A Heideggerian Critique of the Role of 'Relation' in John Dewey's Philosophy of Education

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A HEIDEGGERIAN CRITIQUE OF THE ROLE OF ‘RELATION’ IN JOHN DEWEY’S
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

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To Mickey, for outfitting my imagination with wings.

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ABSTRACT

John Dewey belonged to the Aristotelian and Kantian metaphysical tradition, which means that he relied on their categories to signify and therefore to know individual entities in the empirical world, including human beings. Specifically, he relied on relation. With the help of the method of intelligence (or the scientific method generally), Dewey found that relation reigns in the physical environment. Since human beings are inextricably bound to it, Dewey inferred that relation reigns, or rather should be made to reign, in the social environment. The chief purpose of education is to ensure this reign, and this purpose is a moral purpose. Concerned with doing the ‘right’ thing, teachers (and adults generally) would strive to realize this purpose by encouraging students to reconcile their powers and dispositions with conjoint activity aimed at the expansion of the general welfare. In doing so, teachers would be teaching students, in Dewey’s view, the essence of morality. It is Dewey’s inferring relation from the physical environment, and using it as the ground to draw a conclusion about the essence of morality, with which I take issue in this dissertation. From the perspective of Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology—and of his existentials in particular, which he formulated as a set of categories with which to distinguish human from non-human entities—I challenge what I refer to as Dewey’s excessive optimism with respect to what we may expect from teachers (and adults in general) who insist that children choose to reconcile their powers and dispositions with other children (and adults) in an effort to expand the general welfare, and to adopt the notion that what they are choosing is the essence of morality. From this perspective, I offer an alternative philosophy of moral education that is more consistent with the kinds of teachers (and adults) children are likely to encounter.
CHAPTER ONE

MY ‘FELT DIFFICULTY’ WITH THE ROLE OF ‘RELATION’ IN JOHN DEWEY’S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Dewey’s philosophy of education belongs to the Aristotelian and Kantian metaphysical tradition of thinking about and understanding individual entities in the empirical world, including human beings, in terms of categories—relation in particular. The source of my ‘felt difficulty’ with this fundamental aspect of his philosophy of education is this: by means of the method of intelligence (or the scientific method generally), Dewey found that relation reigns in the physical environment. Since human beings are inextricably bound to it, he inferred that relation reigns, or rather should be made to reign, in the social environment. The chief purpose of education is to ensure this reign, and this purpose is a moral purpose. Concerned with doing the ‘right’ thing,

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1 While he is a member of said tradition, his membership is not uncritical, as I will show in Chapter 3.
2 Henceforth, I will use the italicized relation to mark its membership in the Aristotelian and Kantian tradition, which I will discuss in Chapter 3.
3 This is evident in Experience and Nature (1925), and remains implicit throughout Democracy and Education and Reconstruction in Philosophy.
4 According to Parsons,

Dewey believed that all the needful and worthwhile certainties of human life are to be found in the sustaining matrix of our common life and that, armed with our common faith in these values and their source and stay, we might pierce and confront the unknown, seeking hopefully the good and acknowledging with courage what is adverse in society and nature. Dewey, in short, never doubted the existence and worth of a structure and direction in things that could not be undone [i.e., “our common life”]. His faith in this is indeed so deep-going that he seems to have considered it unnecessary to explicate it [Howard L. Parsons, “The Meaning and Significance of Dewey’s Religious Thought,” 188].

One of the fundamental reasons why I am writing this dissertation is because I don’t share Dewey’s faith in “our common life,” which Strike characterized as being rooted in “the conviction that liberalism corrodes community” [Kenneth A. Strike, “The Moral Role of Schooling in a Liberal Democratic Society,” 447]. Lest I be misunderstood, I am not advocating for any particular form of liberalism, but rather for an education that will enable students to decide whether or not, and if so the extent to which to embrace any one of them.

5 Dewey’s metaphysical commitment to relation, combined with his commitment to a Hegel-inspired teleology that incessantly reconciles individual entities with progressively comprehensive wholes [e.g., Dewey thought the ultimate aim of voluntary associations is “the effective formation of an international mind” (Reconstruction in Philosophy, 205)], and with his “excessive optimism” (see below) about what such commitment could accomplish, compelled him to argue that education must prepare individuals to choose to participate in some conjoint activity, and to focus it on attaining “collective efficiency” (Ibid, 209). While I do not reject the obvious need for individuals to know how to engage in conjoint activity, this need is not fundamental for me like it was for Dewey. Throughout this dissertation I will contend that Dewey’s metaphysical commitment to relation, to a Hegel-inspired teleology, and to an “excessive optimism” about its being able to accomplish the expansion of the general welfare, limits
teachers (and adults generally) would strive to realize this purpose by encouraging students to reconcile their powers and dispositions with conjoint activity aimed at expanding the general welfare. In doing so, teachers would be teaching students, in Dewey’s view, the essence of morality.\(^7\) It is Dewey’s inferring relation from the physical environment, and using it as the ground to draw a conclusion about the essence of morality, with which I take issue in this dissertation.\(^8\)

I take issue with Dewey’s inference for several reasons. First, Dewey downplayed, if not ignored, often-insurmountable obstacles that mitigate students’ choosing to reconcile their powers and dispositions with conjoint activity aimed at expanding the general welfare.\(^9\) Among them are dread, despair, disillusionment, disease, impotence, and death.\(^10\) What I have not found in Dewey, but have found in Heidegger, is finitude\(^11\)—i.e., limits\(^12\) beyond which students\(^13\) cannot or will not go when faced with the question of whether or not to reconcile their powers and dispositions with conjoint activity aimed at expanding the general welfare. In other words, I want to emphasize in Sidney Hook what, in Cornel West’s view (with which I agree), is largely individual choice, for the logic of said commitments discourages students from conceiving of education as a process of interrogating the morality of said commitments, especially when a majority avers them.

In “Dewey and the Threat of Tyranny of the Majority,” David Fott raised serious questions about whether or not Dewey’s insistence that all children be educated to think in terms of his method of intelligence would prevent said tyranny. He asked: “But if the desired result [of the method of intelligence] is a “consensus of conclusions” [which for Dewey, it was (see note 57)], if the result of the test must be widely shared [which for Dewey, it must (see note 57)], how likely is it that the test would eradicate an unfounded or dangerous dominant opinion? Would a minority likely be able to convince a majority to abandon that opinion?” I will deal with the issue of exempting certain assumptions and values from the scrutiny of Dewey’s method in more detail in Chapter 2.

Pragmatists, and I place Dewey in this category, embodied “the spirit of the moral reformer in their teachings” (Donald Mackay, “Pragmatism,” 387). West described this spirit as a “passionate moral interest” (Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism, 115). “All education which develops power to share effectively in social life is moral” (John Dewey, Democracy and Education, 345). In the index of this work (if not in the passage from which this quote is taken), under “morality,” we find that Dewey considered this statement to express its “essence.”

Lest I be misunderstood, I am not rejecting relation per se, for it is an indispensable cognitive tool with which to think about and understand empirical phenomena: indeed, relation renders the interconnections between the letters on this page intelligible; science is impossible without it; and it makes sense out of much human activity—e.g., drafting LeBron James as opposed to Dwayne Wade on the basis of their respective field goal percentages. What I am rejecting is Dewey’s inference that since relation governs all empirical phenomena, it also and necessarily governs (or should be made to govern) social phenomena as well, including morality.

According to William James, “the combined mission” [of Pragmatism] was to be, indeed, a transformation of philosophy and its methods in the interest of all that is “profitable to our lives” (William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, vii [as quoted in Donald Mackay, “Pragmatism,” 387]).

For a visual representation of dread, despair, and disillusionment, see Edvard Munch’s The Scream.

I will discuss this concept at length in Chapter 4.

For example, intellectual, affective, and motor.

I will discuss teachers below.
missing in Dewey: “Marx’s insight that people act and create but not under circumstances of their own choosing (emphasis mine),”14 and further qualify this statement by inserting the word ‘some’ in front of “people”—the ‘some’ referring to those who, in Heidegger’s terms, strive to live authentically.15 In light of the indelible fact of human finitude,16 Dewey’s “excessive optimism” [emphasis mine]17 about people’s ability and willingness to reconcile their powers and dispositions with conjoint activity aimed at expanding the general welfare is unwarranted.18

Lest my proposal be considered superfluous when compared to West’s, mine underscores West’s “tragic action,” but it remains ambivalent about his “revolutionary intent, usually reformist consequences, and always visionary outlook.”19 I remain ambivalent because nearly four decades of experience with sundry people has taught me that, while the pragmatists’ (and Dewey’s) object is to discern “the practical consequences of ideas as employed in the solution of human problems,”20 many of them more or less have (and do) suffer from dread, despair, disillusionment, disease, and other infirmities21 that more or less permanently cripple their ability and willingness to solve their own problems, let alone social problems—their (and their teachers’) best efforts notwithstanding.22

Dostoevsky’s Notes from the Underground (Notes henceforth) articulates the second reason I take issue with Dewey’s inference.23 According to this text, some people, myself included, will sometimes resist others’ attempts to categorize them (say, as ‘those who embody the essence of morality,’ as Dewey conceived it) by choosing to remain egocentric, and thereby

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15 I will discuss this concept at length in Chapter 4.
16 I understand dread, despair, disillusionment, disease, and death as aspects thereof.
17 Ibid, 226.
18 Dewey’s notion about the essence of morality “reeks of an optimism that turns its face from realities of history and present-day society … (for example,) brutalities and atrocities in human history, the genocidal attempts in this century, and the present-day barbarities.” In a word, Dewey ignored the “tragic … (which) highlights the irreducible predicament of unique individuals who undergo dread, despair, disillusionment, disease, and death and the institutional forms of oppression that dehumanize people” (Ibid, 116, 227, 228).
19 Ibid, 229.
20 Donald Mackay, “Pragmatism,” 389.
21 All suffer from death. As my late friend Steve used to say, “The mortality rate is still 100%!"
22 Kafka’s The Metamorphosis is an excellent illustration of the aforementioned dread, despair, disillusionment, disease, and death. This short story belongs to the genre of modernism in literature, which has given us the trope that individuals are fundamentally alone: they are born alone; they have little power to control what happens to them while they are alive; and they die alone. In the modernist mood, individuals daily awaken “from uneasy dreams,” only to find themselves transformed “into a gigantic insect … [with] numerous legs … pitifully thin compared to the rest of [their] bulk, [waiving] helplessly before [their] eyes” (Franz Kafka, Selected Short Stories of Franz Kafka, 20).
23 This reason is consistent with the Heideggerian proposal for moral education I will articulate in Chapter 5.
choosing to reject appeals to reconcile their powers and dispositions with conjoint activity aimed at expanding the general welfare. Why would anyone choose to reject what is manifestly so reasonable, if not laudable? In *Notes*, Dostoevsky implicitly critiqued Aristotle on the following point, which Dewey took for granted: desire should coincide with and be subject to reason with respect to a goal or purpose, and right desire—i.e., desire that coincides with and is subject to reason—precludes choosing against reason, and reason dictates against self-harm and nonsense (e.g., fantasy). However, some people do not necessarily want what is reasonable—i.e., what is most “profitable to our lives,” which may indeed entail conjoint activity as Dewey conceived it—but rather want to have the right to choose to pursue a goal reasonably or capriciously, or even to do it by inflicting self-harm. They do not want to be “bound to an obligation to desire only what is intelligent,” nor to pursue some purpose only by means of Dewey’s method of intelligence, nor by means of another method purporting to be intelligent, for they may conclude that such action would amount to breaking their back to lift Moloch to heaven—i.e., to relinquishing the right to live authentically. Such a person implicitly acts on what I, with Nietzsche, maintain is the fundamental principle of morality, upon which I build my proposal for pre-service teacher education in the area of moral education in Chapter 5. This fundamental principle is self-preservation. Acting from this principle, such people may choose to inflict self-harm, even when the best available evidence supports the danger of doing so. My proposal amounts to persuading able and willing pre-service teachers to help their able and willing students to live according to the principle of self-preservation, even if on a particular occasion—say, when the conclusion to a particular lesson is that reconciling their powers and dispositions for the purpose I have described, is reasonable—students disagree, and thereby choose to

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24 See note 9.
25 “I am a sick man … I’m a spiteful man…. I think there’s something wrong with my liver…. I’m not receiving any treatment, nor have I ever done, although I do respect medicine and doctors…. No, it’s out of spite that I don’t want to be cured…. I know better than anyone that in doing this I shall harm no one but myself. Anyway, if I’m not receiving medical treatment it’s out of spite. If my liver is hurting, then let it hurt all the more!” (Fyodor Dostoevsky, *Notes from the Underground*, 7).
26 Ibid, 29.
27 Allen Ginsberg, “Howl,” 68.
28 Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*. While I posit that ‘self’ fundamentally refers to an individual (see my discussion of mineness in Chapter 4), it also refers to a group thereof.
preserve an unreasonable kind of self, at least as determined by the teacher’s and/or the school/district/state administrations’ standards. 29

Like their students, teachers are human beings, which means that they also have, do, and will suffer, more or less, from egocentrism, dread, despair, disillusionment, disease, impotence, death, and other infirmities that more or less permanently cripple their ability and willingness to solve their own problems, let alone social ones. Both parties bring their respective infirmities to the interaction we call teaching and learning. Their interaction often induces a crisis in both. They experience an inability, more or less, to go beyond the limits of what each considers true, good, and/or beautiful. This inability evokes dread, despair, and disillusionment in both—in the former, about not teaching well, and in the latter, about not learning well. Dread, despair, and disillusionment occur when teachers must face a potentially infinite number of ways to teach well, and when students must face a potentially infinite number of ways to learn well, and thus when both must face indeterminacy and uncertainty. Paralysis is a common result, and there is no guarantee that either of them will overcome it, regardless of how attractive a particular project that expands the general welfare may be. 30 These further considerations underscore why Dewey’s notion of the essence of morality suffers from excessive optimism. 31

I object to Dewey’s inference for another reason: institutional forms of oppression. 32 Many teachers, administrators, and policy makers are conservative—i.e., they are not prone to encouraging students to reconcile their powers and dispositions with conjoint activity aimed at expanding the general welfare, but rather are prone to encourage them to reconcile their powers and dispositions with an institution governed by values of prediction and control divorced from Dewey’s humanism—i.e., from using prediction and control to expand the general welfare. Many teachers, administrators, and policy makers participate, even deliberately, in creating and recreating “forms of consciousness [in students] that enable social control to be maintained…,” 33 for they are so saturated with society’s dominant—i.e., accepted, or commonsense—attitudes

29 Lest I be misunderstood, my proposal is not an effort to teach students to be unreasonable or to inflict self-harm, but rather to reason according to the principle of self-preservation, which may or may not entail acting unreasonably or inflicting self-harm for the sake of remaining true to the principle.

30 These fundamental themes of existentialism are found in Helmut Kuhn, “Existentialism,” 405-415.

31 The implicit point here is that my proposal is not one-size-fits-all, but rather suggests that only particular configurations of teachers’ and students’ infirmities in a particular place and time will yield successful teaching and learning. Admittedly, finding such configurations, places, and times is difficult, but I offer no silver bullet to end our educational woes.

32 See note 18.

and values that it is quite difficult, if not impossible, for them to see, let alone to have, other attitudes and values. As Williams put it in his discussion of hegemony:

[Hegemony] is a whole body of practices and expectations; our assignment of energy, our ordinary understanding of man and his world. It is a set of meanings and values which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming. It thus constitutes a sense of reality for most people in the society [including teachers], a sense of absolute because experienced [as a] reality beyond which it is very difficult for most members of a society to move in most areas of their lives.  

To put the matter in Williams’ terms, Dewey understood relation in the following way: it “involves seeing social activity—with education as a particular form of that activity—as tied to the larger arrangement of institutions,” and individuals as necessarily dependent on each other. Neither Heidegger nor I would dispute this. What I maintain, however, is that while Dewey’s excessive optimism virtually requires that personal interdependence result in using the method of intelligence to expand the general welfare, and that he thought individuals are “infinitely malleable” towards that end by means of an educational process, human beings are permanently beset by finitude—i.e., individuals’ ability and willingness to cultivate interdependence for the sake of expanding the general welfare are limited for the reasons above—e.g., egocentrism. Hence, we should expect to always find egocentric people who will use the method of intelligence (or the scientific method generally) to increase their own security, even if their efforts increase others’ insecurity.

It is not uncommon to find that teachers are sometimes such people. Apple argued that teachers routinely participate in processes that socialize students “to accept as legitimate the limited roles they ultimately fill in society,” in no small part because many, if not most teachers, cannot engage in what he thinks is required for them to cease this behavior: they need to engage in “a good deal of plain old hard ‘intellectual’ work … [acquiring] more than a modicum of reading, study, and honest debate in areas [they] have only a limited background in.” While Apple shares Dewey’s excessive optimism that this is possible on a broad scale, with Heidegger I would argue that while it may be possible, it is highly unlikely, and for two

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34 As quoted in Ibid, 5.
36 See note 308.
38 Ibid, 12.
reasons. First, if we add up the time and energy most teachers must invest in preparing to teach, in teaching, advising, mentoring, grading, attending meetings, serving their schools in various capacities, and attending to their personal and family lives, we should not be surprised to find that they have little, if any time and energy to invest in “a good deal of plain old hard ‘intellectual’ work.” Second, many teachers depend on our educational system (unjust though it may be) for their livelihood: it pays their rent/mortgage, their car payment, their health insurance, their retirement benefits, and their recreation—i.e., considerable aspects of their quality of life for which they would fight if threatened. The fact remains: they would fight for the system that feeds them, so changing it in a manner that would prevent them from purchasing goods and services they value would likely be met with opposition. That they preside over and perpetuate a system that (in Apple’s view) thrives on producing low achievers who cannot demonstrate a predefined level of mastery over “high status knowledge” is fortuitous, for they in effect preside over and perpetuate a system that produces the cheap labor required to produce the goods and services they can purchase with their middle-class incomes.

Even if teachers felt guilty about presiding over and perpetuating this system, they are beset by strong forces to conform to it. As Apple noted, teachers

… are not free to define the classroom situation in any way they choose … [for] the school is a well-established institution, and it may be that neither the teacher nor the children can perceive more than marginal ways to deviate to any significant extent from the commonsense rules and expectations that distinguish schools from other institutions.40

Teachers’ tasks are largely circumscribed by compulsion, where they (and their students) are forced to behave according to “accepted uniform procedures….”41 This is especially the case when teachers, even those with egalitarian sensibilities, find themselves in contexts where the student population is both growing and diversifying. Historically, the institutional answers to these problems have been acculturation into predetermined values, attitudes, and dispositions, and standardization of the means to measure the extent thereof. According to Apple, the schools have been designed to place the teacher in the role of a supervisor over workers-in-training to

39 Ibid, 35-40. For example, scientific, or technical knowledge.
40 Ibid, 52.
41 Ibid, 55.
ensure they all work together “toward the completion of a product which they [have] little role in designing.”

In the late 19th and early 20th century, this product has been, and largely continues to be social homogeneity and cultural consensus patterned after

[The] small, rural town with its deep, face to face personal relationships … rooted in [the] beliefs and attitudes of the middle class … was synonymous for … members of the [American] intelligentsia [including Dewey] with the idea of democracy…. Later, and more importantly, the members of [the] new group of intellectuals … took what they thought constituted the basis of the small town’s ability to provide for stability, its like-mindedness in beliefs, values, and standards of behavior, and idealized [emphasis mine] this feature of small town life as the basis of the order necessary for an emerging urban and industrialized society. For these intellectuals the notion of community became synonymous with the idea of homogeneity [which for Dewey was homogeneity of method—i.e., of the method of intelligence] and cultural consensus. If their upbringing in the rural town taught these individuals anything, it taught them that order and progress were dependent on the degree to which beliefs and behaviors were common and shared.

In this context, the promise of science and its products—e.g., paved roads, automobiles, trains, railroads, telegraphs, telephones, etc.—was to shrink, if not to obviate, the distance between

42 Ibid, 69. Someone may object that my proposal for pre-service teacher education in the often-controversial area of moral education is unreasonable because it expects too much from pre-service teachers once they become in-service teachers in the kind of restrictive environment I am describing here. Not so. I have no such expectation, but rather a faint hope that some teacher in some place working within more or less prohibitive circumstances (see my discussion of thrown-ness in Chapter 4) will help some student achieve some measure of authenticity. If I must admit to having an expectation, it is that I expect most teachers and students to fall short of, and even fail to achieve a significant measure of authenticity, for finitude is often too heavy of a burden to bear.

43 Ibid, 71-72. In West’s words, Dewey’s “democratic faith … is tainted by the very provincial mentality he scorns; that is, he simply cannot shed the narrow cultural and communal model for his creative democracy. This model rests upon, as C. Wright Mills notes, “a relatively homogenous community which does not harbor any chasms of structure and power not thoroughly ameliorative by discussion” (quoting Mills’ Sociology and Pragmatism, 405). [Dewey] believes that social conflict can be resolved and societal problems overcome by a widely held consensus more characteristic of artisanal towns or farming communities than of industrial cities or urban capitalist societies” (Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism, 102).
individuals, and was thus considered a tool with which to achieve social cohesion of the sort described above on a large scale.

Despite the promise Dewey saw in it, science has not always been used to realize humanistic ends. Apple said the following about science and its historical role in education:

[What was originally seen by American intellectuals [even in Dewey’s day] as a cultural problem of ethnic and class differences was redefined in the seemingly neutral language of science as a problem of differences in intelligence, as a problem in differing ‘abilities’ to contribute to the maximization and control of ‘expert’ moral and technical knowledge, in this way divesting the problem of its economic and social content. Social control, hence, became covered by the language of science, something that continues to this day. [Even in Dewey’s day, science] performed a legitimating or justificatory function….]

[L]egitimating language serves to establish a person’s claim that he or she knows what he or she is doing, or that he has the right, responsibility, authority or legitimacy to do it. In short, it reassures a number of groups and people, not the least of whom is the educator himself, that he knows and has a right to continue doing what he has been doing all along…. [T]he rationality of science and technology was an ideal device to create a new set of meanings, a new vision of the ‘sacred’, if you will, that would rebuild the affiliative bonds that had become so fragile, that could recreate ‘community’.

As Apple suggests here, Dewey’s excessive optimism about science’s promise to expand the general welfare was out of touch with what many of his contemporaries were doing with its help. The point of adopting science as a lingua franca was, according to Apple, to create cultural homogeneity and social control—a not so noble goal when the masters of said language speak it to increase their security, even if it means increasing others’ insecurity. In light of these considerations, adopting Dewey’s enthusiasm for science does not necessarily help us to understand human beings as human, which is to say, as more or less able and willing to promote

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44 In Globalization and its Discontents (New York: WW Norton & Company, 2003), Joseph Stiglitz provides compelling evidence to support the judgment that increasing economic interdependence can have disastrous consequences. It would not be unreasonable to extrapolate from economic interdependence to moral interdependence, for excessive economic interdependence can undermine one’s ability to live according to the principle of self-preservation.

45 In the 21st century, however, the vast majority of people on the planet live in urban areas, where relationships are relatively shallow, impersonal, and evanescent, and where the small town’s sense of stability, and thus the predictability and control it affords, is all but extinct. In short, demographic shifts have obviated the need to conceive of human beings as governed by relation, at least as Dewey understood it: where individuals organize themselves into coherent small groups, discordant small groups organize themselves into the large internally-cooperating group, and said groups act together for common ends, with common vision, and with united judgment.

and adopt policies to sharpen their power to predict and control children’s behavior. In short, shorn of its humanism by such things as egocentrism, Dewey’s enthusiasm for science easily becomes dehumanizing in the hands of actual people.

Perhaps we could trace Dewey’s excessive optimism about such matters to what I will discuss at some length in Chapter 2: his subscription to what Apple called “a consensus theory of science [conceived of either as what science is, or as what science ought to be], one that underemphasizes the serious disagreements over methodology, goals, and elements that make up the paradigms of activity of scientists.”47 In Apple’s view, this is the theory of science tacitly taught in schools, and the effect is the following:

[B]y the fact that scientific consensus is continually exhibited, students are not permitted to see that without disagreement and controversy [emphasis mine, and precisely what I want to promote through my proposal] science would not progress or would progress at a much slower pace. [More importantly, such a theory does not] enable students to see the political dimensions of the process by which one alternative theory’s proponents win out over their competitors. Nor can such a presentation of science do more than systematically neglect the power dimension involved in scientific argumentation.48

Apple found the same “pro-consensus and anti-dissension”49 bias in social studies teaching and curricula. To put it succinctly:

[T]he basic framework of most curriculum rationality [which shapes and informs teaching] is generally supportive and accepting of the existing [emphasis in the original] economic, political, ideological, and intellectual framework that apportions opportunity and power in American society.50

Apple also noted that the systems management approach to education—i.e., one that measures the success of educational interventions in terms of observable behavior—is based on

[A] constitutive interest … in … effecting and maintaining technical control and certainty [emphasis in the original]…. [I]t is aimed, fundamentally and unalterably, at the regularities of human behavior [or rather, at regulating it by preordaining some kinds as acceptable, and other kinds as unacceptable, and by

47 Ibid, 89. Chapter 2 supports this claim.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid, 96.
enforcing conformity with the former, and enforcing avoidance of the latter]…. It is, hence, essentially manipulative [emphasis mine]…. The very idea that educators should specify all or even the primary aspects of a person’s action substitutes the slogan of manipulation for the awesome task of making moral choices.\(^{51}\)

Of course, it could be said that administrators and teachers who work under the aegis of systems management—arguably the conceptual framework underlying educational accountability schemes today—are merely trying to secure “intellectual and economic legitimacy and a sense of neutrality”\(^{52}\) for their historically low-status field. The point that I would impress upon them, however, is that the will to predict so as to control betrays a latent conservatism: “[T]hat is, [many teachers] use forms of thought that at least partly stem from, and can tacitly act to maintain the existing social and economic substructure and distribution of power in a corporate society such as our own.\(^{53}\)

None of the discussion thus far has been to suggest that Dewey was directly complicit in encouraging a minority to use science and systems management to predict and control a majority’s thoughts and behaviors to increase its own (the minority’s) security, but rather that such an outcome should not surprise us when we find ourselves living in a time when prediction and control divorced from Dewey’s humanism constitute orthodox belief, and frame educational policy.

I believe we are living in such a time.\(^ {54}\) Hence, instead of proposing to adopt Dewey’s notion of the essence of morality, I want to offer an alternative to it—i.e., one based on people as I have observed them to be—viz., as beset by egocentrism, dread, despair, disillusionment, disease, impotence, ambivalence, death, and institutional forms of oppression that always and already limit how malleable they can be when encouraged to engage in conjoint activity aimed at expanding the general welfare. My proposal, therefore, does not assume or hope these infirmities can be overcome, but rather takes the need of West’s “tragic action” for granted, and encourages able and willing teachers to encourage their able and willing students to live as authentically as possible within the sundry limitations (personal and institutional) that always and already beset

\(^{51}\) Ibid, 110, 111. I hope it is clear that my overriding concern in this dissertation is to suggest one way that teachers who are so inclined can help their able and willing students to undertake the awesome task of making moral choices, even if their choices disturb others’ efforts to predict and control their behaviors. 

\(^{52}\) Ibid, 113.

\(^{53}\) Ibid, 118.

\(^{54}\) I take contemporary proposals to privatize public education as evidence to support this claim.
them. Specifically, I want to propose a method through which students may challenge the notion that reconciling their powers and dispositions with conjoint activity aimed at expanding the general welfare is a moral endeavor, for they may judge that it is immoral for them to do so, and thus choose to pursue their own conclusions about the ‘good.’ The method I propose is rooted in, and grows out of Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, from which I develop a philosophy of education—or more precisely, a philosophy of moral education—to guide able and willing teachers to help their able and willing students to strive toward moral autonomy.

In sum, my dissertation is an argument to suggest a “paradigm shift” in philosophy of education circles where Dewey holds sway. This would be a shift away from his excessive

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55 I will discuss it at length in Chapter 5.
56 Dewey characterized moral decision-making independent of “sharing and communication—public, social” in terms of “transient sensations or private appetites”—in a word, devoid of intelligence, or critical thought (John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 206). Dewey also condemned such decision-making in the following way:

From a social standpoint, dependence denotes a power rather than a weakness; it involves interdependence. There is always a danger that increased personal independence will decrease the social capacity of an individual. In making him more self-reliant, it may make him more self-sufficient; it may lead to aloofness and indifference. It often makes an individual so insensitive in his relations to others as to develop an illusion of being really able to stand and act alone—an unnamed form of insanity which is responsible for a large part of the remediable suffering of the world [John Dewey, Democracy and Education, 42].

These quotes are apt illustrations of Dewey’s distrust of private, or individual, moral decision-making, and thus they suggest his disapproval of my proposal.

57 “Under ordinary circumstances the life of the individual is not wholly absorbed in group experiences. In societies that lay some claim to a civilized life, such experiences are balanced by the individual’s desire to live in a world of his own, both real and imaginative…. Though fearful of the futility and rottenness of the secluded inner life, Dewey seemed unaware that the same faults might pervade a shared life. To him the goodness of free and full communication, the happiness of the shared life were self-evident [emphasis mine]. He regarded these processes as inherently rational and could not conceive of the possibility that democratic society, too, could be deluded…. Humanism for him meant a social humanism that would teach young people to take an intelligent interest in such problems as poverty, insanity, city planning and the conservation of natural resources. Although there is merit in this, it neglects to help young people discover and perfect their own humanity. As preparation for life today, this appears as a serious failure” [Frederic Lilge, “John Dewey in Retrospect: An American Reconsideration,” 110-111]. Though Lilge said these words in 1960, I don’t think they are any less true today.

58 It is well-known that Heidegger joined the Nazi Party shortly after Hitler’s ascension to the chancellery in 1933, and that he remained a member until after the war. If one therefore concludes that any philosophy of education inferred from his philosophy necessarily (though perhaps implicitly) promotes a Nazi agenda, and must therefore ipso facto be rejected, then one would be committing the ad hominem fallacy—i.e., rather than trying to disprove the truth of Heidegger’s assertions, and the truth of a philosophy of education inferred from them, the person would be attacking Heidegger’s personal character instead. In Irving Copi’s words, impugning Heidegger thus “is logically irrelevant to the truth or falsehood of what he says or the correctness or incorrectness of his argument” (Irving Copi, Introduction to Logic, 54).

59 I am invoking Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. For instance, that relation is fundamental to Dewey’s understanding of the scientific method is plain in places like his discussion of “Science and Social Progress” in Democracy and Education (pages 214-219), where science necessarily brings people together in the process of creating and recreating means and purposes, where it widens the “area of intercourse,” and where it brings “about interdependence of interests” to a level of comprehension such that it is capable of addressing itself to “the interests of mankind.”
optimism about the prospects for teaching students to reconcile their powers and dispositions with conjoint activity aimed at expanding the general welfare, which he justified by treating relation as a metaphysical category to which all human interaction must conform, and toward a Heideggerian philosophy of moral education built on the Nietzschean principle of self-preservation. This shift may result in some students choosing to modify, if not to reject Dewey’s...

In light of this passage, which I take to represent Dewey’s general opinion about what science is and what it does, I contend Dewey would have denied that social progress actualized by the scientific method could occur by narrowing the “area of discourse,” by dissolving an “interdependence of interests,” and by pursuing interests inconsistent with “the interests of mankind,” whatever they may be. In short, I contend Dewey would have denied that social progress actualized by the scientific method (as he understood it) could occur by dispensing with it—i.e., by dispensing with relation as a category necessarily governing social matters. Yet, this is precisely what Kuhn argued. Fott summarized it well:

[M]any of the greatest scientific achievements have come when at least one of the steps in [Dewey’s method of intelligence] has been violated, or when diverse views have not been fully tolerated, or when one person has worked alone. Moreover, as Dewey knows, science does not always operate for democratic ends. Even when citizens want to achieve democratic ends, practical limitations may work to hurt minorities: Society cannot test the worth of all of its opinions at once; and deeply held, widespread opinions are likely to be the last ones to be tested, if they are tested at all [David Fott, “Dewey and the Threat of Tyranny of the Majority”].

Makedon expressed virtually the same idea in the following way:

Dewey felt that the scientific method will promote cooperation and scientific habits that ultimately will help produce democratic personalities. Yet the fact is that many scientists work in isolation. They discover something new frequently as a result of an inspiration they had while hit by the proverbial apple all alone under a lonely tree, than as a result of the give and take which Dewey described [Alexander Makedon, “Reinterpreting Dewey: Some Thoughts on His Views of Play and Science in Education,” 3].

Apple put the matter as follows:

[T]he history of science and the growth of individual disciplines, has not proceeded by consensus. In fact, most important progress in these fields has been occasioned by intense conflict, both intellectual and interpersonal, and by conceptual revolution. It is primarily by such conflict that significant advancement is made, not primarily by the accumulation of factual data based on the solving of puzzles generated by a paradigm all must share. The very normative structure of scientific communities tends toward skepticism and not necessarily toward intellectual consensus. The call for consensus, thus, is not a call for science [Michael W. Apple, Ideology and Curriculum, 2nd ed., 119].

Fott’s summary was in response to Dewey’s pronouncements on the “nature of science:”

It is of the nature of science not so much to tolerate as to welcome diversity of opinion, while it insists that inquiry brings the evidence of observed facts to bear to effect a consensus of conclusions... [F]reedom of inquiry, toleration of diverse views, freedom of communication, the distribution of what is found out to every individual as the ultimate intellectual consumer, are involved in the democratic as in the scientific method [John Dewey, “Freedom and Culture,” (1939), in Later Works, vol. 13 (1988), 135].

In short, Dewey assumed (or hoped) that one of the hallmarks of science, and what made it a model for social organization, is that while individuals generate new ideas and hypotheses, they submit them for public testing and evaluation for the sake of reaching a consensus of opinion. However, the evidence above suggests that they do not, yet socially beneficial scientific revolutions and discoveries occur nonetheless. Hence, submitting ideas and hypotheses for public testing and evaluation for the sake of reaching a consensus of opinion does not necessarily ensure scientific and therefore social progress. In fact, submitting them thus may retard it. Dewey failed to consider what Kuhn himself knew: sometimes an individual must break from the group’s opinion as to what constitutes a correct solution to some problem, and thus create new knowledge that would have been impossible to create had he held allegiance to the group as paramount. My proposal, then, may be understood as an attempt to teach pre-service teachers to teach their students to discriminate between instances in which submitting ideas and hypotheses for public testing and evaluation is prudent, and when it is not. This proposal depends on first dispensing with relation as a metaphysical category to which all social life must conform.
notion of the essence of morality. To put it plainly, this dissertation is an argument in favor of educating students to decide for themselves whether or not, and if so the extent to which to take heed of what adults and/or experts declare to be the ‘right’ thing for them to think, to do, and to feel.

A Note on Method

Whereas quantitative research relies primarily on statistical methods to analyze numerical data, and qualitative research on induction to analyze textual data, I will rely primarily on logic to analyze the argument defending the fundamental place of relation within Dewey’s philosophy of education, and on a deductive argument in particular to offer my alternative to it. I will rely on logic because it is philosophy’s quintessential method of analyzing arguments, and of advancing alternative ones. To write a philosophy of education dissertation, therefore, is to rely on logic to analyze an educational argument, and to advance an alternative one. This dissertation is an extended deductive argument:

1. In Aristotle’s philosophy, the role of the categories is to establish the classes through which all individual entities in the empirical world said ‘to be’—i.e., to exist—may be signified, and therefore known.
2. In Immanuel Kant’s philosophy, the categories are derived from Aristotle’s philosophy, and their role is the same.
3. Relation is one of Aristotle’s and Kant’s categories.
4. Relation is the fundamental category in John Dewey’s notion of the essence of morality, and its role is the same.
5. Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is a correction of Aristotle’s and Kant’s categories.

Therefore, Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is a correction of John Dewey’s notion of the essence of morality.

The reason why I am relying on a deductive argument is as follows: if you agree that the premises are true, then you must agree, by the force of the argument, that the conclusion is also

60 Logic “is the study of the methods and principles used in distinguishing correct from incorrect reasoning” [Irving Copi, Introduction to Logic, 2nd ed., 3]. Logic’s method is argument, by which I mean “any group of propositions [also known as premises] of which one (viz., the conclusion) is claimed to follow from the others, which are regarded as providing evidence for the truth of that one” (Ibid, 7).
61 A deductive argument is “one whose premisses [Copi’s spelling for ‘premises’] are claimed to provide conclusive evidence [emphasis mine] for the truth of its conclusion. Every deductive argument is either valid or invalid: valid if it is impossible for its premisses to be true without its conclusion being true also, invalid otherwise” (Ibid, 133).
true. Once I establish this conclusion, I will proceed to consider the consequences of what I will call the Heideggerian correction for pre-service teacher education in the area of moral education, since my highest aspiration is to contribute to this field.

Before trying to establish the conclusion above, I will turn to consider the literature on Dewey’s method of intelligence. Considering its role in Dewey’s philosophy of education is important for several reasons: a) Dewey argued it is the method with which a student may reconcile himself with his aims; b) it is the method with which a teacher may reconcile a student’s aims with social aims; and c) it is the method with which social leaders (e.g., philanthropists, scholars, and experts of sundry sorts)—i.e., those who represent, shape, and guide social aims—may reconcile social institutions (e.g., schools) with said aims, which are always evolving, and the method of intelligence guides their evolution. As I will show, relation is the categorical basis of the method of intelligence, and thus of Dewey’s philosophy of education. To consider what has been said about this method, therefore, is equivalent to considering what has been said about relation. I will devote Chapter 2 to this task, to which I now turn.

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62 An inductive argument is the other major kind of argument in Logic. Inductive arguments “merely (try) to establish’ [the conclusions they draw from their premises] as probable, or probably true” [Ibid, 337]. Because of the nature of a deductive argument, it is the strongest kind. Suggesting a “paradigm shift” in philosophy of education circles where Dewey holds sway deserves nothing less.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

_The individual has always had to struggle to keep from being overwhelmed by the tribe. If you try it, you will be lonely often, and sometimes frightened. But no price is too high to pay for the privilege of owning yourself._

~ Friedrich Nietzsche

In Chapter 1, I introduced one of my aims in this dissertation, which is to identify the categorical basis of Dewey’s method of intelligence (viz., _relation_), to locate that basis in the Aristotelian/Kantian metaphysical tradition (which I will do in Chapter 3), and to critique the excessive optimism that Dewey invested in that basis when he defined the essence of morality in terms of preserving _relation_’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare. I will discuss at some length in Chapter 4 that conceiving of _relation_ as necessarily governing social life in this manner, and claiming that preserving its governance of social life defines the essence of morality, effectively denies individuals the opportunity to define morality in terms of the principle of self-preservation. I would expect that a student who reasons according to this principle would find cases in which reconciling his powers and dispositions with conjoint activity aimed at expanding the general welfare is immoral, for he may judge that doing so would compromise his living according to the principle in question. To conceive of morality in Dewey’s fashion effectively denies individuals the opportunity to define morality in terms of the principle of self-preservation, because it would label such reasoning immoral—that is, if it led to the conclusion that fusing one’s powers and dispositions with a social group in order to expand the general welfare is immoral. This judgment would be the reason why a student uncritical of, and educated according to the method of intelligence would feel guilty if he were to judge that reconciling his powers and dispositions with conjoint activity aimed at expanding the general welfare is immoral, at least in some cases. As I understand it, the function of guilt is to prevent an individual from thinking, feeling, and behaving according to what some principle forbids—in this case, reaching the immoral conclusion in question. To search the literature on the method of intelligence it to implicitly search it for scholars’ (implicit or explicit) opinions regarding Dewey’s excessive optimism.
about the general welfare being best served by preserving *relation*’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life.

