorate and again gave voice to the marginalized. But even the newly developed southern region of opposition displayed fluidity, as in 2008 when the opposition DPP lost the southern cities of Kaohsiung and Tainan. And while sports are often
held as a form of escape from the political, sports identity and nationalism are rife with politic motives. The international "acceptance" of Taiwan's relegation to a non-state entity may support the status quo of one China, but identity politics still exist whether through the Chinese manipulation of "Chinese Taipei" or that Taiwan is able to compete on the same level as recognized countries such as the United States and China.

To be sure, each of these spaces of engagement comes together to create a greater picture of Taiwaneseness, even if it is still contested. Each contestation builds on previous constructions of Taiwanese identity and creates debates about which characteristics best promote such an identity. As Dittmer (2010, 76) notes, "people's identity" are best imagined "as being produced through a variety of public narratives." It is this conception of identity that is applicable to Taiwan as the various public narratives of what it means to be Taiwanese actually constructs "Taiwaneseness." The various groups and individuals involved in the national identity debate in Taiwan bring to the debate unique perspectives that help shape the discourse. Bundles of identities come into play in Taiwan where, for example, native Taiwanese members of the KMT are left to choose between supporting Taiwanese ethnic nationalism and the policies of the KMT that tend to veer away from such ethnic identity construction. But, more importantly, the collective "Taiwanese" identity is one constructed from various other identities, each arising from various spaces of engagement. The National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, the presidential elections, and international sports are but three of these spaces that help shape and construct this identity.

But it is important to be cognizant of what the preceding chapters present in the ongoing debate over national identity in Taiwan. The debate is deeper than party politics or ethnic difference or China-Taiwan relations. The two main political parties in Taiwan generally reflect opposing sides of the identity debate, but the KMT is held as "anti-independence" if only because it is juxtaposed to more independence-leaning DPP. However, even the KMT and the DPP are relatively moderate as the People First Party is more staunchly opposed to independence than the KMT while the Taiwan Solidarity Union is a more vocal champion of de jure independence. Additionally, ethnic Taiwanese are equally as likely to support the KMT as they are to support the DPP. While mainlanders are less likely than Taiwanese to vote for a DPP candidate, what is suggested is that the national identity debate is not just concerned with ethnicity. And the national identity debate is not only limited to China and Taiwan. The label of
"Chinese Taipei" arises from the International Olympic Committee and its confusing creation of the two-China situation. But that the international community also acknowledges "Chinese Taipei" as representing Taiwan also plays a role in how (and where) Taiwanese identity can be constructed and displayed.

While Taiwanese national identity may include complex layers of a variety of "spaces of dependence," there is perhaps a more simple element in this entire discussion – place. To be sure, place is not the only factor in the construction of Taiwanese national identity, but it plays a significant role in that construction. The attempts to construct a place are not too dissimilar to attempting to find a place to "call home." Certainly each of the three case studies and their involvement in the construction of identity unfolds at a particular place – at the National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall; at the southern region of Taiwan; at the "stage" at which sports are "performed." But each of these three cases works to create Taiwan as a "place" and thus create a place-based identity.

But Taiwan as a place is not a singular conception. Nor is it a static one. As Massey (2005, 139-41) notes

'Here' is where spatial narratives meet up or form configurations, conjectures of trajectories which have their own temporalities (so 'now' is as problematic as 'here'). But where the successions of meetings, the accumulation of weavings and encounters build up a history. . . . 'Here' is an intertwining of histories in which the spatiality of those histories (their then as well as their here) is inescapably entangled. . . . [W]hat is special about place is precisely that throwntogtherness, the unavoidable challenge of negotiating a here-and-now. . . . This is the event of place in part in the simple sense of coming together of the previously unrelated, a constellation of processes rather than a thing. This is place as open and as internally multiple. . . . [T]he throwntogtherness of place demands negotiation.

Massey's explanation of place as not being "intrinsically coherent" lends itself to the type of open debate about what it means to be Taiwanese. Taiwan as a place is one that is "open" and allows for various interpretations about "Taiwaneseness." But Massey is also on point when she notes that place is a culmination of past "narratives." What it means to be Taiwanese in 2011 is different than what it meant in 1991 and different from 1941, and what it will mean in 2046. The meshing of time and space to create unique place-based identities that arise from previous narratives also suggests the delicate and contentious nature of identities, as evident in the case of Taiwan.
Thus, Taiwan is a place through which "Taiwaneseness" is constructed and where the Taiwanese identity – regardless of which characteristics it contains – is at "home." As Creswell (2004, 24) writes, "Home is an exemplary kind of place where people feel a sense of attachment and rootedness. Home, more than anywhere else, is seen as a center of meaning and a field of care." Projecting Taiwan as home allows for that sense of attachment – national identity. Creswell cites Bachelard (1994) in stating that "the interior arrangement of the house constitutes not one homogeneous place but rather a series of places with their own memories, imaginings and dreams." Taiwan too is not one homogenous place but a series of places – or with regards to this dissertation a series of spaces of engagement – through which aid in the perceptions of "Taiwaneseness." This multiplicity of "memories" and "narratives" create a rich identity that is also contested.

