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(1 - 10 of 10)
- Title
- 'determinism' Is Just Fine: A Reply To Scott Sehon.
- Creator
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De Marco, Gabriel
- Abstract/Description
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Scott Sehon recently argued that the standard notion of determinism employed in the Consequence Argument makes it so that, if our world turns out to be deterministic, then an interventionist God is logically impossible. He further argues that because of this, we should revise our notion of determinism. In this paper I show that Sehon's argument for the claim that the truth of determinism, in this sense, would make an interventionist God logically impossible ultimately fails. I then offer and...
Show moreScott Sehon recently argued that the standard notion of determinism employed in the Consequence Argument makes it so that, if our world turns out to be deterministic, then an interventionist God is logically impossible. He further argues that because of this, we should revise our notion of determinism. In this paper I show that Sehon's argument for the claim that the truth of determinism, in this sense, would make an interventionist God logically impossible ultimately fails. I then offer and respond to a weaker version of the argument for the claim that we should revise our notion of determinism.
Show less - Date Issued
- 2016-06
- Identifier
- FSU_libsubv1_wos_000384551600015, 10.1007/s11406-016-9712-0
- Format
- Citation
- Title
- Causal Network Accounts of Ill-being: Depression & Digital Well-being.
- Creator
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Byrd, Nick
- Abstract/Description
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Depression is a common and devastating instance of ill-being which deserves an account. Moreover, the ill-being of depression is impacted by digital technology: some uses of digital technology increase such ill-being while other uses of digital technology increase well-being. So a good account of ill-being would explicate the antecedents of depressive symptoms and their relief, digitally and otherwise. This paper borrows a causal network account of well-being and applies it to ill-being,...
Show moreDepression is a common and devastating instance of ill-being which deserves an account. Moreover, the ill-being of depression is impacted by digital technology: some uses of digital technology increase such ill-being while other uses of digital technology increase well-being. So a good account of ill-being would explicate the antecedents of depressive symptoms and their relief, digitally and otherwise. This paper borrows a causal network account of well-being and applies it to ill-being, particularly depression. Causal networks are found to provide a principled, coherent, intuitively plausible, and empirically adequate account of cases of depression in everyday and digital contexts. Causal network accounts of illbeing also offer philosophical, scientific, and practical utility. Insofar as other accounts of ill-being cannot offer these advantages, we should prefer causal network accounts of ill-being.
Show less - Date Issued
- 2020
- Identifier
- FSU_libsubv1_scholarship_submission_1583266427_1eac7adf, TBD
- Format
- Citation
- Title
- Equality Of Authority As The Aristotelian Common Good.
- Creator
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LeBar, Mark
- Identifier
- FSU_libsubv1_wos_000553759300002, 10.1007/s10790-020-09758-x
- Format
- Citation
- Title
- Korsgaard's Arguments For The Value Of Humanity.
- Creator
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Bukoski, Michael
- Date Issued
- 2018-04
- Identifier
- FSU_libsubv1_wos_000428148300002, 10.1215/00318108-4326604
- Format
- Citation
- Title
- Moral Responsibility, Authenticity, And Ownership.
- Creator
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Flummer, Matthew T.
- Date Issued
- 2016-09
- Identifier
- FSU_libsubv1_wos_000382403800002, 10.1007/s10790-015-9534-5
- Format
- Citation
- Title
- Quantum-like Behavior Without Quantum Physics I.
- Creator
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Selesnick, S. A., Rawling, J. P., Piccinini, Gualtiero
- Abstract/Description
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Recently there has been much interest in the possible quantum-like behavior of the human brain in such functions as cognition, the mental lexicon, memory, etc., producing a vast literature. These studies are both empirical and theoretical, the tenets of the theory in question being mainly, and apparently inevitably, those of quantum physics itself, for lack of other arenas in which quantum-like properties are presumed to obtain. However, attempts to explain this behavior on the basis of...
Show moreRecently there has been much interest in the possible quantum-like behavior of the human brain in such functions as cognition, the mental lexicon, memory, etc., producing a vast literature. These studies are both empirical and theoretical, the tenets of the theory in question being mainly, and apparently inevitably, those of quantum physics itself, for lack of other arenas in which quantum-like properties are presumed to obtain. However, attempts to explain this behavior on the basis of actual quantum physics going on at the atomic or molecular level within some element of brain or neuronal anatomy (other than the ordinary quantum physics that underlies everything), do not seem to survive much scrutiny. Moreover, it has been found empirically that the usual physics-like Hilbert space model seems not to apply in detail to human cognition in the large. In this paper we lay the groundwork for a theory that might explain the provenance of quantum-like behavior in complex systems whose internal structure is essentially hidden or inaccessible. The approach is via the logic obeyed by these systems which is similar to, but not identical with, the logic obeyed by actual quantum systems. The results reveal certain effects in such systems which, though quantum-like, are not identical to the kinds of quantum effects found in physics. These effects increase with the size of the system.
Show less - Date Issued
- 2017-09
- Identifier
- FSU_libsubv1_wos_000408372500007, 10.1007/s10867-017-9460-9
- Format
- Citation
- Title
- Quantum-like behavior without quantum physics I: Kinematics of neural-like systems..