The method of intelligence is “the Deweyan linchpin when it comes to education.” In this chapter, I will show there is an extensive body of literature spanning several academic disciplines and more than seven decades that is more or less concerned with said method. This body of literature may be divided into four parts: a) the authors of this literature took Dewey’s method of intelligence for granted, and thus they took the notion for granted that preserving *relation*’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality; b) the authors of this literature defended Dewey’s method, and thus they (implicitly or explicitly) defended the notion that *relation*’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality; c) the authors of this literature criticized Dewey’s method, and thus they (implicitly or explicitly) criticized the notion in question, but not from the perspective of Heidegger’s *fundamental ontology*; and d) the authors of this literature are prominent philosophers, one of education (Jim Garrison), and the other of pragmatism in general (Richard Rorty); while Garrison has pushed Deweyan scholarship in new directions, and Rorty has come quite close to my concerns, neither one of them tried to blaze the path I am trying to clear. Thus, my critique of Dewey’s excessive optimism about the general welfare being best served by preserving *relation*’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life (which is the essence of morality, according to Dewey, and is the ethic underwriting the method of intelligence) from the perspective of Heidegger’s *fundamental ontology* makes this dissertation a pioneering study in Deweyan scholarship.

**Part A: Authors Who Have Taken Dewey’s Method for Granted**


64 To be clear: I am not criticizing Dewey’s attempt to find cause/effect relation among empirical phenomena, for such a relation is indispensable for science, and thus for the method of intelligence. What I *am* criticizing is the ethic underlying Dewey’s method that, as I have said elsewhere, requires an individual to reach a consensus of opinion with others engaged in the investigation of the same empirical phenomenon. The possibility that my proposal strives to leave open is that dispensing with the ethic in question may usher in social progress nevertheless, though ushering it in is not my primary concern.
As the name of his article stated, Ivie compared the educational philosophy of Jose Vasconcelos—one of the most prominent Mexican philosophers and educators of the 20th century—and John Dewey. Ivie compared them because, in his own words, Vasconcelos developed his own philosophy of education “in the spirit of protest against positivism, pragmatism, protestantism, and the educational philosophy of John Dewey…. According to Ivie,

Vasconcelos saw no essential difference between the positivism of Comte and the pragmatism of Dewey. It seemed to him that they both made a fetish out of science, stressed empiricism over intuition, asserted naturalism in place of transcendentalism, and placed the present condition of man over and above the life of the spirit. Therefore, concluded Vasconcelos, pragmatism was just the American variety of positivism.

In Ivie’s view, Vasconcelos rejected Dewey’s method of intelligence because it was premised on inductive reasoning, not on deductive reasoning starting from the supposedly eternal ideas of perennialism, which is what Vasconcelos preferred. Thus, Ivie noted that Vasconcelos rejected Dewey’s method, and thus rejected its moral commitments—i.e., the notion that preserving relation’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality. However, it isn’t clear whether or not, and if so the extent to which Ivie accepted or rejected Dewey’s method and the notion in question.

Price discussed several criticisms of the liberal tradition similar to those of Macpherson (as presented by Clarke and Tilman [see below]), yet he limited his investigation to the Progressive Period of American history. In his own words,

It is the purpose of this paper to explore the critique mounted by American intellectuals in this earlier period—the indictments brought against the liberal capitalist order, the arguments made and the means chosen in the dual quest for fraternity and order, the implications for how “politics” is to be conceived and practiced—and briefly to assess its continuing reverberations.

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65 Stanley D. Ivie, “A Comparison in Educational Philosophy: Jose Vasconcelos and John Dewey,” 408.
68 Ibid, 405.
70 Michael Clarke and Rick Tilman, “C.B. Macpherson’s Contributions to Democratic Theory.”
71 Ibid, 1663.
One of the main critiques Price identified is that if left alone, the laissez faire doctrine tends toward waste and destruction, and thus requires human intervention, direction, and control for the sake of ensuring the aims of the liberal tradition—viz., individual liberty and equality of opportunity. Price summarized Dewey’s criticism of said doctrine in the following way:

[I]n seeking to recapture the essence of community life, he seeks first of all a sense of efficacy, mastery, and self-direction for its constituents. His attempts to develop a “method of intelligence” [emphasis mine] adequate to purposive social intervention and the kind of education that could underwrite and guide its application have this qualitative end in view: to make of the Great Society a truly democratic, self-aware, self-determining community.\(^{72}\)

Price did not venture beyond this summary. Thus, he took the notion for granted that preserving relation’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality.

In taking a critical look at Dewey’s social and political philosophy, Ryder\(^ {73}\) said the following:

[Dewey’s social and political philosophy] fails to be progressive enough … in that Dewey was never able to develop and endorse the appropriate implications of his own class analysis. Consequently, there is an insoluble conflict at the very heart of his philosophy.\(^ {74}\)

In Ryder’s view, Dewey identified the cause of class division as a ‘cultural lag’:

[A] society like ours has the serious economic, social, and political problems that it does … [because] its material basis of production is no longer consistent with the [scientific] ideas according to which it organizes itself.\(^ {75}\)

Dewey, said Ryder, thought that the way to eradicate this “cultural dissonance” is to rely on the method of intelligence. Tilman\(^ {76}\) echoed Ryder on this point in his discussion of the unpublished correspondence between Dewey and Clarence Ayres. While Ryder found fault in Dewey’s claim

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\(^{72}\) Ibid, 1672.

\(^{73}\) John Ryder, “Community, Struggle, and Democracy: Marxism and Pragmatism.”

\(^{74}\) Ibid, 107.

\(^{75}\) Ibid, 118.

about why such a lag exists, Ryder and Tilman left the method itself untouched, and thus they took the notion for granted that preserving relation’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality.

Tilman undertook a critical appraisal of Progressivism writ large, by which I mean he challenged a long-standing assumption that Progressivism was a monolithic movement. He reasoned his comparison and contrast of Dewey and Veblen would achieve the needed revision of the movement’s history. His revision included highlighting Dewey’s treatment of:

[C]onflict situations as problems requiring more intelligence rather than as difficulties necessitating structural change or revolution. Veblen was not as optimistic as Dewey; for he had less confidence in the ability of human intelligence to overcome its environmental constraints…. Given Veblen’s position, Dewey’s “method of intelligence” is unlikely to be an effective instrument of change in an environment dominated by ceremonially encrusted minds and buttressed by socially rigid institutions.

Trusting Tilman’s exposition of Veblen’s position, Veblen’s is similar to my own in that I also have less confidence than Dewey did in what I have been calling his excessive optimism in the ability and willingness of individuals to fuse their powers and dispositions into conjoint effort guided by the method of intelligence in order to expand the general welfare. Also like Veblen, I think it is futile to rely on the method of intelligence when its use is “encrusted” with people’s various blights. Tilman’s purpose, however, precluded an investigation into the method of intelligence, and thus into the notion that preserving relation’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality.

Shea compared and contrasted Dewey and Bernard Lonergan’s educational opinions to disclose how each man argued in favor of transitioning from classicism to method, or rather how each man argued for the blending of theory and practice, and the transition’s impact on higher education. As Shea pointed out, Dewey’s method of intelligence was his mechanism for

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77 Rick Tilman, “Dewey’s Liberalism versus Veblen’s Radicalism: A Reappraisal of the Unity of Progressive Social Thought.”
78 Ibid, 748.
79 Ibid, 749.
achieving said blending,\textsuperscript{81} but Shea’s interest did not venture beyond this claim. Hence, Shea took the notion in question for granted.

In a vein of thought similar to Shea’s, Schubert\textsuperscript{82} wrote about the common disconnection between educational research and educational practice, and how to make the former relevant to the latter. Among his recommendations,\textsuperscript{83} Schubert simply identified Dewey’s method of intelligence as an important precedent for practice-oriented researchers to consider their effort to embrace the vision Schubert outlined.\textsuperscript{84} While Schubert did not go past this point, which means that he took the notion in question for granted, he identified existentialism and phenomenology (but not Heidegger, from whom we received the term ‘existentialism’) as critiquing what he called the “theoretical paradigm” and as advocating on behalf of strategies that generate “knowledge of a learner’s knowledge,” of specific situations, and of those involved in them.\textsuperscript{85} Hence, I invite you to think of my work as an implicit critique of the “theoretical paradigm,” and as explicitly advocating for a teaching method consistent with what Schubert identified as the “practical paradigm.”

Petr\textsuperscript{86} adduced the method of intelligence in his discussion of political economy. In his own words:

The task, then, of this essay is to provide some indication of the fundamentals, principles, or theoretical commonalities that bind together institutionalist analysis of contemporary economic problems and that underlie institutionalist prescriptions for their solution, in order to answer the question, “What is the institutionalist base for policy formation?”\textsuperscript{87}

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid, 302.
\textsuperscript{82} William H. Schubert, “Recalibrating Educational Research: Toward a Focus on Practice.”
\textsuperscript{83} a) Rather than formulate problems in terms of abstract conceptualizations, problems should be formulated in terms of “the extant situation itself … of concrete instances (i.e.,, states of affairs that are acknowledged as perplexing by those who participate in them);” b) rather than consider problems according to “detached objective observation and rational categorization,” researchers should interact with “problematic situations;” c) rather than “attempt to discover … universals … [and] … to isolate variables and to discover laws that explain and predict activity or behavior,” researchers should look for the “unique qualities of situations that must be taken into account if just decision and action are to accrue;” and d) researchers should abandon their bias in favor of pursuing knowledge for its own sake, and instead pursue “situationally specific” knowledge, i.e.,, knowledge that solves particular problems (Ibid, 18).
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid, 19.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid, 21.
\textsuperscript{86} Jerry L. Petr, “Fundamentals of an Institutionalist Perspective on Economic Policy.”
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid, 2.
Petr’s list of “ten bases of institutionalist policy formation…”88 included instrumentalism, which he understood to be synonymous with Dewey’s method of intelligence.89 Having identified said method as one such base, Petr left it alone, and thus took the notion in question for granted.

Concerned with Dewey’s influence on Japanese higher education, Nolte90 wrote about Tanaka Odo, who studied with Dewey at the University of Chicago between 1893 and 1897, and then returned to Japan to take up a career as a professor of philosophy at Waseda University—a center for the study of American pragmatism.91 While there, he became an advocate for democracy along Deweyan lines, which is to say that he “saw Dewey as he saw himself, a debunker of outmoded beliefs and systems, a prophet of the new order, a spokesman for industrial democracy.”92 According to Nolte, Odo considered the method of intelligence to be the tool with which to usher in and continuously improve the new order.93 Nolte did not go beyond noting this, however, thus presupposing the notion in question.

Lawson94 attempted to explain what he called Dewey’s “detachment from [the] leading social doctrines”95 of his day. He found an answer in the history of Dewey’s ideas, “analyzing Dewey’s characteristic reactions to their sources and the context in which they arose.”96 According to Lawson, Dewey encountered the implementation and development of one such idea during his visit to the Soviet Union. This idea was the attempt to use state educational agencies to effect a “cooperative self-realization”97 akin to the kind discussed by Karier98 below. Though Lawson chronicled a shift in Dewey’s thinking—starting along the lines described by Karier below, and ending with “a near existentialist defense of the individual, groping for satisfying association”99 100—his faith101 in the method of intelligence to achieve both objectives

88 Ibid, 4.
89 Ibid, 5.
91 Ibid, 277.
92 Ibid, 283.
93 Ibid, 287.
94 Alan Lawson, “John Dewey and the Hope for Reform.”
95 Ibid, 31.
96 Ibid, 35.
97 Ibid, 39.
98 Clarence J. Karier, “Liberalism and the Quest for Orderly Change.”
100 Out of fairness to Dewey, it is worth noting that toward the end of his life he acknowledged the following: “I should now wish to emphasize more than I formerly did that individuals are the finally decisive factors of the nature
remained unshaken. However, since Lawson did not go beyond articulating Dewey’s faith in said method, he took the notion in question for granted.

Bullough\textsuperscript{102} considered the efficacy of Harold Alberty’s\textsuperscript{103} conceptual framework to accomplish curriculum integration. Given Alberty’s pragmatic (and thus experimentalist) proclivities, he was committed to basing curricula on children’s needs and interests, and to inferring theories therefrom. He recognized such needs and interests would require the sort of interdisciplinary approach to curriculum development discussed by Short\textsuperscript{104} below. Bullough’s discussion of Alberty’s work at the Ohio State University Lab School included a discussion of the philosophy of education its faculty adopted, which included holding fast to Dewey’s method of intelligence, and to developing zeal in their students for using it. Bullough did not go any further than noting the faculty’s preference for said method, which means that he did not venture to interrogate the notion in question.

In his study of the relationship between philanthropy and educational movements, particularly the 20\textsuperscript{th} century parent education movement funded by the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial (LSRM), Schlossman\textsuperscript{105} inquired into said organization’s efforts to build its philanthropy on a firm scientific basis. Its chief architect was Lawrence K. Frank, who often decried what he considered to be the generally sorry state of American public education. According to Schlossman, Frank’s proposed remedy was applying Dewey’s method of intelligence to educational problems of every stripe, including the problems of parent education programs he would later oversee as their chief administrator, for he (like Dewey) held the conviction that “science [is] the key to social progress…. As Dewey was the apostle of the “progressive” school, Frank became the apostle of the “progressive” home.”\textsuperscript{106} Frank’s

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\textsuperscript{101} “[Dewey’s] outlook was utopian in the sense that it projected a society only a radically changed future society could support. He had arrived at the water’s edge and could only await a means to ferry him across to his ends” (Ibid, 57). This is another way to express what I have been referring to as Dewey’s \textit{excessive optimism}. A “radically changed future society” is one in which the personality blights I have been discussing have largely disappeared.\textsuperscript{102} Robert V. Bullough, Jr., “Past Solutions to Current Problems in Curriculum Integration: The Contributions of Harold Alberty.”\textsuperscript{103} Former professor of education at the Ohio State University and author of the famous \textit{Eight Year Study} (1939). He was heavily influenced by Boyd H. Bode—an experimentalist philosopher of education with an orientation similar to Dewey’s.\textsuperscript{104} Edmund C. Short, “Knowledge Production and Utilization in Curriculum: A Special Case of the General Phenomenon.”\textsuperscript{105} Steven L. Schlossman, “Philanthropy and the Gospel of Child Development.”\textsuperscript{106} Ibid, 281.
apostleship extended to recruiting women’s colleges to embrace the parent education movement, and thereby use their cooperation (which he largely failed to do) as leverage for his more ambitious goal, which was to replace, in his own words, their “rational, intellectualistic curriculum with its conceptual knowledge [with] … the training in methods and techniques for meeting situations, which is the method of intelligence.” Schlossman’s account did not go beyond reporting Frank’s preference for Dewey’s method, so he did not move in the direction of investigating the notion in question.

Wu’s work approaches the heart of my present concerns. He said the following:

The basic attempt is to present a comparative study of the Confucian theory of revolution as embodied in the *I Ching* and the concept of revolution in John Dewey’s political philosophy. In doing so, Wu found that the *I Ching* and Dewey share the same fundamental metaphysical tenets—a finding that supports my claim that Dewey’s philosophy of education has metaphysical commitments, naturalistic though they were. Wu said the following about said tenets:

I observe that there are two basic metaphysical beliefs shared by both the *I Ching* and John Dewey: the first, change or a process view of the universe, the second, the primacy of interaction.

Given that they share the same metaphysical tenet, Wu inferred they would share similar conceptions of revolution as well. While the *I Ching* discusses revolution, and its pronouncements about whether or not it should be violent may be inferred, Wu argued, Dewey never developed a theory of revolution. So Wu inferred what he reasoned could have been Dewey’s theory of revolution from other texts. Wu concluded Dewey would likely have opposed any kind of violent revolution, for Dewey thought “the right method for solving social problems is not violence but intelligence.” In other words, Wu concluded (and I think correctly) that Dewey preferred the method of intelligence to violent revolution. Wu, however, did not

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107 As quoted in 288.  
109 Ibid, 323.  
110 Ibid, 324.  
111 Ibid, 329.  
112 Ibid.
advance beyond articulating Dewey’s preference,\textsuperscript{113} which means that he presupposed the notion in question.

In his review of the historical relationship between Pragmatism and Catholicism, which he found to be largely acrimonious, Croce\textsuperscript{114} juxtaposed Adler’s “neo-Thomist attacks on the [seemingly] amoral instrumentalism of pragmatism” to Dewey’s “secular method of intelligence.”\textsuperscript{115} While in Robert J. Roth’s \textit{Radical Pragmatism} he found evidence for “ecumenical bridge-building”\textsuperscript{116} between the two traditions, Croce did not advance beyond his one and only reference to Dewey’s method. Thus, he took the notion in question for granted.

In their “critical appreciation of Israel Scheffler’s philosophy of education,” Arnstine and Arnstine\textsuperscript{117} attempted to do the following:

\begin{quote}
First, we'll try to summarize his views for those who are less familiar with them or whose recollections of them are not fresh. Second, we’ll indicate some questions that some of his analyses have raised for us. Finally, we’ll examine Scheffler's analysis of John Dewey’s views about teaching and schooling.\textsuperscript{118}
\end{quote}

Within the context of their third aim, they justified it on the grounds that they found an “ambivalence … [in Scheffler’s] … discussions of curriculum … [and that such ambivalence] seems at times to indicate sympathy for a Deweyan, pragmatic approach to education.”\textsuperscript{119} While they found mutual sympathies in Scheffler’s and Dewey’s opinions on the value of science and reason, they found the authors at odds with respect to whether the school should engage in social reconstruction. While they noted that Scheffler would have answered in the negative, Dewey would have answered in the positive, and urged that those engaged in the process rely on his method of intelligence to bring about needed social changes. However, Arnstine and Arnstine did not consider said method beyond noting its socially reconstructive role in Dewey’s philosophy of education, and thus they took it for granted that preserving \textit{relation’s} metaphysical

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\textsuperscript{113} Dewey’s method of intelligence is premised on the principle of interaction (along with that of continuity). As I will show in Chapter 3, \textit{relation} is the categorical basis of said method, and thus of the principle of interaction (and of continuity).

\textsuperscript{114} Paul J. Croce, “Radical Pragmatism.”

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid, 1.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid, 2.

\textsuperscript{117} Donald Arnstine and Barbara Arnstine, “Rationality and Democracy: A Critical Appreciation of Israel Scheffler’s Philosophy of Education.”

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid, 25.

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid, 33.
The “decline in elite contestation …, [i.e., the increasingly] … disengaged senior cadres of China’s Party” was Gilley’s central concern in his article.\textsuperscript{120} In discussing the virtues, and the rise and fall of political contestation within the elite ranks of China’s single-party system, Gilley documented top-level efforts to impose a “unitary principle”\textsuperscript{121} upon the national government. In doing so, he presented several historical examples of such principles, all of which allegedly reject “the indeterminacy and instability of democratic politics.”\textsuperscript{122} He identified Dewey’s method of intelligence among them. While Gilley was correct to recognize Dewey’s method as a “unitary principle,” he did not say anything else about it. Thus, he presupposed the notion in question.

In their survey of the research published during the first 25 years of the existence of \textit{Review of Educational Research}, Stanley and Smith’s\textsuperscript{123} only reference to Dewey’s method of intelligence is found in their brief discussion of Robert Mason’s \textit{Moral Values and Secular Education} (1950), in which he “attempted to show that the method of intelligence, including the scientific method as ordinarily understood, is grounded ultimately in an ethical system [my claim exactly, and I have been referring to the underlying principle of the “system” as the ‘notion in question’], namely, the democratic ethic.”\textsuperscript{124} In citing Mason, Stanley and Smith anticipated Hlebowitsh and Wraga’s agreement with Mason’s endorsement of Dewey’s method as embodying ‘good’ morals, though Stanley and Smith did not say whether or not they themselves endorsed it. In this case, it is difficult for me to conclude that Stanley and Smith took the notion in question for granted.

In exploring “The Meaning and Significance of Dewey’s Religious Thought,” Parsons discussed Dewey’s desire to separate strong religious feelings from “rites, symbols and ideas associated with dogmatic beliefs,”\textsuperscript{125} and to unite them with a “faith in the active tendencies of the day … [and with] the courage of intelligence to follow whither social and scientific changes

\textsuperscript{120} Bruce Gilley, “The “End of Politics” in Beijing,” 116.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid, 124.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{123} William O. Stanley and B. Othanel Smith, “The Historical, Philosophical, and Social Framework of Education.”
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid, 315.
\textsuperscript{125} Howard L. Parsons, “The Meaning and Significance of Dewey’s Religious Thought,” 172.
take us.” The inference to be made here (and which Parsons corroborated), which I also anticipated in Chapter 1, is that Dewey sought to unite religious feelings to the method of intelligence, and thus to preserving relation’s governance thereof. In short, relation’s governance of group life is the ‘good’ that must be preserved. “By the same token, whatever obstructs or impairs the developing connectedness of human community is evil.” Because I think the evidence here points to Parsons’ awareness of the notion in question, I cannot say that he took it for granted.

Mayer’s reference to Dewey’s method in “The Role of Form and Function in the Collegiate Biology Curriculum”— where he criticized the “heavy emphasis … [that has traditionally been] placed on morphological detail and the vocabulary attendant thereunto,” and where he suggested the need to replace it with “a meaningful synthesis based on unifying principles”—is found in his discussion of a consensus among some scholars and scientists in the early 20th century about secondary schools that placed an undue “emphasis on the practical and the applied.” Mayer quoted Dewey’s correction of said emphasis, which consisted of explaining the method of intelligence as a unitary (moral) principle, as Gilley noted above, and a broad orientation to solving problems, and not as comprising a “limited field of subject matter.” Beyond this reference, Mayer did not mention it again. Thus, he presupposed the notion in question.

In his discussion of the importance of moral philosophy in higher education, Sloan drew a panorama of the various ways in which it was taught in American colleges and universities during a 100-year period. In the 19th century, according to Sloan, moral philosophy unified higher education curricula by providing a common set of social values upon which to build national unity. After chronicling the several forces that threatened to rend it, Sloan identified those that tried to preserve it. Among them was Dewey’s method of intelligence. In

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128 Ibid, 177.
130 Ibid, 661-662.
131 Ibid, 625.
132 As quoted on page 625.
134 For instance, moral philosophy was thought to provide “an anchor of stability for a nation in change” (p. 22). After all, Sloan’s survey begins with the decade after the Civil War.
135 For instance, the once reform-minded social scientists who advocated using their training to alleviate, if not cure social ills retreated into positivism, in whose ranks they reaped the benefits of intellectual prestige and job security.
Sloan’s words, “Dewey and his followers … attempted to find the unity of the curriculum in the solution of concrete life problems through the method of science,” which for Dewey was synonymous with his own. Sloan, however, did not go any further along these lines, hence taking the notion in question for granted.

Finally, Roth’s concern with the treatment of the “death-of-God” in the “American tradition,” and with finding alternatives to it within the same, apparently in an attempt to salvage some notion of ‘God.’ led him to Dewey’s view of the ‘religious’ as that which consists of “inclusive ideal ends, which imagination presents to us and to which the human will responds as worthy of controlling our desires and choices.” Dewey’s “emphasis on human creativity indicates that [his] view of the religious dimension of existence is secular and humanistic.”

According to Roth, Dewey rejected theism because “our best method of inquiry [viz., the method of intelligence] … stresses empirical, open-ended, self-corrective testing that [allegedly] results in communal agreement about matters of fact.”

Roth then went on to consider James’ more nuanced approach to theism, claiming the following:

Every theory and set of criteria including versions of the ‘method of intelligence,’ must be taken as hypotheses to be tested at all levels of experience. If they are reductive and narrow with respect to moral and religious hopes, a man may modify them or seek others that do justice to those hopes.

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136 Ibid, 34.
137 He did, however, discern the recurrent theme that general education—what I would call the ‘liberal arts requirement’ at places like Florida State University—within the context of higher education is fundamentally concerned with ensuring that students can competently engage in moral reasoning. As a future professor of pre-service teachers who aspires to teach general education courses within a college of education, my fundamental concern is the same, except that it also extends to the generations of children they will teach, for they will need the same skill. Like Dewey, my proposal is an argument in favor of finding a “unitary principle” in education, but unlike Dewey, mine is a paradoxical proposal in that social unity is not the necessary outcome. However, my proposal should not be misconstrued as an argument in favor of promoting social disunity. Rather, it is an argument in favor of teaching children a method with which they can decide for themselves whether or not, and if so the extent to which to embrace social unity, or to put it in the broadest terms, the ‘good.’ To say the matter succinctly, my proposal is an argument in favor of unity with respect to pedagogical method, not of its outcome.
139 Ibid, 53.
141 Ibid, 56-57.
142 Ibid, 57.
143 Ibid, 59.
In claiming this, Roth anticipated my present concern, though not in its Heideggerian form. While I am not arguing in favor of theism *per se*, I would grant the philosophy of education I will elaborate from Heidegger’s *fundamental ontology*, in which he strove to remain ethically neutral, is based on my own ethical stance—viz., when possible, more choice is better than less. Hence, if a student finds that Dewey’s moral philosophy limits his moral hope (to put it in James’ words) to consistently think, feel, and act according to the principle of self-preservation—for example, by claiming the essence of morality is preserving *relation*’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare—then he is justified in rejecting it. My proposal, which is a proposal for pre-service teacher education in the realm of *moral* education, is to teach pre-service teachers a method with which they may help their students to decide whether or not, and if so the extent to which to assent to the notion in question. In other words, my proposal is to teach pre-service teachers a method with which they may help their students to decide whether or not, and if so the extent to which the essence of morality is what Dewey said it is.

In sum, the authors of this literature took Dewey’s method of intelligence for granted, and thus its underlying ethic: viz., the notion that preserving *relation*’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality. I suspect a major reason for this is because they have assumed, even if only implicitly, that the notion in question is virtually unassailable, and thus the Aristotelian/Kantian metaphysical tradition to which *relation* belongs. If so, then I also suspect they share this reason in common with those authors who have defended Dewey’s method. It is to their work that I now turn.

*Part B: Authors Who Have Defended Dewey’s Method*

Concerned that the “central beliefs, … [the] central premises, … [and the] relatively unquestioned assumptions about the teaching of art, [confused] … facts with values,… [Ecker144 outlined] a new proposal for art education … [he] … believe[d] [would clear up the confusion and] provide direction for teachers of art.”145 He argued that Dewey’s method of intelligence is a

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144 David W. Ecker, “Some Inadequate Doctrines in Art Education and a Proposed Resolution.”
145 Ibid, 71.
model for developing what he called “qualitative intelligence” \cite{146}—i.e., the ability to engage in a “qualitative ordering” \cite{147} of artistic means to artistic ends—and thus the method is a model for providing direction for teachers of art. Ecker thus implicitly defended the notion in question. While I think there is a necessary connection between “lines, textures, volumes, and colors as qualitative means to achieve their qualitative end” \cite{148} in arts such as painting, sculpture, and architecture, which therefore justifies using relation as a fundamental category with which to understand them, it does not necessarily follow that relation is a fundamental category on the basis of which to judge on the morality of human behavior. In short, while it is appropriate to use relation (or Aristotle’s and Kant’s categories generally) to organize art, it is inappropriate to use it to define the essence of morality—a uniquely human affair. I will explain why in Chapter 4.

Strike’s “The Moral Role of Schooling in a Liberal Democratic Society” decries the dearth of a “public philosophy” that critically examines the question of how we should go about the business of educating liberal democratic citizens. For Strike, educating this kind of citizen is a moral imperative Americans must obey, for “Ours is a liberal democratic society.” \cite{149} After a lengthy discussion about the nature of, and tensions between liberalism and democracy, and a lengthier comparison and contrast between forms of political liberalism (e.g., Rawls \cite{150} and Ackerman \cite{151}) and their respective implications for citizen education, Strike ventured to consider the nature of, and tensions between “valuationally coherent communities” on the one hand, and pluralism and autonomy on the other. Consider the following:

Valuationally coherent communities might offend against two types of moral ideals. One is pluralism. The second is autonomy. Pluralism is threatened in that, when the values of one group are dominant, other groups may experience schools as oppressive. Autonomy may be threatened by an environment that prevents students from developing as independent selves. Calls for community in education thus must be

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[Ibid, 80.]
\item[Ibid.]
\item[Ibid, 79.]
\item[149] Kenneth A. Strike, “The Moral Role of Schooling in a Liberal Democratic Society,” 413. In contrast to Strike, I am arguing in favor of an education that helps students decide whether or not, and if so the extent to which to embrace “[t]his assertion, as much aspiration as [it is a] description.”
\item[150] John Rawls, A Theory of Justice.
\item[151] Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
appraised by noting their educational consequences, but also by noting their cost in decreased cultural pluralism and individual autonomy.\footnote{Kenneth A. Strike, “The Moral Role of Schooling in a Liberal Democratic Society,” 420.}

On the surface, it may seem Strike anticipated my criticism of Dewey’s argument on behalf of a community’s need to renew and perpetuate itself by ensuring its young adopt its aims and habits through an educational process, even if its aims and habits are marred by its members’ personality blights. However, Strike approached this issue from the perspective of political philosophy, not from the perspective of its metaphysical roots in general, of its roots in Aristotle’s and Kant’s metaphysical tradition in particular, nor from the perspective of Dewey’s membership in it. Moreover, my concern is not with preparing pre-service teachers to impart certain moral ideals to their students—the apparent concern of the scholars in his literature review (including Strike himself)—but rather with preparing them to share a method with their students so they themselves may decide which moral ideals to endorse—i.e., those characteristic of liberalism, communitarianism, or any other –ism.

Returning to consider Strike’s treatment of Dewey, he identified Dewey’s method of intelligence as central to the task of “collective problem solving through informed discussion.”\footnote{Ibid, 448.} He also suggested that Dewey would have agreed with the following opinion: “Individual preferences can be overridden by collective choice or by the imperative to promote democratic character”\footnote{Ibid, 456.}—in short, my ‘felt difficulty’—presumably when such overriding is guided and justified by the method of intelligence.\footnote{It is a ‘felt difficulty’ because the individual with a preference at odds with the preferences of the agents of “collective choice” may judge (and correctly) that the latter are poxed with sundry personality blights the individual finds noxious.} While Strike inferred several social and educational

\footnote{Strike identified Dewey with what he called a “strong democracy,” and the reason is apparent from how he described it: “Its essential thrust is to resist what it sees as the excessive individualism and emphasis on individual liberty in liberalism and to attempt to realize more of the values associated with community by attempting to make democratic participation itself the basis of community” (p. 446). “Strong democracy [and thus Dewey] has a yen for a national polis organized around the values of democratic participation. Local community, diverse moral traditions, and other forms of moral particularity [including my own] may not live comfortably in this national democratic polis” (p. 457). We could say I am writing this dissertation to help students so inclined to reject values inconsistent with their evolving sense of ‘self.’ While I am clearly on the side of individualism (see the quote at the beginning of this chapter), it does not follow I am therefore advocating liberalism. Rather, I am advocating for a method with which students so inclined may decide whether or not, and if so the extent to which to accept liberalism, “strong democracy,” or some other proposed way to live their lives.}
consequences from said method, he never questioned the method itself. In fact, he defended it, thus defending the notion in question.

Patterning their work after Ralph W. Tyler who worked with Alberty on the *Eight Year Study*, Hlebowitsh and Hamot\(^{157}\) focused their attentions on civic and citizenship education in secondary schools of the Czech Republic. Their research looked at the role of said schools in encouraging and sustaining democracy. In particular, they investigated progressive teaching techniques that would prepare students for democratic civic participation and citizenship, and co-developed student behavioral objectives with Czech educators. For them, Dewey’s method of intelligence provided the best means of fulfilling these goals. Thus, they defended the notion in question.

Parker’s\(^{158}\) educational research is consistent with the underlying social aim of my dissertation, viz., to fan American citizens’ revolutionary flame (those able and willing), even if it has cooled to a spark. In his case, he was interested in the issue of how classroom discussion may contribute to nurturing citizens, for he had found that “most indicators point to a very weak culture of discussion in U.S. schools,”\(^{159}\) and thus (in his view) a very weak culture of nurturing citizens therein. He differentiated between *seminar* and *deliberation* as two distinct (though interrelated) kinds of discussion, with the latter being distinguished by the fact that “participants speak and listen to … [learn and] decide [as opposed to only learn] which course of action will best address a shared problem….\(^{160}\) In Marxist terms, seminars are spaces in which students learn about the world, while deliberations are spaces in which students learn about the world in order to *change* it. In the context of his discussion on listening—an indispensable aspect of participating in both seminars and deliberations—Parker identified Dewey’s method of intelligence as a means to actualize “humility, caution, and reciprocity”\(^{161}\) — i.e., civic virtues conducive to facilitating classroom discussion, and thus citizenship. Such praise, even if muted, betrayed his support of the notion in question.

Sharing similar concerns with Parker, Sherry\(^{162}\) assayed “a concrete examination of the substantive legal implications of an education for republican citizenship,”\(^{163}\) which would

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\(^{157}\) Peter S. Hlebowitsh and Gregory E. Hamot, “Pragmatism and Civic Education in the Czech Republic.”

\(^{158}\) Walter C. Parker, “Public Discourses in Schools: Purposes, Problems, Possibilities.”

\(^{159}\) Ibid, 12.

\(^{160}\) Ibid.

\(^{161}\) Ibid, 16.

\(^{162}\) Suzanna Sherry, “Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship.”
include an emphasis on what she called the civic virtue of individual responsibility—a needed counterweight, in her opinion, to an “exaggerated focus on individual rights.”\textsuperscript{164} In her view, “the education of children for responsible republican citizenship” is the way to provide it.\textsuperscript{165} She claimed such an education should ensure that children learn three things: “moral character, critical thinking, and cultural literacy (that is, a knowledge of and attachment to their own culture).”\textsuperscript{166} I agree with Sherry on these points,\textsuperscript{167} though with some reservations, which I will describe below.

Sherry’s argument in favor of teaching children a “prudent regard for tradition … mediated by reason”\textsuperscript{168} is consistent with my own, which I will articulate at length in Chapter 5. One reason she gave for said regard is the following:

\begin{quote}
[A] common culture is most important in our diverse society as a means of maintaining connections [emphasis mine] among citizens and between citizens and the polity. In an America that consists of separate and individual cultures with no common bond, citizens will have no reason [emphasis mine] to act on behalf of either the common good or members of other groups.\textsuperscript{169}
\end{quote}

Given the fundamental importance of “maintaining connections” in Dewey’s philosophy of education, as evidenced by his principles of interaction and continuity, Dewey would agree with Sherry’s opinion about the necessity of a common culture, at least in principle. In creating and sustaining such a culture, which she admitted “is a diverse and multi-ethnic one,”\textsuperscript{170} Sherry argued for the seemingly inescapable need to rely on inculcation\textsuperscript{171} to ensure children adopt it,
which would require inculcating values like tolerance when the common culture in question is ‘liberal’ in nature—i.e., one based on the fundamental premise that there is a plurality of ‘good’ lives that are worth living. In short, Sherry argued in favor of exempting some values (e.g., tolerance) from the mediation of reason, which she otherwise requires.\footnote{Sherry quoted Amy Gutmann approvingly: “Children must learn not just to \textit{behave} in accordance with authority but to \textit{think} critically about authority if they are to live up to the democratic ideal of sharing political sovereignty as citizens” [p. 172]. Apparently, Sherry favored exempting some values (e.g., tolerance) inculcated by authority from critical thinking, hence limiting its scope. I do not.} I disagree with her for one simple reason: tolerance is sometimes intolerable.\footnote{The same can be said for those components of the “American creed” Sherry identified: “hard work, honesty, careful thought, individual responsibility, treating others with respect and tolerance, [and] expecting that others will follow the same precepts. [These components] have been … successful in producing a vibrant, productive, wealthy, multicultural nation” [p. 171]. In my view, these components comprise a caricature of the so-called American creed, for it implicitly denies that laziness, deceit, stupidity, irresponsibility, treating others with disrespect and intolerance, and/or preventing others from following the same precepts had anything to do with “producing a vibrant, productive, wealthy, multicultural nation.” In short, we may find instances in which “hard work, honesty, careful thought, individual responsibility, [and/or] treating others with respect and tolerance” is intolerable, and instances in which others have reached the same conclusion, and yet have contributed to “producing a vibrant, productive, wealthy, multicultural nation.” The teaching method I am proposing is a method to help students decide whether or not, and if so the extent to which behaving according to the “American creed” (as articulated by Sherry) is appropriate in any given situation.} As I will make clear in Chapter 5, teachers can teach children a method by which to determine whether or not, and if so the extent to which tolerance is intolerable. In other words, the “common culture” I want to pass on, but only to those who are willing and able to embrace it (for I reject inculcation as a method in moral education) is a \textit{method} by which children may (but not necessarily) grow to find \textit{some} reason “to act on behalf of either the common good or members of other groups.” Not finding such a reason would not necessarily entail (as I will argue) what Sherry thought would happen if a liberal society fails to compel its children to “choose one of the good lives” it values: viz., such a society would “cast [its children] adrift to choose indiscriminately from an infinite number of possible lives.”\footnote{Suzanna Sherry, “Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship,” 173.} To sum up what I will argue, a liberal society that fails to compel its children to so choose does not necessarily cast them adrift to choose indiscriminately, for (and as I will maintain) the fundamental principle of self-preservation is precisely what will allow them to discriminate between a life they find worth living, and one not worth the trouble.

I have treated Sherry’s argument to a longer-than-usual exposition because I share her concerns. For the purposes of this literature review, and the centrality of Dewey’s method of consistent with their sense of self-preservation—what I argue is the fundamental principle of all morality, be it republican or otherwise. In short, my interest in said method is an interest in minimizing, if not eliminating, the need to resort to inculcation as an educational strategy.
intelligence herein, Sherry considered it to be consistent with “the responsible republicanism I am advocating.” It follows that Sherry considered the notion in question to be consistent with it as well.

Hlebowitsh and Wraga argued against the opinion that “progressive liberal thinkers … [e.g., Dewey, failed] to provide a substantive social class analysis of public schooling.” Specifically, they defended the thesis that “many progressive-experimentalists used their criticisms of class division and economic injustice in the society to argue for more directed efforts at developing social consciousness and social insight in the school.” It is worth noting their acknowledgment of critics who have characterized “Dewey as a thinker whose idealistic treatment of democracy led him to advocate on behalf of an education of conformity to the well-being of the group,” for it invokes my own criticism of his philosophy of education. Not siding with them, Hlebowitsh and Wraga embraced Dewey’s method of intelligence as the means by which to uphold “a worldview of democracy.” This is to say that they embraced the notion that preserving relation’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality.

In his critique of American schools that either sought to emulate the emphasis placed on math and science in Soviet secondary school curricula, or that sought to surpass Soviet schools in the number of future mathematicians and physicists they graduated, Johnson urged them “to improve [their] curriculum by pulling [them]selves up by [their] own bootstraps, not those of Ivan!” His proposal was that they should rather try to arrange “physical, social, and humane materials in their proper proportion and with their interrelations clearly established.” Initially concerning himself with “the place of science in the physical studies,” Johnson asserted that in “pure science, the rules of procedure are themselves moral principles … [e.g.,] tolerance,

175 Ibid.
177 Ibid, 7.
178 Ibid, 8.
179 Ibid, 10.
180 See Chapter 1. While their acknowledgement invokes my criticism, it does not do so completely, for in admitting that Dewey’s philosophy of education seeks to reconcile the individual with what he hoped would be an always-evolving society, it is clear that I, along with the authors of this article, reject the opinion that Dewey was merely a defender of the status quo.
183 Ibid, 439.
184 Ibid, 440.
185 Ibid.
competence, and humility.”

