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Biased Contests For Symmetric Players
Title
Biased Contests For Symmetric Players.
Creator
Drugov, Mikhail, Ryvkin, Dmitry
Abstract/Description
In a biased contest, one of the players has an advantage in the winner determination process. We characterize a novel class of biased contest success functions pertaining to such contests and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for zero bias to be a critical point of arbitrary objectives satisfying certain symmetry restrictions. We, however, challenge the common wisdom that unbiased contests are always optimal when contestants are symmetric ex ante or even ex post. We show that...
Show moreIn a biased contest, one of the players has an advantage in the winner determination process. We characterize a novel class of biased contest success functions pertaining to such contests and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for zero bias to be a critical point of arbitrary objectives satisfying certain symmetry restrictions. We, however, challenge the common wisdom that unbiased contests are always optimal when contestants are symmetric ex ante or even ex post. We show that contests with arbitrary favorites, i.e., biased contests of symmetric players, can be optimal in terms of various objectives such as expected aggregate effort, the probability to reveal the stronger player as the winner or expected effort of the winner. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Date Issued
2017-05
Identifier
FSU_libsubv1_wos_000404821700008, 10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.003
Format
Citation
Competition in a Posted-Salary Matching Market under Private Information
Title
Competition in a Posted-Salary Matching Market under Private Information.
Creator
Boosey, Luke A.
Abstract/Description
We study a posted-salary labor market in which firms engage in salary competition. Firms' preferences over workers are private information, creating uncertainty about competitive pressure for different workers. We consider a baseline 2-firm, 2-worker model, then extend the analysis to larger markets by replicating the baseline. We characterize the unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, in which each firm type chooses a distributional strategy with interval support in the salary space. The main...
Show moreWe study a posted-salary labor market in which firms engage in salary competition. Firms' preferences over workers are private information, creating uncertainty about competitive pressure for different workers. We consider a baseline 2-firm, 2-worker model, then extend the analysis to larger markets by replicating the baseline. We characterize the unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, in which each firm type chooses a distributional strategy with interval support in the salary space. The main result shows that competition is localized, in the sense that firm types with a common most preferred worker choose non-overlapping, adjacent supports. We also provide numerical results to show that the equilibrium strategies in finite replicated markets converge to the corresponding equilibrium strategies in a market with a continuum of firms and workers.
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Date Issued
2016-06
Identifier
FSU_libsubv1_wos_000387177600007, 10.1515/bejte-2015-0022
Format
Citation
Contests with Group Size Uncertainty
Title
Contests with Group Size Uncertainty: Experimental Evidence.
Creator
Boosey, Luke, Brookins, Philip, Ryvkin, Dmitry
Abstract/Description
In many contest situations, the number of participants is not observable at the time of investment. We design a laboratory experiment to study individual behavior in Tullock (lottery) contests with group size uncertainty. There is a fixed pool of n potential players, each with independent probability of participating. We independently manipulate each of the parameters and test the implied comparative statics predictions. Our results provide considerable support for the theory, both in terms...
Show moreIn many contest situations, the number of participants is not observable at the time of investment. We design a laboratory experiment to study individual behavior in Tullock (lottery) contests with group size uncertainty. There is a fixed pool of n potential players, each with independent probability of participating. We independently manipulate each of the parameters and test the implied comparative statics predictions. Our results provide considerable support for the theory, both in terms of comparative statics and point predictions. Most surprisingly, we find no evidence of overbidding in treatments where there is a nontrivial probability that group size is one. This stands in stark contrast to the robust overbidding observed in experimental contests with deterministic group size. We propose a one-parameter model that incorporates nonlinear probability weighting and a modified version of joy of winning, which we call Constant Winning Aspirations (CWA), and show that it neatly organizes all of our results.
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Date Issued
2017-09-01
Identifier
FSU_libsubv1_scholarship_submission_1521483114_187c882f, 10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.008
Format
Citation
Experimental Study Of Democracy Breakdown, Income And Inequality
Title
An Experimental Study Of Democracy Breakdown, Income And Inequality.