However, Creswell (115) also notes that the concept of "home" in the Western perception is correlated with housing. If we are to construct nations as homes and thus in need of housing, would Taiwan be considered "homeless"? Citing May (2000), Creswell explains that homelessness may also signify displacement. This concept of displacement is important as it reflects Taiwan's loss of international standing. The process of surrogation thus evolves out of the displacement of Taiwanese standing and its "Chinese" identity.

Yet, it should also be understood that the concept of homelessness and displacement with regards to Taiwan is one that is derived from norms that dictate what it means to have a home, or in this case to be an internationally-recognized nation-state. Again citing May as well as Veness (1992), Creswell (117) notes that "homeless people . . . think of themselves as having places to call home – even when they were sleeping rough – but these places do not count in the eyes of those who encounter them." Taiwan may exist as a place – as a sovereign nation-state – to Taiwanese, but not to the international community, the United Nations or even the IOC. "The close connection between place, identity and morality creates a world that is difficult for some of those who are apparently 'without place'"

But are Taiwanese without a place? Certainly with regards to international diplomatic recognition, the Taiwanese are without a "home" or place. But as even comedian George Carlin (1992) stated, "A home is an abstract idea. It is a setting. A home is a state of mind." And is through a sense of attachment to this abstract idea that identity is created. Taiwan may "not count in the eyes" of the international community, but the Taiwanese still call it home. Taiwan
as a place and as a home, as well as its displacement, creates the space of dependence through which "Taiwaneseness" is created.

And through the spaces of engagement detailed in this dissertation "Taiwaneseness" is constructed, contested, asserted, assigned, ignored, embraced, experienced and, perhaps, accepted. It is my hope that this dissertation sheds light not only on the ongoing struggle to define "Taiwaneseness," but to also furthers research on national identity debates among non-state entities. Taiwan may be diplomatically "homeless" but that does not mean that it lacks a desire to find a permanent home. It also does not mean it lacks its own perception of "home," or place, for through this "place" the Taiwanese are able to build on previous and ongoing discourse over what it means to be Taiwanese. With future presidential elections and participation in international sports likely to evoke questions of national identity, debates over what is "Taiwaneseness" will continue to rage on as Taiwan continues to search for its own place.
APPENDIX A

1996 TAIWANESE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS, BY DISTRICT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Chen Lyu-An (Ind.)</th>
<th>Lee Teng-hui (KMT)</th>
<th>Peng Ming-min (DPP)</th>
<th>Lin Yang-gang (Ind.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Votes</td>
<td>Share</td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>Share</td>
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<tr>
<td>Changhua County</td>
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<td>9.70%</td>
<td>40720</td>
<td>63.63%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>116154</td>
<td>18.12%</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>54776</td>
<td>8.55%</td>
</tr>
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## APPENDIX B

### 2000 TAIWANESE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS, BY DISTRICT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>James Soong (PFP)</th>
<th>Lien Chan (KMT)</th>
<th>Chen Shui-bian (DPP)</th>
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<td>Share</td>
<td>Votes</td>
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## APPENDIX C

### 2004 TAIWANESE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS, BY DISTRICT

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**Notes:**
- The share is calculated as (Votes / Total Votes) * 100%.
- The total votes for the DPP and KMT are 6471970 and 6442452, respectively.
- The results are categorized by districts, with the central region having the highest share of votes for the DPP (50.11%).

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# APPENDIX D

## 2008 TAIWANESE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS, BY DISTRICT

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REFERENCES


–. 2002a. _Place and Politics in Modern Italy_. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.


–. 2006. “Street names as memorial avenues: the reputational politics of commemorating Martin Luther King Jr. in a Georgia County,” in Romano, R.C. and L. Raiford, eds. _The Civil Rights Movement in American Memory_. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press


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http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/12/05/2003391160/2

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/02/06/2003347859


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Daniel McGowin was born and raised in Moody, Alabama. Thanks to the pictures of flags and maps found in his parents' Funk & Wagnalls encyclopedias, Daniel found an early love of geography that carried into his undergraduate degree at the University of Alabama. At Alabama, he studied geography, international relations, and Japanese; participated in a short-term exchange program to Hiroshima University; and in 2002 earned his Bachelor of Arts. After a brief stint in the Asian Studies program at the University of Hawai'i, Daniel decided to return to Alabama and continue studying geography. In 2006, Daniel earned his Master of Science in Geography with his thesis titled "Yasukuni-Jinja: Iconography and the Lost Cause Myth in Japan." Soon after, Daniel began his Ph.D. in geography at the Florida State University, with his dissertation focusing on Taiwanese identity.

Daniel's research interests include Northeast Asia, identity, political geography, popular culture and geography, and sports. He has presented annually at both regional and national academic meetings, with topics ranging from language identity to haunted places. He is the lead author for "Geography, Identity and Florida's Specialty License Plates," published in The Florida Geographer in 2010; co-author of "Research on the Political Geography of the South, 1980-2005," published in the Southeastern Geographer in 2007; and author of "Place, Identity, and Taiwan's Presidential Elections, 1996-2008," an edited book chapter published in Revitalizing Electoral Geography in 2011. Daniel is currently serving on the faculty at Alabama State University.