Pure science proceeds according to the scientific method, which Johnson equated with Dewey’s method of intelligence. It follows, therefore, that the rules of procedure for Dewey’s method are themselves moral principles, at least in Johnson’s opinion. Dewey would have agreed with Johnson, which is to say he would have agreed that relation, in addition to being a category in his metaphysics, is also a fundamental moral principle when conceived as governing social life aimed at expanding the general welfare. In light of his assertions about the moral import of Dewey’s method, it is easy to infer that Johnson implicitly defended the notion in question.

In “An Experimental Democracy,” Fitch said the following about democracy:

The problem of democracy is to locate an experimental mean between these two extremes [viz., individualism and socialism]. Since neither anarchy nor stagnation [the tendency of each respective extreme] allows for progress, a democracy must forever consider anew the areas in which it wants freedom and the areas in which it wants control. Since both the belief in the natural goodness of man [underpinning individualism] and the belief in the natural depravity of man [underpinning socialism] decree the impossibility of remolding human nature, a democracy will assume that men are born morally neutral, and that what gives moral character to a people are its institutions, political, religious, educational, and economic. Since the ascription of final authority to a chosen class [which, according to Fitch, individualism and socialism have in common] must lead to rigidity, and eventually to stagnation and to decay, a democracy had the problem of exploiting, in alternation and as need may be, the talents of all classes. And above all a democracy must recognize the fact of growth and of change, and provide orderly techniques for change that shall preserve the best of the old while allowing for what is promising in the new. A democracy that fulfills these conditions may be called an experimental democracy.

Rather than articulate the precise details of such a democracy, Fitch endeavored to “clarify the principles on which it rests.” Of course, listing them is beyond the scope of my work. For my purposes, it suffices to say that Fitch described such a democracy’s negotiating between various class interests as “the method of intelligence [emphasis mine] rather than of absolutism, the

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186 Ibid, 441.
187 Ibid, 444.
188 Stanley and Smith found that Robert Mason had argued virtually the same point in Moral Values and Secular Education.
189 This is the same conclusion I reached in Chapter 1.
192 Ibid, 459.
method of orderly growth rather than of violent change.” In other words, Fitch simply assumed the efficacy of said method, and thus the efficacy of the notion in question.

Having concerns similar to Fitch’s, Clarke and Tilman discussed C.B. Macpherson’s work as being “a theory of the institutional configurations that will maximize human growth and development without either sacrificing individual freedom or promoting economic exploitation.” Macpherson was impelled to formulate this theory because “the liberal values of liberty and equality appear to be inconsistent with the other liberal values of unlimited property accumulation and the right of unlimited consumption.” According to the authors, one of the chief criticisms against Macpherson’s theory is that it lacked a “transition mechanism, a vehicle through which the desired state is to be achieved.” In their view, Dewey’s method of intelligence provides such a mechanism. Their preference for Dewey’s method committed them to accepting the notion in question.

Short investigated the relationship between knowledge production and knowledge utilization in matters of curriculum research and teaching practice. What he found is unsurprising: gaps often exist between theory and practice for an array of reasons, none of which I will go into here; furthermore, he found there was no general agreement among social science scholars as to how to bridge said gaps. However, he found consensus among them with respect to the need of generating solutions for actual (as opposed to theoretical) problems; in short, theory needs to emerge from and be addressed to “the knowledge requirements of practice.” According to Short, before such requirements may be known, “conceptualizations of the whole [practical] matter” must first be developed. For Short, Dewey’s method of intelligence could provide such a perspective. About it he said the following:

It is interdisciplinary, in the sense that the questions probed are not by their nature restricted to the use of but one of the modes of disciplined inquiry. On the other hand, all such disciplined approaches do not have

193 Ibid, 463.
195 Ibid, 184.
196 Ibid, 192.
197 Edmund C. Short, “Knowledge Production and Utilization in Curriculum: A Special Case of the General Phenomenon.”
198 Ibid, 241. Shea and Schubert shared the same concern.
199 Ibid, 270.
to focus on the same aspect of the question. Perhaps the term “multidisciplinary” describes this best. It is more like a cooperative approach rather than a multiple attack interdisciplinariness. 200

It is clear that Short was concerned with finding a method with which to understand “the whole [practical] matter” at hand before attempting to infer a theory about it with which to guide further research, and he found Dewey’s method promising in this regard. It follows that Short found the notion in question promising as well.

Evans 201 described his transition from teaching social studies methods courses according to what he named a “reflective, issues-centered model” 202 in which, in his own words, he took a “cursory look at alternative ways of seeing the field, and then imposing [his] approach,” 203 to one in which students studied “the four or five most significant [pedagogic creeds] and [chose] one.” 204 About the latter approach he said the following: “I am more comfortable with this new approach because it is closer to Dewey's method of intelligence,” 205 which he apparently admired. Such admiration effectively renders the notion in question admirable.

Focusing his attention on questions of science, Williams 206 attacked the idea that science does not itself contain processes and findings with a moral bearing. In other words, he attacked the idea that science is not value laden, and that its values are not for the improvement of our standard of living. 207 In defending what he would have called science’s positive values, Williams identified his version of science with Dewey’s “method of intelligence.” 208 Hence, it follows that Williams considered Dewey’s method to promote positive values. 209 Of course, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to enumerate them here. Suffice it to say that Williams’ high opinion of Dewey’s method implicitly committed him to accepting the notion in question.

“We are learning to be at home in the world, not by misrepresenting it, but by understanding it.” 210 These are Bush’s first words in considering “The Background of

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200 Ibid.
201 Ronald W. Evans, “Pedagogic Creed as Foundation: An Approach to Teaching Social Studies Methods.”
202 Ibid, 57.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
205 Ibid, 59.
206 Elgin Williams, “Can We Save Science?”
207 Williams thus agreed with Mason and Johnson.
208 Ibid, 338.
209 This is virtually the same conclusion reached in Robert Mason’s Moral Values and Secular Education—as discussed by Stanley and Smith, and as by Johnson.
Instrumentalism.” Having identified various factors in said background—e.g., “the importance of radically improving our social and political conditions”211 by first clearing away the debris of pseudo-problems in philosophy (the existence of evil, for instance)—Bush proceeded to pronounce Dewey’s method of intelligence, and its embodiment in the Essays in Experimental Logic, a “prolegomena [emphasis in the original] of … an organon [of thought that enables the systematic pursuit of] progress, of emancipation, [and] of liberty.”212 This is true if one shares Dewey’s assumption (and apparently Bush’s) that progress, emancipation, and liberty are best pursued in conjoint experimental activity—i.e., activity governed by relation—but false otherwise. In light of his opinion of Dewey’s method of intelligence, it follows that Bush would have accepted the notion in question. In light of the argument I am advancing in this dissertation, the pedagogical method I am proposing would prepare students to decide whether or not, and if so the extent to which to pursue progress, emancipation, and liberty conjointly, for they may decide the pursuit is best undertaken alone, if they decide to pursue it at all.213

Kennedy214 tried to refute arguments that have tried to challenge the method of intelligence’s use to resolve social conflicts—based on, for example, the claim that “there isn't a problem [emphasis in the original] to which it might be applied” because “a complex society with its antagonistic and competing interest groups … [will] in fact give rise to a plurality of problems each of which has its own [emphasis in the original] solution”215—by arguing that said method is indeed useful when parties in conflict over a particular problem arrive at a compromise. That they would so arrive she assumed (or hoped) to be inevitable.216 In my view, her assumption (or hope) reflected her solidarity with the notion in question, or at least the portion that takes relation’s necessary governance over social affairs as given. As I said in Chapter 1, and as I will continue to say throughout this dissertation, treating the method of intelligence as universally applicable, and thus as affirming relation’s necessary governance over the social affairs the method guides, effectively denies the possibility that individuals engaged in social conflict could decide that their differences are irreconcilably different, and thus decide to

211 Ibid, 711.
212 Ibid, 712.
213 Thus, my proposal implicitly critiques Robert Mason’s Moral Values and Secular Education—as discussed by Stanley and Smith, and Johnson.
215 Ibid, 907.
216 Ibid.
go their separate ways. Not only do I accept such a possibility, but I am also promoting a pedagogical method that will help students who are able and willing to decide for themselves whether or not, and if so the extent to which to seek a compromise with those with whom they quarrel.

Johnston summarized his praise of Dewey’s method of intelligence in the following way:

In this article I seek to investigate and to rebut charges that Dewey had either too authoritative a conception or use of philosophical and educational inquiry, or not enough of an authoritative use. I look specifically at two critics, one in the discipline of education and one in the discipline of history. These two are, respectively, Clarence Karier and J. P. Diggins. In the final analysis, I conclude that Dewey’s talk of authority generally, and his talk of inquiry specifically, functions according to the needs and problems of the community [emphasis mine] that it takes place in, and cannot, therefore, be hooked to some larger, metaphysical end or aim beyond this [presumably a reference to the ‘empirical’].

While I would grant that Dewey’s conception of authority and inquiry could not be hooked to some larger, metaphysical end or aim beyond this, Dewey did in fact hook inquiry, or the method of intelligence, to some larger, metaphysical end or aim within this—viz., to ‘Nature.’ As the italicized words in the quote make clear, Johnston shared Dewey’s assumption that relation is a metaphysical (though naturalistic) category, and thus authority generally, and inquiry specifically, must function accordingly. My rejection of the notion that preserving relation’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality, and my development of a philosophy of moral education derived from Heidegger’s fundamental ontology will show that inquiry into the morality/immorality of behavior functions according to the needs and problems of the individual conducting research according to the principle of self-preservation—an individual who may or may not, or somewhat choose to reconcile his solutions with the community of inquirers.

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217 It is because I reject what I have been calling Dewey’s excessive optimism about these matters.
218 James S. Johnston, “Authority, Inquiry, and Education: A Response to Dewey’s Critics.”
220 I will demonstrate this claim in Chapter 3.
In his discussion of ‘method,’ its role in the history of philosophy generally, and in the work of Dewey in particular, McClellan summarized the peculiarly philosophical sense of ‘method’ under the following four headings:

First, we are talking of method only when we are speaking of actual procedures arranged in time-ordered sequence.… [T]he emphasis is upon now-this … then-that.… Second, method is perfectly general; it does not apply to the discovery of a particular piece of information (this may occur by happenstance) but with procedures that can be applied to any problem, doubt, or concern that may arise…. Third, a corollary of this second element of method should be made explicit. Method should specify procedures to answer moral and political questions as well as to discover truths in physics or geometry…. Fourth, a philosophy of method is an expression of the basic rationality of the human soul … it is the freeing of man's inherent potential to know the truth.

Then later in his article, he claimed that Dewey’s method of intelligence was a contemporary manifestation of said sense in the following way:

[Dewey endeavored] to formulate a conception of scientific method, taking as [his] point of departure the actual operations of scientists [which they are not (see note 48)] and not some abstract epistemology, and then to demonstrate that in history, in psychology, in education, in morals and politics, and the arts, and finally in logic itself this same conception of method can be used to define intelligence. Without attempting to recount Dewey's works in detail, I wish to assert that, in effect, he did just that.

In a word, McClellan claimed that Dewey had more or less successfully created a universally applicable method. As I have shown, Dewey’s universally applicable method (according to McClellan) is underwritten by the notion in question. Hence, and as has been the case with the authors in this literature review, McClellan implicitly defended it.

“Education for Change,” according to Cole, is required in a revolutionary age such as it was in the United States of 1938. Modern science and its products—e.g., the Model T Ford;
the transformation of “dirt roads … into arteries of transcontinental traffic”228; the advent of the modern house, with its “inclusive set of electrical appliances to serve the needs of the family, [its] [t]hree and a half miles of wiring and over two hundred outlets and connections …[which] … made available one hundred and eight electrical horsepower of energy to do the work of eight hundred and sixty-four servants”229—demands that people “must learn, unlearn, and relearn times without number how to accommodate their behavior, wishes, norms of living, and world view to the surpassing values that are found to be inherent in the scientific approach to life.”230 Cole’s hortatory tone is unmistakable. In light of this rhetoric, it is not a surprise that Cole admonished “society [to] adopt the experimental method [in his mind, Dewey’s method of intelligence231] to meet the problems that hold it in their grip.”232 Cole’s obvious advocacy for Dewey’s method committed him to the notion in question.

In his effort to state what in his view are necessary conditions for effective curriculum improvement, Lawhead233 relied on Dewey’s idea of an educative experience—i.e., one governed by the principles of continuity and interaction—to conceptualize how teachers should go about the business of creating and revising curricula. Lawhead approvingly quoted Harold and Elsie Albery’s suggestions for how to organize curricula: “The program would be characterized by cooperative planning and the use of the method of intelligence.”234 Hence, Lawhead implicitly approved of the notion in question.

In asking whether or not Dewey’s educational vision is still viable, Robertson235 was quite frank about the answer depending on whether or not we share Dewey’s commitment to what she quoted Westbrook (1991) as naming a “socialized democracy.”236 By this term I think Robertson had in mind what Dewey said (and which she quoted) on page 95 of Democracy and Education: “A society which makes provision for participation in its good of all its members on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the

227 Ibid, 7.
228 Ibid, 8.
229 Ibid.
230 Ibid, 9.
231 Ibid, 16.
232 Ibid, 15.
234 Ibid, 211.
235 Emily Robertson, “Is Dewey’s Educational Vision Still Viable?”
236 Ibid, 337.
different forms of associated life is ... democratic.”  

A careful reading of her lengthy article demonstrates that she shared Dewey’s commitment. Since Dewey’s method of intelligence is underwritten by the notion in question, Robertson therefore shared Dewey’s commitment to it, even if cautiously:

Communities in which all share in the creation and enjoyment of common goods, in which each person’s flourishing is thought necessary for the full flourishing of the others and the individuality of each is respected, and in which conflicts are brought out in the open and resolved through public discourse surely are a worthy goal.

In short, Robertson answered the question that is the title of her research review in the affirmative, thus rendering a critique of the method’s underlying notion superfluous.

Anderson’s article also had a question for its title. Worried about the fate of History of Education courses in the teacher education curriculum, Anderson outlined and addressed three objections that challenged the need for this course: a) the charge “that the materials and methods used in the teaching of History of Education have failed to produce worthwhile results”; b) the charge “that the work is valueless because it is theoretical”; and c) the charge that the work does not help teachers and administrators to solve practical problems they face every day. Focusing his attention on the third charge, Anderson argued there are two things the History of Education professor must do in order to affect educational practice:

In the first place, [she] must use historical materials different from those commonly used in the traditional, compendious, academic courses in the subject. The materials which are used must be carefully selected in terms of the purposes to be achieved and they must be handled in ways which are appropriate to the achievement of those purposes. In the second place, there must be a more definite, and a more soundly

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238 In her conclusion, she advises the following: “While, in my view, Dewey's focus on developing social intelligence should not be discounted in reconstructions of his social and political philosophy, a fuller, and probably more adequate, theory emerges when attention is paid to his emphasis on the importance of meaning in human life and his account of how meaning is created, transmitted, and reconstructed through communication in communities of loyalty and attachment” (Ibid, 372).
239 Ibid, 374.
240 Archibald W. Anderson, “Is There a Functional Role for the History of Education in the Training of Teachers?”
241 Ibid, 55-57.
244 Ibid, 62.
Based, determination of the areas, in the professional behavior of teachers within which the study of educational history can have an influence upon behavior.\textsuperscript{245}

By doing these things, the History of Education professor can extend “the experiences of men.”\textsuperscript{246} Expanding on this idea, Anderson identified Dewey’s method of intelligence as the method of choice to solve problems, “especially group or social problems,”\textsuperscript{247} that arise from said experiences. The task of the History of Education professor, therefore, is to share “historical examples of the use of the method of intelligence”\textsuperscript{248} to extend teachers’ experiences, and thus to prepare them to use the method themselves. By arguing thus, Anderson clarified the method’s role in ensuring the existence of History of Education courses in the teacher education curriculum, and thus the reason why he chose it. Given that Anderson gave the method the role of securing the future of said courses, and that he preferred it to solve “group or social problems,” he was therefore implicitly committed to the notion in question.

Randall’s work\textsuperscript{249} on liberalism’s “faith in intelligence,” and on Dewey’s method of intelligence as arguably its best-known example, was partially apologetic in nature. He termed the “liberal method [in general, and Dewey’s in particular, as] … the essence of the liberal spirit.”\textsuperscript{250} “[T]he real issue in the defense of the liberal faith” that Randall imputed to liberals (including Dewey), “is over the method of attaining collectivism,”\textsuperscript{251} whose end is “the fullest possible realization of human potentialities.”\textsuperscript{252} Since what is possible depends on “definite objective conditions, economic, social, and cultural,… [w]hat will largely determine the participation that men will find possible and satisfying is the method by which they seek to realize this” end: “The liberal method is indeed the essence of the liberal spirit.”\textsuperscript{253} According to Randall, Dewey’s method of intelligence is such a method. In Randall’s case, as in the case of the authors under the present subheading, apology—even for the notion in question, which I would submit as the essence of what Randall called the “liberal method”—trumped critique. As mine will make clear, neither Heidegger nor I share Dewey’s or Randall’s faith.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{245}Ibid, 63.
\bibitem{246}Ibid, 65.
\bibitem{247}Ibid, 66.
\bibitem{248}Ibid.
\bibitem{249}John H. Randall, “Liberalism as Faith in Intelligence.”
\bibitem{250}Ibid, 262.
\bibitem{251}Ibid, 259.
\bibitem{252}Ibid, 262.
\bibitem{253}Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
In *Reality, Value, and Growth*, Parsons analyzed “the relation between reality and value.” Arguing from a naturalistic perspective—i.e., the same perspective from which Dewey argued—he claimed the former is more than an ““irreducible and stubborn” datum; but … [that reality also] … bodes good or ill for the organism and its meanings.” Having collapsed the fact/value dichotomy with what I would call the doctrine of interactionism, Parsons, in Deweyan fashion, proceeded to suggest that the best way to approach reality is to study “the way in which men do in actual fact satisfy needs and test preferences; that is to say, by studying the real preferences common to the natures of men.” According to Parsons, the “spur of need” drives organisms to satisfy it via “interactions and transactions with events.” “Realism is the way of fulfill[ing]” need, and he shared Dewey’s faith that the method of intelligence is the best way to do it. Taking the method’s efficacy as self-evident does not lend itself to subjecting the notion in question to critical scrutiny.

Of all of the sources I consider in this literature review, none accepts Dewey’s method of intelligence on faith as fully as Stengel’s *Making Use of the Method of Intelligence*. As if the title alone were insufficient to illustrate her conviction, she said the following early in her article:

[This article reflects] my liberal use of [other scholars’] arguments to make a broader point about both the cognitive and moral import of Dewey’s “method of intelligence” with particular reference to teacher education: there is no substitute in educational efforts for the regular and unrelenting practice of intelligence by teachers, by students, by administrators, and by policymakers. No program, no curriculum, no strategy—no matter how helpful—will suffice. Intelligence makes possible the “fitting response” to the persons and circumstances embedded in a particular educational challenge. The educator who makes use of the method of intelligence will overcome the deficiencies of *any* [emphasis mine] particular policy or program; the educator who does not cannot be saved by the best-conceived curriculum or course plan. If

254 Howard L. Parsons, “Reality, Value, and Growth.”
255 Ibid, 513.
256 Ibid, 514.
257 Ibid.
258 Ibid.
259 Ibid, 515.
260 According to Parsons, reason “progressively orders and unifies qualities and meanings” [Ibid, 516]. I use “faith” in this context, as in others, because to believe that reason (or intelligence) can do this is to assume that reason has few, if any, limits. I explicitly reject this faith, and for reasons I will make clear in Chapter 4.
261 Ibid, 518.
262 Barbara S. Stengel, “Making Use of the Method of Intelligence.”
263 This conviction is also present, though not to the same degree, in Barbara S. Stengel, “Teaching in Response,” *Philosophy of Education Yearbook* (2001).
correct, my claim implies that educational efforts for teachers should be structured to maximize capacity for intelligence for all involved.  

Stengel’s faith in intelligence is clear, for she was apparently convinced that Dewey’s method could “overcome the deficiencies of any [emphasis mine] particular policy or program.” As she stated in her essay, a substantial personal and professional experience has shown her “there are too few individual instructors and too few schools who take their cue from Dewey’s Laboratory School,” where Dewey’s method was practiced. In other words, there are too few individual instructors and too few schools who share her faith. While I share Stengel’s concern with the cognitive and moral import of the pedagogical education pre-service teachers receive in teacher education programs, I do not share her opinion that Dewey’s method of intelligence (and hence, the notion in question that underwrites it) is what pre-service teachers must learn, and for reasons I will soon clarify.

In the essay cited above, Stengel raised a point I want to address here. She conflated ‘reflective thinking’ with Dewey’s method of intelligence. If she suggested the former is indispensable to the latter, then I would agree. However, if she suggested the latter is the former’s paragon, then I would agree, but only within the framework of Aristotle’s and Kant’s metaphysics—i.e., within a framework in which relation is a fundamental category governing moral education. In a framework where it is not—i.e., in Heidegger’s—Dewey’s method of intelligence ceases to be the model of reflective thinking insofar as other human beings are the subjects and objects of thought. Having rejected Dewey’s method of intelligence as a model of reflective thinking (because I reject the underlying notion in question about what he thought is the essence of morality), I will discuss what I think is an appropriate model thereof within a Heideggerian framework in Chapter 5.

The intensity of Tanner’s advocacy for Dewey’s method of intelligence rivals Stengel’s, as well as his disappointment for the dearth of its use. His praise for its unique approach to critical thinking emphasized the method’s exclusive attention “to solving real [as


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264 Ibid, 110.
265 Ibid, 115.
266 I, however, do not share Stengel’s advocacy for particular moral values—e.g., “sympathy” (Ibid, 117), for individual students may judge sympathy is inconsistent with their sense of self-preservation, perhaps because they consider it a weakness in some instances.
267 I am afraid this dissertation will not help her win converts.
268 Laurel N. Tanner, “The Path Not Taken: Dewey’s Model of Inquiry.”
opposed to simulated or contrived] problems269—an objective I agree with. However, the
method I will propose, which I will make plain in Chapter 5, dispenses with relation as a
fundamental category through which to understand the essence of morality, and builds on the
Heideggerian framework I have been adducing.

Focusing his attention on the concept of technology within the context of
“institutionalism”—also known as evolutionary economics, Lower270 interpolated Dewey into
his topic by citing his “instrumentalist philosophy”271 as the conceptual basis of Clarence Ayers’
theory of economic progress, providing him with the idea of the “interdependence [emphasis in
the original] between tools and knowledge.”272 To summarize his point, Lower claimed that as
tools evolved, knowledge about how to predict, shape, and control the environment grew, and as
the latter grew, it provided direction for the evolution of the former. For Ayers, according to
Lower, Dewey’s method of intelligence and its emphasis on conjoint activity provided the
explanatory framework for said interdependence, which means that Ayers argued “it is not the
heroic efforts or the genius of skilled individuals—however essential (but also constant) these
may be—that is the underlying basis of technological development.”273 Given the method’s
prime role in Ayer’s theory, it isn’t surprising that Lower did not cite any objections about the
method on Ayer’s part, nor did Lower offer any. Thus, relation’s governance of conjoint
activity—i.e., the notion in question—remained untouched.

Also working within the field of institutionalism (evolutionary economics), Tilman274
sought to synthesize what he noted were rifts in the doctrines of neo-institutionalists of sundry
persuasions with respect to democratic theory. He found a rallying point in Dewey’s method of
intelligence.275 While Tilman was aware of the several difficulties attending keeping the faith in
the method,276 he nevertheless affirmed his faith in the “grounded idealism”277 the method
embodies, and its efficacy in the “elimination of historically unnecessary forms of

269 Ibid, 472.
270 Milton D. Lower, “The Concept of Technology within the Institutionalist Perspective.”
271 Ibid, 1156.
272 Ibid.
273 Ibid.
275 Ibid, 1387.
276 Ibid, 1390, second paragraph; 1393, first paragraph; and 1395 (first paragraph)-1397 (end).
277 Ibid, 1394.
domination.” Hence, in lauding Dewey’s method, Tilman lauded relation’s role in the notion in question.

Finally, Mead’s article on Dewey’s philosophy writ large traced (in outline) its development from Dewey’s days as a university student through to his mature work. For instance, in his exposition Mead articulated the connection between Dewey’s psychology and its basis in the child’s impulses, emotions, and desires on the one hand, and his education on the other, which of course begins and ends with a child’s experience—always and necessarily animated by the child’s impulses, emotions, and desires. It is through the method of intelligence, Mead went on, that children progressively gain control over their environment. In broader terms, it is through the method that society “should find its morality.” Perhaps a more explicit endorsement of the notion in question cannot be found.

In drawing this subsection to a close, I want to acknowledge the more or less persuasive arguments that have been forwarded by these authors. To subject each one to critique would be to accept the challenge to fight them on their turf, but their turf rests on the bedrock that is the Aristotelian and Kantian metaphysical tradition to which Dewey’s method of intelligence belongs. Instead, I will take a different approach. If I can persuade you that Dewey’s method of intelligence belongs to the Aristotelian and Kantian metaphysical tradition (Chapter 3), and that Heidegger’s fundamental ontology corrects them both (Chapter 4), then the arguments in this subsection, which depend on Dewey’s method of intelligence, will become less persuasive. Of course, delineating the ramifications of my strategy for the academic fields in which these arguments were made is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Part C: Authors Who Criticized Dewey’s Method, But Not from Heidegger’s Perspective

In considering the role of the humanities in education, Karier undertook to study the genealogy of the idea that humankind is capable of gaining control of its social institutions and thereby improve its lot in life. He identified Dewey as one of the loudest voices espousing this

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278 Ibid.
280 Ibid, 64.
281 Ibid, 81. Here we hear the echoes of Robert Mason’s Moral Values and Secular Education—as discussed by Stanley and Smith, and Johnson.
282 Clarence J. Karier, “‘Humanitas’ and the Triumph of the Machine.”
faith, and his method of intelligence as the means of realizing it. Though he criticized Dewey for importing values into what Karier called his “scientific humane individualism” that were not themselves created with his method of intelligence, Karier’s critique did not extend to the notion in question.

In another piece, Karier took a critical look at Liberalism in the United States of the 20th century, which included acknowledging the “secularized socially conscious Protestant Christianity” that underwrote it. According to him, “science and technology were the new theology,” and its spokespeople, including Dewey, were “fundamentally moralists.” According to Karier, one of the tenets for which Dewey advocated was the primacy of the community:

To Dewey the spirit of God was in man and only through a more authentic community could that truth be set free. The community was the sacrament through which the divine in man could be allowed to grow.… His community would include the experimental, the scientific, and the technical and would necessitate a new man who found his individualism realized in the emerging corporate community.

Quoting Mayhew and Edwards, Karier added that Dewey conceived of the role of history in his Laboratory School curriculum as helping the child “gradually to shape his expression to social

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283 Ibid, 23.
284 Ibid, 28.
285 For all the faith Dewey placed in the method of intelligence to construct and reconstruct values by subjecting them to said method, Dewey himself, according to Karier, did not derive his own values from applying the method to his own life. In Karier’s words: “Freedom, flexibility, authentic community of open discourse, respect for truth, individual growth, and collective progress of mankind were all values he derived not so much from science, but from the moral capital of his own past” (p. 24). In other words, Dewey would not have subjected these values to investigation by his method, for its conclusions could mitigate, if not destroy them under certain circumstances. Again:

[Dewey] … realized the need to employ … science and technology in the creation of a more humane civilization. Dewey’s vision of that civilization was enriched by the moral capital of his past. The values which marked the perimeters of his philosophy were not the products of science, but rather the products of a humanistic philosopher concerned with human values in a scientific technological age. Dewey erred, it seems, when he looked at science and technology and saw his own values rather than an amoral instrument of intelligence which could just as easily be used to destroy his “human age” as to achieve it (p. 25).

Thus, we have a second instance (the first one being his social philosophy as it relates to his philosophy of education, as articulated in Chapter 1) in which Dewey spared some values—e.g., the metaphysical primacy of relation, and the governing role Dewey gave it over social affairs—from treatment by his method and thus remain for a social group to transmit uncritically to its young.

286 Clarence J. Karier, “Liberalism and the Quest for Orderly Change.”
287 Ibid, 61.
288 Ibid, 62.
289 Ibid.
290 Ibid, 67.
ends, and thus make them, through his growing control, more and more effective in the corporate life of the group.”

Dewey’s emphasis on social unity was such that, according to Karier:

The violent, bloody history of the Indians, blacks, and immigrants, as well as the labor conflicts of the previous decades were peculiarly missing in the school’s history of the progressive evolution of American technology.

Karier quoted Dewey’s own explanation for his curricular expurgation thus:

[H]istorical material was subordinated to the maintenance of community or cooperative group in which each child was to participate.

As Dewey himself explained in Individualism Old and New, while the task of education is to help children to develop their individual talents, its primary task is to develop “a personal interest in social relationships and control, and the habits of mind which secure changes without introducing disorder.” Karier’s analysis suggests that Dewey was willing to exempt issues from collective investigation that may have undermined it. While Karier noted Dewey’s willingness to sacrifice the collective inquiry he otherwise lauded for the sake of ensuring what at best would have been a flimsy sense of social cohesion—a sacrifice that undermines Dewey’s claim (or perhaps only hope) that his method is universally applicable—he did not inquire into the notion in question as I do.

In a similar vein of thought, Bowman outlined several disintegrating social forces that frustrate individuals’ attempts to gain some measure of psychological unity. Dewey was aware of said forces, and he, according to Bowman, proposed “the articles of his own humanistic religion” to counteract them. Dewey hoped his “religion” would supplant traditional

\(^{291}\) Ibid, 68.

\(^{292}\) Ibid.

\(^{293}\) Ibid, 68-69.

\(^{294}\) As Karier quoted it on page 69.

\(^{295}\) Here we have a third instance in which Dewey exempted some values from being investigated with his method of intelligence—in this case, the value that students in his Lab School may have placed on studying the history of the Indians, blacks, and immigrants, as well as labor conflicts, for in that history students may have found reason to resist the Lab School’s insistence that they adopt the notion that preserving relation’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality.

\(^{296}\) Claude C. Bowman, “American Culture and the Problem of Personal Organization.”

\(^{297}\) Ibid, 487.
religion’s role of providing individuals seeking psychological unity through attachment to a supernatural ideal, with a naturalistic religion in which the “individual … [would be identified with] the processes and objects of the natural world rather than [with] the belief that man is above nature.”

According to Bowman, one such article was the “acceptance of the method of intelligence as the means of improving society.” I will quote Bowman’s critique of Dewey’s “article” at length to capture its flavor. It goes as follows:

[The “article” faces] obstacles to diffusion which its distinguished advocate does not seem to consider…. Anthropology has placed the other social sciences in its debt by revealing the flexibility of human nature, that is, how human characteristics vary significantly from culture to culture. Such studies seem to justify the postulate that the general run of human beings is capable of developing a higher degree of rationality within a more socialized framework of reference, given appropriate conditions for its nurture [emphasis in the original]…. Let us simply grant the assumption that Dewey's humanistic faith represents contemporary human nature at its ethical best; nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the social process is commonly not conducive to the production of the “best.” Indeed, it is not too much to state that the Ideal Society is a necessary social condition for producing a large number of persons possessed of the detachment and intellectual-emotional discipline upon which such a faith is based [emphasis mine]. Actually, the child is trained through association with adults whose personalities are likely to show various sorts of blights. He also learns that self-interest of a practical sort [emphasis mine] is appropriate to a competitive situation where status and possessions are hard to get and hard to keep. Implicit in the humanism sketched above

298 For Dewey, said Murphy, “‘[T]he social’ was not merely a subject matter, but a gospel…” [Arthur E. Murphy, “John Dewey and American Liberalism,” 422].
299 Ibid.
300 Ibid.
301 For example, my mother suffers from bipolar disorder, she refuses to take medication for it, she is a pathological liar, and she insists on the right to lie to me if and when she sees fit. She thinks dishonesty preserves the boundaries that separate her from others, for honesty may bring them close enough to ideas she identifies with, and this would cause her discomfort, for she suspects they will disapprove, and she doesn’t want to hear their opinions. In short, my mother finds dishonesty assures her comfort.

Moving on to other members of my family, my wife’s paternal grandmother is an Auschwitz survivor who as an octogenarian still suffers from keen and chronic posttraumatic stress disorder, her daughter is a raving lunatic, and her son (my wife’s father), who is a quinquagenarian, has been more or less in a state of depression for most of his adult life. Furthermore, each of these people has clothed their disease in a shabby cloak of self-righteousness. I could go on, but the point is this: such people’s blights and other psychological disturbances would quickly dissolve the method of intelligence into an exercise in madness.

302 It would be fair to characterize this concern in these terms as the basis of the pedagogical method for which I will advocate.
303 Dewey exempted humanism, among other values, from being tested by his method of intelligence: “Now it is true that social arrangements, laws, institutions are made for man, rather than that man is made for them; that they are means and agencies of human welfare and progress” (John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 194). This is a fourth value Dewey exempted from being investigated with his method.
is the principle, “every one for every one else,” while the traditional individualism of America stresses the principle of each man for himself. Indeed, sociological theory seems to have over-emphasized the process of socialization to the neglect of the limits set by our culture in this respect. It is true that economic adversity has led to certain modifications in this individualism in such matters as unemployment relief and social security, but it is easy to exaggerate the extent of the change in the *mores* [emphasis in the original]. Individual rights have been stressed while the concept of social responsibility has not been popular. Individual success in the face of adversity is admired and small attention is paid to the problem of reducing certain types of adversities. Individual effort is considered a primary factor in securing status without an adequate recognition of the circumstances that cause frustration of ambition and “laziness.” Add to this the isolating influences of jealousy and suspicion [i.e., other personality blights] wrought by intense competition and the limits of socialization [and intelligence] become more apparent.

Bowman’s critique of Dewey’s “article” suggests that Dewey presupposed the appropriate conditions for nurturing “a large number of persons possessed of the detachment and intellectual-

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304 This is what I called ‘altruism’ in Chapter 1.
305 As an immigrant to this country who can still manage to gain some critical distance from the dominant American macro culture into which I have largely assimilated, I have met more people who live by this principle than by the other. Judging from my experience, those who live according to the principle of “every one for every one else” are members of a small minority group.
306 Agreeing with Veblen and Bowman,

Bowers [like Karier above] argues that Dewey failed to fully recognize the effects of cultural traditions on his own thinking [but he did not specifically identify any of them as Aristotelian/Kantian like I do, nor did he identify Heidegger’s *fundamental ontology* as its corrective], traditions that led to his privileging the ideological assumptions of social progress, a belief in the ability of rational thought to control social life, faith in the scientific method, and a belief in the ability of society to cope with an increasing rate of social change.... [Bowers concludes that Dewey failed to recognize that] intelligence as a form of consciously directed activity *is always limited and never entirely free* [emphasis mine] from the implicit assumptions of the culture” [as quoted in Emily Robertson, “Is Dewey’s Educational Vision Still Viable?”, 363]. [According to Dewey], all aspects of culture are theoretically open to experimental test, [and he] held that inquiry begins with a problematic situation. Thus, Bowers claims, those tacit aspects of culture that seem too self-evident to be discussed will largely remain unexplored. But it may be these very beliefs that are, in fact, responsible for the social problems we experience.... Thus, students should be taught how to decode culture and to reveal background assumptions, not simply the techniques of problem solving (Ibid, 364-365).

To put it in Robertson’s terms, my claim is that in Dewey’s method of intelligence, the underlying notion that preserving *relation’s* metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality, is a tacit aspect of culture Dewey and the authors in this literature review considered too self-evident to question.

Similarly, Mackedon argued that Dewey never questioned the cultural traditions that shaped his assumptions about the educational role of play. In his words,

[It] may be said that given the secondary role that he assigned to play vis-à-vis work and science, not to mention his stinging attack against its presumably asocial qualities, he may have been himself the victim of the social attitude toward play which he criticized.... [O]ne wonders how much the protestant work ethic influenced his philosophy of play, even in spite of his religious liberalism, child-centered views in education, or outright criticism of puritanical extremes. Play is sacrificed in Dewey’s scheme of things at the altar of purposeful work [Alexander Makedon, “Reinterpreting Dewey: Some Thoughts on His Views of Play and Science in Education,” 4].

The educational implication of these considerations is this: since there are cultural assumptions that may be so self-evident that they may escape critical scrutiny altogether (i.e., Heidegger’s central contention, which I discuss in Chapter 4), teachers should teach students how to expose and interrogate said assumptions. Dewey made one such assumption, and this assumption is the notion in question.

emotional discipline” required to practice his faith were manifest in his day. In other words, Bowman suggested Dewey assumed that the American society he knew had sufficiently undergone the transformative process by which it had become the “Ideal Society” with enough ideal citizens able and willing to practice the rigors of his faith. In short, Dewey implicitly denied the existence of insurmountable obstacles that would forever wither efforts to plant his version of Plato’s Republic on American soil.

What Dewey denied is what Heidegger affirmed, and so thoroughly that it comprises a defining characteristic of Dasein—i.e., his concept for all human beings. I find evidence for this in one of his existentials: finitude. In this context, Bowman’s critique suffices to illustrate it: I would not advocate for establishing the Republic on American soil (or anywhere else, for that matter) because the leaders of children (including teachers) are variously and irredeemably blighted; because where demand for a ‘good’ outstrips its supply, antagonism, jealousy, and competition will reign; and because, to draw from my own teaching experience, when I consider much of Hollywood’s blockbuster fare, the hero always beats what mere mortals would find to be impossible odds, and the more impossible they are, the more I am entertained. In short, Bowman’s critique of Dewey suggests his faith barred him from acknowledging that when Intelligence finds itself face-to-face with Obstacles, the latter wins more than it loses, and this despite our best efforts and brightest minds.

308 In C. Wright Mill’s words, this is “a kind of community that nowhere exists” [as quoted in J.L. Simich and Rick Tilman, “Radicalism vs. Liberalism: C. Wright Mills’ Critique of John Dewey’s Ideas,” 418].
309 As Metz pointed out, Dewey assumed “man is in reality infinitely malleable [emphasis mine] in the name of “growth” [Joseph G. Metz, “Democracy and the Scientific Method in the Philosophy of John Dewey,” 251, footnote 40].
310 In fairness to Dewey, and thus to slightly correct Bowman on this point, as well as to temper my own comments, Dewey admitted the following: “The thesis that the operation of cooperative intelligence as displayed in science is a working model of the union of freedom and authority does not slight the fact that the method has operated up to the present in a limited and relatively technical area. On the contrary, it emphasized that fact. If the method of intelligence had been employed in any large field in the comprehensive and basic area of the relations of human beings to one another in social life and institutions, there would be no present need for our argument. The contrast between the restricted scope of its use and the possible range of its application of human relations—political, economic, and moral—is outstanding and depressing. It is this very contrast that defines the great problem that still has to be solved” [John Dewey, “Authority and Social Change,” in Authority and the Individual, p. 187]. Hence, the opinion to criticize in Dewey is not that he thought he lived in the Ideal Society, but rather that he thought it was possible to create it. This is what I have called his excessive optimism.
311 I will discuss Dasein, existentials, and finitude in Chapter 4.
312 Apple (Chapter 1) made this point quite clear.
313 The Jaws series, the Rocky series, the Terminator series, the Indiana Jones series, the Star Wars series, the Mission Impossible series, the Matrix series, the James Bond series, and Avatar come to mind immediately.
To draw my consideration of Bowman’s article to a close, his critique of Dewey’s “article” is sociological, which means that he analyzed the less-than-ideal social context in which Dewey sought to spread his faith. My critique, on the other hand, seeks to penetrate to his method’s metaphysical core, and to revise it in light of Heidegger’s *fundamental ontology*. Heidegger’s *existentials* replace Aristotle’s and Kant’s categories (and thus *relation*, and its governing role in Dewey’s philosophy of education), which include *finitude*—i.e., the *existential* Bowman inadvertently described in sociological terms.