Creator
Ryvkin, Dmitry, Semykina, Anastasia
Abstract/Description
Many empirical studies investigate the relationships between economic development, inequality, and democracy survival; however, establishing causal links with naturally occurring cross-country data is problematic. We address this question in a laboratory experiment, where in democracy citizens can invest in profitable projects and vote on income taxation. In the alternative regime-autocracy-efficient investment levels and equitable redistribution are implemented exogenously, but there is a...
Show moreMany empirical studies investigate the relationships between economic development, inequality, and democracy survival; however, establishing causal links with naturally occurring cross-country data is problematic. We address this question in a laboratory experiment, where in democracy citizens can invest in profitable projects and vote on income taxation. In the alternative regime-autocracy-efficient investment levels and equitable redistribution are implemented exogenously, but there is a risk of resources being partially expropriated. Citizens can voluntarily switch from democracy to autocracy by a majority vote, which mimics recent historical examples, where voters voluntarily delegate political powers to an autocrat in exchange for a promise of high taxation and redistribution. We find that the likelihood of democracy breakdown increases with the degree of inequality but does not vary with productivity. The link between productivity and democracy survival depends critically on the degree of sophistication of the median voter.
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Date Issued
2017-06
Identifier
FSU_libsubv1_wos_000401066400006, 10.1007/s10683-016-9490-3
Format
Citation
I Paid A Bribe
Title
I Paid A Bribe: An Experiment On Information Sharing And Extortionary Corruption.
Creator
Ryvkin, Dmitry, Serra, Danila, Tremewan, James
Abstract/Description
Theoretical and empirical research on corruption has flourished in the last three decades; however, identifying successful anti-corruption policies remains a challenge. In this paper we ask whether bottom-up institutions that rely on voluntary and anonymous reports of bribe demands, such as the I paid a bribe website first launched in India in 2010, could act as effective anti-corruption tools, and, if this is the case, whether and how their effectiveness could be improved. We overcome...
Show moreTheoretical and empirical research on corruption has flourished in the last three decades; however, identifying successful anti-corruption policies remains a challenge. In this paper we ask whether bottom-up institutions that rely on voluntary and anonymous reports of bribe demands, such as the I paid a bribe website first launched in India in 2010, could act as effective anti-corruption tools, and, if this is the case, whether and how their effectiveness could be improved. We overcome measurement and identification problems by addressing our research questions in the laboratory. Our results show that the presence of a reporting platform like the I paid a bribe website may be insufficient to systematically lower bribery. A more effective platform is one where posts disclose specific information about the size of the bribes and the location of their requestors, i.e., a platform that could serve as a search engine for the least corrupt officials, especially if posting is restricted to service recipients. Our results also show that while citizens rarely post false information, lying by officials, when allowed to post on the platform, is widespread. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Date Issued
2017-05
Identifier
FSU_libsubv1_wos_000401207500001, 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.02.003
Format
Citation
Immigrant assimilation and male labor market inequality
Title
Immigrant Assimilation And Male Labor Market Inequality.
Creator
Mason, Patrick L.
Abstract/Description
At the height of the US civil rights movement in the mid-1960s, foreign-born persons were less than 1 % of the African-American population (Kent, Popul Bull, 62:4, 2007). Today, 16 % of America's African diaspora workforce consists of first-or second-generation immigrants and 4 % is Hispanic. Intergenerational improvement is an important source of wage convergence of black immigrants. Unskilled immigrants who arrive in the USA as children and adolescents experience substantial wage...