- Creator
-
Selesnick, S A, Rawling, J P, Piccinini, Gualtiero
- Abstract/Description
-
Recently there has been much interest in the possible quantum-like behavior of the human brain in such functions as cognition, the mental lexicon, memory, etc., producing a vast literature. These studies are both empirical and theoretical, the tenets of the theory in question being mainly, and apparently inevitably, those of quantum physics itself, for lack of other arenas in which quantum-like properties are presumed to obtain. However, attempts to explain this behavior on the basis of...
Show moreRecently there has been much interest in the possible quantum-like behavior of the human brain in such functions as cognition, the mental lexicon, memory, etc., producing a vast literature. These studies are both empirical and theoretical, the tenets of the theory in question being mainly, and apparently inevitably, those of quantum physics itself, for lack of other arenas in which quantum-like properties are presumed to obtain. However, attempts to explain this behavior on the basis of actual quantum physics going on at the atomic or molecular level within some element of brain or neuronal anatomy (other than the ordinary quantum physics that underlies everything), do not seem to survive much scrutiny. Moreover, it has been found empirically that the usual physics-like Hilbert space model seems not to apply in detail to human cognition in the large. In this paper we lay the groundwork for a theory that might explain the provenance of quantum-like behavior in complex systems whose internal structure is essentially hidden or inaccessible. The approach is via the logic obeyed by these systems which is similar to, but not identical with, the logic obeyed by actual quantum systems. The results reveal certain effects in such systems which, though quantum-like, are not identical to the kinds of quantum effects found in physics. These effects increase with the size of the system.
Show less - Date Issued
- 2017-09-01
- Identifier
- FSU_pmch_28707197, 10.1007/s10867-017-9460-9, PMC6104899, 28707197, 28707197, 10.1007/s10867-017-9460-9
- Format
- Citation
- Title
- Rescuing The Zygote Argument.
- Creator
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De Marco, Gabriel
- Abstract/Description
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In a recent paper, Kristin Mickelson argues that Alfred Mele's Zygote Argument, a popular argument for the claim that the truth of determinism would preclude free action or moral responsibility, is not valid. This sort of objection is meant to generalize to various manipulation arguments. According to Mickelson, the only way to make such arguments valid is to supplement them with an argument that is an inference to the best explanation. In this paper, I argue that there are two other ways in...
Show moreIn a recent paper, Kristin Mickelson argues that Alfred Mele's Zygote Argument, a popular argument for the claim that the truth of determinism would preclude free action or moral responsibility, is not valid. This sort of objection is meant to generalize to various manipulation arguments. According to Mickelson, the only way to make such arguments valid is to supplement them with an argument that is an inference to the best explanation. In this paper, I argue that there are two other ways in which the proponent of such manipulation arguments can modify their argument, neither of which requires an inference to the best explanation. I then briefly consider and respond to a worry with one of these proposed solutions.
Show less - Date Issued
- 2016-06
- Identifier
- FSU_libsubv1_wos_000376271100011, 10.1007/s11098-015-0571-5
- Format
- Citation
- Title
- Self-knowledge And Its Limits.
- Creator
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Schwenkler, John
- Abstract/Description
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A philosophical account of self-knowledge should offer more than an epistemological explanation of first-personal privilege. It should also address the many cases where the first-person perspective is not so privileged, and account for the importance of self-knowledge to a person's social and psychological well-being. Quassim Cassam's Self-Knowledge for Humans and John Doris's Talking to Our Selves both emphasize the importance of these latter tasks, but neither author is wholly successful:...
Show moreA philosophical account of self-knowledge should offer more than an epistemological explanation of first-personal privilege. It should also address the many cases where the first-person perspective is not so privileged, and account for the importance of self-knowledge to a person's social and psychological well-being. Quassim Cassam's Self-Knowledge for Humans and John Doris's Talking to Our Selves both emphasize the importance of these latter tasks, but neither author is wholly successful: Cassam's argument rests on a gross distortion of the "Rationalist" picture he sets up as a foil, and Doris's on a skeptical argument that stands in some questionable company.
Show less - Date Issued
- 2018
- Identifier
- FSU_libsubv1_wos_000424088200005, 10.1163/17455243-01501005
- Format
- Citation
- Title
- What We Can (And Can't) Infer About Implicit Bias From Debiasing Experiments.
- Creator
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Byrd, Nick
- Abstract/Description
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The received view of implicit bias holds that it is associative and unreflective. Recently, the received view has been challenged. Some argue that implicit bias is not predicated on “any” associative process, but it is unreflective. These arguments rely, in part, on debiasing experiments. They proceed as follows. If implicit bias is associative and unreflective, then certain experimental manipulations cannot change implicitly biased behavior. However, these manipulations can change such...
Show moreThe received view of implicit bias holds that it is associative and unreflective. Recently, the received view has been challenged. Some argue that implicit bias is not predicated on “any” associative process, but it is unreflective. These arguments rely, in part, on debiasing experiments. They proceed as follows. If implicit bias is associative and unreflective, then certain experimental manipulations cannot change implicitly biased behavior. However, these manipulations can change such behavior. So, implicit bias is not associative and unreflective. This paper finds philosophical and empirical problems with that argument. When the problems are solved, the conclusion is not quite right: implicit bias is not necessarily unreflective, but it seems to be associative. Further, the paper shows that even if legitimate non-associative interventions on implicit bias exist, then both the received view and its recent contender would be false. In their stead would be interactionism or minimalism about implicit bias.
Show less - Date Issued
- 2019
- Identifier
- FSU_libsubv1_scholarship_submission_1583266715_b56f8ace, 10.1007/s11229-019-02128-6
- Format
- Citation