In “The Ideologies of Progressive Education,” Bowers challenged the thesis that the Progressive Movement was monolithic, and thus that its influence on education was unified, consistent, and singular. I found Dewey’s method of intelligence in the midst of his analysis: for Bowers, it provided “continuity between progressivism and the new reform ideology [viz., social reconstructionism] of the thirties.” In other words, Bowers’ concern with said method extended only as far as the role it played in stabilizing an otherwise changing movement. After mentioning it once, he did not mention it again. It is worth noting, however, that Bowers anticipated my own critique of Dewey as I articulated it in Chapter 1, though he associated it with the broader social reconstructionist movement that elaborated Dewey’s ideas about the proper relationship between the individual and the group to which he belongs. In Bowers’ words:

> [T]hose who did not conform to the group were themselves to be the object of the group’s reconstructive efforts. That there was a danger in “reconstructing” the individual who might, in fact, have a clearer understanding of the truth was simply ignored. For to these leading interpreters of progressive education truth and social consensus were indistinguishable.

My fundamental concern in this dissertation is, to put the matter in Bowers’ words, to formulate a Heideggerian philosophy of education that emphasizes teaching individuals to decide whether or not, and if so the extent to which to identify moral truth with social consensus (or rather, with

314 We could say that my critique will result in a method that students will be able to apply when they have decided the adults to whom they have been entrusted are poded with blights they wish to shun. Of course, I agree with Heidegger and Bowman that there will be obstacles particular to students’ location in time and space that they will find insurmountable, hence some students will become infected, perhaps permanently.

315 Chet A. Bowers, “The Ideologies of Progressive Education.”

316 Ibid, 461.

317 Dewey assumed that this individual does not exist, or perhaps more correctly, that this individual must be discouraged from existing. My project, on the other hand, is a proposal to educate individuals such that they will seek and hold on to the ‘truth’, even if it is at odds with the group’s version of it.

318 Ibid, 468.
the notion in question), for, as Bowers pointed out, he may have the clearest understanding of the moral truth in some given situation, and refuses to be reconstructed along Deweyan lines.

In his work entitled *Postcolonial Pragmatism? Ethno-Religious Conflict and Education in Postcolonial Spaces*, Milligan\(^{319}\) summarized it in the following way:

[T]he difficulties [Mindanao State University (M.S.U.)] has faced in its mission are due, at least in part, to an uncritical acceptance of institutional models founded upon American approaches to higher education and an inability to hear local voices articulating quite different conceptions of education more consistent with indigenous values and experience. I will then examine Duncan Ivison’s recent conceptualization of *postcolonial liberalism* [emphasis in the original] as a philosophical framework for resolving such tensions, a framework that seems to suggest a Deweyan approach to education in such contexts. I will conclude by considering where Dewey's philosophy of education may provide useful resources and where it may be lacking as a more inclusive plan of operations for educational development in postcolonial spaces marred by ethno-religious conflict.\(^ {320}\)

In his discussion of Dewey’s philosophy of education, Milligan identified the method of intelligence as a means by which to challenge the “violence”\(^ {321}\) of the education provided at M.S.U.—“yet another instance of … traditional education.”\(^ {322}\) However, it is important to point out that Milligan qualified his preference for Dewey’s method in light of the context in Mindanao. Milligan said:

I do not want to suggest here that Dewey's philosophy of education is an off the shelf recipe for the problems endemic to education in internal colonial contexts—like that represented in the case of M.S.U.—or postcolonial contexts like those that confront any effort to attend to educational development and reform in the Muslim world. Dewey’s apparent focus on the individual—despite the criterion of interaction and the focus on democracy—may yet prevent his educational thought from fully accounting for the significance of collective identities like that of the Maranao. His frequent dichotomization of civilization and savagery as a metaphor for social progress suggests a conflation of developed with civilization and so-called underdevelopment with the lack of civilization, a dichotomy common to colonial discourse. And his deep mistrust of supernatural religion as an impediment to thought represents a significant barrier to applying his philosophy in a community rooted in Islam....\(^ {323}\)

\(^ {319}\) Jeffrey A. Milligan, “Postcolonial Pragmatism? Ethno-Religious Conflict and Education in Postcolonial Spaces.”
\(^ {320}\) Ibid, 287-288.
\(^ {321}\) Ibid, 293.
\(^ {322}\) Ibid, 294.
\(^ {323}\) Ibid.
While Milligan understands the limitations of applying Dewey’s method of intelligence in the context of Mindanao, he did not critique the notion in question, which, as I have continued to claim, underwrites his method of intelligence.

Continuing along the lines of his interest in issues pertaining to religion and education, Milligan analyzed the concept of “separation” as it applies to the constitutional doctrine of the separation of church and state. Within this framework, he expressed deep concerns about how Dewey’s secular method of intelligence may be misused when said concept is misunderstood:

[It may wall] out religion [from schools] as a deeply influential aspect of human culture worthy of our consideration. And the effect of this is profound. It leaves us deeply ignorant of the role of religion historically and in our contemporary world and unable to understand those to whom it is important…. It also leaves us unable to put our own religious beliefs in the sort of cultural and political perspective that might help us see how our actions affect others. It leaves unchallenged ignorance about the meaning of separation, leading some to engage in or advocate practices in schools that clearly violate the First Amendment. It unnecessarily exacerbates a sense of exclusion among some believers that helps drive the “choice” movements and threatens to push separation to the point of balkanization, a result inimical to democratic society.

In short, Milligan’s concern is that making Dewey’s method of intelligence the highest educational ‘good,’ and thus banishing students’ religious experiences “to educationally unused spaces of school, the hallways, [and] the margins of the school day” would effectively “constitute[] a barrier to communication and understanding.”

I share Milligan’s concern for how Dewey’s method of intelligence may be used to limit students’ understanding. However, while Milligan’s concern is with how said method may be used to limit students’ understanding of religion, and with how to create a form of community whose basis is non-rational, my concern is with how it may be used (and by Dewey, it was used) to limit students’ understanding of the basis of moral reasoning, which includes religion, but is not exhausted by it.

324 Jeffrey A. Milligan, “Religious Diversity, Education, and the Concept of Separation: Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?”
325 Ibid, 417-418.
326 Ibid, 417.
327 Ibid, 418.
In his investigation of the relationship between Dewey’s method of intelligence and its application to political democracy, Metz\textsuperscript{328} saw a shortcoming with respect to the public dissemination of the method of intelligence similar to Bowman’s above, though worded more broadly. In the former’s words, “[T]he formation of intelligent public opinion based on scientific method—however potentially valuable in a genuine democracy—remains an obscure and futuristic goal within Dewey’s theory.”\textsuperscript{329} Furthermore, and quite close to my concerns here, Metz offered the following critique:

[C]riticism is not directed at Dewey’s use of the scientific method \textit{per se} [emphasis in the original], but rather at the philosophical presuppositions of instrumentalism which are intrinsically woven into the scientific method in its application to democracy.\textsuperscript{330} Accordingly, when Dewey called for this application, he also interjected, if at times only implicitly, the philosophical values of instrumentalism into political democracy. In a word, Dewey’s scientific method cannot be separated from instrumentalism as a whole. Moreover, the result is that the purpose of application of the method is not to serving existing [emphasis in the original] democratic ideals or institutions in order that they might be more fully realized. Rather, Dewey’s purpose was to reshape these ideals and institutions in accordance with certain metaphysical—and therefore not necessarily scientific—assumptions, that is, those springing from his philosophy of experience.\textsuperscript{331}

In other words, Dewey spared his own metaphysical assumptions from the method of intelligence (and the notion in question), not only in its application to democracy, but also in its application to education, which of course were intimately related for him.\textsuperscript{332} Though Metz

\textsuperscript{328} Joseph G. Metz, “Democracy and the Scientific Method in the Philosophy of John Dewey.”
\textsuperscript{329} Ibid, 258.
\textsuperscript{330} “Apart from the issue of whether any hypothesis testing can begin without some prior preconception of what constitutes “testing,” if not “experience” itself, and therefore without some type of preconceived ideas or “essences,” the fact remains that Dewey didn’t analyze his own metaphysical claims thoroughly enough to respond to the criticism that science, too, is no more than another preconceived essence, value, or belief system” [Alexander Makedon, “Reinterpreting Dewey: Some Thoughts on His Views of Play and Science in Education.” 3].
\textsuperscript{332} In the language of philosophy of science, Dewey’s claims are theory-laden. To say that a claim, which is based on an observation, is theory-laden is to say that “[w]hat an observer sees, and also what he or she does not see, and the form that the observation takes, is influenced by the background knowledge of the observer—the theories, hypotheses, assumptions, or conceptual schemes that the observer harbors” (D.C. Phillips and Nicholas Burbules, \textit{Postpositivism and Educational Research}, 15). Of course, Dewey’s claim that relation is a category governing social life is theory-laden: wherever two or more people are gathered, Dewey would see them in terms of that which connects them—supposing throughout that they are in fact connected in some vital way. While it may be argued that my Heideggerian alternative to Dewey’s philosophy of education amounts to substituting one perception-altering theory for another, I would grant the point, and say, like I have throughout this dissertation, that I prefer my
claimed said assumptions underwrite Dewey’s opinions about the “nature of reality, the nature of man, the nature of the state, etc.”, he did not name them. I, however, do, and claim, as I have and will, that relation is such an assumption. Since relation is his method’s fundamental category, and since it serves a particular purpose in the notion in question, submitting it as a hypothesis to be tested in experience may result in rejecting it as a necessary bond that must hold two or more people together in some conjoint activity aimed at expanding the general welfare, and if so, it would result in dissolving the method itself, and thus in dissolving the universal utility Dewey claimed (or hoped) for it.

Slochower noted similar problems in Dewey’s philosophy. In his exposition of the “modern notion of Becoming,” he referred to “philosophies of time,” and described them as being premised on the idea “that life is a streaming continuity without fixed divisions.” However, he also noted …

… the fact that philosophies of time in our day reveal their modern sceptical character by indirect acknowledgement that the concept of change is insufficient. All this suggests that modern concepts of change are colored by partial homage to permanence.

Slochower subsumed Dewey’s philosophy under the rubric of said philosophies, for Dewey’s concept of ‘Nature’ is the “stable [though vague] category” against which he could ascertain and measure time and change. As Slochower put it, Dewey’s method of intelligence is “a universal good … [with] religious force” that mediates between a social group’s purposes alternative because it does not necessarily posit relation as a category governing social life, and therefore leaves Dasein some room to decide whether or not, and if so the extent to which to be vitally connected to another person or group of people. In short, I simply value more choice than less (and always within the limits of the possible), and Heidegger’s fundamental ontology supports it, though without Dewey’s excessive optimism that the method of intelligence can, given enough resources (which in my view are not always available) solve all problems for the sake of expanding the general welfare.

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333 Ibid, 260.
334 Harry Slochower, “John Dewey: Philosopher of the Possible.”
335 Ibid, 151.
336 Ibid, 152.
337 This quote comes from a footnote on page 151 of Slochower’s text.
338 Ibid, 152, 153.
339 According to Joseph Ratner, Dewey’s concept of ‘Nature’ is “an inclusive history of multitudinous ongoing histories, the comprehensive interactive continuum consequent upon the interactivities of an indefinite number of interactive continua of an indefinite number of general kinds” (as quoted in Ibid, 159).
340 Ibid, 159.
341 Ibid, 153.
342 Ibid, 160.
and ‘Nature.’ Dewey’s method, as Slochower pointed out, is oriented toward the consequences its application produces, but he found that Dewey left a crucial question unanswered:

[Which [emphasis in the original] consequences are to be considered relevant [emphasis in the original], and at what stage (shorter or longer view) we regard them to have been representatively gathered, with the result that the “criterion of consequences,” tested by “the future state of society,” becomes an elusive infinite.]343

Lest such a state become an elusive infinite, Slochower argued that Dewey’s concept of “growth,” among others, prevents this from happening:

It would seem fair to conclude that a state in which men “grew” in a manner making for complete individual and social harmony would constitute a “final” aim within Dewey’s unfinished world. Similar criteria are indicated when Dewey interprets progress as “reconstruction adding fullness and distinctness [emphasis mine] of meaning,” and values “as intrinsic qualities of events in their consummatory [emphasis mine] reference”…. In such passages “fulfillments,” “universal application” [in the case of the criterion of ‘growth’344], “consummatory,” suggest final values within Dewey’s experimentalism.345

Thus, said Slochower, such final values render Dewey’s philosophy an “inconsistent instrumentalism”346—thus corroborating the consensus among some scholars in this review that Dewey exempted certain values from being investigated by his method. Slochower, however, did not identify the notion in question as one such value.347

In his attempt to deal with the problem of the separate and distinct, though related natures of religious and secular concerns with morality, Smith348 identified “the “pietistic” and the “activistic” poles within the religious community.”349 He defined the two thus:

343 Ibid, 161.
344 John Dewey, Experience and Education, 29.
346 Ibid, 165.
347 With C. Wright Mills we could say that Dewey’s exemption of certain values from being subjected to his method of intelligence attests to this: “Dewey was wrong in believing that the method of science [which for Dewey was synonymous with his method] is necessarily self-corrective,” for how can it correct what it ignores?” [J.L. Simich and Rick Tilman, “Radicalism vs. Liberalism: C. Wright Mills’ Critique of John Dewey’s Ideas,” 416] By noting “tacit aspects of culture that seem too self-evident to be discussed,” Bowers effectively agreed with Mills.
348 John E. Smith, “Religion and Morality.”
349 Ibid, 87.
The former pole … while not unmindful of the moral problem, tends to stress the exclusively religious aspect of experience, while the latter tends to put the greatest emphasis on morality and the ideal relations between man and man, often to the exclusion of what is more definitely the concern of religion. The pietistic pole raises the question of man’s ultimate destiny and looks to God as the supreme object of trust and devotion, at the same time recognizing the gulf between man and God (sin) and the consequent need for reconciliation (salvation). The activistic pole, on the other hand, is impatient with this concern for ultimate questions and foundations, and, being tremendously impressed by the concrete historical situation with its multitudinous evils, it wants to be engaged in some concrete task in this world…. Here the concern is for economic and social justice, for the care of the weak and the poor, and for the establishment of that society on earth which shall be, if not actually the Kingdom of God, the closest approximation to that ideal that is possible for man…. From these two poles develops the problem of the relation of religion and morality.\(^{350}\)

Smith identified Dewey’s method of intelligence as a well-known tool with which the latter pole has been pursued in isolation from the former,\(^{351}\) yet Smith ultimately concluded “that morality is necessarily related to religion,”\(^{352}\) and hence Dewey’s attempt to separate them is ultimately mistaken. While I reject Smith’s conclusion because he commits a number of logical fallacies in reaching it, the point that is relevant to my purpose here is Smith’s intimation that the purpose of Dewey’s method of intelligence is to usher in a secular “Kingdom of God,” and thus command the devotion formerly given to what Smith would call ‘pietism.’ In short, Smith’s point here is consistent with Bowman’s claim that Dewey proselytized on behalf of a “humanistic religion” in which the notion that ‘preserving relation’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality’ is an article of faith.

In his critique of pragmatism by way of his treatment of Russell’s “Philosophical Essays.” Santayana\(^{353}\) criticized what he called pragmatism’s “psychological point of view,”\(^{354}\) by which he meant that pragmatism’s formulators could not (or would not) distinguish with precision the difference between empirical and attitudinal phenomena. He identified said view as being “equivalent to the idealistic doctrine that the articulation of human thought constitutes the

\(^{350}\) Ibid, 87-88.  
\(^{351}\) Ibid, 91.  
\(^{352}\) Ibid, 93.  
\(^{353}\) George Santayana, “Russell’s Philosophical Essays.”  
\(^{354}\) Ibid, 116.
only structure of the universe, and its whole history.” Of course, Santayana’s critique presupposed the very subject/object dualism pragmatism (and Dewey) rejected. Nevertheless, if I grant Santayana’s point, then I could infer an explanation as to why Dewey exempted certain values from being investigated by his method, including the notion in question. To say it briefly, his belief in the principles upon which his own “humanistic faith” rested may have been so thorough that he may have considered it unthinkable to question them. In sum, while Santayana’s analysis of Russell’s critique of pragmatism led him to detect what he would have called Dewey’s subjectivism, it did not lead him to detect the notion in question’s role therein.

Hall’s brief survey of Western philosophy included a necessarily cursory look at various methods philosophers have used to seek knowledge. Among them he named the method of “authority,” which he illustrated thus: “To the fifteenth century authoritarian, that which was not found in the writings of Aristotle could not be.” Hall also noted the following:

Precisely the same attitude is reflected today when anyone refuses to give serious consideration to claims of supernatural revelation in such matters as morals and religion on the ground that science discovers nothing of the supernatural.

He identified Dewey’s opinion about the status of his method of intelligence—e.g., that it is the “one sure road of access to truth”—as an instance of said attitude. Hall went on to claim that the “assertion that one particular method is “the method of intelligence” is surely a bit less than flattering to those philosophers who have favored other methods.” After citing several philosophers who disagreed with Dewey’s opinion about the status of his method, Hall questioned its “universal validity,” and pointed to “[c]rime, war, and violent deaths in

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355 Ibid.
356 As Bowers pointed out.
357 Clifton L. Hall, “Sources of a Philosophy of Education.”
358 Ibid, 352.
359 Ibid.
360 Ibid.
362 Ibid, 353.
363 Ibid, 354.
increasing number”\textsuperscript{364} as evidence to quiet Dewey’s zeal, or what I have been referring to as his excessive optimism, for the method allegedly destined to “bring on the millennium unaided.”\textsuperscript{365}

While I am not inclined toward arguing in defense of supernatural revelation like Hall seemed to be, I agree with him that Dewey’s method of intelligence is not universally valid, for I have shown that he exempted several values from its otherwise searching eye. I also agree with Hall “there is a need for some other method or methods in the realm of specifically human affairs.”\textsuperscript{366} Although providing one was beyond the scope of his article, it is within the scope of this dissertation. As I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 4, Heidegger’s \textit{fundamental ontology} is an analysis of said realm, and the method I will infer from it may be called a \textit{hermeneutical} method of teaching and learning how to engage in moral reasoning outside the purview of Dewey’s method of intelligence.

Critiquing the claim “that John Dewey was a “radical” democrat and that his philosophical works as well as his political acts defended an open and expansive public square,”\textsuperscript{367} Feffer raised concerns about the accuracy of this opinion and expressed them with the following general statement: Dewey’s “understanding of democracy was, at the very least, unstable—contingent on the demands of political practice … but also inconsistent\textsuperscript{368} and often unintelligible.”\textsuperscript{369} Having cited numerous examples to illustrate his point—e.g., Dewey’s endorsement “with little compunction [of] an aggressive repression of legitimate political dissent” in the case of the splitting of the New York City Teachers Union (Local 5) over “the question of democratic participation in [it],”\textsuperscript{370} Feffer arrived at his central argument:

I am arguing that Dewey’s reading of the political antagonisms in Local 5 and his reaction to them raises questions about the capacity of Deweyan pragmatism to accommodate a genuine plurality of views, and thus about what one could possibly mean by calling Deweyan democracy “radical.”\textsuperscript{371}

\textsuperscript{364} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{365} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{366} Ibid, 355.
\textsuperscript{367} Andrew Feffer, “The Presence of Democracy: Deweyan Exceptionalism and Communist Teachers in the 1930s,” 79.
\textsuperscript{368} This was also Slochower’s criticism.
\textsuperscript{369} Ibid, 80.
\textsuperscript{370} Ibid, 81.
\textsuperscript{371} Ibid, 88.
In Feffer’s view, Deweyan pragmatism cannot accommodate a genuine plurality of views for the following reason:

Dewey consistently conflated his notion of democracy as a “way of life” with a foundational belief that such a democracy as an “ethical ideal” had been realized in some permanent fashion in American culture—a form of what historians have long called American exceptionalism and which they have quite persuasively tied to nationalist and anti-democratic currents in American political culture.

In short, Feffer found Dewey’s exceptionalism was inconsistent with his belief that truth and knowledge are contingent. Hence, Feffer followed, we should not be surprised at Dewey’s intolerance for “the sort of rule breaking engaged in by left-wing teachers,” for he apparently considered Local 5 an institutional embodiment of said exceptionalism.

If I grant Feffer’s argument, then it follows “the open discussion of social problems” otherwise fostered by Dewey’s method of intelligence “in which potential solutions could be proposed that would then be tested in collective social action” may be suppressed, for, having arrived at the kind of democracy described in the quote above, the class war pined after by Communists, as Dewey alleged, or political mobilization out of step with “‘intelligent’ public deliberation, as Dewey and his colleagues understood it,” would destroy American exceptionalism. In short, Feffer argued Dewey was content to exempt “alternative publics or social movements that challenged conventional rules and values” from participating in a wide and inclusive application of his method of intelligence. Milligan reached the same conclusion with respect to those who identify themselves as ‘religious.’

So far I have shown that Dewey exempted several values from being investigated by his method of intelligence—the notion in question chief among them, at least for my purposes. To the theme of being exempt from said method, Feffer added whomever Dewey and his pragmatic

372 Here we hear the echo of Bowman’s critique.
373 Ibid, 89.
374 Ibid, 90.
375 Ibid, 91.
376 As we saw in Karier’s discussion of Dewey’s expurgation of the Lab School’s curriculum.
377 Ibid, 95.
378 Ibid, 96.
379 Ibid, 97.
380 Jeffrey A. Milligan, “Religious Diversity, Education, and the Concept of Separation: Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?”
followers would have interpreted as threatening American exceptionalism. The growing list of exemptions makes Dewey’s hopes for the universal utility of his method progressively untenable.

In his assessment of American Liberalism, Murphy\(^{381}\) said the following about progressivism:

The liberal of those hopeful times was the progressive, and progress was increasingly the order of the day. Events were on the march and the reformer who sought to reconstruct society for beneficent purposes had only to put himself in line with them, in an intelligent and forward-looking fashion, to point the way ahead toward a better world. Social change was naturalized\(^{382}\) as evolutionary growth, and to make it “progress” all that was required was the free use of cooperative intelligence by progressively educated men in the solution of their common problems.\(^{383}\)

Anyone familiar with Dewey’s method of intelligence will assent that “cooperative intelligence” is a necessary element. As Dewey made clear in *Democracy and Education*, “cooperative intelligence” for the sake of solving common problems is the essence of morality\(^{384}\)—an excellent paraphrase of what I have been referring to as ‘the notion in question.’

Murphy found a “curious emptiness” in Dewey’s moral claims.\(^{385}\) In brief, he found it so because, in his words,

[W]hen men [in the confusing aftermath of WWI, during the social disarray of the Great Depression, and the dangers posed by WWII and the Cold War] asked in earnest for the common meaning in community that would distinguish its cooperative intent from the push and pull of competing class interests, his [i.e., Dewey’s] philosophy could answer only in morally empty and therefore practically equivocal terms. It had deprived itself of the moral means of making this distinction.\(^{386}\)

In other words, Murphy argued there is nothing in Dewey’s method of intelligence to prevent the “free use of cooperative intelligence” it requires from seeking its own security (perhaps under the

\(^{381}\) Arthur E. Murphy, “John Dewey and American Liberalism.”

\(^{382}\) The notion in question was naturalized as well, at least in Dewey’s philosophy of education, as I have and will maintain.

\(^{383}\) Ibid, 420.


\(^{385}\) Arthur E. Murphy, “John Dewey and American Liberalism,” 427.

\(^{386}\) Ibid, 432-433.
rubric of American exceptionalism) instead of unlimited scope for inquiry—and even narrowing
said scope when it threatens the security of “cooperative intelligence.” According to Murphy,
this is what happened during the Great Depression, WWII, and the Cold War. A similar
argument could be made about today’s sociopolitical climate. In short, Murphy saw irony where
Dewey and his followers saw only an object of faith, and I suppose the source of the irony is the
Machiavellian/Actonian dictum: power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely, which
means that we should not be surprised to find that once people enter Dewey’s (and more
generally, liberals’) reconstructed institutions and begin to wield their vested powers, there will
come a time when they will do so on their own behalf, which may or may not be consistent with
the interests of all (or a majority of) citizens. No amount of intelligence, and no amount of
faith in the notion in question, can change this fact of realpolitik. Though I am sympathetic to
Murphy’s argument, I hope it is clear by now how my critique of Dewey’s philosophy differs
from his.

In the realm of legal scholarship, Smith asked why there was a rush to embrace legal
pragmatism in his day, and whether the movement was likely to produce beneficial results for
law and legal thinking. As a preliminary step, Smith defined legal pragmatism…

[A]s a kind of exhortation about theorizing; its function is not to say things that lawyers and judges do not
know, but rather to remind lawyers and judges of what they already believe but often fail to practice. The
pragmatist is a kind of preacher…. [Her gospel is to remind them to create and remain faithful to
theories] firmly grounded in experience, [and to avoid] … unwarranted generalization, formalistic rigidity,
[and] insensitivity to context.

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387 This point highlights what I think was a fallacy in Dewey’s thinking: for him, virtuous-because-reconstructed
social institutions create virtuous individuals [cf. John H. Randall, “Liberalism as Faith in Intelligence,” 256], with
virtue denoting having complete and absolute faith in the notion in question. Public education is a social institution.
Hence, public education creates virtuous individuals. If I have understood Dewey correctly, then he committed the
fallacy of begging the question, which means that he assumed as a premise for his argument the very conclusion he
intended to prove: viz., social institutions (or rather their leaders) are already virtuous. I think this was the spirit of
Sidney Hook’s critique of Dewey’s faith in the method of intelligence, as you can see on page 260 of Randall’s
article. If they are not already virtuous, then I do not see how Dewey’s philosophy of education, whose function it
was to usher in such a reconstruction, is or can be tenable in practice. Of course, this critique is on logical grounds.
The basis of my critique in this dissertation, however, is ontological—Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, to be
exact.
388 Steven D. Smith, “The Pursuit of Pragmatism.”
389 Ibid, 411.
390 Ibid, 446.
The answer he provided to the first question is legal pragmatism’s condemnation of excessive abstraction at the expense of “overlooking potentially significant features of experience”\textsuperscript{391}—the source material to be reconstructed according to Dewey’s method of intelligence, which, as I said in Chapter 1, requires “broad social discussion.”\textsuperscript{392} While critiquing the notion in question that justifies this characteristic of the method is my concern, Smith’s concern was with the method’s usefulness (very little, in his view) in providing solutions to legal problems. What it can provide, and here Smith answered the second question, is admonishment to avoid theoretical pretentiousness.”\textsuperscript{393} In other words, the notion in question was not his concern.

Finally, Lilge\textsuperscript{394} looked at Dewey retrospectively, and said the following about his own work:

[T]his essay will proceed directly to the ultimate concern that holds together [Dewey’s] large and many-sided work, the unification of contemporary culture for the sake of a common, more closely shared democratic life. His two main interests, philosophy and education, received their meaning by subserving the paramount purpose of social reform—philosophy, by furnishing a general diagnosis of what Dewey regarded as a prolonged and serious cultural crisis; education, by becoming the chief and perhaps the only means of solving the problems which constituted that crisis. His quest for unity and commonality will be the general concern of this essay.\textsuperscript{395}

According to Lilge, Dewey’s “quasi-religious” method of intelligence was the means by which he wanted to effect his “deep longing for unity and commonality”—in short, to effect a “common faith.”\textsuperscript{396} In other words, Lilge claimed (and I think rightly) that Dewey sought to develop a philosophy “which admitted no discontinuities [between individuals\textsuperscript{397}] and which in fact held out the promise of a final unification of cultural life.”\textsuperscript{398} Dewey’s craving for continuity was part of what in Chapter 3 I will identify as the permanent affinity to Hegelian metaphysics in his thinking. Lilge continued:

\textsuperscript{391} Ibid, 433.
\textsuperscript{392} Ibid, 443.
\textsuperscript{393} Ibid, 449.
\textsuperscript{394} Frederic Lilge, “John Dewey in Retrospect: An American Reconsideration.”
\textsuperscript{395} Ibid, 99.
\textsuperscript{396} Ibid, 100.
\textsuperscript{397} “[Dewey] granted the uniqueness of individuals and appreciated their contributions to the common life. But he denied that there was a life of the spirit and a happiness apart from sharing common activities” (Ibid, 109). Of course, I maintain that there is a life of the spirit and a happiness apart from sharing common activities. If you don’t believe me, try to spend a day with my family.
\textsuperscript{398} Ibid, 101.
In order to realize the promise within his own philosophy, Dewey had to delegate the work of Hegel's superhuman mind, in which all contradictions and absurdities became spiritually sublimated, to the human intelligence: it was to resolve the conflicts and chaos into some kind of order within which man could become secure and have a dignified existence.

Hence, it should not surprise us that *relation*—unity’s conceptual underpinning—was the categorical basis of Dewey’s philosophy of education, which, as the “general theory of education,” was to actualize his deep longing for unity.

As I have said elsewhere, unity, and thus *relation*’s role in the notion in question, had the weight of a categorical imperative for Dewey. Lilge wrote:

A recurrent theme in Dewey’s thought indicative of his quest for unity is his condemnation of the separation of science and morals. He believed that this separation lay at the root of the cultural crisis, and that to destroy it was one of the chief burdens of education. Young people should be shown that moral beliefs are not intrinsically true, but that they arise under certain conditions and have observable consequences when acted upon. In the light of these consequences our moral beliefs should be subject to revision, much as our ideas about physical reality are.

What Dewey would exempt from what young people should learn about moral beliefs—beyond all the exemptions I have already noted—is that his own method of intelligence could itself be subjected to revision, if not rejection. This is to say that the notion in question may be revised, or even rejected, as when an individual concludes that living according to it unreasonably compromises self-preservation. To articulate and illustrate how this is possible through an educational process is this dissertation in germ. Lilge did not do this, nor did he identify the root of the problem of Dewey’s emphasis on unity as the notion in question.

399 Dewey tries to immerse us in an experiential continuum that is clearly a fantasy unrealizable at any time because it depends upon ironing out all the differences between those who are to be immersed in it. They are abstract people who all receive the same messages, rather than people with histories like ourselves [i.e., blighted people]. Dewey, in fact, says that to conceive of experience one need not posit a self at all…. His view of men, women, and children reduces them to interchangeable communicators and cancels their personal histories; his schools aim at immersing children in an experiential flux magically credited with the power of social transformation…. [Anderson emphasized a particular impossibility:] … the assumption of a literally common context for communication and action, an assumption that Dewey’s affirmation of our distinctive personal growth simply contradicts” [Quentin Anderson, “John Dewey’s American Democrat,” 157, 158, 159]. My proposal, on the other hand, is an effort to teach people with histories like ourselves.

400 Ibid, 101-102.


Before I draw this subsection to a close, I want to briefly acknowledge other scholars whose work has approached my own. Vanderstraeten and Biesta approached my central argument when they criticized Kant’s influence on contemporary education, but their analysis centered on what they argued is his philosophy’s individualistic bias, not on the influence of his categories in education.  

Reynolds argued in favor of Foucault’s turn toward Kant’s “anthropological study of the limits of human knowledge,” and his settling upon what she called “pragmatic humanism,” which she claimed is “parallel” to Dewey’s philosophical work; however, she was silent about any direct philosophical connection between Kant and Dewey.

Steiner discussed how Kant’s and Dewey’s aesthetic theories may be brought to bear on arguing in favor of retaining the arts in schools, but he was silent about their respective categorical bases.  

Biesta discussed how the works of Kant and Dewey lend themselves to different conceptions of the “democratic person,” but he was silent about the relationships between the categories in their philosophies.

Rondel argued that Dewey’s philosophy is superior to Kant’s for posing issues of equality, but he did not do so on the basis of their respective categories.

Burke discussed Peirce’s correction of Kant’s philosophy, including his categories, but he remained silent about any correction that Dewey may have offered in this respect.  

Morse argued against Kant’s effort to find the basis for morality outside of human experience, and he identified Dewey’s “naturalistic ethics” as a superior guide to our moral decision-making, but he, like every scholar in this review, was silent about the role of categories in their respective philosophies.

Takaya analyzed the concept of ‘imagination’ in relation to education in historical perspective, which he did by taking Kant’s and Dewey’s definitions and uses of the concept into account, but he did not do so from the perspective of categories.

Hughes rejected Kant’s view of genius in favor of John Dewey’s “view of inquiry as the proper foundation of art education,” but he did not do so on the basis of a critique of their categorical frameworks.

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404 Joan M. Reynolds, “‘Pragmatic Humanism’ in Foucault’s Later Work.”
405 David M. Steiner, “Aesthetics Between Philosophy and Pedagogy.”
408 Arthur W. Burks, “Peirce’s Evolutionary Pragmatic Idealism.”
409 D.J. Morse, “Dewey’s Ethics: Moral Value in the Natural World.”
Finally, Thompson considered the concept of ‘experience’ in philosophy and education in historical perspective, but she did not do so from the perspective of categories in general, nor of relation in particular.  \(^{412}\)

Of all the scholars who appear in this literature review, only Johnston\(^ {413}\) has written about Dewey’s critique of Kant’s categories—a critique that would suggest the fourth premise of my argument is false.  \(^{414}\) A closer look, however, will suggest otherwise. If I may, I will discuss Johnston’s work in my exposition of Dewey’s position in Chapter 3, where it falls naturally within the flow of my argument.

**Part D: Jim Garrison and Richard Rorty**

I will draw this chapter to a close by considering the work of two prominent and contemporary philosophers, one of education in particular, and the other of pragmatism. The former is Jim Garrison, and the latter is Richard Rorty. I consider their thoughts in what follows.

In *Dewey and Eros: Wisdom and Desire in the Art of Teaching*,\(^ {415}\) Garrison was concerned with the role of educating *eros*, “or passionate desire”\(^ {416}\) in moral education. I agree with his claim that in the contemporary educational landscape, “[m]oral education is restricted to precepts and rules….”\(^ {417}\) However, his proposal for moral education entails educating students’ *eros* …

… to enable [them] to distinguish between something they might desire and the truly desirable. It is the single most important aspect of all education. Why? Because we become what we love. That is how we grow.\(^ {418}\)

I agree with Garrison that moral education should enable students to make this distinction. However, and unlike Garrison, my proposal entails enabling students to do so by interpreting moral rules (which I will discuss in Chapter 5). Perhaps Garrison points in a direction I should

\(^{412}\) R. M. F. Thompson, “Experience as a Mode of Learning in Adulthood.”

\(^{413}\) James S. Johnston, “Dewey’s Critique of Kant.”

\(^{414}\) “Relation is the fundamental category in John Dewey’s notion of the essence of morality, and its role is the same.”

\(^{415}\) Jim Garrison, *Dewey and Eros: Wisdom and Desire in the Art of Teaching*.

\(^{416}\) Ibid, 2.

\(^{417}\) Ibid.

\(^{418}\) Ibid, 28.
consider after I have completed this work, for I find his claim that “we become what we love” compelling. Perhaps the affective reason students would bother to interpret moral rules is because they passionately desire to behave morally—i.e., to do the ‘right’ thing.

In addition to the book above, Garrison has edited two volumes: the first is entitled The New Scholarship on Dewey.\textsuperscript{419} In it, Garrison assembled what in his view is scholarship that needed to be gathered for the sake of identifying contemporary educational concerns, and to pose how Dewey’s scholarship may still provide useful answers to them. The scholars he included covered such topics as a Deweyan critique of cognitivist epistemologies in contemporary education; what an application of Dewey’s aesthetics to art education and to popular art would look like; the relationship between Dewey’s aesthetics and moral education, as well as democratic education; the relevance of Dewey’s philosophy of religion for education in general; the relationship between pragmatism and communicative action; the use of Deweyan pragmatism, in combination with poststructuralism, psychoanalytic work, and critical theory; “a feminist critique of the discursive and textual politics of the West”;\textsuperscript{420} a feminist reformulation of Dewey’s thoughts on co-education to serve contemporary needs; and the relationship between Deweyan pragmatism and Turkish education.

Two authors in Garrison’s volume have concerns similar to mine. In “Dewey’s Metaphysics and the Self,” Craig A. Cunningham’s conclusion was

… that in the end, Dewey decided that there is no ‘Self’ to be ‘realized,’ there is nothing ‘in’ the future possibilities of the self, no intrinsic essence, no ‘brute core of existence,’ no defining characteristics toward which to guide personal growth.\textsuperscript{421}

Cunningham’s conclusion has some bearing on my argument, for my concern with \textit{Dasein} is a concern with the possibilities for self-creation. As I hope it will increasingly become clear throughout this dissertation, I agree with his conclusion, perhaps even more than he does, for I maintain that Dewey—at least the Dewey of \textit{Democracy and Education}—argued there \textit{are} defining characteristics toward which to guide personal growth: viz., the notion that preserving \textit{relation}’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding

\textsuperscript{419} Jim Garrison, ed., \textit{The New Scholarship on Dewey}.
\textsuperscript{420} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{421} Ibid, 5.
the general welfare is the essence of morality. I am not saying that said characteristic is unimportant, but rather that my proposed philosophy of moral education would have teachers leave it up to individual students to decide whether or not, and if so the extent to which said characteristic is a virtue.

In addition to Cunningham, Larry Hickman discussed “Dewey’s … program for improving scientific thinking within schools, and for the public, by employing a life curriculum” in “Science Education for a Life Curriculum.” While my present concerns coincide with Hickman’s insofar as scientific thinking is concerned (specifically, the method of intelligence), Hickman’s work does not deal with the method’s categorical basis, nor does he critique the notion in question like I do—e.g., by claiming that the notion in question, when considered within the context of social philosophy, is what Phillips and Burbules called an ‘auxiliary assumption’ that Dewey resisted testing, as I have shown. In drawing my discussion of this volume to a close, I grant that its authors have pushed Deweyan scholarship in new directions, but none of the paths they have cleared, as I have summarized them here, coincide with mine.