Show moreAt the height of the US civil rights movement in the mid-1960s, foreign-born persons were less than 1 % of the African-American population (Kent, Popul Bull, 62:4, 2007). Today, 16 % of America's African diaspora workforce consists of first-or second-generation immigrants and 4 % is Hispanic. Intergenerational improvement is an important source of wage convergence of black immigrants. Unskilled immigrants who arrive in the USA as children and adolescents experience substantial wage assimilation, especially Caribbean-English and African-English immigrants. But both unskilled immigrants arriving as adults and all skilled immigrants fail to catch up to the wage status of either native-born whites or native-born African-Americans. After living in the USA for 9-15 years, first-generation black immigrants will have wage penalties at least as large as native-born African-Americans. The immigration process selects black immigrants who have or who would have achieved middle income or higher status in their country of origin. As such, black immigrants tend to have above average observable characteristics. Nevertheless, black immigrants do not obtain wage assimilation equal to native-born non-Hispanic white male workers.
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Date Issued
2016-09-12
Identifier
FSU_libsubv1_wos_000388131300001, 10.1186/s40176-016-0065-z
Format
Citation
In Wrong Anticipation - Miscalibrated Beliefs between Germans, Israelis, and Palestinians
Title
In Wrong Anticipation - Miscalibrated Beliefs Between Germans, Israelis, And Palestinians.
Creator
Goerg, Sebastian J., Hennig-Schmidt, Heike, Walkowitz, Gari, Winter, Eyal
Abstract/Description
The reconcilability of actions and beliefs in inter-country relationships, either in business or politics, is of vital importance as incorrect beliefs on foreigners' behavior can have serious implications. We study a typical inter-country interaction by means of a controlled laboratory investment game experiment in Germany, Israel and Palestine involving 400 student participants in total. An investor has to take a risky decision in a foreign country that involves transferring money to an...
Show moreThe reconcilability of actions and beliefs in inter-country relationships, either in business or politics, is of vital importance as incorrect beliefs on foreigners' behavior can have serious implications. We study a typical inter-country interaction by means of a controlled laboratory investment game experiment in Germany, Israel and Palestine involving 400 student participants in total. An investor has to take a risky decision in a foreign country that involves transferring money to an investee/allocator. We found a notable constellation of calibrated and un-calibrated beliefs. Within each country, transfer standards exist, which investees correctly anticipate within their country. However, across countries these standards differ. By attributing the standard of their own environment to the other countries investees are remarkably bad in predicting foreign investors' behavior. The tendency to ignore this potential difference can be a source of misinterpreting motives in cross-country interaction. Foreigners might perceive behavior as unfavorable or favorable differentiation, even thoughunknown to them-investors actually treat fellow-country people and foreigners alike.
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Date Issued
2016-06-16
Identifier
FSU_libsubv1_wos_000378029800025, 10.1371/journal.pone.0156998
Format
Citation
Silence is Golden
Title
Silence is Golden: Team Problem Solving and Communication Costs.
Creator
Charness, Gary, Cooper, David, Grossman, Zachary
Abstract/Description
Numerous experimental studies have found that teams outperform individuals on intellective problems by a large degree. This result is intuitively appealing, as teams can benefit from sharing insights. However, much of this literature considers a task that involves a single clear insight. We instead analyze experiments comparing the performance of individuals and teams of four subjects at solving a series of challenging logic puzzles, where the solution involves a series of incremental steps....
Show moreNumerous experimental studies have found that teams outperform individuals on intellective problems by a large degree. This result is intuitively appealing, as teams can benefit from sharing insights. However, much of this literature considers a task that involves a single clear insight. We instead analyze experiments comparing the performance of individuals and teams of four subjects at solving a series of challenging logic puzzles, where the solution involves a series of incremental steps. Contrary to the existing literature, team performance is statistically indistinguishable from that of individuals when there is no cost to sending a message. Frictions resulting from both congestion and incorrect suggestions substantially derail the solution process for teams. If we impose a very small cost of communication on teams, the performance of teams improves. Underlying these results is a robust negative relationship between frequency of communication and team performance. Using a straightforward prediction exercise, we show that performance would have improved dramatically if the best member of each team had been asked to solve the puzzles alone rather than forming a team.
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Date Issued
2018-01-26
Identifier
FSU_libsubv1_scholarship_submission_1516997564_26bd399d
Format
Citation