Finally, Garrison’s edited *Reconstructing Democracy, Reconstructing Dewey* shares a structure similar to the volume above. This volume includes two authors whose work has some bearing on mine. First, in “Thinking Desire: Taking Perspectives Seriously,” Charlene Haddock Seigfried placed Aristotle and Dewey in the same sentence, but it was only to claim that “Dewey chides Aristotle for elevating pure, passionless cognition over “thinking desire,” Aristotle’s own term for practical knowledge.” Second, in “Dr. Dewey’s Deeply Democratic Metaphysical Therapeutic for the Post-9/11 American Democratic Disease: Toward Cultural Revitalization and Political Reinhabitation,” Judith Green approached my concerns with her discussion of how to “lead us to a more deeply democratic post-9/11 cultural revitalization and political reinhabitation,” and her suggestion was “by applying Dewey’s “metaphysic” [to] promote healing, growth, and hope for the democratic future of our nation and the world.” Green understood this metaphysic

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422 Ibid.
425 Ibid, 38.
… understands humans as inextricably interconnected to one another and to other living and inorganic entities within local life systems and within the larger whole of nature, from which they emerge and within which they may grow and individuate into particular, active, creative agent-patients who, in turn, influence local and global futures through ongoing, partially controllable transactions with each other and with their wider world. Thus an ontology that is realistic and useful for world understanding and future guiding must be “socialist” rather than “individualist”—it must reflect these necessary networks of transactional relations that go “all the way down” within our being and becoming.426

This is why she preferred Dewey’s “metaphysic” to someone like Heidegger—presumably because he was too “individualist” for her taste. Green’s idealism rivals Dewey’s, and I can understand her fervent tone in light of the tragedy of 9/11 to which she was responding. However, and to repeat, while most human beings may be “inextricably interconnected,” it is not necessarily the case, despite Dewey’s and Green’s excessive optimism, that inextricable interconnectivity will result in cooperation toward the expansion of the general welfare. We have only to remember 9/11, the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and a seemingly infinite number of examples that could easily be drawn from the historical record to illustrate the obvious: there are (and have been) many people who will risk their lives, suffer debilitating wounds, and even die because they find a particular mode of inextricable interconnectivity repulsive. To suppose that we can persuade the repulsed individual to accept the notion in question without evoking more repulsion is, in my view, profoundly unrealistic, and perhaps even dangerous.

Moving on to consider Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,427 Rorty said the following about Dewey and Heidegger:

[Along with Wittgenstein, he considered them] the three most important philosophers of our [i.e., the 20th] century. [He went on to say that they] are in agreement that the notion of knowledge as accurate representation, made possible by special mental processes, and intelligible through a general theory of representation, needs to be abandoned. For all three, the notions of “foundations of knowledge” and of philosophy as revolving around the Cartesian attempt to answer the epistemological skeptic are set aside. Further, they set aside the notion of “the mind” common to Descartes, Locke, and Kant—as a special subject of study, located in inner space, containing elements or processes which make knowledge

426 Ibid, 41.

427 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.
possible… [They] have brought us into a period of “revolutionary” philosophy (in the sense of Kuhn’s revolutionary science) by introducing new maps of the terrain (viz., of the whole panorama of human activities) which simply do not include those features which previously seemed to dominate.\textsuperscript{428}

He went on to say the following:

[T]he common message of Wittgenstein, Dewey, and Heidegger is a historicist one. Each of the three reminds us that investigations of the foundations of knowledge or morality or language or society may be simply apologetics, attempts to eternalize a certain contemporary language-game, social practice, or self-image.\textsuperscript{429}

Furthermore, Rorty saw these men

… as philosophers whose aim is to edify—to help their readers, or society as a whole, break free from outworn vocabularies and attitudes, rather than to provide “grounding” for the intuitions and customs of the present.\textsuperscript{430}

While I readily agree with Rorty on this point, I disagree that Dewey was as successful as Heidegger in this regard, for the former relied on the Aristotelian/Kantian vocabulary of categories (\textit{relation} in particular) to effect his attempt to edify—an attempt which, in my view, is not necessarily edifying, for his attempt to preserve \textit{relation}’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare, conceived as the essence of morality, denies me the option to opt out of such an undertaking, for I may find it is inconsistent with acting according to the principle of self-preservation.

Rorty further noted: Heidegger, like Wittgenstein, and unlike Dewey, was “concerned with the rarely favored individual rather than with society—with the chances of keeping oneself apart from the banal self-deception typical of the latter days of a decaying tradition”\textsuperscript{431}—a tradition, in my view, of thinking about human beings in terms of Aristotle’s and Kant’s categories, which in Dewey’s case means in terms of \textit{relation}, or rather, in terms of the notion

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{428} Ibid, 6-7.
\item \textsuperscript{429} Ibid, 9-10.
\item \textsuperscript{430} Ibid, 11-12.
\item \textsuperscript{431} Ibid, 13.
\end{itemize}
that preserving relation’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality.

In *Consequences of Pragmatism*, Rorty said the following about Nietzsche, Heidegger, and “the pragmatists”:

Unlike Nietzsche and Heidegger … the pragmatists did not make the mistake of turning against the community which takes the natural scientist as its moral hero—the community of secular intellectuals which came to self-consciousness in the Enlightenment. James and Dewey rejected neither the Enlightenment’s choice of the scientist as moral example, nor the technological civilization which science had created. They wrote, as Nietzsche and Heidegger did not, in a spirit of social hope … and liberation.

Here we see Rorty compare Dewey’s philosophical project to the ‘later’ Heidegger for philosophical reasons beyond my present concerns. Suffice it to say that since Heidegger’s *Being and Time*—the work upon which this dissertation largely rests—belongs to the ‘early’ Heidegger, Rorty therefore did not discuss any way in which this work could offer a correction or revision of Dewey’s philosophy of education.

In the work in question, there is a promising chapter entitled “Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey.” Rorty saw them as “seeing no interesting future for a distinct discipline called ‘philosophy’ … that neither held out the hope of the successful completion of ‘research programs’ nor suggested new ones.” Rorty claimed these men held similar opinions about

(1) the distinction, in ancient philosophy, between contemplation and action; (2) the traditional Cartesian problematic which center around epistemological skepticism; (3) the distinction between philosophy and science; and (4) the distinction between both and “the aesthetic.”

Hence, they both went about revising the Western philosophical tradition in their own way. While Rorty noted similarities between Dewey’s and Heidegger’s approach, he also noted

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432 Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*.
433 Rorty’s commitments are clear.
434 Ibid, 161.
435 Ibid, 41.
436 Ibid, 42.
437 See page 42 of Ibid.
important differences, and imagined how “Dewey … would presumably look to Heidegger.” In doing so, Rorty gave an account that, compared to the other scholars in this literature review, came the closest to my present concerns:

[Heidegger] offered us *Existentiale* in place of the “categories” of the [Western philosophical] tradition. Dewey, despite the fact that he too wants to offer us a new jargon to replace the notions of the “subject” and “substance” which are common to Aristotle and Descartes, will appear to Heidegger as self-deceptive and self-defeating. If one reads Dewey through Heidegger’s eyes [like I do], one sees his thought as so thoroughly infected by these traditional conceptions [i.e., the categories] that he has no notion of [the history of Western philosophy as the history of how Being has been revealed to various people, and thus as the source for finding out where and why the Western philosophical tradition was led astray with respect to thinking about Being] as an alternative to metaphysics.439

From Heidegger’s perspective, according to Rorty, Dewey’s attempt to offer his own jargon to replace the notions of “subject” and “substance,” and thus to replace Aristotle’s metaphysical jargon with his own, is self-deceptive and self-defeating. It is thus because, while he emptied his concept of human beings of ‘substance,’ he did not empty his concept thereof of *relation*. In other words, Dewey’s attempt to replace Aristotle’s metaphysical jargon with his own was self-deceptive and self-defeating because Dewey did not have the vocabulary of Heidegger’s *existentials* with which to reconceive of individual human beings (not social groups) as the ‘place’ where the meaning of Being (or of existence generally) is revealed. Because Dewey did not have Heidegger’s vocabulary of *existentials*, and because his craving for unity underwrote his inveterate neo-Hegelianism, Dewey committed himself to the notion that preserving *relation*’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality, and thus he committed himself to the language of Aristotle’s categories—a language game that committed him to uphold the tradition he was trying to revise. Dewey’s commitment to the notion in question obscures what Heidegger’s existentialism clarifies. First, there are *degrees* of interconnectedness between human beings. At one extreme, we may find the self-sufficient hermit living in the wilderness with minimal (if any) human contact; at the other, we may find an individual in whose language the concept of

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438 Ibid.
439 Ibid, 50-51.
Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am,” where an actor performs an action, does not exist, and thus this individual lives in a state of complete interconnectedness. Second, interconnection is not necessarily amicable and thus conducive to expanding the general welfare. Third, antagonistic interconnection many not be made friendly and mutually supportive, even if enough dialogue citing enough evidence with enough warranted assertability were to take place. Dewey’s self-deception and self-defeat prevented him from accepting that an individual can exercise some control over the degree to which he accepts the notion in question, that he can live with a generally antagonistic disposition towards associated life, and that he may choose to die having done a deed that improved the lot of but one person: himself.

Finally, in Contingency, irony, and solidarity, Rorty said the following words about Dewey and Heidegger. While they do not have direct bearing on my argument, I include them for their value in illuminating the nature of Heidegger’s philosophy, as well as that of my own proposal: “Heidegger [wrote] philosophy in order to exhibit the universality and necessity of the individual [emphasis mine] and contingent.” In another context, where Rorty discussed Habermas, we find the following words pertaining to Heidegger:

> With Nietzsche, Habermas says, “The criticism of modernity [i.e., the attempt to come to terms with loss of the kinds of social cohesion found in premodern societies] dispenses for the first time with its retention of an emancipatory content.” Habermas takes this refusal of the attempt to emancipate to be Nietzsche’s legacy to Heidegger, Adorno, Derrida, and Foucault—a disastrous legacy, one which has made philosophical reflection at best irrelevant, and at worst antagonistic, to liberal [e.g., Deweyan and Rortian] hope.

Rorty is quite correct here. Lest there be any mistake about my intentions, my proposal for a new philosophy of teacher education in the area of moral education is neither emancipatory nor hopeful, for let’s face it: we all die. Death is the ultimate and irrefutable check on Dasein’s aspirations, which is why, as I said in Chapter 1, the basis of morality is self-preservation—the temporarily-necessary-but-ultimately-futile preservation of a decaying self with some and

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440 D.C. Phillips and Nicholas Burbules, Postpositivism and Educational Research, 15.
441 Richard Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity.
443 Once again, Rorty’s commitments are clear.
444 Ibid, 62.
ultimately fleeting control over what happens to him in a world indifferent to his existence. At best, what I have to offer students is an invitation to embrace their mortality and whatever opportunities it may afford; at worst, I offer them horror, for I, like Heidegger, have rejected the possibility that human beings can transcend their mortality. In short, my philosophy of teacher education in the area of moral education emerges from the sobering, ultimate, abiding, and irrefutable sentence of death.

Conclusion

In closing, I hope it is clear that while the scholars in this literature review may have made genuine contributions to their respective fields, their contributions do not include an attempt to find and critique the categorical basis of Dewey’s method of intelligence (viz., relation), they do not include an attempt to find its underlying ethic—viz., preserving relation’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality—nor have they tried to articulate what Heidegger’s correction thereof may be, let alone inferring a philosophy of teacher education therefrom. Hence, I conclude that my claim to be writing a dissertation making an original contribution to Dewey scholarship is highly plausible, if not certain.

Having established the plausibility of my claim, I now turn to Chapter 3, where I will develop the argument upon which this dissertation is based.
CHAPTER THREE

DEWEY’S MEMBERSHIP IN THE ARISTOTELIAN/KANTIAN
METAPHYSICAL TRADITION

Before I go any further, I want to review what I have said and what I have not said. I have not said that I reject relation per se, for it is an indispensable cognitive tool with which to think about and understand empirical phenomena. What I have said is that I reject Dewey’s inference that since relation governs all empirical phenomena, that it also and necessarily governs (or should govern) social phenomena as well—morality in particular. My primary task in this chapter is to establish Dewey’s membership in the Aristotelian/Kantian metaphysical tradition. By establishing his membership therein, I will have a basis from which to argue that not only does Heidegger’s fundamental ontology suggest a correction of Aristotle’s and Kant’s categories, but that it also suggests a correction of relation’s role in Dewey’s notion of the essence of morality. I now turn to the task at hand.

Aristotle

I find the source of my problem at the beginning of Western philosophy itself, with Aristotle. At the end of the Sophistical Refutations, he justly claimed that he had invented Logic. The Categories (a work on words), the De interpretatione (a work on propositions), and the Prior Analytics (a work on syllogisms), are the grounds of his claim. Combined with the Topics, the Sophistical Refutations, and the Posterior Analytics, these works came to be known as the Organon, or “tool” of thought—of cognition,\textsuperscript{445} in contemporary use. Its influence on subsequent philosophical thought (including intellectual thought more generally, and educational thought more specifically) is almost impossible to overstate. Rather than attempt to articulate an impossible overstatement, I will limit my concerns to the Categories.

\textsuperscript{445} In Aristotle as in Kant, this is a claim about how the human brain perceives and understands the world.
As stated above, the *Categories* is a work on words. Its significance lies in the following considerations. Aristotle’s Logic is comprised of the syllogism. Here is a classic example:

1. All men are mortal.
2. Jeff is a man.

    Hence, Jeff is a mortal.

All syllogisms are comprised of “propositions,” like “All men are mortal.” All propositions are complex in the sense that they are comprised of simple words—e.g., ‘men’ and ‘mortal.’ Furthermore, all propositions in syllogisms are general propositions, which means that they are not about individual entities in the empirical world. The careful reader may take another look at the proposition that “Jeff is a man” and conclude that I am contradicting myself. That would be a hasty conclusion. The primary use of Aristotle’s Logic is to establish which class—e.g., ‘men,’ ‘mortal’—Jeff belongs to. To evoke Marxist language, Jeff’s class membership is precisely what tells us what kind of entity he is. In short, and to state the matter generally, the primary use of Aristotle’s Logic is to establish which category—i.e., which class—an individual entity in the empirical world belongs to.

Within the Western philosophical tradition, Aristotle’s *Categories* establishes the classes through which all individual entities in the empirical world said ‘to be’—i.e., to exist—may be signified, and therefore known. In other words, they are the structure in terms of which individual entities in the empirical world may be cognized as such. Since such entities depend on the categories in order to be cognized, cognition thereof sans the categories is impossible.

While Aristotle himself denoted the categories with nouns, verbs, and interrogatives, by the

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446 In short, it is a method of inference. An extended discussion of the syllogism is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, you may consult the *Prior Analytics* for such a discussion: Aristotle, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*. Richard McKeon, ed. (New York: Random House, 1941).

447 “A form of words in which a predicate is affirmed or denied of a subject, the relation between them being expressed by the copula” (Oxford English Dictionary). For an extended discussion of these terms and their relationships, I refer you to the *Prior Analytics* in McKeon’s edition.

448 In the proposition “All men are mortal,” “All” is a quantifier, and “are” is a copula. In other words, Aristotle’s Logic does not consider a copula a ‘word.’

449 My ‘beef’ with Dewey’s use of relation is that he made the preservation of its metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare the essence of morality. In short, I disagree that such is morality’s essence.
Middle Ages they had been codified as nouns. They are substance,\textsuperscript{450} quantity, quality, \textit{relation}, place, time, posture, vesture, activity, and passivity.\textsuperscript{451}

As I stated above, Aristotle’s categories are categories of thought in terms of which individual entities in the empirical world may be cognized and therefore known. To expand the proposition that “Jeff is a man,” I could say, “Jeff is a man” (substance); “He is seven feet tall” (quantity); “He is a world-renowned expert on issues of religion and education” (quality); “He understands these issues better than Mickey” (relation); and, “In 2010 (time), his home is Tallahassee, Florida” (place). Of Jeff, I could also say that he is walking to teach a class (posture); that he is wearing polished work boots, loose-fitting jeans, and a collared, short sleeve, button-down shirt with a tropical print (vesture); that he is sipping on his coffee (activity); and that he is pleased by the new garnet-colored walls in the College of Education. In short, Aristotle’s categories allow us to signify Jeff as the particular kind of entity in the empirical world which he is, and thus to know him as such.

\textit{Kant}

Immanuel Kant’s Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (Prolegomena in short) is a guide through what Kant himself called the “thorny paths” of’ his \textit{Critique of Pure Reason.}\textsuperscript{452} In

\textsuperscript{450} Dewey’s membership in Aristotle’s and Kant’s metaphysical tradition was not unqualified, as I will demonstrate below. However, I can provide one example here. According to Metz, whom I discussed at greater length in Chapter 2, Dewey “denied any ontological unity to substance and form…. By denying the notion of substantial form, as classically held, Dewey has precluded any natural inclination to action in accordance with form…. Having denied substantial form, any notion of the essential and unchanging nature of man and a natural inclination following this nature will be eliminated as the ultimate end and measure of [education] [Joseph G. Metz, “Democracy and the Scientific Method in the Philosophy of John Dewey,” footnote on pp. 261-262]]. To put the matter in contemporary terms, Dewey denied that the human brain has an essential and unchanging nature, and that such a nature includes fixed inclinations following that nature, and that education should consider them as fundamental. To deny substantial form to human beings is to deny thinking about them in terms of \textit{substance}, i.e., in terms of Aristotle’s and Kant’s categories. Metz explained the significance of Dewey’s denial in the following way: “The absence of such a qualification regarding man’s nature and end allows the [philosopher of education] to treat man as a special kind of “event” within the larger system of events which Dewey called “experience.” Accordingly, the question of human freedom is not to be understood from the perspective of the individual’s substantiality, individuality, or rationality, but in terms of \textit{adjustment and the experimental perception of consequences} [emphasis mine]” (Ibid, 262). In a previous page, Metz articulated Dewey’s notion of the ‘individual’ more explicitly: “In view of the centrality of the process of \textit{association} [emphasis mine] and his relativistic interpretation of man, Dewey implicitly substituted “growth” and the method by which it is to be realized [viz., the method of intelligence] for the individual as the proper end of [education and thus of] … the democratic state. For Dewey “individuality” was a formal and artificial concept” (Ibid, 257). This helps explain why Metz said that, according to Dewey, “man is in reality infinitely malleable” on page 251 of the same text, and why Anderson claimed that Dewey’s conception of people was “abstract.” In short, Dewey rejected thinking about human beings in terms of \textit{substance}, but he accepted thinking about them in terms of \textit{relation}. This is the ontological basis of Dewey’s naturalistic idealism.

\textsuperscript{451} Within the Western philosophical tradition, the categories have been the most abstract designation about any ‘thing’ whatsoever.
Prolegomena, Kant explained his project thus: he wanted to understand the cognitive conditions under which metaphysics is possible, that is, the cognitive conditions under which a knowledge of the principle which is the ontological ground for all that can be said ‘to be’—i.e., ‘to exist’, or Being—is possible. More specifically, Kant wanted to know the cognitive conditions under which reason may apprehend Being. What he termed the ‘categories’ are said conditions.\textsuperscript{454} Because, according to Kant, all human brains are equipped with them—these “\textit{a priori} principles of possible experience”\textsuperscript{455}—humans can assert universal and therefore necessary propositions about individual entities in the empirical world. In other words, because of them, human judgment about such entities may be rendered objectively valid.\textsuperscript{456}

Kant derived his ‘categories’ from Aristotle’s \textit{Categories}\textsuperscript{457}—which, to repeat, as categories of cognition, they allow humans to signify and thus to know individual entities in the empirical world. In other words, they are the cognitive structure in terms of which we may cognize and classify said entities. To speak more precisely, the categories condition\textsuperscript{458} our sense organs such that whatever individual entities we sense,\textsuperscript{459} we cognize in terms of the categories. As it was for Aristotle’s \textit{Categories}, so it was for Kant’s: cognition sans categories is impossible.

Kant organized his categories\textsuperscript{460} in four classes of three: quantity (\textit{unity}, \textit{plurality}, \textit{totality}); quality (\textit{reality}, \textit{negation}, \textit{limitation}); \textbf{relation} (\textit{substance and accident}, \textit{cause and effect}, and \textit{reciprocity between agent and patient}); and modality (\textit{possibility and impossibility}, \textit{existence and non-existence}, and \textit{necessity and contingency}).\textsuperscript{463} With but few changes, Kant made Aristotle’s Logic the propositional tool—what he called “modes of uniting
(sensual) representations in consciousness—with which human judgment may unite and subsume all “intuitions” under the categories.

There is a final member of Kant’s cognitive system, namely the “Pure Physical Table of the Universal Principles of the Science of Nature.” It consists of four principles: a) Axioms of Intuition; b) Anticipations of Perceptions; c) Analogies of Experience; and d) Postulates of Empirical Thinking Generally. The first principle…

[S]ubsumes all phenomena, as intuitions in space and time, under the concept [category] of quantity, and is thus a principle of the application of mathematics to experience. The second one subsumes the strictly empirical element, namely sensation, which denotes the real in intuitions, not indeed directly under the concept of quantity, because sensation is not an intuition that contains either space or time, though it places the respective object corresponding to it in both. [In short, this principle allows the understanding to anticipate sensations from objects in the empirical world and the degrees of difference between them]; that which is real in all appearance has degree. Here is the second application of mathematics … to the science of nature.

The third principle, that is, “analogies of experience”, with “analogy” denoting a due proportion of one thing to another, subsumes the appearance of objects in the empirical world…

[U]nder the concept of substance, which as a concept of a thing is the foundation of all determination of existence; or, secondly—so far as a succession is found among appearances, that is, an event—under the concept of an effect with reference to a cause; or lastly—so far as coexistence is to be known objectively, that is, by a judgment of experience—under the concept of community (action and reaction). Thus, a priori principles [categories] form the basis of objectively valid, though empirical, judgments—that is, of the

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464 Ibid, 52.
465 For Kant as for Aristotle, the function of Logic is to systematize the rules by which judgments about the objects of sense experience—i.e., what Kant called “intuitions”—are rendered objectively and universally valid. The rules are those of deduction, and the principles from which conclusions about objects of sense experience are deduced are the categories themselves. These, “and this exact number only, constitute our whole knowledge of things by pure understanding” (Ibid, 71). I will return to Kant’s notions of “intuitions” and “pure understanding” in Chapter 4.
466 Kant formulated a logical table of judgments (to which I refer again in Chapter 4), each of which subsumes sense experience under its corresponding category. He divided the table into four sets of three: as to quantity—universal, particular, and singular; as to quality—affirmative, negative, and infinite; as to relation—categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive; and as to modality—problematic, assertoric, and apodictic. I include this table, as well as the “Pure Physical Table of the Universal Principles of the Science of Nature” to give you a sense of the structure of Kant’s system.
467 Denoting Nature in general.
468 Ibid, 54.
possibility of experience so far as it must connect objects as existing in nature. These principles are the real
laws of nature, which may be termed “dynamical.”

Finally, knowledge of the agreement and connection, not only of appearances among themselves in
experience (like the third principle above allows) but of their relation to experience in general, belong to
the judgments of experience. This relation contains either their agreement with the formal conditions,
which the understanding recognizes, or their coherence with the materials of the senses and of perception,
or combines both into one concept. Consequently, their relation to experience in general entails possibility,
actuality, and necessity, according to universal laws of nature. This would constitute the physical doctrine
of method for distinguishing truth from hypotheses and for determining the limits of certainty of the
latter. According to Kant, these four principles empower our faculty of judgment to constitute the
“essence of experience” as fully as possible, which it does (and to repeat) by uniting and
subsuming all “intuitions” under the categories. To put the matter succinctly, Kant argued that
our understanding applies these four principles to the contents of “intuitions” received from
sense experience, and these principles distribute the contents of intuition among the categories by
means of Logic.

Dewey

In “From Absolutism to Experimentalism,” Dewey admitted that there had always
remained a permanent affinity to Hegelian metaphysics in his thinking, which he acquired during
his neo-Hegelian days. This affinity drove him to see the world in terms of a world
hypothesis Pepper called organicism. In short, this system is premised on the concept of

469 Ibid, 55.
470 Bertrand Russell illustrated this, when he said the following about the results of the process Dewey called
“inquiry”: “Unless on the basis of an unconscious Hegelian metaphysic, I do not see why inquiry should be expected
to result in “unified wholes.” Furthermore, Russell said the following about Dewey’s “doctrine”: “The metaphysic
of organism [Pepper’s organicism] underlies Dewey’s theories, but I do not know how far he is aware of this fact”
[Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, 823-824].
471 “It thus becomes clear that, in the pursuit of reliability, structural corroboration [i.e., corroboration of fact with
fact] does not stop until it reaches unlimited scope. For as long as there are outlying facts which might not
corroborate the facts already organized by the structural hypothesis, so long will the reliability of that hypothesis be
questionable. The ideal structural hypothesis, therefore, is one that all facts will corroborate, a hypothesis of
unlimited scope. Such a hypothesis is a world hypothesis” [Stephen Pepper, World Hypotheses: Prolegomena to
Systematic Philosophy and a Complete Survey of Metaphysics, 47, 77].
a “process of organic integration”—what Pepper called its “root metaphor.” In his discussion of \textit{organicism}, Pepper called those entities to be restored the “fragments” of experience. Such restoration presupposes an inherent relation between them. In short, it presupposes Aristotle’s and Kant’s category of \textit{relation}.

I detect \textit{relation} in one of Dewey’s most typical renditions of his concept of ‘experience’—central in his philosophy of education:

Experience (is) an affair primarily of doing. The organism does not stand about, Micawberlike, waiting for something to turn up. It does not wait passive and inert for something to impress itself upon it from without. The organism acts in accordance with its own structure, simple or complex, upon its surroundings. As a consequence the changes produced in the environment react upon the organism and its activities. The living creature undergoes, suffers, the consequences of its own behavior. This close \textit{connection} between doing and suffering or undergoing forms what we call experience.…

\begin{footnotes}
\item[473] “Dewey is a strong contextualist and organicist (an organic holist, actually)” [Jim Garrison, email message to author, August 18, 2009].
\item[474] “[World hypotheses] are derived from certain masses of empirical evidence, originating in common sense, which become cognitively refined and may be codified into sets of categories that hang together. The concrete evidential source of the categories (is) called the \textit{root metaphor} [emphasis mine] [Stephen Pepper. \textit{World Hypotheses}, 328].
\item[475] John A. Simpson and Edmund S.C. Weiner, eds., \textit{The Oxford English Dictionary}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed.
\item[476] What Morse called the “Biological Model of a Person” underwrites Dewey’s philosophy of education, if not his entire philosophical corpus. This model suggests the difference between human and non-human entities is one of degree, not of kind, for they both bear a vital and organic relationship to their environment, in which they both act and undergo the consequences of their action. Said model consists of the following four points:
\begin{itemize}
  \item An animal is a unity of organic systems that are capable of performing certain specified functions, including respiration, nourishment, movement, growth, reproduction, and various sentient activities such as perception, recollection, thought and self-consciousness.
  \item Humans are animals sharing these basic functions with other animals, but ultimately what distinguishes them is a certain higher order state of recollection, thought and self-consciousness. It is this higher order of organic functioning that we mean when we say someone is a person.
  \item If a human loses its ability to perform these higher order organic functions, it ceases to be a person, and prior to the existence of these functions it is not a person.
  \item A person therefore is nothing else but the totality of its current organic functions, particularly its higher order intellectual functions [D.J. Morse, “Dewey’s Ethics: Moral Value in the Natural World,” 215-216].
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotes}

If you accept Morse’s diagnosis of the presence of said model in Dewey’s philosophy, then, after you read Chapter 4, you will not be surprised to find that Dewey relied on \textit{relation} (or more broadly, on Aristotle’s and Kant’s categories) to express the metaphysical state of human and non-human entities alike. In short, Dewey’s reliance on \textit{relation} illustrates, according to the idea I will develop in Chapter 4, an instance of a broader error at the heart of the Western philosophical tradition, viz., the error of relying on Aristotle’s and Kant’s categories to think about (cognize) the nature (essence) of human beings and non-human entities alike; because of it, said tradition has failed to develop a proper understanding of the unique nature (essence) of human beings.
It follows, therefore, that the “basic category” of experience is relation, for why would the organism and its environment interact if they were not somehow connected in the first place? Without this category, Dewey’s notion of ‘experience,’ and thus his philosophy of education, cannot stand.  

In *Democracy and Education*, I also detect relation in what I consider to be another one of Dewey’s typical descriptions of what an ‘experience’ is:

Experience as trying (or doing) involves change, but change is meaningless transition unless it is consciously connected [emphasis mine] with the return wave of consequences which flow from it… It is not experience when a child merely sticks his finger into a flame; it is experience when the movement is connected [emphasis mine] with the pain which he undergoes in consequence…. Being burned is a mere physical change…, if it is not perceived as a consequence of some other action…. To “learn from experience” is to make a backward and forward connection [emphasis mine] between what we do to things and what we enjoy or suffer from things in consequence. Under such conditions, doing becomes a trying: an experiment with the world to find out what it is like; the undergoing becomes instruction—discovery of the connection [emphasis mine] of things.

Again, in positing the “connection of things” as a fundamental feature of ‘experience,’ Dewey presupposed relation. Furthermore, “the measure of the value of an experience lies in the perception of relationships or continuities to which it leads up,” which is to say that the measure of the value of an experience lies in the perception of relation. Dewey gave the name “reflection” to such perception, so anyone can thereby “analyze to see just what lies between

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478 Ibid, 87. Also note that according to Dewey, relation is the primary fact, or the basic category of experience. In other words, the individual human ‘self’ is not the primary fact of experience, as it would be for Heidegger. In light of what Metz observed, Dewey’s identification of relation, and not the human ‘self’ as the primary fact of experience, is not surprising.

479 A reminder: my objection is not to relation per se, but rather with Dewey’s inference that since it holds in the physical realm, it must also hold in the social and moral realm.


481 Ibid, 134.

482 Ibid, 139.
[emphasis mine] (actions and their consequences) so as to bind together [emphasis mine] cause and effect, activity and consequence.” In short, “reflection” discovers relation.

The deliberate cultivation of this phase of thought [i.e., “reflection”] constitutes thinking as a distinctive experience. Thinking, in other words, is the intentional endeavor to discover specific connections [emphasis mine] between something which we do and the consequences which result, so that the two become continuous.

Hence, “reflection” and therefore “thinking [as an] intentional endeavor” discovers relation. To state that thinking so defined is central to Dewey’s philosophy of education is to state the obvious: “Thinking is the method of an educative experience.” You may recall that in Experience and Education, Dewey defined an “educative experience” as one governed by the principles of interaction and continuity. Both principles, and thus an “educative experience,” would be theoretically superfluous without the presupposition of relation.

Six years before Dewey wrote Democracy and Education, he published a book solely devoted to the question of thinking. In How We Think, he defined “thinking” in terms of discerning causality and since causality is a form of inference, he effectively defined “thinking” in its terms. In other words, inference is the method by which we discover relation.

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483 Ibid, 139.
484 Ibid, 140.
485 Ibid, 148, 149, 151, 152, 154.
487 In Dewey’s philosophy of education, an educative experience is such because its ‘stuff’ is bound together by interrelationships. In other words, relation is the species, or class, to which an educative experience belongs. When relation is absent, we know that experience is miseducative, not to mention immoral.
488 John Dewey. Experience and Education, 43.
489 John L. Childs, a former student of Dewey’s and professor at Teacher’s College, said the following about the place of continuity in Dewey’s philosophy: “The postulate of the continuity of the human, the organic, and the physical, is foundational in his approach to the problem of logic, psychology, politics, art, ethics, and education. Indeed, it seems to him to be the necessary starting-point for the fruitful study of any aspect of human experience” [John L. Childs. “The Educational Philosophy of John Dewey.” In The Philosophy of John Dewey, Paul Arthur Schilpp, ed., 422]. Continuity is inconceivable without connectedness, i.e., without relation. Hence, relation is a “foundational” category in Dewey’s philosophy in general.
490 Wartofsky defined the classical concept of causality in the following way: “[A] two-valued counterposition: Determined-Undetermined. This, as an exclusive disjunction, holds for the mechanistic view of the cause-effect relation, in which there is no merging or interaction, but only action upon” [Marx W. Wartofsky, “Temporal Description and Ontological Status of Judgment, Part I,” 30]. In light of my exposition thus far, it should be clear that Dewey did not subscribe to the classical concept of causality so defined. Though we see him use the term throughout How We Think, Dewey clearly understood it in terms of relation—specifically in terms of its subcategory of reciprocity between agent and patient (see my discussion of Kant above). As will be seen throughout my exposition, Dewey’s concept of “thinking” presupposes relation.
The relation [emphasis mine] of means-consequence is the center of all understanding.\textsuperscript{492}

According to Dewey, “thinking,” “reflection,” and the “method of intelligence” are virtually synonymous. Reflection is “the better way of thinking,”\textsuperscript{493} which is to say that perceiving the connections between individual empirical entities is such a way. As I stated above, reflective thinking…

[I]nvolves a con-sequence—a consecutive ordering in such a way that each determines the next as its proper outcome, while each outcome in turn leans back on, or refers to, its predecessors….\textsuperscript{494} Thinking … is … (that operation in which present facts suggest other facts in such a way as to induce belief in what is suggested on the ground of real relation in the things themselves) [emphasis in the original], a relation [emphasis mine] between what suggests and what is suggested…. It is an objective connection [emphasis mine], the link [emphasis mine] in actual things, that makes one thing the ground, warrant, evidence, for believing in something else.\textsuperscript{495}

I will come back to Dewey’s emphasis on a “real relation” and an “objective connection” between “actual things” in a moment, for it marks an important difference between his philosophy and Kant’s. Returning to the matter at hand, the “objective connection” between “actual things”—i.e., relation—is itself the criterion that all mental activity must meet in order to qualify as “thinking,” and the justification of belief in some things, and not in others.

“Thinking” orders “actual things.” When we think about them, we do so as what Dewey called “terms” or “mental pictures”—in short, as symbols.\textsuperscript{496}

\textsuperscript{491} In a footnote on page 148, Joseph Ratner said the following about Dewey’s notion of causality: “Cause is an old name for a system of interactivities [emphasis mine] going on, and effect an old name for the qualitative consequences of the interactions [emphasis mine].” Furthermore, on page 151, he said, “[C]ausality … consists in the sequential order itself.” The sequence, however, is not a mere linear, one-dimensional arrangement of situations, but is also characterized by the reciprocal action of the principles of continuity and interaction—i.e., those which govern an educative experience and take relation for granted—which are the “longitudinal and lateral aspects of every history, of every situation, of every sequential order, of every connection [emphasis mine] of cause-effect” [Joseph Ratner, ed., Intelligence in the Modern World: John Dewey’s Philosophy, 153, 908].

\textsuperscript{492} John Dewey. How We Think, 146.

\textsuperscript{493} Ibid, 3.

\textsuperscript{494} Ibid, 4.

\textsuperscript{495} Ibid, 12. Please bear the following in mind: all I am trying to do here is to establish the importance of relation in Dewey’s philosophy, and thus to establish his membership in the Aristotelian/Kantian metaphysical tradition.

\textsuperscript{496} D.J. Morse discussed Dewey’s use of symbols in practical decision making in “Dewey’s Ethics: Moral Value in the Natural World.”
Each phase (of thought) … is a term of thought. Each term leaves a deposit [emphasis mine] that is utilized in the next term. The stream or flow becomes a train or chain. There are in any reflective thought definite units that are linked together (emphasis mine) so that there is a sustained movement to a common end.\textsuperscript{497}

Apparently, the “deposit” is the basis, or the binding link, of connectedness between terms, that is, of relation. Of each definite unit, Dewey said the following:

[A] thought or idea is a mental picture of something not actually present, and thinking is the succession of such pictures.\textsuperscript{498}

In short, thinking is synonymous with inference, and as I said on the previous page, inference is the method by which we discover relation.

Dewey used the metaphor of a train to explain the “succession of such pictures”:

The train must lead somewhere; it must tend to a conclusion that can be substantiated outside the course of the images…. There is a goal to be reached, and this end sets a task that controls the sequence of ideas….\textsuperscript{499}
To the degree that a distant end controls a sequence of inquiries and observations and binds them together [emphasis mine] as a means to an end, just to that degree does curiosity assume a definitely intellectual character.\textsuperscript{500}

So, in addition to the “deposit” mentioned above, the “distant end” controls the direction in which inference leads from one “definite unit” to another, and binds them together. In other words, the “distant end” controls the direction of connectedness between one “definite unit” and another. In short, the “distant end” controls the direction in which relation is expressed.\textsuperscript{501}

According to Dewey, one does not simply decide to engage in reflective thinking, as if occasioned by mere wonder. Such thinking involves…

\textsuperscript{497} Ibid, 4, 5.
\textsuperscript{498} Ibid, 5.
\textsuperscript{499} Ibid, 6-7.
\textsuperscript{500} Ibid, 39.
\textsuperscript{501} By raising the issue of an end or conclusion toward which a succession of mental pictures “must lead,” Dewey raised the issue of justification, i.e., of providing a reason (or a ground for) why a particular arrangement of a finite number of mental pictures bears the stamp of “intellectual character,” and why another arrangement does not. Without relation, justification so conceived is impossible.
1) (A) state of doubt, hesitation, perplexity, mental difficulty ... [which finds resolution in] 2) an act of searching, hunting, inquiring, to find the material that will resolve the doubt, settle and dispose of the perplexity.\footnote{502}

As you may have already inferred, and as Dewey himself made clear throughout *How We Think*, an important task of education is to teach students how to think reflectively—i.e., to think in terms of *relation*. Since reflective thinking has “the property of order, of consecutiveness, (of an) ‘association of ideas,’ or a train of suggestions,”\footnote{503} it follows that the task of education is to teach students how to order their thoughts consecutively. Consecutiveness presupposes continuity, and the latter presupposes *relation*.

According to Dewey, reflective thinking entails inference, and inference is but another word for inductive reasoning—i.e., a “… process of arriving at an idea of what is absent on the basis of what is at hand….\footnote{504} As he made clear on page twelve of *How We Think* (and throughout this work), inductive reasoning is what “thinking” entails. Any one familiar with the scientific method knows that it is a method of inductive reasoning.\footnote{505} Inductive reasoning qualifies as science when the accuracy and precision of its predictions can be tested and controlled, and when the results of the tests modify the predictions, and so on *ad infinitum*. For Dewey, scientific method is virtually synonymous with inductive reasoning, and inductive reasoning with “thinking,” and as I have shown, the object of “thinking” is to discover *relation*. Hence, the object of scientific method is to discover *relation*. Dewey’s own discussion of definitions on pages 161-164 of *How We Think* supports my reasoning on this matter:

The scientific definition is founded, not on directly perceived qualities nor on directly useful properties (as the lay person may think), but on the *way in which certain things are causally related to other things* [emphasis in the original]; i.e., it denotes a *relation* [emphasis mine]…. Our conceptions attain a maximum of definite individuality and of generality (or applicability) in the degree to which they show how things depend upon one another or influence one another…. The ideal of a system of scientific conceptions [which is Dewey’s ideal system] is to attain continuity [which I have shown presupposes *relation*], freedom, and flexibility of transition in passing from any fact and meaning to any other; this demand is met in the degree

\footnote{502}{Ibid, 12.}
\footnote{503}{Ibid, 47.}
\footnote{504}{Ibid, 95.}
\footnote{505}{Quoting Clifford approvingly, Dewey said the following about the peculiarity of “scientific thought”: “Skill enables a man to deal with the same circumstances that he has met before, (while) scientific thought enables him to deal with different circumstances that he has never met before” (Ibid, 193).}
in which we lay hold of the dynamic ties [emphasis mine] that hold things together in a continuously changing process—a principle that gives insight into mode of production or growth.\textsuperscript{506}

Again, that such “ties” are “dynamic” is an important point that differentiates Dewey from Kant, to which I will return below.

Returning to the matter at hand, the scientific method—Dewey’s preferred method to any other method claiming to be ‘intelligent’—in the hands of the trained scientist breaks …

[\textit{U}]p the coarse or gross facts of observation into a number of minuter processes not directly accessible to perception … (in order to yield) a connection [emphasis mine] of cause and effect.\textsuperscript{507}

Dewey was committed to the scientific method because it operationalized his interest in the future—his lifelong “faith in progress.”\textsuperscript{508} Progress depends on what he thought the scientific method could deliver: a means of testing all things presumed to have “permanent value,”\textsuperscript{509} including moral principles.\textsuperscript{510}

Why was Dewey a champion of relation? I turn to the history of philosophy for an answer. When David Hume sought to dissolve the necessity of cause-and-effect connections in his \textit{Treatise on Human Nature} (1739-40) by asserting that we never perceive causes, but only events and sequences from which we infer causes and their necessity, he was in effect seeking to dissolve the notion that relation necessarily and therefore universally binds cause and effect. In short, Hume sought to dissolve the possibility of science. In Kant’s assertion that relation is an \textit{a priori} category with which we construct experience, and Dewey’s claim that there is an objective relational connection between actual things,\textsuperscript{511} they were effectively defending the possibility of science. Like Hume, Dewey understood that science is impossible without relation.\textsuperscript{512} Thus, Dewey’s defense of it was a defense of science itself. Without relation, Dewey’s experimentalist philosophy of education would be untenable.

\textsuperscript{506}Ibid, 163-164.
\textsuperscript{507}Ibid, 195.
\textsuperscript{508}Ibid, 199.
\textsuperscript{509}Ibid, 202.
\textsuperscript{510}D.J. Morse made this point clear throughout “Dewey’s Ethics: Moral Value in the Natural World.”
\textsuperscript{511}I will say more on this difference below.
\textsuperscript{512}For a fuller treatment of this issue, see “Immanuel Kant and German Idealism” (Chapter 6) in Will Durant’s \textit{The Story of Philosophy} (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1926).
While my focus in this dissertation is \textit{relation} as the categorical basis of Dewey’s philosophy of education, which places him in the Aristotelian/Kantian metaphysical tradition, I hope you will allow me to say a brief (and highly relevant) word about Dewey’s ontology, which his philosophy of education requires; to say that it does not would be to charge Dewey with inconsistency, which I do not think he was guilty of. My brief word about Dewey’s ontology is highly relevant because it is the aspect of Dewey’s philosophy most amenable to a Heideggerian correction.\footnote{I will articulate this correction in Chapter 4.} According to Morse,\footnote{D.J. Morse invites us to think about the basis of Dewey’s ontology as “[A] kind of non-reductivist psychophysicalism, or what I will call “interactionism”. [In other words,] humans and world must be defined completely in co-relational terms, that is, in terms of their interaction.” A few pages later he added, “Breathing, walking, willing, even thinking, Dewey holds, always exist in interaction with a surrounding world, an interaction that in its own right can account for the organization that we just do find in experience because experience just \textit{is} this process of organization” [D.J. Morse, “Dewey’s Ethics: Moral Value in the Natural World,” 20, 21, 25]. Fundamentally for my purposes, Morse showed that \textit{relation} is also the categorical basis of his ethics.} Situations are events that involve an organism-environment interaction, where the environment is in part constituted by the impulses and habits of the organism and gets its meaning through the response … of the organism—through its acts. Dewey thus introduces an entirely new ontology \footnote{John Dewey, “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology,” 357-370.} For, according to the new ontology, function replaces substance, so that both “physical event” and “person” are taken to be abstractions from a larger ongoing functional process rather than pre-existing entities (or substances) standing outside the process.\footnote{For example, in \textit{Democracy and Education}, Dewey articulated one of education’s basic functions as enabling the “continuous reconstruction of experience” (p. 77).}

That Morse should describe Dewey’s ontology as “functional” should surprise no one, for his psychology—famously articulated in his \textit{Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology}\footnote{Ibid, 174.}—which his philosophy of education took for granted, was functional as well.\footnote{Ibid, 174.} If the “basic category” of experience is \textit{relation} between an organism and its environment (and I have shown that it is), and if \textit{relation} between an organism and its environment is the conceptual basis of “situations” (and I have shown that it is), and if “situations” are the basis of Dewey’s ontology (and according to Morse, they are), then it follows that \textit{relation} is the basis of Dewey’s ontology, which is to say that Aristotle’s and Kant’s tradition of cognizing individual entities in the empirical world and their interconnections in terms of categories is the basis of Dewey’s ontology, at least insofar as \textit{relation} is concerned.
Before proceeding with what remains of this exposition, I will summarize what I have argued thus far. *Relation* is the categorical basis of Dewey’s metaphysics and his ontology; it is the categorical basis of experience and its value, reflective thinking, the method of intelligence, and as Morse showed, his ethics. That *relation* is the categorical basis of Dewey’s ethics is the reason why he maintained the notion that preserving its metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality. Just as *relation* is a device that maintained order in Dewey’s understanding of metaphysics, ontology, experience and its value, reflective thinking, and the method of intelligence, *relation* also kept order in his understanding of ethics, hence my claim throughout this dissertation that Dewey understood *relation* as necessarily governing social life aimed at expanding the general welfare. In short, because *relation* is a fundamental category in Dewey’s philosophy (and hence in his philosophy of education), it therefore belongs in the Aristotelian and Kantian metaphysical tradition.

Having established Dewey’s indebtedness to Aristotle’s and Kant’s metaphysical tradition as I have described it, it is time to establish Dewey’s indebtedness to Hegel (in fact, I pointed in this direction earlier when I discussed the permanent affinity to Hegelian metaphysics in Dewey’s thinking). It is from having acquired said affinity that Dewey criticized Kant’s categories. Admitting that Dewey criticized Kant’s categories does not commit me to a contradiction, as I will show.

*Dewey’s Permanent Affinity to Hegelian Metaphysics*

According to Stephen Houlgate,

Hegel … agrees with Kant that we bring categories to bear on the world we perceive, but, in contrast to Kant, he maintains that those categories make possible genuine consciousness of the world itself and do not simply bring order into our own ‘limited’ human experience. [In other words, the categories] equip us to

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518 Lest you think I am wrong to claim that Dewey had metaphysical commitments, Cornell West claimed the same thing when he said that *Experience and Nature* is “Dewey’s principal work on and in metaphysics” [Cornell West, *The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism*, 95]. With Dewey, we can call his metaphysics “naturalistic,” though Rorty criticized Dewey’s nomenclature [Richard Rorty, “Dewey’s Metaphysics,” in *Consequences of Pragmatism*, 72-89].
see and understand what *is* (precisely because) we ourselves are born into and so share the character of the world we encounter.\textsuperscript{519}

In short, the categories reveal the world and the interrelationships between and among the entities in it as they truly are because they themselves inhere in, and emerge from “the world itself.”

To claim that the categories reveal the world and the interrelationships between and among the entities in it as they truly are is to claim that Kant’s concept of the ‘thing-in-itself’—i.e., the concept that the spur to thought and activity exists outside of experience—is wrong. This was Hegel’s position, which Dewey adopted, and he did not reject it, even after he abandoned Hegel’s Absolute Idealism. In other words, Dewey’s adoption of Hegel’s position—viz., that the categories inhere in, and emerge from “the world itself”—makes manifest his permanent affinity to Hegelian metaphysics.

Within the context of his instrumentalism, Dewey interpreted the categories as tools with which people—spurred by their need to adapt to their environment in order to control it—order the ‘stuff’ of experience. By rejecting Kant’s concept of the thing-in-itself, Dewey (in the spirit of his neo-Hegelianism) tried to emancipate experience—actual and possible—from the argument (Kant’s) that the categories themselves did not emerge from experience. In Hance’s words, Hegel and Dewey thought that the categories “are the ways the world presents itself to thought.”\textsuperscript{520} If one equates ‘world’ with ‘Nature,’ and ‘Nature’ with ‘Being’—which was Dewey’s fundamental equation in *Experience and Nature*—then they can say that “[B]eing manifests itself or becomes seen and known” by means of categories inherent within it.\textsuperscript{521} Hance put the matter like this:

\textsuperscript{519} Stephen Houlgate, *Freedom, Truth, and History*, 8.

\textsuperscript{520} Allen Hance, “Pragmatism as Naturalized Hegelianism: Overcoming Transcendental Philosophy?”, 363.

\textsuperscript{521} Ibid. While Heidegger would have agreed that Aristotle’s and Kant’s categories are perfectly adequate to the task of understanding non-human entities in the empirical world, he would have disagreed that they are therefore perfectly adequate to the task of understanding specifically human entities in the empirical world. What did not occur to neither Hegel nor Dewey is that *Dasein* (Heidegger’s term for all human beings) is a unique and therefore different entity from non-human entities. Part of its uniqueness lies in that it is the ‘place’ where Being discloses itself. Hence, if we want to understand Being, we must first understand *Dasein*, and in order to understand *Dasein*, we must reject Aristotle’s and Kant’s categories as a means to achieve said understanding—and therefore the categorical basis of Dewey’s philosophy of education—in favor of a new set—viz., Heidegger’s *existentials*. Only then will we be able to understand *Dasein*, and then, perhaps, Being.
To be a neo-Hegelian means not only to follow Hegel over Kant (which it does) but [is also] to construe the nature of the self and world as organic [hence Pepper’s organicism]…. It means to see categories as dynamic and evolving; not fixed and ready-made. [Despite Dewey’s criticisms of Kant], there is an element of Kant that Dewey thought important enough to maintain—even over and against Hegel: this, I believe, is Kant’s admonition regarding percepts and concepts: in an experience, the two do not outrun each other. Notably, consciousness is never not present in an experience, though what they do and how they operate, differs for Kant and Dewey. There is for both, though, always a level of awareness acting to bind experiences had, together…. 522 Regardless of Kant’s positing of a thing-in-itself or a transcendental object as a ground for the categories, the idea that an experience is an active, pluralistic affair, remains. 523 Kant denigrates experience through the introduction of an unknown thing-in-itself, which lies outside of experience, whereas Dewey (and Hegel) characteristically places all logical moves inside of experience. Experience occurs not through the bringing of a realm outside of experience together with one inside, but rather in and through the awareness of self-consciousness as it sees itself in the interconnection [emphasis mine] between self and world. 524

“There is for both, though, always a level of awareness acting to bind experiences had, together.” As I have argued thus far, relation is the category with which people may bind together “experiences had.”

Basically, Dewey’s critique of Kant’s categories is that “the categories are brought down to bear on the extraneous sensory material and are themselves something outside of experience, with the experience itself only formed in the combination of categories and sense data,” 525 and that they are “rigid and inflexible.” 526 In Dewey’s own words:

Though the categories make experience, they make it out of a foreign material to which they bear a purely external relation. They constitute objects, but these objects are not such in universal reference, but only to beings of like capacities of receptivity as ourselves. They respect not existence in itself, but ourselves as affected by that existence. 527

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523 Ibid, 521.
524 Ibid, 534.
525 Ibid, 533.
526 Ibid, 542.
527 John Dewey, “Kant and Philosophic Method.” In John Dewey: The Early Works, 1882-1898, I: 1882-1888, Jo Ann Boydston, ed., 39. Apparently, Dewey did not see the value in understanding “beings of like capacities of receptivity as ourselves,” and “ourselves as affected by that existence.” Rather, and as this quote attests, he valued understanding objects in their “universal reference,” and “existence in itself” without reference to how such things affect our “capacities.” Heidegger not only valued understanding “beings of like capacities of receptivity as ourselves” and how objects affect our “capacities,” but he also made this understanding the centerpiece of his
Further textual evidence from Dewey’s work supports Houlgate’s, Hance’s, and Johnston’s claims. For example, in *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, in the chapter entitled “Changed Conceptions of Experience and Reason,” Dewey rejected Kant’s claim that the categories are *a priori*, or innate, in the human mind (brain). Of them, he said the following:

> When the isolated and simple existences of Locke and Hume are seen not to be truly empirical at all but to answer to certain demands of their theory of mind, the necessity ceases for the elaborate Kantian and Post-Kantian machinery of *a priori* concepts and categories to synthesize the alleged stuff of experience. The true “stuff” of experience is recognized to be adaptive courses of action, habits, active functions, *connections* [emphasis mine] of doing and undergoing; sensori-motor co-ordinations. *Experience carries principles of connection and organization within itself* [emphasis mine]…. 528 This organization *intrinsic to life* [emphasis mine] renders unnecessary a super-natural and super-empirical synthesis. 529 It affords the basis and material for a positive evolution of intelligence as an organizing factor within experience. 530

To claim that “[e]xperience carries principles of connection and organization within itself”—in a word, the categories—and to make relation the foundation of his metaphysics, his ontology, his philosophy of education (as I have shown), and his ethics—is to claim, in effect, that relation (and Kant’s categories generally) exists *within* experience, and is not imposed from *without*, as Houlgate, Hance, and Johnston have averred. In short, Dewey’s philosophical innovation with respect to relation amounts to this: by claiming that relation (and the categories generally) is *a posteriori*, Dewey relocated it within the realm of experience.

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529 While it is true that Kant’s “super-natural and super-empirical synthesis” presupposed the subject/object dichotomy, Heidegger’s *fundamental ontology*, while it rejected said dichotomy, it embraced the need to understand how the human mind (brain) works as it processes information from the empirical world in which it always and already is (see Chapter 4). Thus, Heidegger’s *fundamental ontology* is akin to neuroscience, while Dewey’s neo-Hegelianism is not, for it is concerned with “adaptive courses of action, habits, [and] active functions”—in a word, with the human mind’s (brain’s) observable *effects* on such action, habits, and functions.


531 “[E]xperience … is no infinitesimally thin layer or foreground of nature, but that it penetrates into it, reaching down into its depths, and in such a way that its grasp is capable of expansion” [John Dewey. *Experience and Nature*, 2nd ed., 2].
Indeed, Dewey accepted that relation is necessary to intellectually order experience, with the one difference you have seen: relation, and the categories generally, inhere and emerge from experience itself. Since Dewey conceived of experience as organically bound with nature, he wanted categories “which constitute experience, internal and external, subjective and objective, and an account of them as a system, an organic unity [emphasis mine] in which each has its own place fixed.”

There is one final reason why Dewey rejected Kant’s claim that the categories are a priori: politics.

The dogmatic rigidity of Rationalism is best seen in the consequences of Kant’s attempt to buttress an otherwise chaotic experience with pure concepts [categories]. He set out with a laudable attempt at restricting the extravagant pretensions of Reason apart from experience. He called his philosophy critical. But because he taught that the understanding employs fixed, a priori, concepts [categories], in order to introduce connection into experience and thereby make known objects possible (stable, regular relationships of qualities), he developed in German thought a curious contempt for the living variety of experience and a curious overestimate of the value of system, order, regularity for their own sakes…. When Kant taught that some conceptions, and these the important ones, are a priori, that they do not arise in experience and cannot be verified or tested in experience, that without such ready-made injections into experience the latter is anarchic and chaotic, he fostered the spirit of absolutism, even though technically he denied the possibility of absolutes. His successors were true to his spirit rather than his letter, and so they taught absolutism systematically. That the Germans with all their scientific competency and technological proficiency should have fallen into their tragically rigid and “superior” style of thought and action (tragic because involving them in inability to understand the world in which they lived) is a sufficient lesson of what may be involved in a systematical denial of the experimental character of intelligence and its conceptions.

The passage is important for two reasons: a) while Dewey objected to the philosophical and political ends that Kant’s a priori categories were subsequently made to serve, he did not object

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532 John Dewey, “Kant and Philosopher Method,” 44. Dewey’s inveterate neo-Hegelianism and its stubborn teleology of reconciling individual entities with progressively comprehensive organic wholes biased him against developing what Heidegger called fundamental ontology. In other words, Dewey’s inveterate neo-Hegelianism precluded him from developing a new set of categories—Heidegger’s existentials—with which to identify and understand Dasein as unique and therefore different from non-human entities, and yet as always and already bound up with such entities in the empirical world—i.e., as Being-in-the-world. I will discuss these issues at length in Chapter 4.

to their usefulness in ordering experience, as I have already shown; and b) while he argued in favor “of the experimental character of intelligence and its conceptions,” thereby suggesting that the a priori status of Kant’s categories should be subjected to testing, Dewey nevertheless affirmed one of them when he insisted on the notion that preserving relation’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality. I have yet to find a single instance where Dewey suggests that the notion in question itself be treated as a hypothesis “to be worked out in practice, and to be rejected, corrected and expanded as [it] fail[s] or succeed[s] in giving our present experience the guidance it requires.”

To the reply that Dewey would have favored treating the notion in question as a hypothesis, I would retort that such treatment would make it possible for individuals to reject it (as I do) because they would find instances in which fusing their powers and dispositions with their variously (and inevitably) blighted compatriots for the purpose of expanding the general welfare is insufferable. If individuals reject the notion in question (which to repeat, is about the putative essence of morality), then they would reject Dewey’s method of intelligence (conceived as the embodiment of this particular ethic), and thus his philosophy of education, for without relation’s necessary ordering role, the notion in question would dissolve. Dewey’s exemption of the notion in question from experimental scrutiny is unwarranted. Experimental scrutiny in the form of the method of intelligence cannot justify it because it takes it for granted. The logical circularity of the notion in question, or perhaps the humanistic ends to which it has been put, is the source of its life.

By now, it should be clear that Dewey claimed to reject the concept of relation as an a priori category, and why he did so. Rather than locate it in the human mind (brain), he found it in the social environment:

534 Ibid, 99.
535 Ibid, 96. In phrases like these—common in Dewey’s work—he suggests he is in a better position to judge the guidance that experience requires than the individuals having it.
536 In his Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Chapter 7—“The Construction of Judgment”—Dewey claimed the following: “The conceptual and “rational” contents (of subject-matter) are hypotheses.” In this context, Dewey criticized the “rationalist” tradition in logical theory (to which in his view Kant belonged—(cf. Reconstruction in Philosophy, 98) for hypostatizing logical functions—e.g., relation—“into a supra-empirical reality.” Yet, in exempting the notion in question from his own experimentalism, Dewey effectively treated it as a “supra-empirical reality.” [In Joseph Ratner, ed. Intelligence in the Modern World: John Dewey’s Philosophy, 908]. Several of the authors I cited in Chapter 2 noted this inconsistency.
[S]ocial as well as biological organization enters into the formation of human experience. Probably one thing that strengthened the idea that the mind is passive and receptive in knowing was the observation of the helplessness of the human infant. But the observation points in quite another direction. Because of his physical dependence and impotency, the contacts of the little child with nature are mediated by other persons. Mother and nurse, father and older children determine what experiences the child shall have; they constantly instruct him as to the meaning of what he does and undergoes. The conceptions that are socially current and important become the child’s principles of interpretation and estimation [emphasis mine] long before he attains to personal and deliberate control of conduct. Things come to him clothed in language, not in physical nakedness, and this garb of communication makes him a sharer in the beliefs of those about him. These beliefs coming to him as so many facts form his mind; they furnish the centers about which his own personal expeditions and perceptions are ordered. Here we have “categories” of connection and unification as important as those of Kant, but empirical not mythological.  

In the context of this quote, Dewey advanced a brief genealogy of the categories, whose birth he placed in the past—presumably, in social history and accessed through memory. In Dewey’s view, mothers and nurses, fathers and older children, and teachers of all kinds should place a high value, if not the highest value, on educating young children to order their “personal expeditions and perceptions” in terms of the notion in question. The reason for this valuation is because Dewey, like Aristotle and Kant before him, understood its indispensability (and that of the categories in general) for making thought possible:

We come to know or note not merely this particular which as a particular cannot strictly be known at all (for not being classed it cannot be characterized and identified) but to recognize it as man, tree, stone, leather—an individual of a certain kind, marked by a certain universal form characteristic of a whole species of thing.

For Dewey, relation was such a form, albeit found within experience, not imposed from without. Understanding that the “generality and the organization” of individual entities within experience

537 Ibid, 91-92.
538 John L. Childs’s comments about how a child acquires “mind” echoed Dewey’s: “The child acquires mind—a rational nature—as he masters the meanings of affairs in his environment. These meanings are not primarily his own original creations. They have been developed by the long and painful experience of the race; they are funded in the habits, customs, traditions, tools, methods, techniques, and institutions of his society. The child makes them his own through a learning process. It is through learning by participation in the ways of his community that he achieves mind—becomes a person” [John L. Childs. “The Educational Philosophy of John Dewey.” In The Philosophy of John Dewey, Paul Arthur Schilpp, ed., 422, 425].
539 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 79.
in terms of relation is “restricted and fallible”\textsuperscript{541}—i.e., that entities once thought to be interconnected turn out not to be upon further investigation—Dewey recommended that we rely on the “method of intelligence” to readjust individual entities’ relationships to each other, and to find new relationships, as evolutionary pressures require us to do so. However, the notion in question itself is not, in Dewey’s view, “restricted and fallible.” On the contrary, it is, or rather Dewey hoped it would become universal.

**Conclusion**

Dewey belongs to the metaphysical tradition of Aristotle and Kant in the sense that his philosophy of education depends on the cognitive necessity of categories: without them, it is simply impossible to note or to know any particular thing as an \textit{individual}, for we can note or know it only when we first know its \textit{kind}—the “certain universal form characteristic of a whole species of thing.”\textsuperscript{542} As if it were not clear enough that Dewey belongs to said tradition, Dewey’s membership becomes plain when we realize that his terminology—e.g., the “universal form”—comes from Aristotle’s philosophy (cf., \textit{Prior Analytics}, \textit{De Anima}, \textit{Physics}). As I have already noted, Kant’s categories play the same cognitive role as Aristotle’s. While some might argue that Dewey was more of a Hegelian than he was a Kantian, Hegel’s \textit{Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline} (1817)—the basis for Dewey’s idea that the categories are immanent in nature, dynamic, and evolving—presupposed the cognitive role Kant (and Aristotle) had given them.\textsuperscript{543} Heidegger never denied the cognitive importance of categories, but he denied the cognitive importance given to Aristotle’s and Kant’s list as a universal and therefore necessary means to understand \textit{human} beings. Hence, Heidegger would have denied the cognitive importance Dewey gave to relation to achieve such an understanding. In Chapter 4, I will explain why Heidegger denied the cognitive importance given to Aristotle’s and Kant’s list of categories as a means to understand human beings as social beings (not as physical facts, for which the categories are well suited), why he replaced them with his \textit{existentials}, and his replacement’s consequences for pre-service teacher education in the area of moral education.

By this point in my argument, I hope I have established the first four premises: 1) In Aristotle’s philosophy, the role of categories is to establish the classes through which all

\textsuperscript{541} Ibid, 80.
individual entities in the empirical world said ‘to be’—i.e., to exist—may be signified, and therefore known; 2) In Immanuel Kant’s philosophy, the categories are derived from Aristotle’s philosophy, and their role is the same; 3) Relation is one of Aristotle’s and Kant’s categories; and 4) Relation is the fundamental category in John Dewey’s notion of the essence of morality, and its role is the same. At the beginning of the next chapter, I will endeavor to establish the fifth: “Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is a correction of Aristotle’s and Kant’s categories.” I now turn to this task.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE HEIDEGGERIAN CORRECTION OF ARISTOTLE, KANT, AND DEWEY

The fifth premise of my argument is as follows: “Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is a correction of Aristotle’s and Kant’s categories.” Before I consider how this is so, I must first consider Heidegger’s fundamental ontology itself. In fact, I must consider what ontology is before considering why Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is unique. I now turn to these matters.544

Ontology

Ontology is an essential branch of metaphysics—i.e., “that which comes after ‘physics,’ the latter being the study of nature in general. Thus the questions of metaphysics arise out of, but go beyond, factual or scientific questions about the world.”545 Factual questions are questions about objective reality—i.e., questions about what is actual. “Ontology is the study of Being—

544 Michael C. “Mickey” Dwyer was my Heidegger teacher. We often talked about working together on a project that articulated the educational consequences of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology for pre-service teacher education in the area of moral education. To help me prepare for this project, he collaborated with me on a book chapter and on a paper we presented at the International Network of Philosophers of Education (INPE) meeting in Kyoto, Japan, in 2008. I say that Mickey helped me to prepare for this project because both collaborations had substantial sections on Heidegger’s philosophy and its consequences for teacher education. These collaborations were made possible by a Directed Individual Study (DIS) Dr. Jeffrey Milligan kindly approved, and by countless hours spent at Mickey’s trailer, my house, coffee shops, restaurants, and during road trips. Moreover, I further prepared for this project by writing, submitting, and publishing papers about Heidegger’s philosophy and its consequences for teacher education in various peer-reviewed publications. However, we did not get to collaborate on drawing out the educational consequences of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology for pre-service teacher education because Mickey died of pancreatic cancer in 2009. Lucky for me, he left a written record of his work on Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, but he did not draw out its consequences for pre-service teacher education in this work. His Master’s Thesis is said record [Michael C. Dwyer. Heidegger on Fundamental Ontology]. His thesis is the indispensable basis of this chapter. Rather than being a mere reproduction of it, this chapter is the result of doing the following to Mickey’s thesis: editing, paraphrasing, clarifying, drawing out implicit lines of reasoning, and articulating the logical consequences for pre-service teacher education. In other words, I consider this chapter (indeed, much of this dissertation) the fruit of the above-mentioned DIS and countless hours with Mickey. In short, it is my first attempt to do what I had hoped we would do together.

545 A.R. Lacey, A Dictionary of Philosophy, 3rd Revised Ed., 205.
i.e., of what is, of what is actual, of what exists.” Hence, ontology takes precedence, or is antecedent to physics, for ontology’s task is to establish the existence (actuality) of the entities that lie within physics’ domain—e.g., energy, matter, and their interactions—or, in Dewey’s humanistic term, within experience. In short, ontology seeks to establish the existence (actuality) of the entities the ‘beyond’ of which comprises the province of metaphysics.

Fundamental Ontology

On the face of it, the ‘fundamental’ in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology seems to inhere in ontology itself, and thus seems to be redundant, for what could be more fundamental than establishing the existence (actuality) of the entities that lie within the domain of experience? This is the question Heidegger endeavored to answer, but why?

According to Dwyer, Heidegger thought that astonishment with respect to the meaning of Being—in Carman’s words, “What does it mean to be?”—is the origin of philosophy in the Western tradition that effectively began with Plato. Astonishment is the emotion that “brings one to begin to philosophize and something which carries one along the way…. (It) … pervades our thought as we move forward” with our philosophizing. The tradition soon forgot this astonishment, which resulted in misunderstanding the meaning of Being. In trying to remember what the tradition forgot, Heidegger tried to guide it in a new direction by pointing to what it should have done, and thus what needs to be done now, viz., fundamental ontology.

The Western philosophical tradition has misunderstood the meaning of Being, said Dwyer, by presupposing three things: a) it is the clearest of all concepts, for we invoke it every time we conceive of any entity whatsoever; b) by virtue of its status as the most universal

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547 One may argue my exposition is dated, which would be to suggest that scientists (or physicists, to be more exact) have taken over the role, formerly reserved for philosophers, of establishing what in fact exists. I would reply that while scientists (or physicists) have taken over said role, they have not ceased practicing ontology.
548 From this perspective, the significance of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason lies in his attempt to establish a cognitive ‘machinery’ (which includes the categories) by means of which human beings can know what is, and thereby make metaphysics possible.
549 Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964), David Farrell Krell, ed., ix.
550 Here, the “tradition” means “the working out of the answers to certain problems which have been formulated in certain ways due to this forgetting” (Ibid, 4). It is not to be confused with Tradition, meaning ‘any worldview a person has been taught.’
551 Michael C. Dwyer. Heidegger on Fundamental Ontology, 3.
concept, Being is undefinable because all definitions appeal to more comprehensive concepts, so we can simply ignore the meaning of Being; and c) as the most universal concept, Being is self-evident. These presuppositions notwithstanding, “the meaning of Being is still veiled in darkness.” Thus, the purpose of fundamental ontology is to lift this veil.

According to Dwyer, Heidegger began to redirect the tradition with his discussion of Dasein, which literally means Being-there, with ‘there’ marking the ‘place’ where Being is revealed, and it is revealed in Dasein’s interaction with individual entities in the empirical world. Dasein is an entity, but unlike other entities—e.g., plants, telephones, books, etc.—it is uniquely a human entity, what all human entities are. Dasein differs from non-human entities in that “in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it”; it is what sets it apart from them. For instance, if I came across a plant and asked, “What is it?”, I could define its ‘essence’ by means of Aristotle’s and Kant’s categories, for its properties are fixed and can thus be known ahead of time—i.e., their ‘nature’ can be predicted and controlled for some purpose. Dasein, on the other hand, cannot be defined by means of said categories, for its ‘essence,’ while fixed, is to become, and therefore what it becomes cannot be known ahead of time—i.e., it cannot be predicted and controlled, despite efforts to do so. Hence, Heidegger created a set of categories exclusively

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552 “[Being is] the universal in beings as such, the meaning of being in general with regard to Being’s complete abstraction, apart from all relation to any specific being…. For every definition must dispose what is to be defined in proper order under a higher determination. Table is a use-object; a use-object is something extant; something that is extant is a being; Being belongs to beings. I cannot pass beyond Being; I already presuppose it in every determination of a being; it is not a genus; it cannot be defined” [Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Albert Hofstadter, trans., 84].

553 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, trans., 23.

554 Hence, it follows that Heidegger’s philosophy, and the philosophy of teacher education I will infer from it, which is a philosophy of moral education, cannot be impugned for promoting relativism, for Dasein and its existentials are universal states and conditions.

555 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 32.

556 In the case of non-human entities, ‘essence’ denotes their necessary and thus immutable properties, which inhere in the entities themselves. In Heidegger’s terms, non-human entities are present-at-hand. In Heidegger’s view, Aristotle’s and Kant’s categories are perfectly adequate for the task of thinking (cognizing) and therefore of learning about entities present-at-hand.

557 In other words, its ‘essence’ is to have possible ways ‘to be’, to choose one from among them, and to suffer the consequences. Hence, the purpose of education, or more specifically, of teachers—parents being the first and most significant ones—is to help students in the process of choosing some possible way ‘to be,’ not prescribing what to choose (e.g., the notion that preserving relation’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality, as Dewey insisted). When to children we prescribe what to choose, we effectively treat them as if they were non-human entities—i.e., as if they were present-at-hand. Hence, by prescribing that children adopt the notion in question, teachers treat them as if they were present-at-hand—Dewey’s claims to the contrary notwithstanding. In Chapter 5, I will illustrate what this assistance may look like, so that would-be teachers who are persuaded by my argument will have practical solutions (or pointers thereto) to help students in the endeavor in question.
for the purpose of defining Dasein’s ‘essence,’ He called them existentials.\(^5\) His creation of existentials to develop a proper understanding of Dasein was an implicit correction of Aristotle’s and Kant’s categories, for while the ‘nature’ of entities present-at-hand can be predicted and controlled for some purpose, Dasein’s ‘nature’ cannot (or rather, it is much more difficult to do). In what follows, I provide a selective list and a brief discussion of the existentials.

Mine-ness

Dasein “has its Being to be, and has it as its own.”\(^55\) While Heidegger used Dasein to describe all human entities, “[Dasein] must always be understood as mine.”\(^56\) “In each case Dasein is its possibility, and it ‘has’ this possibility.”\(^57\) Each possibility is an option that Dasein may or may not choose to actualize. However, the choice whether to actualize some possibility or not always (and fundamentally) belongs to Dasein, and to Dasein alone.\(^58\)

In Dwyer’s words, “the peculiar sense in which Dasein’s ‘essence’ is its existence has shown itself to be that Dasein defines itself through its actions, through actually existing.”\(^59\) While

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\(^5\) You could think of them as ‘lenses’ that always and already ‘color’ Being as it presents itself to Dasein.

\(^55\) Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 33, emphasis mine.

\(^56\) Michael C. Dwyer, Heidegger on Fundamental Ontology, 13. Note: whatever happens to an individual engaged in the business of living, which includes education, fundamentally happens to him, not to the social group with which he is associated, though of course what happens to him may have repercussions for it. By comparison, since according to Metz Dewey’s denial that human beings consist of a substantial form entailed concluding they are infinitely malleable, and for the sole purpose of expanding the general welfare, then what happens to a (Deweyan) ‘individual’ engaged in said business fundamentally happens not to him, but rather to the social group with which he is associated, for what has happened to him necessarily has repercussions for the social group’s growth. Dewey’s denial of a substantial form eliminated any notion of the essential and unchanging nature of human beings and a natural inclination following this nature—leaving reconstructed institutions (e.g., schools led by altruistic individuals) the task of continuously reshaping them according to the changing needs of the group. On the other hand, Heidegger’s replacement of Aristotle’s substantial form with Dasein allowed him to keep the notion of an essential and unchanging nature of human beings—and in Metz’s terms, to be infinitely malleable—is limited. There isn’t much room for Dewey’s optimism in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology.

\(^57\) Martin Heidegger. Being and Time, 68. This should not be understood as an abstract expression of ‘freedom,’ for in Heidegger’s thought, ‘freedom’ is always and already circumscribed and therefore limited by Dasein’s historicity—i.e., its existence in a particular time and place.

\(^58\) That is, not (or not primarily) to supposedly reconstructed social institutions.

\(^59\) Ibid, 33.
engaged in “actually existing,” Dasein exists *ontologically* when it is concerned with questions about the meaning of Being. However, Dasein exists *ontically* when it is concerned with non-Being—i.e., with taking action without thinking about the meaning of Being, or the meaning of what it means for it ‘to be’—and thus exists like all entities that exist present-at-hand. Aristotle’s and Kant’s categories are quite useful to cognize and therefore to know Dasein when it is not concerned with the meaning of Being, e.g., for determining students’ performance on standardized tests.

**Pre-ontological Understanding of Being**

I have shown that for Heidegger, Dasein is such that “in its very Being, that Being is an *issue* for it.”\(^{565}\) This implies that Dasein has *some* understanding of the meaning of Being, however vague it may be. In Heidegger’s words:

> It is peculiar to this entity [Dasein] that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it. *Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein’s Being* [emphasis in the original].

Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it *is* [emphasis in the original] ontological.\(^{566}\)

Dasein demonstrates its pre-ontological understanding of Being every time it says or implies that something *is*. However, Dasein’s pre-ontological understanding of Being remains inadequate as long as Dasein does not inquire into it—i.e., as long as Dasein is not existing *ontologically*. As Dwyer put it,

> [T]his pre-ontological understanding of Being has played a significant part in the tradition’s failure to grasp the problem of ontology in what Heidegger thinks is the proper way.\(^{567} 568\)

**Being-in-the-world**

According to Heidegger, Dasein is always and already abiding with some familiar aspect of the world. In Heidegger’s words:

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\(^{565}\) Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 32.

\(^{566}\) Ibid.

\(^{567}\) Michael C. Dwyer, *Heidegger on Fundamental Ontology*, 15.

\(^{568}\) This quote invokes the three presuppositions about Being I mentioned above.
When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere [e.g., ‘mind’] in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always ‘outside’ alongside entities which it encounters and which belong to a world already discovered…. And furthermore, the perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one’s booty to the ‘cabinet’ of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it; even in perceiving, retaining, and preserving, the Dasein which knows remains outside [emphasis in the original], and it does so as Dasein [emphasis in the original].

There are two things to note in this passage: a) Heidegger rejected the subject/object dichotomy; and b) by rejecting it, Heidegger effectively claimed that Dasein is always and already abiding with some more or less familiar aspect of the world. Because Dasein is always and already in such a state, it cannot choose to be ‘outside’ of it. In sum, Dasein is always and already in a state of transcendence with respect to entities present-at-hand.

Thrown-ness

Owing to always and already abiding with some more or less familiar aspect of the world, Dasein is thrown into the world. This suggests that it exists alongside other people, entities, and

569 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 89.
570 And thus he rejected the framework within which Kant labored, for Kant’s understanding of transcendence entailed giving an account of how the human mind (brain), or subject, can transcend its own boundaries to grasp—i.e., to know—an always ungraspable thing-in-itself, or object. Heidegger’s understanding of transcendence, on the other hand, entailed that since Dasein is always and already Being-in-the-world—i.e., it is always and already alongside familiar objects, Dasein is therefore not seeking to transcend towards objects, but is rather seeking to transcend towards the world, “which we might also understand as Being…” (Michael C. Dwyer, Heidegger on Fundamental Ontology, 55).
571 Within experience (in Dewey’s terminology). When Being-in-the-world is conceived in combination with mineness, it means something like the following: while one individual is familiar with some aspect of the world, another individual is unfamiliar with the same aspect. To put it into terms central to my concerns, while one individual is familiar with the notion that preserving relation’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality, another individual is unfamiliar with the same notion. In fact, the latter individual understands that self-preservation is the essence of morality, and thus understands that fusing his powers and dispositions with other individuals working toward expanding the social welfare will be worthwhile as long as such work remains consistent with self-preservation. In short, Being-in-the-world further particularizes Dasein’s mineness. Together, they constitute a boundary that distinguishes Dasein from the world, even while Dasein remains in and is of the world. This is the boundary Dewey dissolved when, in Metz’s account, he denied that human beings consist of a substantial form, and thus are infinitely malleable in the interests of expanding the general welfare. In short, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology gives Dasein a distinctive boundary Dewey’s ontology dissolved.
572 That is, unlike in Kant’s philosophy, there is no subject/object dichotomy to overcome.
573 Heidegger’s sense of transcendence is as follows: since Dasein’s ‘essence’ is to become, it is always and already in the process of becoming something as opposed to something else. While so engaged, it chooses an entity present-at-hand to help its becoming. While so engaged, it realizes the entity helps or hinders its becoming. Hence, Dasein transcends (or goes beyond) the entity as merely present-at-hand and toward the realization that it helps or hinders Dasein’s becoming something as opposed to something else.
is beset by sundry circumstances. By reason of being Dasein, it depends, more or less, upon these people, entities, and circumstances for its sustenance, and sometimes it finds itself at their mercy—i.e., it is powerless with respect to some of them, and its powerlessness varies according to the particular people, entities, and circumstances in question. In its state of dependence and powerlessness, Dasein comports itself towards these people, entities, and circumstances in some manner, and it creates itself according to how it chooses to comport itself towards them, and the options for self-creation they afford. In short, Dasein’s dependence and powerlessness with respect to people, entities, and circumstances in the world is one of its defining characteristics. As Dwyer put it, “This dependence and powerlessness, which together describe Dasein’s thrown-ness … also illuminates Dasein’s finitude.” In short, dependence and powerlessness in sundry forms and degrees always and already beset Dasein.

Earlier in the discussion I claimed that, according to Heidegger, the origin of Western philosophy lies in the emotion of astonishment with respect to Being—i.e., with respect to what it means ‘to be.’ Just like I carry this origin with me when I philosophize, I also carry my history, or rather, my past. In Heidegger’s words:

[Dasein] is [emphasis in the original] its past, whether explicitly or not…. Dasein ‘is’ its past in the way of its [emphasis in the original] own Being, which, to put it roughly, ‘historizes’ … its future on each occasion. Whatever the way of being it may have at the time, and thus with whatever understanding of Being it may possess, Dasein has grown up both into and in a traditional way of interpreting itself [emphasis mine]: in terms of this it understands itself proximally and, within a certain range, constantly. By this understanding, the possibilities of its Being are disclosed and regulated. Its own past—and this always means the past of its ‘generation’—is not something which follows along after [emphasis in the original] Dasein, but something which already goes ahead of it.
As I have maintained, Dewey was convinced that the essence of morality is preserving relation’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare. Furthermore, Dewey wanted public schools to ensure that all children adopt this opinion. Supposing that Dewey and the public schools (as he hoped they would be) had succeeded in this endeavor, the notion in question would have become the ‘past’ with which all children “historicize” their future. Thus, if public schools had succeeded like Dewey wanted them to, the notion in question would have become Dasein’s “traditional way of interpreting itself”—i.e., as one who necessarily fuses his powers and dispositions with those of other individuals toward the goal of expanding the general welfare, others’ blights notwithstanding. In short, if Dewey had had his way, the notion in question would have determined the possible ways in which Dasein may understand itself, and thus the possible ways for it ‘to be.’ Dewey’s notion would have determined Dasein’s future. In this way, Dewey’s notion would have played the same role as what I have been calling Tradition.579

Before moving on, I will summarize what I have said thus far. Dasein’s ‘essence’ is ‘to be’—i.e., it becomes by choosing to actualize one possibility, by ignoring another, and by suffering the consequences of both. While Dasein is Heidegger’s name for all human entities, it should always be understood as mine—e.g., I am always and already a being-in-the-world. As such, I am always and already abiding with more or less familiar aspects of the world, and I am dependent and powerless with respect to some of them to varying degrees, depending on the people, entities, and circumstances involved. Moreover, I have a pre-ontological understanding of Being, and may subsequently develop an ontological understanding of it—that is, if I can learn the basis of Tradition and revise, if not reject its prescriptions for how I should interpret myself and what is possible for me to think, to feel, and to do. Finally, I project my past into the

579 Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that Dewey was blindly advocating for reconciling children to the notion in question in order to defend traditional ways to be, for he understood the method of intelligence as the way to break with such ways that are no longer useful in attaining some future purpose. What I am suggesting is that if we admit that people are more or less blighted as I have described them, and that their blights are more or less indelible, then we must therefore admit that teaching children to adhere to the notion in question would amount to teaching them that the essence of morality is to associate themselves with people who will inevitably try (explicitly or implicitly) to transmit their sundry poxes to them through a process of education. In other words, Dewey’s method of intelligence may be expected to work as an effective tool with which to break with traditional ways to be if we assume (or perhaps only hope) that people are, in Metz’s words, “infinitely malleable.”
future—regardless of the degree to which I have been able to revise, if not reject Tradition—and thus the former determines (and limits) the latter.\(^{580}\)

Having summarized what I have said thus far, I now return to Heidegger’s idea that Dasein’s past determines its possibilities—i.e., its future. I return to it because I may have inadvertently suggested that Heidegger understood this aspect of the past to be a necessary restriction for Dasein. Not so. Dasein can undertake a critical review of Tradition to find its basis, and having found it, Dasein can thereby create possibilities extrinsic to it, if it so chooses. Such an undertaking has considerable educational consequences, and I will articulate them in Chapter 5. In the same spirit, Dasein can also undertake a critical review of the history of Western philosophy to find the basis of the question of the meaning of Being. By means of this undertaking—i.e., by means of “the task of destroying the history of ontology,”\(^{581}\) which Heidegger considered a positive step—we can learn the extent to which the history of Western philosophy has restricted our existential possibilities,\(^{582}\) and begin to learn how to move beyond its restrictions.

In light of these considerations, I can now address what Heidegger meant by fundamental ontology directly:

By fundamental ontology is meant that ontological analytic of man’s finite essence which should prepare the foundation for the metaphysics ‘which belongs to human nature.’ Fundamental ontology is that metaphysics of human Dasein necessary if metaphysics in general is to be possible.\(^{583}\)

I will let Dwyer explain at some length why Heidegger thought that fundamental ontology must be done prior to metaphysics:

\[\text{[Heidegger]}\text{ says that Plato and Aristotle leave the problems which are to become metaphysics in an unsettled state. The basic issue for them is knowledge of the entity as such and in its totality. There are two points which determine the development of metaphysics in the tradition which follow[s] Aristotle. The first}\]

\(^{580}\) Fundamentally, I reject the notion that preserving relation’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality, because I don’t want it to determine (and limit) my future.\(^{580}\)

\(^{581}\) Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 41.

\(^{582}\) In particular, Dewey’s philosophy of education.

\(^{583}\) Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 1-2.
is the methodology used, which is modeled on mathematics so as to be strictly rational. The second influence is Christianity, which states that all that is not divine is created, with the stipulation that man has a special place within the created.\(^{584}\) The second of these leads to metaphysics being divided up into Theology (knowledge of God, the creator), Psychology (knowledge of man) and Cosmology (knowledge of nature). These three together constitute what has come to be known as *metaphysica specialis* [emphasis in the original], knowledge of the entity in its totality.

We are left then with *metaphysica generalis* [emphasis in the original], or knowledge of the entity as such. This is what Heidegger calls ontology, or the study of Being. The proper place for philosophy according to Heidegger, is being engaged in ontology. The study of Being must always be accomplished through the study of some particular being(s), where the term “being(s)” always refers to some (any) particular being (entity), but this does not [emphasis in the original] say that Being must therefore be understood as [emphasis in the original] a being.\(^{585}\) Quite the opposite is the case for Heidegger, who says that Being is not a being. The question then arises, what is the relationship between Being and being? The problem which arises from a consideration of this is what Heidegger calls the *ontological difference* [emphasis mine], [which] is concerned with the *difference* [emphasis in the original] between Being and being. We have already seen that Dasein can be equated with transcendence, which for Heidegger is a going beyond something. This going beyond is always a going beyond something present-at-hand, a [non-human] entity. Transcendence implies that there is yet something to go beyond, for Heidegger, which is why we said that it must be understood as a continuous process…. What is it which is out there, which we have not yet gone beyond? What presents itself, reveals itself, in this place [viz., Da-sein] is Being ([Dasein is] the horizon of Being); and this is what Heidegger means by saying that Dasein is the place, the ‘there,’ at which Being reveals itself. Thus we might say that man (Dasein) is in [emphasis in the original] the difference of the ontological difference, that Dasein is that unique being who finds himself between things which are present-at-hand, and [is] the horizon within which Being reveals itself.\(^{586}\)

In short, and according to Dwyer’s exposition of Heidegger, the proper way to study Being (the object of *metaphysica specialis*) is to study the ontological difference between Being and being. Since Dasein is in this difference, then the proper way to study Being is to study how things present-at-hand (the object of *metaphysica generalis*) present themselves to Dasein—i.e., to study *fundamental ontology*.\(^{587}\) Once fundamental ontology is understood, then *metaphysica*

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\(^{584}\) For a traditional expression of this “special place,” see Psalms 8:4-8.

\(^{585}\) This is the mistake the Scholastics made when they conceived of Being as God (see below), and that Kant made as well, when he conceived of Being as a being—i.e., as an entity *present-at-hand*, the thing-in-itself.


\(^{587}\) Moral rules—including notions that stipulate permissible kinds of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors: for example, Dewey’s notion that preserving *relation’s* metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality—are entities present-at-hand. Hence, if we want to know about the metaphysics of morals, then we must begin with *Being-in-the-world*. In other words, we must begin
specialis becomes possible. By never recognizing the problem of the ontological difference that Heidegger formulated, said Dwyer, the Western philosophical tradition was led astray, and remained astray during the Middle Ages.

Being and God in the Middle Ages

According to Heidegger, the Western philosophical tradition during the Middle Ages approached all ontological problems from the perspective of the concept of God:

[T]he supreme being … the most perfect being…. What most perfectly is [emphasis in the original] is obviously most suited to be the exemplary being, from which the idea of being can be read off. God is not merely the basic ontological example of the being of a being; he is at the same time the primal ground of all beings [emphasis mine]. The non-divine, created entity must be understood by way of the being of the supreme being. Therefore it is no accident that the science of being [during the Middle Ages] is oriented in a distinctive sense toward the being which is God.

exactly where (and how) we are. As I have said, Tradition determines our understanding of where we are and where we can go. It does this by prescribing ways ‘to be’ in the form of moral rules. These exist where we are, i.e., they are familiar. Hence, moral education that aspires to educate students about the ultimate foundation of morals consists of presenting them with familiar moral rules (e.g., classroom rules) to determine how, or in what manner, students understand such rules. In order to determine the effects of such rules, we must encourage students to interpret them. Yet, students will be able to interpret them only after they understand their basis. According to Nietzsche, their basis is self-preservation, and Heidegger accepted this claim. Hence, if we want to know about the metaphysics of morals, and if we understand education to be a process of helping students to know said metaphysics so as to ground their moral reasoning, then we must begin by learning about the kind of self—my-self (mineness applies here)—familiar moral rules were created to preserve, and by learning about the kinds of selves students could create if they chose to revise, if not to reject, the familiar moral rules (including Dewey’s notion in question) created to prescribe who they are and where they can go.

That is, once we understand the kinds of selves familiar moral rules were created to preserve, and once we understand the kinds of selves students could create if they chose to revise, if not to reject the familiar moral rules created to prescribe who they are and where they can go, then we may begin to understand the ultimate foundation of morals. Since I expect teachers (or broadly, society) to employ sundry means to discourage students from creating certain kinds of selves (e.g., because they are convinced of the truth of Dewey’s notion in question and/or because they are required to obey certain district and/or state educational policies governing such matters), and thus to discourage students from creating certain kinds of selves where Being could be revealed with more diversity, then I do not expect to gain such an understanding. In the final analysis, therefore, the most I can expect moral education to achieve is to help some students to engage in moral reasoning according to the principle of self-preservation, with the understanding that thrown-ness will always mitigate their ability to take action according to the conclusions of such reasoning to some degree, depending on the people, entities, and circumstances at hand.

Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 29.
To say that God is “the primal ground of all beings” is the equivalent of Aldous Huxley saying in *Time Must Have a Stop* (1945), that the theological conception of said “ground” is “the ultimate all-embracing field … the unmanifested principle of all manifestation.”

As you may have inferred from the quote above, Heidegger suggested the Scholastics equated reality, or that which is actual, with God’s ‘essence’ (*essentia*), which would enable you to say, “That which is real is so because it corresponds to God’s ‘essence’.” In other words, the Scholastics maintained God’s ‘essence’ is the ground of the real. Since the real must also exist, the Scholastics therefore maintained that existence (*existentia*)—both actual and possible⁵⁹¹—corresponds to God’s essence. Since God’s essence must exist in order to be correspondent with existence (*existentia*), then God’s essence is His existence, and His existence is His essence; in short, God’s essence and existence are one. Both inhere in Him, and *only* in Him.

On the other hand, all other beings, humans included, are created. As such, they derive their essence and existence from God. In other words, essence and existence do *not* inhere in them, but rather in God. With respect to the Scholastics’ view on the existence of all created beings, Dwyer said the following:

> The relationship between possibility and actuality is such that existence is something added on to [emphasis mine] the reality, yet is not a part of it. This means that the cause of its actuality does not lie in the thing itself, for no created thing can cause itself.⁵⁹²

Here, Dwyer suggested the Scholastics maintained it is futile, sacrilegious, or perhaps even insane for human beings to suppose they have any power whatsoever to choose to actualize some possibility, which would be, simultaneously, to choose *not* to actualize some other one. In short, only God’s Will can choose to actualize the possible. If one were to adopt the Scholastic presupposition that human beings are utterly powerless to choose to actualize some possibility, then one would believe, in effect, in fatalism—i.e., in *utter* powerlessness, or in Heidegger’s term, in *utter thrown-ness*. Human beings who believe in fatalism of any kind leave the door open for Tradition to dictate which possibilities to actualize, and which to let alone. To

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⁵⁹¹ “We say possible here for it does not belong to the being of all things that they must be actual, some may only be possible” (Michael C. Dwyer, *Heidegger on Fundamental Ontology*, 30).
⁵⁹² Ibid, 32-33.
understand the consequences of adopting this presupposition is to understand how the Scholastic worldview, or fatalism generally, restricts human beings’ existential possibilities.\(^{593}\)

Returning to Heidegger’s point about the Western philosophical tradition’s second misunderstanding of the meaning of Being, Heidegger maintained Being cannot be defined. Yet, by thinking of Being as if it were a being—i.e., as an entity, God—the Scholastics thus gave themselves the task of defining it. This task is manifest in Heidegger’s account of their use of the words “supreme” and “perfect” to define it. In giving themselves the task of defining Being as if it were a being—viz., God—\(^{594}\) the Scholastics forgot, or perhaps overlooked the fact that “every definition must dispose what is to be defined in proper order under a higher determination.”\(^{595}\) In short, the Scholastics’ task of defining Being as if it were a being—viz., God—committed them to the logical conclusion that God is not the highest determination of being—i.e., of existence. This last sentence is significant for the following reason: by engaging in the task of defining God, and thus of defining essence and existence, the Scholastics betrayed that they themselves were the highest determination of Being; in Heidegger’s words, they themselves betrayed they were the ‘there’ where Being—i.e., God—was revealed. Moreover, when we remember mineness (one of Heidegger’s existentials), we can thereby infer the Scholastics’ definition (and thus Christianity’s definition by extension) of Being (God) was theirs. In other words, it does not necessarily have to be ours, nor its fatalism. Understanding the Scholastics’ first mistake, as I think Heidegger would have had it, could save us from the Christian tradition of the Middle Ages, that is, if we choose to be born again.

We can approach the Scholastics’ second mistake (according to Heidegger) by returning to my prior discussion of the supposed synonymity between reality and essence. The Scholastics equated “essence with real content, whatness, thingness (realitas),” which may also be designated as quidditas.\(^{596}\) The Scholastics took quidditas, said Heidegger, to mean “that which each thing already was [emphasis mine] in its thingness, before it became actual.”\(^{597}\) Hence,

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\(^{593}\) The educational consequences I will draw from this discussion, particularly with respect to the teacher-student relationship, will effectively entail trying to turn back the tide of the Scholastic legacy—i.e., to turn back the tide of a Christian form of fatalism—even all fatalism, which is widespread in my more or less blighted family.

\(^{594}\) What follows is what I think is the thrust of Heidegger’s critique of the Scholastics and the philosophical tradition that followed them, which is a critique of their failure to see the need for an existential analytic of Dasein—i.e., fundamental ontology.

\(^{595}\) Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 84.

\(^{596}\) Ibid, 85.

\(^{597}\) Ibid.
*quidditas* designates the ‘essence’ of a thing, and thus designates its reality. If we return to Heidegger’s discussion of a definition, we realize, or perhaps are only reminded that a definition delineates a thing’s “thingness”—i.e., its *quidditas*—and thus allows us to discriminate between one thing and another. In a later passage, Heidegger said the following about a thing’s *quidditas*: it is…

That which constitutes the proper determinateness of a being is at the same time what is at its root, the radical, from which all of the thing’s properties and activities are determined and prefigured. Hence what is thus rootlike in a being, its essence, is also designated as *natura*….⁵⁹⁸

The act of defining, when done well, captures and expresses said “radical.” As Heidegger saw it, the Scholastics formulated the *ontological difference* as the difference between a thing’s root and the fruit that it bears, or more literally, as the difference between a thing’s possibility and its actuality. By conceiving of Being as God, and of essence and existence as only inhering in Him, they therefore conceived of the *ontological difference* as the difference between what God’s Will transforms from possible to actual, and those possibilities His Will does not actualize. In sum, Heidegger held that the Scholastics’ mistake in conceiving of the *ontological difference* is twofold: a) they conceived of Being as God; and b) they conceived of God as the cause of the transformation of the possible to the actual.

I need to say one more thing before I move on to discussing Heidegger’s correction of Kant, and by extension, of Dewey. The Scholastics claimed that all created beings, including humans, derive—or in Platonic language, *participate*—in God’s essence and existence. Thus, and by the logic implicit in this conception, we find God on one side, and His creatures on the other. Since all created beings are grouped together, Heidegger maintained the Scholastics assumed that Aristotle’s categories were adequate for the task of thinking about (cognizing) human and non-human entities alike. We have already seen that Heidegger thought Dasein is not like non-human entities, for its essence is ‘to be.’ Hence, Dasein requires a new set of categories—viz., the *existentials*—through which we may understand how Being discloses itself to Dasein. Dwyer said it like this:

⁵⁹⁸ *Ibid*, 86.
Thus we once again see how the influence of Christian dogma, which breaks the world up into the uncreated being (God, Being) and created beings, has led the tradition astray. Dasein gets thrown into the same category as all other entities, for they are all created beings; and thus the basic difference between Dasein and other entities is missed.\footnote{Michael C. Dwyer, \textit{Heidegger on Fundamental Ontology}, 34.}

Kant (and Dewey) shared the Scholastics’ assumption about the utility of Aristotle’s categories to think about (cognize) human and non-human entities alike, if not their assumption that human and non-human entities were both created,\footnote{Dewey’s reliance on \textit{relation} to think about (cognize) the essence of morality suggests that he, like the Scholastics, implicitly conceived of human beings as created. Of course, the crucial difference between them was that while for the Scholastics God was the Creator, for Dewey it was biological evolution through natural selection. Nevertheless, both the Scholastics and Dewey conceived of human beings as created, while Heidegger conceived of them as \textit{self} created—not biologically, of course, but rather existentially, i.e., through the choices we make and do not make.} and this is the reason why, according to Heidegger, Kant (and Dewey) was also led astray.

\textit{Kant Carried the Scholastics’ Torch}

Modern philosophy began with Descartes, and what made it modern was a turn toward the subject. However, this turn was misleading. In Dwyer’s words:

\begin{quote}
[F]or all the attention that is placed on the subject in modern philosophy … the nature of the subject is never brought into question. Thus modern philosophy also fails to provide the proper basis for metaphysics, which Heidegger thinks is fundamental ontology. This, Heidegger claims, holds true even for Kant, despite all of the positive gains he makes with respect to Descartes.\footnote{Ibid, 36.}
\end{quote}

Hence, I will begin this section by summarizing Dwyer’s account of Descartes’ philosophy to identify the position against which Kant made positive gains. Then, I will summarize Dwyer’s account of Kant’s philosophy and point to Heidegger’s correction of it, and the latter’s correction of Dewey by extension.

Because Descartes was a Christian, he understood Being as a being, viz., as God. Everything not God was His Creation, which Descartes separated into two parts: spirit (\textit{res cogitans}) and matter (\textit{res extensa}). This is the subject/object dichotomy.\footnote{Kant accepted it, as I will show.} He considered each to
be a substance.\textsuperscript{603} Descartes’ subject is “absolutely certain,”\textsuperscript{604} as his famous \textit{cogito} suggests. Because of its certainty, it is indubitable, and Descartes reasoned that what is indubitable must be known better than anything else whatsoever. Hence, Descartes never questioned the subject “with respect to its Being,”\textsuperscript{605} i.e., he never attempted fundamental ontology. “Thus if we wish to see how Descartes treats … the issue of Being we are left with only his analysis of [matter] … to look toward, his investigations of \textit{res extensa}.”\textsuperscript{606}

According to Heidegger, Descartes claimed that “[s]ubstances become accessible in their ‘attributes,’ and every substance has some distinctive property from which the essence of the substantiality of that definite substance can be read off.”\textsuperscript{607} Extension is matter’s distinctive property, and we can, according to Heidegger’s account of Descartes, from extension read off matter’s essence—i.e., its particular mode of Being.

The Being of a ‘substance’ is characterized by not needing anything. That whose Being is such that it has no need at all for any other entity satisfies the idea of substance in the authentic sense; this entity is the \textit{ens perfectissimum} [emphasis in the original].\textsuperscript{608}

According to Christian dogma, God is the self-sufficient Creator. Since He is self-sufficient, He does not need anything, and because He does not need anything, He is a substance in the authentic sense; He is the \textit{ens perfectissimum}. As such, He is ‘substance’ \textit{par excellence}. As the Creator, spirit (\textit{res cogitans}) and matter (\textit{res extensa}) are His creations. While each is a substance, they are not so to the same degree. Since God, spirit (\textit{res cogitans}), and matter (\textit{res extensa}) are not substances to the same degree, then they do not share the same degree of Being. If these entities were conceived to share the same degree of Being, then the distinction between the Creator and the Creation would collapse.\textsuperscript{609} Having presupposed Christian dogma as here described, Descartes found that maintaining this distinction was necessary.

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{603} Martin Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 125. He thus defined \textit{substance}: “By substance we can understand nothing else than an entity which is [emphasis in the original] in such a way that it needs no other entity in order to be” [emphasis in the original].
    \item \textsuperscript{604} Michael C. Dwyer, \textit{Heidegger on Fundamental Ontology}, 37.
    \item \textsuperscript{605} Ibid.
    \item \textsuperscript{606} Ibid.
    \item \textsuperscript{607} Ibid, 38.
    \item \textsuperscript{608} Martin Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 123.
    \item \textsuperscript{609} Ibid, 125.
\end{itemize}
I want to return to the Christian notion that Being is a being, viz., God, and as such its being ‘substance’ *par excellence*. Recall Heidegger’s assertion that Descartes claimed “[s]ubstances become accessible in their ‘attributes,’ and every substance has some distinctive property from which the essence of the substantiality of that definite substance can be read off.” In his paraphrase of Descartes, Heidegger said the following:

[Descartes] emphasizes explicitly that substance as such—that is to say, its substantiality—is in and for itself inaccessible from the outset…. ‘Being’ itself does not ‘affect’ us, and therefore cannot be perceived.\(^6\)

Since Being is a being, viz., God, and as such it is ‘substance’ *par excellence*, then Being (God, substance) is inaccessible to us from the outset. However, God is accessible to us through His attributes—i.e., through his Creation: matter (*res extensa*) through extension, and spirit (*res cogitans*) through thinking.\(^7\)

To say that God (substance) is inaccessible to us from the outset is to say that He is inaccessible to us by the categories, for as I said in Chapter 3, the categories are the classes through which all individual entities in the empirical world said ‘to be’—i.e., to exist—may be signified, and therefore known. Descartes’ presupposition that Being is a being, viz., God, and that He (substance) is inaccessible to us from the outset effectively assumes the categories’ proper sphere of application is God’s Creation, of which Dasein is a part.\(^8\) Heidegger maintained that Descartes’ placement of Being out of Dasein’s reach demonstrates that the *ontological difference* did not occur to him, which is to say that Descartes, like the Scholastics before him, did not realize that by engaging in the task of defining God and His attributes,\(^9\) and thus of defining essence and existence, betrayed that he *himself* was, or was in effect attempting to become, the highest determination of Being. In Heidegger’s words, Descartes betrayed that he *himself* was the ‘there’ where Being—i.e., God, substance, essence, existence—was disclosed. Dwyer put the matter like this:

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\(^6\) Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 126-127.

\(^7\) Michael C. Dwyer, *Heidegger on Fundamental Ontology*, 39.

\(^8\) As I have said, Dewey fell prey to this philosophical tradition, even though he rejected theism.

\(^9\) This task includes delineating where God is and is not to be found.
Descartes’ mistake, according to Heidegger, is in equating Being with that which is constantly present-at-hand in an unchanging fashion. The ideal here for Descartes, as it was for the Scholastics, can be seen to be influenced by the concept of God. [Since] God is pure actuality, it is contrary to the nature of God to have within Him an unrealized potentiality. Only if something is present in an unchanging fashion can we have certain knowledge of it, and knowledge must be certain or it is not knowledge. Thus he adopts mathematics as his model for knowledge because it is uniquely suited to grasp that which does not change, namely, mathematical truths.⁶¹⁴

Kant labored under the Scholastic and Cartesian assumption that Being is a being,⁶¹⁵ and that as being (in the case of God) and having (in the case of the ‘thing-in-itself’) true substance, it is inaccessible from the outset, and thus cannot be perceived, save through its attributes: matter (res extensa) through extension, and spirit (res cogitans) through thinking.

Unlike Descartes, who never questioned the subject “with respect to its Being,” and who instead approached Being through extension, Kant did—i.e., he approached Being through thinking, or rather through how the human mind (brain) thinks about Being—and thus he made a positive gain with respect to Descartes’ position. In Dwyer’s words:

Kant’s turn toward the question, ‘what is man?,’ the recognition of man’s essence as that of a finite being⁶¹⁶ and consequently the importance of the problem of transcendence, are the positive moves Kant makes over the position developed by Descartes. In the end, however, we shall see that Kant does not take his investigations far enough and ultimately fails to give what Heidegger sees as being the proper basis for metaphysics, or more precisely, fundamental ontology—an existential analytic of Dasein.⁶¹⁷

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant’s main concern was with the “possibility [emphasis in the original] of empirical knowledge.”⁶¹⁸ Since all knowledge claims as such are epistemological claims by definition, and since epistemological claims must correspond with metaphysical entities in order to be true,⁶¹⁹ then the Critique of Pure Reason is a work on metaphysics.

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⁶¹⁴ Michael C. Dwyer, Heidegger on Fundamental Ontology, 39-40.
⁶¹⁵ For the Scholastics and Descartes, Being was God. For Kant, it was the ‘thing-in-itself’, which he assumed was present-at-hand for the reason articulated in the quote above where this note appears in the text.
⁶¹⁶ As I have shown in my discussion of his existentials, Heidegger shared Kant’s opinion about human beings’ finitude.
⁶¹⁷ Michael C. Dwyer, Heidegger on Fundamental Ontology, 40.
⁶¹⁸ Ibid.
⁶¹⁹ This is an expression of the classic correspondence theory of truth.
Rather than arguing that knowledge must conform to empirical objects, like Locke and other empiricists argued, Kant argued the reverse—viz., empirical objects must conform to knowledge, or more precisely, to the a priori structure of the mind\textsuperscript{620} in terms of which knowledge is organized. The problem for Kant, therefore, was to explain how such objects conform to, and are understood in terms of said structure. In short, Kant’s problem was to explain transcendence.\textsuperscript{621} Moreover, since Kant understood the a priori structure of our minds as fixed,\textsuperscript{622} then any datum inexpressible in terms of an intuition\textsuperscript{623} is unintelligible. Such a datum—e.g., infrared radiation—suggests human finitude, for while such data may exist, they may be inexpressible in terms of intuitions. In sum, Heidegger read Kant’s \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} as representing the first time in the Western tradition in which a philosopher had attempted to lay the proper basis for metaphysics, viz., \textit{fundamental ontology}.

According to Heidegger, Kant’s basis for metaphysics consisted of the a priori structure of the mind (brain). With respect to this structure, Kant’s investigation began with the following question: “How are judgments by principles without recourse to experience possible?”\textsuperscript{624} To ask this question is to ask about the nature, or essence, of human beings.\textsuperscript{625} For Kant, human beings are such that they attain knowledge of individual objects in the empirical world, and only of objects therein, by means of intuitions.\textsuperscript{626} Intuitions are representations of said objects, and concepts are representations of the common features of said objects as communicated by intuitions. Finally, thinking (cognition) entails the use of concepts.\textsuperscript{627} Because the human mind (brain) is a necessary aspect of human nature (essence), because it learns about said objects only insofar as intuitions can represent them,\textsuperscript{628} because it can think about (cognize) them only insofar as concepts can represent the common features of said objects as communicated by intuitions,

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{620} For a synopsis of it, please see Chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{621} Of course, Kant formulated transcendence in terms of the classic subject/object dichotomy, which, as I have shown, Heidegger rejected.
\textsuperscript{622} To put the matter in contemporary layman’s terms, the human brain’s structure predisposes it to operate in one way, as opposed to another.
\textsuperscript{623} Or sense experience communicable to the brain through the nervous system.
\textsuperscript{624} Heidegger would have asked the question like this: “How is ontological knowledge possible?” (Michael C. Dwyer, \textit{Heidegger on Fundamental Ontology}, 42).
\textsuperscript{625} I have already shown Heidegger agreed with Kant that finitude is a constitutive element of human beings’ (Dasein’s) essence.
\textsuperscript{626} Intuitions do not become knowledge “until there is a judgment of the object as something or other” (Michael C. Dwyer, \textit{Heidegger on Fundamental Ontology}, 44).
\textsuperscript{627} Michael C. Dwyer, \textit{Heidegger on Fundamental Ontology}, 43.
\textsuperscript{628} Dwyer expressed this as Kant’s claim that human knowledge, and thus human beings, are “dependent [emphasis mine] on the object which it intuits” (Ibid, 44).
\end{footnotesize}
because there are individual objects in the empirical world unrepresentable by intuitions (and are thus unintelligible), and because this latter state avers human finitude, then it follows that human nature (essence), and thus the knowledge it can attain of said objects, is finite.

Dwyer claimed that Kant thought intuition and understanding “spring from … a common but unknown root.” This quote invites the question: which common root? This question takes me into a consideration of the a priori structure of the human mind (brain), according to Kant. The ‘pure understanding’ adds the ‘pure intuitions’ of space and time to intuitions proceeding from individual objects in the empirical world as they make impressions on humans’ sensory apparatus. Then, the ‘pure understanding’ transforms intuitions-so-clothed into concepts. It effects this transformation by means of the ‘pure concepts’ of the understanding—viz., the categories—that comprise it. In other words, the ‘pure understanding’ relies on the categories to grasp intuitions to form concepts. Kant identified his “table of judgments” as the origin of the categories. Disagreeing with Kant, Heidegger interpreted Kant’s table as constituting the “source of access to the discovery of the [origin of the] categories.” To discover their origin is to

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629 I reach this conclusion by means of the following reasoning: there was a time when scientists did not know about infrared radiation because they did not have the proper tools with which to detect and measure it; scientists came to know about infrared radiation when they had the proper tools with which to detect and measure it. Abstractly, there was a time when scientists did not know about x because they did not have the proper tools with which to detect and measure it; scientists came to know about x when they had the proper tools with which to detect and measure it. The history of science attests to sundry examples of this from-ignore	
to-knowledge pattern. Hence, I conclude it is likely this pattern will be repeated.

630 The following words summarize the line of reasoning I have articulated in this passage: “A judgment is a representation (concept) of a representation (intuition)”, which comes from individual objects in the empirical world. Hence, human beings, like Plato’s artists in the Republic, are thrice removed from the Kantian “thing-in-itself”—i.e., from what is. “The faculty of judging Kant calls the understanding. The understanding is thought in its finitude [i.e., the faculty of judging is thought in its finitude, and thought is finite because judgment is not a representation of the thing-in-itself]. Knowledge is thus for [human beings] a union of (a synthesis [of] the understanding and [intuition]. These two aspects of the human mind, intuition … and understanding spring from, says Kant, a common but unknown root” [Michael C. Dwyer, Heidegger on Fundamental Ontology, 44]. A consequence from the above is as follows: what a human being can know depends on the representational means at her disposal and on the acuteness of her senses. Hence, her knowledge is limited to the degree the representational means at her disposal and/or the acuteness of her senses is limited.

631 From this point forward, ‘pure’ will denote aspects of said structure.

632 It must be kept in mind that Kant tried to do with philosophy in the 18th century what neuroscientists have tried to do with empirical research in the 20th and the 21st: to understand the capabilities and limitations of the human brain. In other words, to understand what it can and cannot do—an understanding we may justly call the foundation of education.

633 This consideration goes beyond what I said about the a priori structure of the human mind (brain) in Chapter 3.

634 Space is “that in which things that affect the senses are ordered (external)” [emphasis mine], and time is “that in which we order [emphasis mine] our representations (internal)” (Michael C. Dwyer, Heidegger on Fundamental Ontology, 45).

635 Ibid.

636 Michael C. Dwyer, Heidegger on Fundamental Ontology, 46.

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discover the “common but unknown root” from which spring ‘pure intuition’ (viz., space and time) and ‘pure understanding.’

As I said a few lines above, the ‘pure understanding,’ which is comprised of ‘pure concepts’—viz., the categories—relies on them to grasp intuitions to form concepts. In grasping intuitions, the ‘pure understanding’ also subsumes them, through the condition of time, under the categories. How is this possible? According to Dwyer, Kant argued the ‘pure understanding’ applies “transcendental schema” to intuitions to grasp and subsume them, through the condition of time, under the categories. Hence, ‘pure understanding’ clothes individual objects in the empirical world in a permanent shroud of temporality.

While the ‘pure understanding’ applies the schema to intuitions, the ‘pure intuitions’ and the ‘pure understanding’ both stem from ‘pure imagination.’ In other words, the ‘pure imagination,’ according to Heidegger, is Kant’s “common but unknown root” from which spring the ‘pure intuitions’ and the ‘pure understanding.’ Dwyer said the following about Heidegger’s views on the ‘pure imagination’:

The [pure] imagination is at the same time productive (spontaneous) and receptive. It is productive in that it is capable of producing images … recalled from the past…. So the [pure] imagination is productive, creative, in a way which is not dependent on an object being present and allowing itself to be seen, as the intuition is dependent, though it is nonetheless just as finite…. It is receptive in a way similar to intuition, [in that] both give to the mind.

Because the ‘pure intuition’ (viz., space and time) and the ‘pure understanding’ are both aspects of the ‘pure imagination,’ it follows that ‘pure intuition’ and ‘pure understanding’ are both productive and receptive: ‘pure intuition’ produces “temporal restrictions it imposes on any empirical encounter in order for [it] to be represented,” and it receives ‘pure space’ and ‘pure

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637 “Time … has a central role to play in the application of the categories to … (intuitions)” (Ibid, 47). On the same page, Dwyer called ‘time’ a “condition of [intuitions],” suggesting the latter always and already take place within the framework of the former.

638 Ibid, 46, 47. Since time mediates their application, the schemas are to be understood in terms of time. For example, Kant understood the schema of substance (one of his categories, and incidentally the one Dewey rejected in his conception of human beings’ ontology) as the “permanence of the real in time” (Kant, as quoted in Ibid, 47), and the schema of necessity (another one of his categories) as “the existence of an object at all times” (Kant, as quoted in Ibid, 48).

639 Ibid, 48-49.

640 Ibid, 49.
time’ from the empirical encounter upon which it imposed temporal and spatial restrictions in the first place; ‘pure understanding,’ on the other hand, receives intuitions clothed by the ‘pure intuition,’ and it produces concepts by applying the categories to said intuitions. In light of the foregoing considerations, Kant’s mistake, according to Heidegger, was that he failed to see that the ‘pure imagination’ is the “common but unknown root” of ‘pure intuition’ and ‘pure understanding,’ that the ‘pure imagination’ makes transcendence possible, and most importantly for my purposes, that the ‘pure imagination’ creates the categories, yet is not itself intelligible in its terms.

This last mistake (in Heidegger’s opinion) is manifest in Kant’s conception of the ‘self’ as consisting of three elements: the personalitas transcendentalis, the personalitas psychologica, and the personalitas moralis. Only the first one concerns me here. It is, according to Dwyer,

The ego which corresponds to the ‘I think’, where this is always an ‘I connect something’, an ‘I bind’ [viz., the ‘pure intuitions’ and the ‘pure understanding’ to create knowledge about individual entities in the empirical world]. It is the ground of, the possibility of all representation. It is the condition for the possibility of the categories ever being used, or applied…. [According to Dwyer, Kant maintained the ‘I think’] cannot be explained with the help of the categories, and therefore cannot be explained at all. Kant, like Descartes and the [Western] tradition before him, failed to see that the categories are not the only option available; and thus they fall short of what Heidegger seeks. They do not see the possibility of Heidegger’s existentials [emphasis mine], and thus do not carry out an existential analytic of Dasein.

Heidegger’s correction of Kant is threefold: a) Kant, along with Descartes and the Scholastics before him, failed to see that Being is not a being; b) Kant failed to see that Dasein is in the ontological difference between Being and being; and c) Kant failed to see that humans’ being in said difference requires a different set of categories with which to think about the ‘I’ of the ‘I think’—viz., Dasein. I will now discuss the bearing of the foregoing discussion on what I imagine would have been Heidegger’s correction of Dewey.

641 Towards the world, again, from the perspective of the classic subject/object dichotomy.
642 “It is the ‘I think’ (which is always an ‘I think x’) that the categories are brought into use” (Ibid).
643 I included this brief discussion to illustrate what Heidegger thought was Kant’s mistake, viz., he failed to see that the ‘pure imagination’ creates the categories, and can therefore create the existentials necessary to undertake what Heidegger thought Kant came close to doing, viz., fundamental ontology.
644 Ibid, 53, 54.
Heidegger’s Correction of Dewey

Perhaps unsurprisingly, a Heideggerian correction of Dewey entails the former’s correction of the latter’s ontology. The reasons why Heidegger would offer to correct Dewey’s ontology are because Dewey made the same mistakes as the Scholastics, Descartes, and Kant, though going beyond them in many respects (e.g., in rejecting the subject/object dichotomy). For instance, Dewey failed to see that Being is not a being. By supposing Being to be a being—in his case, ‘Nature,’ which could be understood as biological evolution through natural selection, or as biological evolution through institutional selection (for science held out the promise of giving philosopher-technocrats increased powers of benevolent prediction and control)—Dewey was therefore committed to supposing that every human and non-human entity within it is its creature. You may recall that this division between the ‘creator’ and his/its ‘creation’ is the reason the Scholastics used Aristotle’s categories to understand supposedly created individual entities. In relying on Aristotle’s categories (relation to be exact) to understand and order creation—in terms of my concerns, to define the essence of morality in terms of relation’s necessary governance over social life—Dewey revealed his membership in the philosophical tradition Heidegger sought to correct. By classifying human beings with the rest of creation—which is to say, by classifying them as events “within the larger system of events which Dewey called “experience” (see below), or as “abstractions from a larger ongoing functional (and organic) process” (see below)—Dewey failed to see that Dasein is in the ontological difference between Being and being. In this case, Heidegger’s correction would have been the observation that Dasein is self-created—not asexually, of course, but rather morally, existentially—i.e., through the choices it makes and does not make, not through the supposedly benevolent social engineering effected by altruistic parents, teachers, administrators, and social leaders—and thus deserves to be understood on its own terms, viz., through existentials.

The above observations bring us to consider Dewey’s justification for conceiving of human beings as “events” and “abstractions.” Metz, whom I discussed in Chapter 2, will help us here as well. According to him,

[Dewey] denied any ontological unity to substance and form…. By denying the notion of substantial form, as classically held, Dewey has precluded any natural inclination to action in accordance with form….

645 This is Dewey’s fundamental assumption in Experience and Nature.
Having denied substantial form, any notion of the essential and unchanging nature of man and a natural inclination following this nature will be eliminated as the ultimate end and measure of [education].  

Metz explained the significance of Dewey’s denial in the following way:

The absence of such a qualification regarding man’s nature and end allows … [Dewey] to treat man as a special kind of “event” within the larger system of events which Dewey called “experience”. Accordingly, the question of human freedom is not to be understood from the perspective of the individual’s substantiality, individuality, or rationality, but in terms of adjustment and the experimental perception of consequences [emphasis mine].

Thus, it would be incumbent upon what Dewey hoped would be virtuous teachers (i.e., not the kind of conformist teachers Apple described in Ideology and Curriculum) to cajole event-students to choose to fuse their powers and dispositions with other event-students toward the end of expanding the general welfare—first, of the classroom community, then of the community at large—and then to engage in “experimental perception of [the] consequences” of cajoling them to determine whether or not, and if so the extent to which they choose to behave as society demands. If event-students did not choose to behave as expected, teachers would repeat and revise the procedure (according to the method of intelligence) until they successfully cajoled event-students to choose to behave in the expected manner. In short, the event-student would choose to behave according to social demands as mediated by supposedly benevolent teachers.

In another context, Metz articulated Dewey’s notion of the ‘individual’ more explicitly:

In view of the centrality of the process of association [emphasis mine] and his relativistic interpretation of man, Dewey implicitly substituted “growth” and the method by which it is to be realized [viz., the method of intelligence] for the individual as the proper end of [education and thus of] … the democratic state. For Dewey “individuality” was a formal and artificial concept.

Having elided substance—or rather, the notion of a fixed essence—Dewey, in Metz’s words, rendered “man [an] infinitely malleable” event whose choice to adopt Dewey’s notion of the...
essence of morality could be elicited by supposedly benevolent philosopher-technocrats’ understanding of what a society largely cured of the blights I have been adducing demands. Dewey’s elision is why Anderson claimed that Dewey’s conception of people was “abstract,” and to be made ‘concrete’ only according to always evolving (and putatively benevolent) social demands.

Morse corroborated Metz’s account of Dewey’s ontological innovation. In his own words,

[A]ccording to … [Dewey’s] … ontology, function replaces substance, so that both “physical event” and “person” are taken to be abstractions from a larger ongoing functional process rather than pre-existing entities (or substances) standing outside the process.

For Dewey, the “larger ongoing functional process” is that of the organism interacting with the environment, and of both undergoing the consequences of the interaction. Within this process, the difference between human and non-human entities is one of degree, not of kind, for they both bear a vital and organic relationship to their environment, in which they both act and undergo the consequences of their action. Eliding substance from his conception of human beings allowed Dewey to absorb them into his Progressive neo-Hegelian flux in the service of expanding the general welfare.

Heidegger’s conception of Dasein, on the other hand, problematizes Dewey’s naturalistic neo-Hegelian idealism. By replacing Aristotle’s substantial form with Dasein—i.e., the ‘place’ where the meaning of Being is revealed through Dasein’s choices—Heidegger was able to keep the notion of an essential and unchanging nature of human beings—viz., to become—without dissolving Dasein’s particularity—i.e., its mineness. In other words, that which persists amidst change for Dasein is that it always chooses ‘to be’ something and not something else—e.g., one who may or may not choose to fuse his powers and dispositions with that of other individuals for the sake of expanding the general welfare. If we were to combine Dasein’s Being-in-the-world with its mineness, it would mean something like this: while one individual is familiar with some aspect of the world, another individual is unfamiliar with the same aspect. To put it into terms

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649 D.J. Morse, “Dewey’s Ethics: Moral Value in the Natural World.”
650 Ibid, 174. While Heidegger would have agreed that human beings are always and already a being-in-the-world, it does not follow that they should be conceived in the manner in question, and for the reasons I have discussed.
central to my concerns, while one individual is familiar with the notion that preserving relation’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality, another individual is unfamiliar with the same notion. In fact, the latter individual understands that self-preservation is the essence of morality, and thus understands that fusing his powers and dispositions with other individuals working toward expanding the social welfare will be worthwhile, as long as such work remains consistent with his best understanding of self-preservation. Being-in-the-world further particularizes Dasein’s mineness. Together, they constitute a boundary that distinguishes Dasein from the world (and from other Daseins), even while Dasein remains in and is of the world. This is the boundary Dewey dissolved when, in Metz’s account, he denied that human beings consist of a substantial form, and thus are infinitely malleable in the interests of expanding the general welfare. In short, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology gives Dasein a distinctive boundary Dewey’s ontology dissolved.

In addition, when we combine Dasein’s Being-in-the-world and its mineness with its thrown-ness and finitude, we can understand that human beings’ ability to become—or in Metz’s terms, to be “infinitely malleable” in the service of expanding the general welfare—is limited. As I said before, the chief limitation in Dewey’s notion of the essence of morality is Dasein’s egocentrism, which is a function of its finitude. This is to say that Dasein’s egocentrism is more or less indelible.

To put the matter in contemporary terms, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology (like Kant’s transcendental philosophy) was an attempt to understand how the human mind (brain) works as it processes information from the empirical world in which it always and already lives. Thus, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is a philosophical rendition of the project of neuroscience. Both try to understand that which is universal and therefore necessary in human beings: structurally, each and every one of them has a brain that works in the exact same way. For example, every neuron in every brain must send an impulse across a synapse in order to communicate with another neuron. Dewey’s naturalistic neo-Hegelianism, on the other hand, is not, for it is primarily concerned with organisms’ observable behavior—i.e., its adaptive courses of action, habits, and active functions as they interact with their environment.

In my view, one distinct advantage that Heidegger’s fundamental ontology enjoys over Dewey’s neo-Hegelianism is that it points towards Piaget’s developmental psychology, and
particularly towards his observation of how our brains make sense of the world. What I have in mind here is my earlier discussion of how Dasein constantly historicizes its future in terms of its past, or Tradition—i.e., the worldview it has been taught. To summarize Piaget, from a young age we actively create mental schema of our world, and actively seek data to determine whether or not they confirm our schema. If the data do not confirm them, then we will revise them in order to strengthen their explanatory and predictive power. According to Piaget, this is how a ‘normal’ human brain works, and the way it can work throughout our lives.\footnote{Bärbel Inhelder and Jean Piaget, \textit{The Early Growth of Logic in the Child: Classification and Seriation}, E.A. Lunzer and D. Papert, trans., 1964.} The human brain’s ‘normal’ function, however, may be impeded by teachers who compel children, however benevolently, to choose to adopt and defend one mental schema at the exclusion of others, when others may be more useful: for example, the notion that preserving \textit{relation}’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality, as opposed to the notion that the basis (or essence) of morality is self-preservation, with Heidegger’s understanding that the \textit{self} exists in a state of continuous becoming, and thus exists in a continuous state of creating, testing, and revising its mental schema, with and without the help of other people. In short, Heidegger’s \textit{fundamental ontology} is consistent with the way in which the human brain works (according to Piaget), and Dewey’s excessively optimistic neo-Hegelianism is inconsistent with it. I say this because we should expect indelibly blighted adults to persuade (if not compel) children to adopt the notion in question, without at the same time subjecting their blights to the ameliorative treatment of the method of intelligence—i.e., to subjecting them to trial and revision in light of their consequences when acted upon. This is to say that in effect, and under the governance of the notion in question, such adults will, for example, praise the virtues of ‘family’ and/or ‘community’ solidarity, without at the same time trying to revise (if not reject) their sundry blights. Thus, such adults will endeavor (more or less deliberately) to transmit their blights to the children in their care,\footnote{With the exceptions noted in my literature review, Dewey was no champion of the moral status quo. He had enduring faith in the method of intelligence to break the hold of traditional ways to be on present and future behavior. If the people he hoped to create through a benevolent education actually existed (or could exist), then I would have striven to become a champion of Dewey’s cause. However, and as Anderson noted (see note 396), we are not dealing with “abstract people.” Rather, we are dealing with people who are more or less blighted with shortcomings and limitations, which I suspect would lead them to laud Dewey’s notion of the essence of morality, without at the same time trying to cure their blights. Hence, the best we can do (which will sometimes be not much)} unless we can teach some of them—i.e., the willing and the able—a
different essence of morality, such that they will be able to consciously and deliberately revise (if not reject) adults’ efforts to assimilate them into their more or less blighted aims and habits. This finding suggests another reason—perhaps the most fundamental of all—why we should abandon Dewey’s philosophy of education, and embrace one derived from Heidegger’s *fundamental ontology*. I articulate such a philosophy in Chapter 5.

**Conclusion**

For the sake of clarity, I will summarize what I have endeavored to say up to this point. Dewey found, with the method of intelligence (or science generally), that *relation* reigns in the physical environment. Since human beings are inextricably bound to it, Dewey inferred that said method could also find that *relation* reigns, or rather that its reign could be duplicated, in the social environment. Dewey made the preservation of *relation*’s reign (or governance) over social life aimed at the expansion of the general welfare the essence of morality. Hence, Dewey made the Aristotelian/Kantian metaphysical tradition (by way of Hegel) the basis of said essence. Heidegger’s correction of Dewey is that Dasein is a fundamentally different entity from other entities found in the physical environment. Dasein is unique, and its uniqueness lies in that the meaning of its being (or of Being in general) is an issue for it. Dasein is the ‘place’ where the meaning of Being is revealed. To dissolve Dasein’s *mineness* and its *Being-in-the-world* in Dewey’s naturalistic neo-Hegelian idealistic flux is to dissolve the boundary that distinguishes it from the world (and from other Daseins), even while Dasein remains in and is of the world. In short, it is to dissolve its uniqueness. Dasein works out the meaning of its being (or of Being in general) through actually existing, which is to say by choosing one particular way to be as opposed to another, and it may choose self-banishment to a barely habitable singlewide trailer outside the city limits.

Dasein is also unique because of its *finitude*. This *existential* is synonymous with the personality blights I have been adducing throughout my exposition. Dewey assumed, or perhaps only hoped, that adults, who are always and already blighted in some degree and fashion, would use the method of intelligence to cure themselves of their non-rational attachments to traditional ways to be, and to teach children how to use it for the sake of improving not only their lot in life,
but more importantly, for the sake of expanding the general welfare. Because of their finitude, I do not expect adults to undertake, let alone to succeed in this difficult, if not impossible task. It is much easier for them to transform Dewey’s essence of morality into a platitude to which all members of a ‘family’ and/or a ‘community’ must conform, thereby affirming the very traditional ways to be that Dewey hoped they would overcome. In their more or less blighted hands, I expect that most adults would transform the notion in question into the ‘past’ with which all children should historicize their future, that it will become their traditional way of interpreting themselves—i.e., as people who necessarily fuse their powers and dispositions with others toward the goal of expanding the general welfare, others’ worship of Moloch notwithstanding. In their more or less blighted hands, I expect that most adults will try to determine children’s possible ways to understand themselves, and thus the possible ways for them to be. In their hands, children would be taught in a manner that is inconsistent with how their brains work. I am afraid I am one of these adults. What makes me different is that I know I am more or less blighted in some way, shape, or form. Hence, my proposal, to which I will soon turn to develop in more detail, is a proposal to teach some children (again, those who are both willing and able) to determine whether or not, and if so the extent to which what I am teaching them is consistent with their evolving sense of self-preservation. By extension, it is a proposal to teach them to judge whether or not, and if so the extent to which the notion in question is an impediment to thinking, feeling, and acting according to their essence, which is to become within the limits imposed by their own finitude and their thrown-ness.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE HEIDEGGERIAN CORRECTION AND PRE-SERVICE TEACHER EDUCATION

At the end of Chapter 1, I summarized my dissertation with the following argument:

1. In Aristotle’s philosophy, the role of the categories is to establish the classes through which all individual entities in the empirical world said ‘to be’—i.e., to exist—may be signified, and therefore known.
2. In Immanuel Kant’s philosophy, the categories are derived from Aristotle’s philosophy, and their role is the same.
3. Relation is one of Aristotle’s and Kant’s categories.
4. Relation is the fundamental category in John Dewey’s notion of the essence of morality, and its role is the same.
5. Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is a correction of Aristotle’s and Kant’s categories.

Therefore, Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is a correction of John Dewey’s notion of the essence of morality.

I devoted Chapter 2 to showing that as far as my research has taken me, no one else has attempted to critique the categorical basis of Dewey’s method of intelligence, and thus of the moral principle which underlies it, which also underlies his philosophy of education; Chapter 3 to establishing the truth of the first four premises; and Chapter 4 to establishing the truth of the 5th one. If I have established the truth of my premises correctly, then it follows I have also established the truth of my conclusion. In this final chapter, I will consider the consequences of what I have called the Heideggerian correction (of Dewey) for pre-service teacher education in the area of moral education, since my highest aspiration is to contribute to this field.

In Chapter 4, I said that moral rules are entities present-at-hand. If we want pre-service teachers to know about the metaphysics of moral rules—i.e., their ultimate foundation (basis),

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653 In using the language of ‘truth’ in this paragraph, I am using the language of logic. It may be more helpful to think of ‘truth’ in terms of plausibility or utility—e.g., a philosophy of teacher education in the area of moral education based on Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is more useful than Dewey’s philosophy of education when the purpose is to affirm the individual student.
which the Scholastics and Descartes identified as God, Kant as the categorical imperative, and Dewey as relation—then we must begin with Being-in-the-world. In other words, we must begin exactly where they are; indeed, this is the only place where we can begin. As I have said, Tradition determines their (and our) understanding of who they are and who they can become. It does this by prescribing ways ‘to be’ in the form of moral rules. Hence, moral education that aspires to educate pre-service teachers about the basis of moral rules consists of presenting them with familiar moral rules. In order to determine how, or in what manner, pre-service teachers understand them, we must help them to interpret said rules. Nietzsche and Heidegger maintained the basis of said rules is self-preservation. Hence, moral education as here described consists of helping pre-service teachers to understand their moral reasoning and the conclusions it produces is an effort to preserve a particular kind of ‘self.’ Moreover, it consists of helping them to understand the kinds of ‘self’ familiar moral rules were created to preserve. Finally, it also consists of helping them to understand the kinds of ‘self’ they could create if they chose to revise, if not to reject, the familiar moral rules created to prescribe who they are and who they can become. With this understanding, pre-service teachers will be able to help their students to engage in moral reasoning. I will now contextualize these considerations within Heidegger’s perspective.

Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time is an analysis of the nature of human existence, which lies along a continuum. On one end, we find inauthenticity, and authenticity on the other. The poles represent the extremes of human existential possibility. All human beings live somewhere in between them. As it turns out, most just happen to live closer to inauthenticity. The reason for this is that Tradition confounds the will when one attempts to move from the inauthentic to the authentic. When a student exists inauthentically, s/he exists without understanding the basis of Tradition, so while s/he may live according to it as a matter of habit, s/he has not chosen to adopt it. When a student exists authentically, on the other hand, s/he understands the basis of Tradition, and can thus choose whether or not to adopt it. This basis is self-preservation—i.e., human beings living a particular kind of life, in a particular place, and at a particular time, created Tradition to secure and perpetuate the conditions that preserved that

654 The Socratic method is well suited for this task.
655 The problem is that science, which in Dewey’s hands was the enemy of Tradition, is now the Tradition. For many scholars within philosophy of education, Dewey is Tradition.
life. Hence, a person exists authentically to the extent that s/he chooses a mode of life that preserves his or her sense of ‘self.’ By engaging in moral reasoning—what I would call a calculus of choosing—the student engages in revaluating the moral rules Tradition has prescribed. In short, the student engages in the work that Heidegger (and Nietzsche) left teachers to do.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger discussed the concept of solicitude, which he placed in the category of care. Solicitude is the type of care shown to other human beings. At its best, education occurs in a relation of care between teachers and students. Thus, we may think of education as a form of solicitude. Teachers may demonstrate it in two ways: a) by leap in for students, or b) by leap ahead of them. I will discuss each one in turn.

When teachers leap in for students, they require students to memorize Tradition’s answers to their moral questions. For example, teachers leap in for students when, if they ask if it is ever moral to kill another human being, they reply, “You shall not kill”, and then require students to regurgitate that answer verbatim on a test to determine whether or not they have ‘learned’ it. Once students comply, teachers distribute grades according to the reproduction’s accuracy, and the cycle begins anew with the next lesson. Such teachers assume the accuracy of students’ reproduction is a proxy for how well they know the moral rule, but they do not. Instead, by leap in for students, teachers ensure that Tradition colonizes the ‘ground’ students are trying to build, that is, teachers prevent students from interpreting the rule, and thus prevent them from understanding it, which they could do if they were shown how to translate it into terms that are consistent with their experiences. By denying students the opportunity to translate and interrogate moral rules, by forbidding them to look for and to discover their basis, and by foreclosing opportunities to judge whether or not they secure and perpetuate the conditions for self-preservation, teachers teach students that Tradition has answered their questions once and for all. Hence, students come to think of moral reasoning as having Tradition’s representatives tell them what constitutes moral ‘truth’, and recalling it verbatim when told to. In short, when teachers leap in for students, they destroy learning.

When teachers leap ahead of their students, on the other hand, they acknowledge and respect the ‘ground’, that is, the moral understanding each student brings into the classroom. By

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656 Friedrich Nietzsche. *On the Genealogy of Morals.*
657 Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* is the model for such a calculus.
virtue of being professionals, of being older and thus of having more experiences, teachers can anticipate the ‘ground’ their students must travel in order to become more authentic. In practice, teachers can present students with moral rules, determine their understanding of them, guide them to interpret and interrogate them, and get out of their way so students themselves may judge whether or not said rules help them to secure and perpetuate the conditions for self-preservation—i.e., the sort of self a particular student wants to become. In leaping ahead of students, teachers intervene in the process of interpretation, but they do not guarantee its results—e.g., the result that students adopt and defend the notion that preserving relation’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is the essence of morality.

Interpretation goes something like this. When faced with a new situation in which a moral judgment must be made, students have to determine whether or not a particular moral rule applies. This is easy if the situation is sufficiently similar to ones they’ve encountered, but difficult if the situation is sufficiently different from them, for students must then determine whether or not, and if so the extent to which the moral rule applies to the given situation. Unfortunately, students cannot interpret it without first knowing the rule’s basis (viz., self-preservation). This basis is precisely what teachers have failed to teach when they require students to merely memorize and regurgitate the rule. Only if students have come to understand this basis as a result of having considered, for instance, whether or not it is ever moral to kill another human being, can they apply the rule correctly. Teachers who prevent students from inquiring into the basis of moral rules encourage students to live inauthentically.

Admittedly, there is nothing easy about this approach to moral education. Students walk into our classrooms with a staggering array of experiences. Thus, we cannot simply legislate moral rules to students who have not themselves come to consider the issues the rule addresses. Students’ individual experiences with moral reasoning must be the basis upon which their moral education rests. Our classrooms are not stations on assembly lines that produce multiple copies of the exact same product, for we do not begin with the same materials. If we are to have citizens capable of critical and independent thought, then there is no other alternative to moral education.

659 My fundamental assumption throughout has been that education is fundamentally about teaching and learning a particular form of morality.
Having read these considerations, you may still be unclear about what my proposal entails in practice. In an effort to illuminate this matter, I will illustrate my proposal with a film and a novel in whose plots Tradition and its prescriptions for moral decision-making are prominent.660

Knocking the Fiddler on the Roof OFF the Roof

Fiddler on the Roof661 is set in Anatevka, a small Jewish shtetl (village) in Tsarist Russia in 1905, circumscribed by a larger Eastern Orthodox population. At the beginning of the film, Tevye, a poor philosophically inclined milkman, tells us that Anatevkans are all fiddlers on the roof,

(T)rying to scratch out a pleasant simple tune without breaking his neck. It isn’t easy. You may ask, ‘Why do we stay up there if it’s so dangerous?’ Well, we stay because Anatevka is our home, (and Tradition is what helps us keep our balance. Because of it,) we have kept our balance for many, many years. Here in Anatevka, we have traditions for everything, how to sleep, how to eat, how to work, how to wear clothes…. You may ask, ‘How did this Tradition get started?’ I’ll tell you. I don’t know, but it’s a tradition, and because of our traditions, every one of us knows who he is, and what God expects him to do.

After Tevye’s introduction, a high camera angle brings us into a town square, buzzing with activity. A song with the following lyrics, sung by baritone and bass-voiced Tevye and the Papas, orchestrates the buzz:

Who, day and night, must scramble for a living,

Feed a wife and children, say his daily prayers?

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661 Norman Jewison, *Fiddler on the Roof*. 

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And who has the right, as master of the house,
To have the final word at home?

In the adjoining chorus, they rejoice in the answer: “The Papa, the Papa! Tradition! The Papa, the Papa! Tradition!” Then it’s Golde’s (Tevye’s wife) and the Mama’s turn to sing Tradition’s praises:

Who must know the way to make a proper home,
A quiet home, a kosher home?
Who must raise the family and run the home,
So Papa's free to read the holy books?

Like the papas, the mamas know the answer, which they sing in concert with them: “The Mama, the Mama! Tradition! The Mama, the Mama! Tradition!” Then it is the sons’ turn:

At three, I started Hebrew school. At ten, I learned a trade.
I hear they've picked a bride for me. I hope she's pretty.

The lyric about arranged marriages introduces the theme upon which the plot turns, which I discuss below. Not to be outdone by those who know the role Tradition has scripted for them, the daughters sing:

And who does Mama teach to mend and tend and fix,
Preparing me to marry whoever Papa picks?

Not surprisingly, they know and sing the answer: “The daughter, the daughter! Tradition! The daughter, the daughter! Tradition!” Then they all join their voices in an exultant strain: “The papas, the mamas, sons, the daughters, Tradition!” After the song and dance is over, Tevye returns to tell us: “Traditions, traditions, without our traditions, our lives would be as shaky as…, as…, as a fiddler on the roof.” The film makes it evident that these traditions have the weight of moral rules.
Indeed, Tradition keeps Anatevkans in their ‘proper’ place. It is held together by an array of safety devices. Yente, the village matchmaker, represents such a device, for her hands cross the seeds of the next generation—Tradition’s standard bearers. Tevye and Golde are too poor to fashion Tzeitel (their eldest daughter) with a dowry, so they cannot afford to be choosy. Yente has chosen Lazar, the town’s 62 year-old widowed but wealthy butcher, to be Tzeitel’s match—an apparently generous offer.

While Yente’s service preserves the status quo, three dangers threaten to topple it: in addition to state-sanctioned pogroms and expulsions, a) Tzeitel wants to marry Motel—a poor tailor she has known since childhood—and thus she threatens to disrupt patriarchy’s practice of giving away daughters as if they were private property; b) the arrival of Perchik, a Marxist revolutionary teacher from Kiev, who falls in love with Hodel, the next-to-oldest daughter, and their decision to marry without Tevye’s permission comes to disrupt the same practice; and c) Chava, who is the middle daughter, wants to marry Fyedka, a Russian peasant, who by definition is a Gentile; their transgression is twofold: they reject Yenta’s service, and thus transgress Tradition’s prescriptions.

The first danger begins to materialize when Tzeitel convinces Motel that “even a poor tailor is entitled to some happiness”. In agreeing with her assertion, and in his subsequent pursuit to realize its consequences, Motel inaugurated a disruption of Tradition’s role for him. His new aspiration launched a series of events that would eventually transgress Tradition’s prescriptions for ‘poor tailors.’

Unsurprisingly, Tzeitel met with Tevye’s resistance when, after he told her about her imminent marriage to Lazar, she said, “Papa, I don’t want to marry him. I can’t marry him, I can’t”. Perplexed by her defiance, Tevye said, “What do you mean you can’t? If I say you will, then you will”. “Papa, if it’s a matter of money, I’ll do anything. I’ll hire myself out as a servant, just….” “We made an agreement, and with us an agreement is an agreement,” he interrupted, shouting, turning, and walking away from her. Pleading with teary eyes and trembling voice, Tzeitel responded, “Is that more important than I am, papa?” While he contemplated an answer, Tzeitel rushed to his side, dropped to her knees as she grabbed the back of his shirt and said, “Papa, don’t force me, please, I’ll be unhappy all my days. I don’t want to marry him”. “Alright, alright”, he said as he slowly turned around and sat down, “I won’t force you”. “Oh, thank you, papa”, she erupted as she lunged in to hug him.
Moments later, Motel rushed in, demanding to speak with Tevye. Stepping outside, Motel told him that they had exchanged pledges to marry each other one year ago. Looking up at the sky to speak with God, Tevye said, “They gave each other a pledge, unheard of, absurd”. After a song and a brief interior monologue in which he engaged in a ‘calculus of choosing’ the ‘right’ thing to do, Tevye decided that Motel’s and Tzeitel’s love was more important than his agreement with Lazar, and thus more important than upholding Tradition.

Of course, Tevye had to justify to Golde his decision to put their love before Tradition. He did so by lying to her about a dream he didn’t have, in which their ancestors—that is, Tradition’s representatives—blessed Motel’s and Tzeitel’s imminent wedding. However, the dream turned into a nightmare when the ghost of Lazar’s wife threatened to kill Tzeitel if Tevye honored his original agreement. When he finished his story, Golde was convinced that Motel must marry Tzeitel. In telling this story, Tevye demonstrates what teachers who leap ahead of students can help them to do: a situation sufficiently different from one to which a moral rule usually applies requires interpreting (or in Tevye’s case, re-interpreting) the rule’s basis in order to nurture a new life. The basis of the implied moral rule, “You shall honor agreements”, is the perpetuation of the institution of arranged marriages, that is, of a particular kind of practice to perpetuate a particular kind of life; Motel’s and Tzeitel’s desire to be bound by love was a new life. Tevye’s re-interpretation of the rule allowed Motel and Tzeitel to nurture their new life together.

On the wedding day—itself the child of Tradition’s breach, Perchik (the Marxist revolutionary teacher) dared to dance with Hodel—high treason indeed, for Tradition required men to dance with men, and women with women. This requirement had been reified in the form of a rope to separate one from the other. In an act of defiance, Perchik crossed the threshold into the women’s side, yanked and threw the rope to the ground, and took Hodel’s hand. On this night, for the first time, and with the rabbi’s blessing, men and women danced together on Anatevkan soil. Apparently, they concluded that their desire to dance together was more important than defending Tradition’s dictates to keep them apart.

On a river’s bank is where the second danger to Anatevkan Tradition began to materialize. While Hodel washed clothes, Perchik taught Shprintze and Bielke (the youngest daughters) a subversive reinterpretation of an Old Testament tale, where Laban fools Jacob into laboring an additional seven years for Rachel. Perchik’s Marxist (and therefore subversive)
reinterpretation is clear: “You can never trust an employer”. It was subversive because it implied a suspicion of authority, the obedience of which Tradition requires. After Golde called Shprintze and Bielke away to chores, Hodel drew near to Perchik to comment on his “interesting” reinterpretation of the tale, and voiced her doubt that the rabbi would agree with it. She objected to his “strange ideas about turning the world upside down”, to which he responded, “You have wit, even a little intelligence, perhaps, but what good is your brain?! Without curiosity it is a rusty tool.” After a brief exchange about Anatevka’s customs and the rapid social change occurring around it, Perchik pulled Hodel into a dance in the absence of parental supervision, thus breaching Tradition. When she thanked him for the dance, she effectively thanked him for helping her “change an old custom”, that is, Tradition. Apparently, dancing alone with Perchik was more important than upholding Tradition’s dictates to prevent it.

Finally, we find the third threat to Anatevkan Tradition on a country road. While walking alone, Chava is harassed by a group of youths. After Fyedka comes to dismiss them, he convinces her to borrow his book, which marks the beginning of their relationship. Later in the film, they fall in love, elope, and thus violate Anatevkan Tradition’s chief taboo: miscegenation. For them, as it was for Motel and Tzeitel, and for Perchik and Hodel, it was more important to uphold their love for each other than to defend Tradition, because the latter existed to keep them apart.

Fiddler on the Roof is a metaphor for the precarious position we try to hold on the steep rooftops of our own ‘Anatevka’. Tradition is what helps us keep our balance, and we want to keep it because ‘Anatevka’ is our home. Tradition buttresses its walls by prescribing routines for “how to sleep, how to eat, how to work, how to wear clothes”—in other words, for which attitudes, values, behaviors, dispositions, emotions, and thoughts are permissible for us to have as papas, mammas, sons, and daughters, or as anything else for that matter. By prescribing the permissible and thus marking the forbidden, Tradition tells each one of us who we are, who or what God is, and what he/she/it/they expect(s) us to do. Yet, like Tevye, many of us do not know Tradition’s basis, which is the same as the moral rules it prescribes. According to Nietzsche, this

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662 Tradition’s greatest threat to learning is that it quells intellectual curiosity.
663 My reference to this film is to illustrate some reasons why people may choose to revise, if not reject Tradition, and to suggest how such revision and/or rejection may be undertaken. It is not an effort to authorize our Tradition, which honors individual choice and marrying for love. Some students taught according to my philosophy of teacher education may reach the conclusion that individual choice should be curtailed in certain instances, and that marrying for money may be justifiable, depending on the circumstances.
isn’t surprising, for our (and Tevye’s) ignorance about its origin is precisely why it remains venerable, unassailable, holy, and true. Tradition is:

A morality, a mode of living tried and proved by long experience and testing, (and) at length (it) enters consciousness as a law, as dominating—And therewith the entire group of related values and states enters into it: it becomes venerable, unassailable, holy, true; it is part of its development that its origin should be forgotten—That is a sign it [Moloch] has become master.664

Tradition’s vaunted venerability, unassailability, holiness, and truth notwithstanding, it begins to crumble when its adherents decide the life it has heretofore preserved must change. Motel and Tzeitel, Perchik and Hodel, and Fyedka and Chava decided their mode of living must change because it prevented their mutual love from flourishing. Tevye also decided that his mode of living must change because adhering to it would have alienated the three daughters he loved so dearly. At the beginning of the film, Tradition kept the fiddler on the roof, that is, it preserved Tevye’s role as patriarch; it kept his daughters in total obedience to him; it kept Motel in the role of a poor tailor destined to be alone and unhappy; it kept Fyedka away from Chava—in short, it kept papas and mamas and sons and daughters playing their proper roles. However, when Tevye and the betrothed decided to put their fiddles down and to step off the roof, that is, when they decided that their traditional mode of living threatened the new life they wanted to live and preserve, they effectively decided to revise (if not reject) Tradition. They rejected Tradition on the basis of self-preservation, and their revision (rejection) was a sign of reclaiming their mastery over it.

Tevye and the betrothed did not reclaim their mastery on a whim. Their choice was the culmination of an often-painful process, which we can see on their faces. Raskolnikov, of Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment, models this process.665 It is to a consideration of this character that I now turn.

I didn’t kill a human being, but a principle.666

664 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Will to Power, Walter Kaufmann and RJ Hollingdale, trans., 277-278.
665 Raskolnikov is the novel’s main character. His career plausibly illustrates the psychological process that leads a person to revise/reject Tradition.
Raskolnikov felt superior to most people, to the point where he felt contempt for them. His attitude towards his landlady exemplifies his attitude towards people in general: he dreaded hearing her “trivial, irrelevant gossip”, and carried an “accumulated bitterness and contempt in (his) heart.”

Dostoyevsky’s description of him during his college years is revealing:

(H)e kept aloof from everyone, went to see no one, and did not welcome anyone who came to see him…. He took no part in the students’ gatherings, amusements, or conversations…. (T)here was a sort of haughty pride and reserve about him, as though he were keeping something to himself. He seemed to some of his comrades to look down upon them all as children, as though he were superior in development, knowledge, and convictions, as though their beliefs and interests were beneath him.

His low opinion of them was matched by his high opinion of himself—a Napoleonic superman, able to leap over tall buildings in pursuit of the Alyona Ivanovnas, that is, of the louses of the world, and to stamp them out. With such powers, only gratitude and glory would be his due.

Raskolnikov tried to kill a moral principle (rule), namely, ‘You shall not kill’, and get away with it, if not receive praise for it. Independence, will power, and genius would have allowed a Napoleonic superman to do it, but not Raskolnikov, at least not as we first find him: destitute and beholden to his mother. In her letter to him, which he read before he tried to kill a ‘principle’, she said:

You know how I love you, you are all we have to look to, Dounia and I, you are our all, our one hope, our one stay. What a grief it was to me when I heard that you had given up the university some months ago, for want of means to keep yourself and that you had lost your lessons and your other work! How could I help you out of my hundred and twenty roubles a year pension? The fifteen roubles I sent you four months ago I borrowed, as you know, on security of my pension….

This letter troubled Raskolnikov, for his mother’s and sister’s plans threatened to keep him dependent upon them. While telling Raskolnikov about Dounia’s shame and suffering on his behalf, she lied to him about having read the letter Dounia wrote to reproach her lecherous boss, which Dounia left with him. The point of the lie was to highlight Dounia’s virtue. Yet in the

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667 Ibid, 9, 10.
668 Ibid, 50.
669 Ibid, 33.
same letter, his mother revealed that Dounia’s virtue did not quell her desire to marry Pyotr Luzhin, a conceited boor who confessed to wanting to marry a poor girl so that she would be completely dependent on him, and thus remain powerless. Apparently, Dounia’s virtue was for sale. However, his mother tried to make it seem as if Dounia decided to marry Pyotr so that he would hire him and thus relieve him of his poverty. Her claim was scarcely credible because Dounia would have been powerless in her marriage. In Raskolnikov’s view, his mother was content to sacrifice Dounia’s so-called virtue for the sake of his financial well-being. Had Raskolnikov approved of Dounia’s sacrifice and of remaining dependent on his mother, he would have approved remaining beholden to two women of whom he had a low opinion. Such a state would hardly qualify him as a Napoleonic superman. Hence, my claim: Raskolnikov’s ability to kill the moral principle (or rule; e.g., ‘You shall not kill’) in question depended on his prior rejection of remaining beholden to his mother and sister. To put it more broadly, when faced with a situation sufficiently different from one to which a moral rule usually applies, a person’s ability to interpret the rule, and thus to change it in order to nurture a new life, depends on his or her prior rejection of remaining beholden to some objectionable aspect of the moral status quo. In Tevye’s case, the ‘prior rejection’ was welcoming Perchik into his home and tolerating his practice of introducing his daughters to unorthodox ideas.

Teachers who want to teach their students according to my proposal can find a lesson here. By virtue of having established trusting relationships with their students, teachers can identify instances in which their students have rejected remaining beholden to some objectionable aspect of the moral status quo. The purpose of identifying these instances is twofold: a) they can help teachers to learn the extent to which students are capable of engaging in this sort of rejection; and b) these instances represent a ground of their own, that is, a basis for understanding how to reject remaining beholden to other objectionable aspects of the moral status quo. Having fulfilled this twofold purpose, teachers’ prospects for helping students with the process of interpreting moral rules improve.

I have acknowledged one reason why my proposal may be difficult to accept—viz., it requires teachers to treat and respect students as individuals—i.e., as constituted by mineness and Being-in-the-world. Here, I acknowledge another one: it could be dangerous. Some may consider

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670 Ibid, 44.
671 “Oh, how I … hate them all.” Ibid, 196.
that teachers who help students to revise moral rules for the sake of nurturing a new life are immoral. Prudence may help avert the danger. Raskolnikov understood this. While thinking about the murder while walking on the street, he was wearing a:

… (T)all round hat … completely worn out, rusty with age, all torn and bespattered, brimless and bent on one side in a most unseemly fashion (which had drawn the attention of someone who may have otherwise been a witness to his crime). Why, a stupid thing like this, the most trivial detail might spoil the whole plan. Yes, my hat is too noticeable…. Nobody wears such a hat, it would be noticed a mile off, it would be remembered…. What matters is that people would remember it, and that would give them a clue. For this business one should be as little conspicuous as possible…. Trifles, trifles are what matter! Why, it’s just such trifles that always ruin everything.672

My proposal requires us to refuse wearing such conspicuous hats when caution is warranted by circumstances. It may require us to make a noose and sew it under our overcoat, so the axe it will hold—our murderous teaching method, will go unnoticed.673 Rather than risk bearing a scarlet ‘C’ (for ‘criminal’) on our chest, I am proposing that, if circumstances warrant caution, we climb up a “back staircase, dark and narrow,”674 on our way to helping our students commit ‘murder’ (of a principle, of course). If we are stopped and questioned, we can say that we are teaching students how to do the right thing.675

Despite his heroic efforts to kill a moral rule, Raskolnikov was less than heroic.676 He was racked by despair, guilt, doubt, anxiety, and ambivalence about choosing between competing options because he could not know their consequences in advance—indeed, he was a 19th century Russian Hamlet. We should expect this when Raskolnikov sits in our classroom and tries to revise (or reject) moral rules for the sake of nurturing a new life. I admit such psychology

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672 Ibid, 10-11.
673 I don’t want to suggest that living authentically amounts to living inauthentically, but rather that living authentically is a ‘more or less’ proposition—i.e., it is a matter of degree, a little more ‘here’, and a little less ‘there’. In other words, living authentically is never an absolute state or destination, at least not beyond a moment abstracted and isolated from the flux that is human existence. Living authentically requires being sensitive to what may or may not be possible in a given set of circumstances, which is not synonymous with cowering to them. Rather, living authentically demands that Dasein rely on its power of judgment to decide how to maximize its options ‘to be’, which are more or less limited by circumstances. Since Dasein’s power of judgment is limited, deciding how to maximize said options is guesswork, more or less.
674 Ibid, 11.
675 Please keep in mind that my proposal is a philosophy of teacher education. Hence, I leave it up to individual teachers’ best judgment as to how to make my proposal developmentally appropriate.
676 A Heideggerian interpretation of a ‘hero’ would remind us that Superman, for example, is always less than super when pricked with kryptonite. Even Superman is beset by his thrown-ness.
adds difficulties to our work, but like I have said, there’s no other alternative to moral education. We are involved in difficult work. While exploring the social ramifications of my proposal is beyond the scope of my dissertation, I ask you to imagine how it could help students to change modes of living they no longer find tenable.

Conclusion

To hold that the essence of morality is preserving relation’s metaphysical primacy in the necessary governance of social life aimed at expanding the general welfare is excessively optimistic. It is so because Dasein is irredeemably constituted by finitude, which means that it is more or less egocentric, dreaded, despairing, disillusioned, diseased, impotent, ignorant, ambivalent, and afraid to be insecure. As Dasein, teachers more or less conform to the educational system because it allows them to purchase various degrees of safety: from hunger (food); from thirst (water); from physical vulnerability (clothing, shelter, climate control); from immobility (transportation); from isolation (communication); from ignorance (education); from illness (health care services); from monotony (recreation); from destitution in old age (retirement); and from sundry other banes. With their varying degrees of egocentrism, dread, despair, disillusionment, disease, impotence, ignorance, ambivalence, and fear, teachers more or less explicitly engage in the business of teaching children the ‘right thing to do’—in a word, morality. As Dasein, their students will also be more or less affected by such infirmities. My proposal for pre-service teacher education in the area of moral education, therefore, is a proposal for teachers variously affected by such infirmities, to teach students moral reasoning in the manner I have described in this chapter, which is a manner that must be tailored to students’ unique configurations of their own infirmities.

A brief word before finally parting: if you think my proposal is dismal, I say it is honest. It is honest because it is an attempt, however imperfect, to give an accurate account of teachers and students as they are, not as we hope they would be. Finally, it is an invitation to think of moral education, not as a vain attempt to forever efface the infirmities in question, but is rather an attempt to teach individual children how to seek authenticity within the insurmountable obstacles and opportunities afforded by their humanity.
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

My name is Haroldo Abraam Fontaine. I was born in Santiago de Cuba, Cuba on June 27<sup>th</sup>, 1974. Thanks to a Puerto Rican man vacationing in Cuba agreeing to marry my mother for political reasons, we left the island on April 20<sup>th</sup>, 1982, for Miami, FL. We made West Palm Beach our home on August 9<sup>th</sup>, 1982. That is where I attended elementary school (from the 3<sup>rd</sup> grade onward), middle school, high school, and community college. I graduated from Florida State University with a B.A. in International Affairs in 1997, and an M.A. in Humanities in 2005. I chose to critique Dewey from Heidegger’s perspective because I’ve never been an optimist, let alone an excessive one, and I have always felt alone. Every day of my life I hear the Reaper’s blade whizzing inches behind me, yet while I live in this dreadful state, I am compelled to choose. Heidegger has helped me to choose intelligently, which is to say according to the principle of self-preservation, as long as there is a self to preserve. Throughout my life, sundry times have adults and teachers pointed to the speck of sawdust in my eye, while ignoring the log in theirs. In addition to Mickey, Jeff, and Madeline, I dedicate this dissertation to teachers who value teaching their students (the able and the willing, that is) to see the logs in others’ eyes, and to students who have grown weary of poxed adults and teachers who insist their blighted way is the only way.